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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the class dynamics, politics, and ideology of food sovereignty in Mexico 
and Ecuador. It argues that engagement with class dynamics within the Via Campesina, the 
world’s preeminent transnational agrarian movement struggling for food sovereignty, is 
essential for the construction of ‘unity in diversity’ necessary to challenge the neoliberal 
food regime. It interrogates the claim made by the movement and its proponents of a 
‘unified people of the land’ to show that the food sovereignty project currently under-
represents rural labour and producers of cash crops. It also shows that struggles of the 
landed peasantry for autonomy from and within the market can successfully resist the 
accelerated forces of proletarianisation, dispossession and immiseration that characterise 
much of the rural South in the neoliberal era. Autonomous struggles are the foundation of 
peasant production and reproduction strategies in Mexico and Ecuador today and are the 
basis from which food sovereignty’s productive, political and ideological alternatives to 
neoliberalism must be developed.  However, state-peasant movement relations are central 
to the construction of counter-hegemony. So too are peasant organisations’ internal 
structures, their modes of representation between leaders and bases, and alliance building 
and conflict with other subaltern groups. These factors are critical in determining whether, 
and to what extent, the food sovereignty movement is able to transform neoliberal food 
and agricultural policies in favour of sustainable, small-scale peasant production guided by 
concerns for social and environmental justice rather than those of capital accumulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Contents 
 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 10 
Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 22 
Chapter 1. From Agrarian Reform to Food Sovereignty: CIOAC, FENOCIN and Peasant 
Movements in Mexico and Ecuador  .................................................................................... 28 
1.1 Mexico’s agrarian reform  ................................................................................... 29 
1.2 Ecuador’s agrarian reform  ................................................................................. 33 
1.3 The scaling back of agrarian reform in Mexico  .................................................. 42 
1.4 The scaling back of agrarian reform in Ecuador ................................................. 48 
1.5 Neoliberalism and the rise of food sovereignty .................................................. 51 
Chapter 2. A Class Based Analysis of Food Sovereignty ................................................... 64 
 2.1 Class and the food sovereignty movement ........................................................ 64 
 2.2 Interpreting class in the food sovereignty movement ....................................... 68 
 2.3 Class origins and shifting class bases of CIOAC and FENOCIN ............................ 70 
 2.4 CIOAC’s class origins ........................................................................................... 71 
 2.5 CIOAC in the mountains of Guerrero .................................................................. 73 
 2.6 CIOAC in Chiapas ................................................................................................. 78 
 2.7 CIOAC and food sovereignty  .............................................................................. 83 
2.8 FENOCIN on the Ecuadorian coast and Andes .................................................... 86 
 2.9 FENOCIN’s diverging class base from the land reform era ................................. 87 
 2.10 FENOCIN and food sovereignty ......................................................................... 93 
 2.11 Class representation within CIOAC and FENOCIN ............................................ 96 
2.12 CIOAC, FENOCIN and the Via Campesina: Class bases, collaboration and 
conflict .................................................................................................................... 101 
 2.13 Concluding comments .................................................................................... 106 
Chapter 3. Autonomy and the Market: Peasant Production and Reproduction Strategies 
under Neoliberalism  ................................................................................................... 110 
 3.1 Peasant autonomy ............................................................................................ 110 
5 
 
 3.2 Land as autonomy ............................................................................................. 112 
 3.3 Property relations and autonomy ..................................................................... 115 
 3.4 Historical dynamics of coffee and cacao sectors in Mexico and Ecuador ........ 117 
 3.5 The struggle for autonomy of CIOAC’s coffee producers ................................. 121 
 3.6 The struggles for autonomy of FENOCIN’s cacao producers  ........................... 132 
 3.7 The search for alternatives in the neoliberal era .............................................. 136 
 3.8 Struggles for autonomy in the neoliberal era ................................................... 141 
 3.9 Cash crops and food sovereignty ...................................................................... 152 
 3.10 TNE-producer relations in Mexico and Ecuador’s coffee and cacao sectors .. 156 
 3.11 Longer-term projections ................................................................................. 165 
 3.12 Concluding comments .................................................................................... 172 
Chapter 4. Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony, and the Politics of Food Sovereignty .......... 174 
 4.1 The state and hegemony .................................................................................. 176 
4.2 Neoliberal transition and state-peasant movement relations in Mexico and 
Ecuador ................................................................................................................... 178 
4.3 The food sovereignty movement in Mexico and Ecuador: A counter-hegemonic 
movement?  ............................................................................................................ 186 
4.4 Organisational structures and counter-hegemony in Mexico’s food sovereignty 
movement ............................................................................................................... 188 
4.5 ‘El Campo No Aguanta Mas’.............................................................................. 200 
4.6 Organisational structures and counter-hegemony in Ecuador’s food sovereignty 
movement ............................................................................................................... 210 
4.7 Correa’s ‘agrarian debt’: Bypassing social movements .................................... 224 
4.8 Concluding comments ...................................................................................... 233 
Chapter 5. Conclusion.................................................................................................. 239 
References  ................................................................................................................. 258 
Appendix 1. Interview Template for Production and Reproduction Strategies ............... 274 
Appendix 2. Interview Template for Political and Social Issues ..................................... 276 
6 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. Total number of hectares legalised and total number of beneficiaries annually in 
Ecuador under agrarian reform ............................................................................................. 39 
Figure 2. Annual surface area legalised and average number of beneficiaries per year from 
colonisation in Ecuador .......................................................................................................... 49 
Figure 3. Total volume of corn and wheat imported by Mexico 1985-2010 ......................... 53 
Figure 4. Total volume of corn and wheat imported by Ecuador 1985-2010 ........................ 54 
Figure 5. Total annual production volume (metric tonnes) of barley, wheat and 
cauliflower/broccoli in Ecuador 1980-2012  .......................................................................... 59 
Figure 6. Annual production volume (metric tonnes) of coffee and tomatoes in Mexico 
1980-2012  ............................................................................................................................. 59 
Figure 7. World coffee and cacao prices per kilo in US dollars (nominal) 1960-2013 ......... 137 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Food Security vs. Food Sovereignty ......................................................................... 13 
Table 2. Goals and accomplishments of agrarian reform and colonisation projects in 
Ecuador 1964-1969  ............................................................................................................... 37 
Table 3. Land holdings and area owned for the peasant (community and ejido), private and 
mixed sectors ......................................................................................................................... 47 
Table 4. Area of landholdings and producer numbers in Northern and Southern States of 
Mexico  ................................................................................................................................... 47 
Table 5. Structure of land tenancy in Ecuador ....................................................................... 61 
 
 
7 
 
Acronyms 
AACH - Asociación Artesanal de Chucaple 
AMSA - Agroindustrias Unidas de México 
ANEC - Asociación Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras 
AP - Alianza País 
ASOCODE - Asociación de Organizaciones Campesinas de Centroamérica para la 
Cooperación y el Desarrollo 
CAP - Congreso Agrario Permanente 
CCI - Central Campesina Independiente 
CIOAC - Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos 
CAN  - Coordinadora Agraria Nacional 
CCC - Central Campesina Cardenista  
CNC - Confederación Nacional Campesina 
CNC-EA -Confederación Nacional Campesina - Eloy Alfaro 
CNOC - Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras 
CNPA - Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala 
CODUC - Coalición de Organizaciones Democráticas, Urbanas y Campesinas 
CONAIE - La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
COPISA - Conferencia Plurinacional e Intercultural de Soberanía Alimentaria 
EZLN - Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional 
FEI - Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios 
FENACLE - Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Agroindustriales Campesinos e Indígenas 
Libres del Ecuador 
FENOC - Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas 
FENOCIN - Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras 
FETAP - Federación de Trabajadores Agropecuarios 
FLO - Fair Trade Labelling Organisation 
FSM - Food Sovereignty Movement 
FT - Fair Trade 
ICO - International Coffee Organisation 
8 
 
IERAC - Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización 
IFI - International Financial Institution 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
INMECAFE - Instituto Mexicano del Café 
INDA - Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Agrario 
ISI - Import Substitution Industrialisation 
MAGAP - Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca 
MLAR - Market Led Agrarian Reform 
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement 
NGO - Non-governmental Organisation 
PACAT - Productores Agroecológicos y Comercio Asociativo de Tungurahua 
PAN - Partido Acción Nacional 
PCM - Partido Comunista de México 
PNCC - Programa Nacional de Cacao 
PRD - Partido de la Revolución Democrática 
PRI - Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
PRM - Partido de la Revolución Mexicana 
PRODEPINE - Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador 
PRONASOL - Programa Nacional de Solidaridad 
PSE - Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano 
PSUM - El Partido Socialista Unificado de México 
SAP - Structural Adjustment Programme 
SIPAE - El Sistema de la Investigación de la Problemática Agraria del Ecuador 
SOE - State Owned Enterprise 
TNC - Transnational Corporation 
TNE - Transnational Exporter 
UFC - United Fruit Company 
UNCAFAECSA - Unión Nacional De Crédito Agropecuario, Forestal y de Agroindustria de 
Ejidatarios, Comuneros y Pequeños Propietarios Minifundistas 
UNOCAR - Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas de Los Ríos 
9 
 
UNORCA - Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas 
UNORCAC - Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas de Cotacachi 
UREAFA - Unión Regional de Ejidatarios Agropecuarios, Forestal y de Agroindustrias de los 
Pueblos Zoques y Tzotziles de Chiapas 
UROCAL - Unión Regional de Organizaciones Campesinas del Litoral 
VC - Via Campesina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades ‘food sovereignty’ has become the guiding principle for many 
rural social movements around the world. Launched in 1996 by the Via Campesina (VC), the 
world’s preeminent transnational agrarian movement and promoter of food sovereignty, it 
has since been taken up by farmers’ organisations, fisherfolk, pastoralists, and civil society 
organisations worldwide. It has even been written into the constitutions of Venezuela 
(2008), Ecuador (2008), Bolivia (2009), Mali (2006), and Nepal (2007) (Holt-Gimenez & 
Shattuck 2011: 128). Its emergence and development as a unifying discourse and political 
programme since the 1990s is a direct response by diverse peasant groups and classes to 
the growing threats posed to their livelihoods by neoliberalism. These threats include rapid 
market liberalisation, withdrawal or elimination of state-support for production, marketing 
and credit, land privatisation and transnational capitals’ increasing concentration of power 
in input and food markets (Edelman et al, 2014: 914). Neoliberal globalisation has resulted 
in the intensification of depeasanisation and proletarianisation globally as withdrawal of 
state support for the peasant sector has combined simultaneously with new enclosures 
(privatised biotechnology and export agriculture), market led agrarian reform and 
international trade policies that flood Southern markets with subsidised agricultural 
products from the global North (McMichael, 2008: 209). However, according to its 
proponents, the food sovereignty movement (FSM)1 and the peasant organisations that 
comprise it are actively defending their spaces from the neoliberal attack on their 
livelihoods (Rosset, 2011; Rosset & Martinez-Torres, 2012; McMichael, 2006; Ploeg, 2014). 
Moreover, they are contesting the subordination of food and agriculture to the price form 
(McMichael, 2008: 215) and seeking to replace the neoliberal food regime with a 
sustainable, peasant based production model in which securing human and environmental 
health and wellbeing, rather than capital accumulation, is the guiding principle. 
 
Launched in 1993, the Via Campesina today unites more than one hundred national and 
sub-national organisations around the world opposed to neoliberalism and advocating a 
pro-poor, sustainable, rights based rural development and greater democratisation (Borras, 
2004: 3). It is divided internationally into eight regions – East and Southeast Asia, South 
                                                          
1 The Via Campesina is a constituent element of the food sovereignty movement, but the two are not 
synonymous. The latter is broader and includes many peasant organisations not aligned with the VC in addition 
to civil society actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) promoting agroecology and sustainable 
production systems. 
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Asia, North America, Central America, South America, the Caribbean, Europe and Africa – 
and delegates from all regions gather together every three to four years for the VC’s 
international conference to determine the movement’s overall direction, policies and 
strategies. Regional and intra-regional meetings and conferences are held periodically to 
allow organisations to discuss and plan regional activities. The 16 member International 
Coordinating Commission is composed of two representatives (one man and one woman) 
from each of its eight regions and acts as the main link between various peasant 
organisations. The Commission is the key decision-making and coordinating body of the VC 
outside of the international conferences, and all decisions are made in consultation with its 
16 members (Desmarais, 2007: 30). 
The VC (2011) defends small-scale sustainable agriculture as a means to promote social 
justice and dignity. It strongly opposes corporate driven agriculture and transnational 
companies that, it claims, are destroying human society and the natural world. Its main goal 
is to realise food sovereignty and reverse the destructive impacts of neoliberalism based on 
the idea that sustainable small farmers are capable of feeding their communities and the 
world. The movement’s understanding of ‘food sovereignty’ has changed over time (see 
Patel, 2007) but it currently defines the term as follows: 
The right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced 
through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define 
their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of 
those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems 
and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations...It offers a 
strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, 
and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by 
local producers and users. Food sovereignty prioritises local and national 
economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven 
agriculture, artisanal-fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, 
distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic 
sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees 
just incomes to all peoples as well as the rights of consumers to control their 
food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage lands, 
territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of 
us who produce food (Via Campesina, 2007 - taken from the Nyéléni 
Declaration on Food Sovereignty). 
 
This definition has become the stated organising principle for peasant organisations around 
the world that seek to reverse the forces of dispossession and impoverishment wrought by 
neoliberal food and agricultural policies. ‘Food sovereignty’ is embraced by these 
organisations as simultaneously a unifying discourse, political project and alternative socio-
12 
 
economic model in their struggles against transnational capital and the institutions and 
policies of neoliberal states. It is constructed on the basis of a rejection of the hegemonic 
model of ‘food security’, the goal of which is to ensure that all individuals have enough food 
to eat without, however, concern regarding where that food comes from or how it is 
produced. As such, food security may be achieved through the free market and the massive 
import of cheap, subsidised food that undercuts local farmers and forces them off their 
land and into (further) poverty. According to McMichael (2009: 299) ‘’free markets’ exclude 
and/or starve populations dispossessed as a consequence of their implementation, in the 
name of food security’. For the VC, genuine food security – sovereignty – can only be 
achieved if people in rural areas have access to productive land and receive prices for their 
products that enable them to make a decent living. As such, food production and access 
cannot be left to the mechanisms of a liberalised world market but instead requires policies 
that support local markets and economic development as the only way to eliminate hunger 
and reduce poverty (Rosset, 2003: 1-2). Under the food security model, hunger and poverty 
are conceived as problems of inefficient trade rather that the result of corporate control 
over systems of production and consumption; food is a tradable commodity rather that a 
right, and hunger is a problem of distribution (Wittman, 2011: 91). In contrast, food 
sovereignty connects access to food as a human right to the rights of producers and 
consumers to shape food and agricultural policies. For Claeys (2012: 849), the VC’s use of a 
rights framework attempts not only to institutionalise new human rights, but also reframe 
the very discourse of human rights itself. By claiming the right to food sovereignty instead 
of the right to food, the VC reframes human rights not only to a share of the social product, 
but also to the organization (and necessarily the democratisation) of production. This rights 
based approach contrasts with the purely economic rationale of promoting efficient market 
transactions at the centre of the food security model. 
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Table 1. Food Security vs. Food Sovereignty 
 
ISSUE 
 
 
FOOD SECURITY MODEL 
 
FOOD SOVEREIGNTY MODEL 
Trade Free trade Food and agriculture exempt from 
trade agreements 
Food 
 
Food as a commodity Food as a human right 
Role of the state Promotion of efficient 
markets 
Supportive policies for small-scale 
producers  
Production priority Based on comparative 
advantage and most 
profitable market 
conditions 
Healthy, culturally appropriate food for 
local markets 
Crop prices Determined by market 
conditions 
Fair and stable prices that cover costs 
of production and allow producers to 
live a dignified life 
Hunger Due to market failures Result of inequality of access to 
productive resources and distribution 
of wealth 
Control over 
productive resources 
Privatised Social, democratic and local 
Access to land Via the market Via (state supported) redistributive land 
reform; land access as prerequisite for 
food sovereignty 
Technology and 
techniques 
Industrial, chemical 
intensive, monoculture, 
GMOs. 
Agroecological, sustainable farming 
methods; no GMOs 
(Adapted from Rosset [2003: 2]) 
 
The recent special issue of the Journal of Peasant Studies (2014, issue 6) on food 
sovereignty attests to the ongoing importance of the topic in both contemporary academic 
debates and processes of agrarian change. The introductory article rightly states that much 
of the early literature on food sovereignty involved a great deal of idealism given the 
concept’s major contribution to galvanizing a broad-based and diverse movement around 
the need for radical changes in agro-food systems. Paraphrasing Bernstein (2014: 1056), 
sympathy for the movement and the wish to further its struggles often sacrificed pessimism 
of the intellect to optimism of the will. Contrary to this trend, in an article from the same 
journal by Borras et al. in 2008 examining the emergence, politics, and impacts of 
transnational agrarian movements, the authors argued that engaging with the complexities, 
contradictions, ambiguities and internal tensions that exist within rural movements is 
essential for advancing their transformative political projects. In order to do so the authors 
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suggested that researchers should engage with five main questions that apply to agrarian 
counter-movements: 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the agrarian structures from which these 
movements have emerged? 
2. What is the social base of the movements - which social classes, groups and sectors 
do they represent (claim to represent or not represent at all)? 
3. What are the demands and issues put forward by global, national and local 
organisations on particular development and policy questions? What are the 
sources of these demands and the social and political forces that back them? 
4. What are the issues that unite and divide agrarian movements and why? 
5. To what extent have the discourses and campaigns and collective actions over time 
by these movements altered (or not) the very agrarian structures that they sought 
to change in the first place? 
This thesis, like Borras et al. (2008) and the Journal of Peasant Studies 2014 issue on food 
sovereignty, aims to further the understanding of the contemporary food sovereignty 
movement through critical analysis of organisations that compose it, their internal 
characteristics, external relations, and their struggles. The following three sets of inter-
related questions guide the research and were initially influenced by the five questions put 
forward by Borras et al. above. 
 
1. What are the class characteristics of the organisations that compose the FSM? How 
and why have peasant organisations’ class bases changed over time and how has 
this affected their demands and strategies? What social classes and groups are 
represented/under-represented/not represented, why is this the case, and what 
are the implications for the FSM’s struggles and its claim to represent all ‘people of 
the land’? To what extent are class-based differences between national level 
peasant organisations struggling for food sovereignty an obstacle for unity? 
2. Given that they vast majority of today’s peasants are integrated into capitalist 
commodity and labour markets, to what extent, why, and by what mechanisms are 
their struggles - as cash crop producers, subsistence growers and wage labourers - 
incorporated or not into the discourses and practices of the FSM? 
3. How does the relationship between the state and national peasant movements 
shape political struggles for food sovereignty? Can the FSM’s counter-hegemonic 
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discourse be uncritically assumed to represent counter-hegemony in practice? 
What are the forces within the state that promote and defend the neoliberal food 
and agricultural model and how do they attempt to neutralise peasant opposition? 
To what extent, how and why have peasant organisations been able (or not) to 
wrest concessions from or transform the state in the name of food sovereignty? 
 
My research engages with these three sets of questions by examining the food sovereignty 
movement in Mexico and Ecuador with a focus on two national level peasant organisations 
in particular (and both members of the VC): CIOAC (Central Independiente de Obreros 
Agrícolas y Campesinos / Independent Central for Agricultural Workers and Peasants) in 
Mexico and FENOCIN (Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y 
Negras / National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous and Black Organisations) in 
Ecuador. Through analysis of the historical development of these organisations’ class 
characteristics, their struggles, and their political strategies, I hope to demonstrate the 
importance of class dynamics and peasant movement-state relations in shaping the food 
sovereignty movement and its potential to transform the neoliberal model of food and 
agriculture.  
 
‘The Peasantry’ and Food Sovereignty 
This research is theoretically guided by two broad schools of thought regarding ‘the 
peasantry’ in contemporary processes of agrarian change and its (transformative) role in 
the neoliberal era. Using Kay’s (2001) terminology, ‘proletarianists’ and ‘agrarianists’ 
represent two very different outlooks on the role and the future of the peasantry within 
processes of capitalist development.2 These terms are derived from debates among social 
scientists in Mexico in the mid-1970s as to the future of the Latin American peasantry 
under capitalism. For the proletarianists (or ‘descampesinistas’ in the Mexican debate), 
peasant production is economically unviable in the long-term therefore small producers are 
immersed in a process of proletarianisation that will lead to their eventual dispossession. 
Capitalist development strengthens this process of social and economic differentiation in 
                                                          
2 Bernstein (2009) uses ‘agrarian Marxists’ and ‘neo-populists’ to distinguish these two sides of the debate. 
However, given that many so-called ‘neo-populists’ base much of their analysis within various strains of 
Marxism, and the negative political connotations associated with the word ‘populism’ - a label which seemingly 
attempts to discredit this school of thought from the outset - Kay’s (2001) terminology seems to me to be more 
useful analytically and less politically charged. 
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which the vast majority are transformed into wage workers while a small minority - the 
most competitive - are able to expand reproduction and become small capitalist farmers 
(Kay, 2001: 377-379). Influenced by the works of Lenin and Kautsky on the agrarian 
question, the proletarianists foresee the eventual elimination of the peasantry as the 
majority are transformed into proletarians as a result of accelerated processes of class 
differentiation (Kay, 1994: 15-16). For many ‘descampesinistas’ in Mexico in the 1970s, the 
absorption of the peasantry into the working class was a political advance. Much of Latin 
America still had many more peasants than proletarians and so, as a result of their 
proletarianisation, they would presumably come to recognise their ‘true’ class interests to 
be aligned with the revolutionary working class. According to ‘descampesinistas’, this would 
not take place if they retained access to the land (Edelman, 1999: 203). Agrarianists (or 
‘campesinistas’), on the other hand, rejected the idea that the tendency towards 
differentiation is inevitable and instead claim that the peasantry is able to exercise 
considerable degrees of agency in order to resist proletarianisation. Instead of being 
eliminated as a result of capitalist development the peasantry persists, often highly 
successfully, and processes of re-peasantisation may and do occur in some areas while de-
peasantisation takes place in others. Peasant production persists because, contrary to 
proletarianist arguments, it can successfully compete in the market with capitalist 
producers. A major reason for this is the use of unpaid family labour, often complemented 
by strong community ties for shared labour services. In addition to economic factors, 
political struggles also allow peasants to resist proletarianisation and dispossession. 
Agrarianist arguments are strongly influenced by the work of Chayanov, according to which 
the peasantry has a specific form of production and organisation which has existed for 
centuries within distinct modes of production, and will continue to do so in the future 
(Edelman, 1999: 203; Kay, 2001: 379). 
In current debates, ‘agrarianists’ tend to be represented by activists and scholars allied or 
sympathetic to the FSM.  For this group, the corporatisation of agriculture in the neoliberal 
era has been to the detriment of farming populations everywhere (McMichael, 2007: 60).  
As the neoliberal project ‘has replaced the period of economic nationalism, de-
peasantisation in the global South has intensified under the combined pressures of 
evaporation of public support of peasant agriculture, the second green revolution 
(privatised biotechnologies and export agricultures to supply global consumers), market-led 
land reform, and WTO (World Trade Organisation) trade rules that facilitate targeting 
southern markets with artificially cheapened food surplus exports from the North’ 
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(McMichael, 2008: 209). Food production, food prices and hunger are all increasing, the 
roots of which lie in the ‘corporate food regime’ (McMichael, 2008). This regime is 
characterised by the unprecedented market power and profits of monopoly food 
corporations (Holt-Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011: 112) and intensified depeasantisation and 
proletarianisation via displacement across the world (Araghi, 2009: 134 & 135). 
Dispossession has accelerated the exodus of surplus rural labour to urban slums and led to 
the unprecedented growth of the global informal working class (Davis, 2004: 10 & 24). In 
response, agrarian movements guided by the struggle for food sovereignty have emerged 
to contest the impacts and the political and ideological underpinnings of the contemporary 
food regime.  
According to agrarianists united in the Via Campesina (VC), the peasantry is emerging as ‘a 
radical world historical subject’ (McMichael, 2008: 225). Far from disappearing as a result of 
processes of capitalist development, peasants are reproducing themselves as a potent 
social and political force. They are struggling to bring about systemic change with 
sustainable peasant and ‘small scale farmer’ production at the core of the food sovereignty 
model (Desmarais, 2007: 37). According proponents of food sovereignty, today’s peasant 
movements are the only entities capable of bringing about the necessary structural change 
to the impoverishing and exclusionary agro-food system currently dispossessing the 
peasantry en masse (Rosset, 2011: 22). Peasants and their organisations are reformulating 
the basis of the agrarian question, traditionally understood as the existence of ‘obstacles’ 
to the complete development of capitalist agriculture in developing countries (Byres, 1995: 
569). Rather than prioritising capital’s transformation of agriculture, the FSM is struggling 
to transform agriculture against the accumulation imperative, challenging the institutional 
relations of neoliberal capitalism and attempting to re-territorialise spaces - physical and 
ideological - in defence of rural communities and sustainable peasant production (Rosset & 
Martinez-Torres, 2012). Centring  food and its local, ecologically sustainable, peasant based 
production at the centre of agrarian questions of the 21st century (McMichael, 2008: 210-
211), peasant movements across the world are struggling for a new society based on 
communal values that contradict the main tenets of capitalism (Teubal, 2010: 164). 
For the proletarianists, neoliberal globalisation similarly represents a new phase of 
international centralisation and concentration, as well as mobility of capital (Bernstein, 
2006: 13). However, whereas agrarianists argue that the FSM’s resistance to the neoliberal 
food regime is the central component of the contemporary agrarian question, Bernstein 
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(2001, 2006) claims that accelerated (semi-)proletarianisation, increased class 
differentiation within the peasantry, and the growing informalisation of wage employment 
in the neoliberal era represent a crisis of labour, not of the ‘peasantry’ as a homogenous 
social category. Rather than transformation against the accumulation imperative as 
suggested by McMichael, Bernstein argues that labour is the core element of the 
contemporary agrarian question and must therefore feature as a central component of 
analysis of today's peasant movements and their struggles. Interpreted through this lens, 
the demands of the FSM are driven not by struggles of a (homogenous) ‘peasantry’ seeking 
systemic transformation based on sustainable peasant and ‘small scale farmer’ production, 
but are instead a response to increasing scarcity, under neoliberalism, of employment that 
pays a living wage (Ibid, 2006: 15). Contemporary peasant struggles constitute an ‘agrarian 
question of labour’ and are ‘driven by experiences of the fragmentation of labour (including 
losses of relatively stable wage employment in manufacturing and mining, as well as 
agriculture), by contestations of class inequality, and by collective demands and actions for 
better conditions of living’ (Ibid, 13). For Bernstein, the FSM’s struggles over land as a basis 
of livelihood and reproduction - ever more difficult under globalisation and labour 
fragmentation - are fundamentally working class-based in nature. Land is sought as a means 
of subsistence because of the failure of the labour market to absorb the masses of 
dispossessed, thus constituting a crisis of social reproduction for labour, not ‘the peasantry’. 
Contrary to much of the FSM literature which assumes a unified ‘people of the land’ (VC, 
2013), for proletarianists class dynamics remain essential for understanding processes of 
agrarian change and should always be a point of departure when analysing the complex 
and contradictory social relations activist movements seek to transform (Bernstein, 2010: 
123). For Bernstein (2010: 103-104), when farming households are integrated into capitalist 
commodity relations they are subject to the dynamics and compulsions of commodity 
production. These dynamics and compulsions are internalised in their relations and 
practices. Once peasants become ‘locked into’ commodity production by the ‘dull 
compulsion of market forces’, their subsistence is commodified and the tendency to 
differentiation into classes takes hold. While many peasants are forced to combine off-farm 
wage employment with subsistence production to meet their reproduction needs, others 
turn to petty commodity production for their survival. Peasants are capitalists and workers 
at the same time as they have access to the means of production and employ their own 
labour in the production of commodities with varying degrees of market integration 
(Bernstein, 2001: 29).  
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Competition between petty commodity producers leads to class differentiation within the 
peasantry; a complete or partial loss of the means of production leads to proletarianisation 
or semi-proletarianisation; middle peasants are able to meet the demands of simple 
reproduction through varying degrees of market integration and petty commodity 
production; rich peasants are able to expand reproduction through the hiring of wage 
labour and the buying or renting of more land or other means of production beyond 
household capacity (Ibid:30). The increasing importance of rural non-farm activities in 
terms of employment and incomes exaggerates this tendency, with some peasants working 
in activities where they earn more than they did before, while the majority are forced to 
earn less (Kay, 2008: 923). As such, peasant struggles for food sovereignty are 'likely to 
embody uneasy and erratic, contradictory and shifting, alliances of different class elements 
and tendencies than to express the interests of some clear-cut and unitary class subject, be 
it proletarian or peasant, semi-proletarian or "worker-peasant"' (Bernstein, 2006: 16). 
Rather than claiming or advocating a unity of ‘people of the land’, ‘in effect a single class 
exploited by corporate capital’ (Bernstein, 2010: 112), a class unified subject cannot be 
assumed, ‘but would have to be constructed from heterogeneous local, regional and 
national “farmers movements”, with all their variations of specific processes of agrarian 
change and the circumstances of different rural classes…, and of specific histories, 
experiences and cultures of struggle’ (Ibid: 121). 
The theoretical framework of this thesis draws from both agrarianist and proletarianist 
approaches to understanding the peasantry and contemporary rural struggles. In 
accordance with proletarianist analysis, class differentiation is understood as a major factor 
in shaping the form and nature of the food sovereignty movement, and processes of 
agrarian change more broadly. As Bernstein (2014: 1041) writes, in the movement’s 
discourse ‘peasants’ are variously personified as capital’s other; ‘food sovereignty discards 
crucial elements of agrarian political economy, of the political economy of capitalism more 
broadly, and of modern history, in order to establish its thesis and especially its antithesis: 
capital’s other’ (Ibid: 1057). However, ‘peasants’ as a unitary concept constructed in 
opposition to capital disguises important class-based differences within and between 
peasant groups. As such, class dynamics must be brought back in to FSM debates and 
analysed in terms of how they shape the FSM and its struggles3. It is not sufficient to simply 
recognise that class differences within the peasantry exist, as McMichael (2015: 199) does 
                                                          
3 See Borras, 2008 and Edelman, 2008 for two of the very few examples of class analyses of contemporary 
agrarian movements. Their works are discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
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in his rejoinder to Bernstein (2014). Rather than focusing on contradictions, McMichael 
argues that the struggle is to construct unity in diversity. However, to successfully construct 
such unity requires in depth analysis of the class dynamics that shape contradictions and 
conflict within the FSM rather than simply acknowledging that they exist. Jansen’s (2015: 
227) discussion of the debate between Bernstein and McMichael concludes that the 
positions held by the two authors are not necessarily mutually exclusive. If class analysis is 
incorporated into agrarianists’ tendency to conceive of the peasantry as a homogenous 
grouping in opposition to capital then, he argues, it becomes possible to rethink ‘capitalism 
from below’ in the search for alternatives to the neoliberal food regime. This thesis 
attempts to do precisely this for the FSM. 
Despite its centrality, how ‘class’ is understood cannot be reduced to a structural position 
within the relations of production, as it is in Bernstein’s (2001) conceptualisation of  ‘petty-
commodity producers’. Class analysis of food sovereignty through the capital/labour lens 
eliminates agency from peasant production and reproduction strategies. It also equates 
‘petty-commodity producers’’ structural positions (determined by ‘particular combination(s) 
of class places and capital’ [Ibid: 29]) with their class interests. Despite sources of wage-
labour having become increasingly informal, insecure and scarce (Ibid: 2006: 13) in the 
neoliberal era, and the increasing proportion of peasants’ household income now being 
derived from wage labour (Kay, 2008: 923), today’s agrarian question and the FSM cannot 
be reduced to a survival response by a labour force increasingly unable to be absorbed by 
neoliberal globalisation. As McMichael (2007 & 2014) suggests, and as will be 
demonstrated in the chapters that follow, demands for food sovereignty go much deeper 
than that. 
Contrary to Bernstein’s (2001) assumption, market integration does not always equate to 
market dependence. By retaining access to the means of production, peasant households 
are often able to exercise a degree of autonomy from market imperatives (Ploeg, 2010; 
Wood, 2002). They can resist full commodification and use land as a space for the political 
and ideological construction of alternative, non-capitalist social relations (Vergara-Camus, 
2014) that form the basis of the social transformations envisaged by the FSM. As 
McMichael (2007: 64) argues, many of the VC’s members aim to limit their subjection to 
capital and practice an alternative form of modernity based on reversing and denaturalising 
the act of dispossession. However, how this aim is interpreted and manifests itself is 
shaped by the diverse class characteristics of peasants and their organisations struggling for 
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food sovereignty. It is also influenced by their specific experiences of capitalist 
development across time and space. For example, struggles of landless peasants are often 
very different in nature, possibly even conflicting, to those of landed peasants seeking to 
make a viable living from the land they already occupy. Similarly within landed peasant 
classes, contradictions may exist between market dependent and relatively more 
subsistence based groups. 
In order to understand the nature of such differences with the aim of constructing unity in 
the diversity within the FSM, how ‘class’ is itself conceived must go beyond structural 
positions in the relations of the production. It must include political and ideological 
elements that also shape class formation. As Otero (2004a: 41-45) argues, not every strata 
(in the relations of production) of ‘direct agrarian producers’ necessarily constitutes a class; 
structural borders are less important than how groups, classes and communities define 
their demands (or objects of struggle), construct organisations to defend their interests, 
and establish alliances with other organisations based on shared experiences of 
exploitation and oppression. A political understanding of class casts light on the agency of 
the peasantry in resisting dispossession and proletarianisation, whereas a structural 
understanding  based on the capital/labour binary (Bernstein, 2009) casts the peasantry as 
a passive object, destined to be dissolved by (path-dependent) capitalist development. A 
political understanding of class formation can bridge the divide between agrarianist 
proponents of food sovereignty who downplay the importance of class differences within 
the peasantry, and proletarianists who rightly focus on the centrality of class dynamics in 
shaping processes of agrarian change and resistance, but whose over-structuralist 
framework cannot adequately engage with the fundamental nature of FSM struggles within 
and against neoliberalism. 
This thesis will demonstrate the centrality of class dynamics to contemporary struggles and 
debates around food sovereignty. It will show that the interests and demands of landless 
and landed peasants are often different - even contradictory - in nature, and very difficult 
to unite under a shared platform of struggle. As such, addressing class differences within 
the FSM is essential for the construction of the unity in diversity necessary to challenge the 
hegemonic neoliberal food regime. To do so requires in depth analysis of the production 
and reproduction strategies of peasants that compose the movement, and the class-based 
demands that derive from these strategies. In the cases of Mexico and Ecuador, I will argue 
that the production and reproduction strategies of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao 
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producers are driven by the desire to maximise relative autonomy both from and within 
increasingly volatile and poorly remunerating commodity and labour markets. Analysis of 
autonomous struggles may bridge the divide between more structuralist (proletarianist) 
interpretations of contemporary rural struggles that downplay peasant agency in resisting 
proletarianisation, and agrarianist conceptions which tend to under-appreciate the 
importance of class dynamics within the peasantry in shaping FSM demands and strategies. 
Articulating with peasant struggles for autonomy, peasant organisations’ interactions with 
neoliberal states are critical for determining their counter-hegemonic potential to bring 
about social transformations in the name of food sovereignty. I will show that peasant 
organisations’ internal structures and their relationships with national states shape their 
capacity to contest neoliberal food and agricultural policies and construct counter-
hegemony.  
 
Methodology 
I chose the Via Campesina (VC) - constituted on the struggle for food sovereignty - as the 
starting point for my research of the food sovereignty movement. The decision to focus on 
Mexico and Ecuador was based on a combination of past experience and the goals of my 
comparative study. My interest in Latina America’s peasant movements derives from work 
experience in rural development organisations in Mexico and Guatemala and I was keen to 
research the food sovereignty movement in the former - a country with what is widely 
regarded as an institutionalised, or ‘neo-corporatist’ peasant movement - on the basis of a 
comparison with a country considered to have a ‘strong’ and independent peasant 
movement. The Ecuadorian indigenous-peasant movement’s central role in Correa’s rise 
the presidency in 2006, and its successful struggles to enshrine food sovereignty into the 
country’s 2008 constitution, convinced me to use Mexico and Ecuador as my two national 
cases. In order to ground my research in concrete analysis of movements in both countries I 
chose to focus on two national level VC member organisations; CIOAC in Mexico and 
FENOCIN in Ecuador. Why these two in particular? Both are national level members of the 
VC and claim to be guided by ‘food sovereignty’ (as defined by the Via Campesina [2007]) as 
their central focus of struggle. The VC is an important constituent element of the food 
sovereignty movement internationally, but the latter encompasses a broader spectrum of 
rural actors and interests with different interpretation of the meaning of food sovereignty. 
As such, selecting two movements within the VC that (at least discursively) share the same 
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definition of food sovereignty, provided my comparative analysis with a conceptually 
constant point of reference. Both organisations also claim to represent a spectrum of 
subaltern rural classes, from the landless to those struggling to make a living from the land, 
as well as indigenous peoples and rural workers, and so provide the basis for engaging with 
my first set of research questions relating to the class characteristics of the FSM. 
Engagement with the second set of research questions - the production and reproduction 
strategies of peasants within the FSM - required the selection of comparable peasant 
groups between both organisations. Focusing on CIOAC's coffee and FENOCIN's cacao 
producers provided both a means of examining the role of export crops and wage labour in 
the food sovereignty movement and a manageable and comparable structure for the 
fieldwork. By focusing on producers of these crops I geographically concentrated on specific 
regions of both countries - the states of Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero in southern Mexico 
and the coastal plain of Ecuador - necessary given the national extension of both 
organisation’s influence and my own time and resource constraints. This crop focus 
determined the communities in which fieldwork was conducted as a starting point. Both 
organisations’ national leaderships facilitated my presence in these communities from 
which I was able to work my way up through a vertical cross-section of CIOAC and FENOCIN, 
from their grassroots organisations upwards to the national committees via municipal and 
state/provincial levels. This allowed me to analyse the organisations’ internal structures - 
their class bases, leaderships and the modes of interaction between the two, critical for my 
final set of research questions. Both organisations share a history of close working 
relationships with Leftist political parties and of oppositional stances and tactics with regard 
to their respective national states during the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) 
period which have transformed into relations better characterised as ‘critical engagement’ 
over the neoliberal era. The analysis of this transition is critical for understanding the form 
and relative success or otherwise of their political strategies, and therefore their potential 
to transform the neoliberal food regime. 
The form of my research methodology coincides with McMichael’s (1990) ‘incorporated 
comparison’, used to conceptualise variation across time and space when both dimensions 
are neither separate nor uniform (Ibid: 385).  It is theoretically grounded in the belief that 
social systems are constantly evolving (Ibid: 386). Rather than some case-oriented 
comparative methods that are used primarily to pinpoint patterns of constant association 
rather than explain variation (Ragin, 1989: 42), incorporated comparison strives to give 
substance to a historical process through a comparison of its parts. In the case of my 
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research the historical process is the development of the FSM and its parts consist of two 
national peasant organisations that form it. The purpose is to develop historically grounded 
theory through the comparison of the elements that form part of a dynamic whole 
(McMichael, 1989: 396). The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted on a reflexive basis 
which, as stated by Burawoy (1998: 5), is premised upon engagement with the world we 
study, not detachment from it. Reflexive is distinguished from positive science on the basis 
that there is no ‘external’ world that can be construed as separate from and 
incommensurable with those who study it (Ibid: 10). 
I carried out a comparative cross sectional analysis of both organisations over the course of 
nine months, from September 2012 to June 2013.  In Mexico two months were spent in the 
state of Chiapas; two weeks in the municipality of Jitotol, three in Las Margaritas and the 
remainder of the time in the state capital of Tuxtla Gutierrez where the state leadership 
committee is based. One month was spent in Oaxaca; two weeks in the municipality of 
Huautla de Jiménez and two in the state capital of the City of Oaxaca, again where the 
leadership resides. In Guerrero, owing to security concerns, I spent just ten days travelling 
between communities in the municipality of Tlapa de Comonfort with CIOAC’s state leader. 
From Guerrero I spent six weeks in Mexico City based in CIOAC’s central offices.  
I was in Ecuador for three months and had initially planned to spend two of those months 
on the coast with FENOCIN’s cacao growers. However, realising soon after my arrival in 
Quito that the organisation’s power is concentrated in the Andes - a significant factor 
shaping its political strategies - and  that the class characteristics of the country’s peasantry 
varies significantly between the coast and the Andes, I decided to divide my time more 
evenly between the two regions. I spent a week in each of the coastal provinces of Rios, 
Esmeraldas, El Oro and Pichincha with FENOCIN cacao growers in addition to two weeks in 
the Andean province of Imbabura and one in Tungurahua. The remainder of the time was 
spent in Quito with the national leadership.  
In addition to the organisational cross-sectional analyses I met with employees of state 
institutions that worked with CIOAC and FENOCIN’s members in providing and 
administrating state projects and programmes, again from the municipal to the federal 
levels. Having arranged interviews with municipal level employees of different state 
legitimating institutions I typically used snowball sampling to gain access to interviewees at 
higher administrative levels. The interviews with state employees were focused on 
institutions responsible for ‘social development’ and those working on productive issues 
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with particular emphasis on the coffee sector in Mexico and the cacao sector in Ecuador. 
Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with transnational export firms and their 
intermediaries that worked with and/or bought coffee and cacao from both organisations’ 
members. I also interviewed members and leaders of other rival and allied peasant 
organisations. All of this allowed me to triangulate my findings and provided alternative 
observations and perspectives regarding my central research questions. In terms of data 
collection within CIOAC and FENOCIN’s grassroots communities, semi-structured interviews 
and focus groups were used throughout. With the members of both organisations I used 
two interview templates, one focused on issues of household production and reproduction 
strategies and the other on social and political themes (appendices one and two). These 
were ‘templates’ in that dialogue between myself and the interviewees provided an ‘ever 
changing sieve for collecting data’ (Burawoy, 1998: 11). Each day I refined or altered the 
template based on the previous day’s intervention with the ultimate aim of achieving 
synchronicity between my theories and what I was studying (Ibid: 17).  
 
Structure of the remainder of the thesis 
The following chapter examines the emergence of food sovereignty as a central organising 
principle for national peasant movements in Mexico and Ecuador. It details the background 
of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s emergence and acts a historical backdrop for the rest of the thesis 
to contextualise discussions in later chapters. It asks why, despite the claim that ‘the impact 
of neoliberalism on pre-existing rural production and exchange relations has had varying 
impacts on different social classes, regions and sectors and within and between countries’ 
(Borras et al, 2008: 182), distinct peasant organisations across the globe have come to 
contest neoliberalism under the unifying banner of ‘food sovereignty’. It does so by 
examining the very different agrarian structures from which CIOAC and FENOCIN have 
emerged, how these have developed to shape the historical form and content of peasant 
struggles in both countries, and why - despite such historical differences - the 
contemporary peasant movements of both countries now share ‘food sovereignty’ as their 
central focus of struggle. Using Byres (2003) typology of agrarian transitions, it will show 
that there has been a convergence between Mexico’s historically (state-mediated) ‘from 
below’ and Ecuador’s ‘from above’ paths as a result of the implementation of neoliberal 
policies in both countries from the late 1970s and early 1980s. This led national peasant 
movements in both countries to embrace food sovereignty in the 1990s as a unifying 
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discourse to contest neoliberalism. However, as we will see, how the term is understood 
and the demands that it encompasses are shaped by the agrarian structures within which 
peasant organisations are embedded, their class characteristics, and the political strategies 
they pursue. 
The second chapter is based on my first set of research questions. It investigates the social 
bases of CIOAC and FENOCIN; the classes, groups and sectors they represent, claim to 
represent and do not represent at all, and how this shapes organisational demands. It aims 
to interrogate the food sovereignty movement’s (Desmarais, 2007; VC, 1996; Rosset, 2011) 
claim to speak for ‘all people of the land’ by demonstrating the class based nature of CIOAC 
and FENOCIN’s demands and how this impacts relationships both within and between 
peasant organisations struggling for food sovereignty. It will show that the class 
characteristics of peasant organisations’ mass bases shape (without determining) 
interpretations of food sovereignty. It will also examine the difficulties that the VC 
confronts in attempting to unify all subaltern rural classes, especially landless and landed 
peasants, within the same movement.  
Having established the class characteristics of both organisations’ mass bases, the third 
chapter addresses the second set of research questions elaborated above. It examines the 
nature and form of the production and reproduction strategies of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s 
coffee and cacao growers under neoliberalism as producers of both cash and subsistence 
crops as well as heavily dependent on labour markets. Theoretically guided by Wood’s 
(2002) distinction between the market as an imperative or an opportunity, it examines the 
extent to which peasant struggles for autonomy from and within the market are 
represented (or not) by their organisations and the food sovereignty movement’s official 
discourse. It will show that CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao growers shift household 
labour use between various degrees of dependence on subsistence cultivation, cash-crop 
production and wage employment depending on market conditions. They do so not on the 
basis of profit or income maximisation, but on securing long-term access to land as the 
foundation of autonomy. However, their interests as producers of export crops are 
currently not represented by the VC and its ambiguous stance on international trade. This 
weakens both the VC’s claim to represent all marginalised peoples of the land and the 
power of its political project to transform the neoliberal food regime. 
To address the final set of research questions, the fourth chapter investigates the political 
strategies employed by CIOAC and FENOCIN in their (at least stated) commitment to radical 
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transformation of the neoliberal food regime through use of Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony. It argues that the transformative potential of the food sovereignty movement 
depends fundamentally on state-peasant movement relations. Peasant organisations’ 
internal structures - their class bases, leaderships and the modes of interaction between 
the two - and their articulation with the state’s hegemonic project are fundamental for the 
relative success or otherwise of peasant movement struggles. It will also show that counter-
hegemonic discourse does not always equate to counter-hegemonic practice, and that the 
discourse of food sovereignty is as much a political tool as it is an alternative socio-
economic model of food and agriculture. Peasant organisations employ this powerful 
discourse in order to hold the state and national governments to account and demand 
resources for their members from the state’s apparatus of legitimation. This is followed in 
chapter five by the conclusion which draws together the major elements of the thesis and 
tentatively suggests ways in which the FSM could be strengthened by addressing some of 
its current weaknesses. 
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Chapter 1. From Agrarian Reform to Food Sovereignty: 
CIOAC, FENOCIN and Peasant Movements in Mexico 
and Ecuador 
Why is it that although ‘the impact of neoliberalism on pre-existing rural production and 
exchange relations has had varying impacts on different social classes, regions and sectors 
and within and between countries’ (Borras et al, 2008: 182), distinct peasant organisations 
across the globe have come to contest neoliberalism under the unifying banner of ‘food 
sovereignty’? This chapter will address this question by examining the very different 
agrarian structures from which CIOAC and FENOCIN have emerged. It will look at the 
development of both countries’ agrarian structures and how this has shaped the historical 
form and content of peasant struggles. It will also examine why, despite historical 
differences, contemporary rural movements in both Mexico and Ecuador now share ‘food 
sovereignty’ as their guiding principle of struggle. 
Historical processes of agrarian reform have radically altered the agrarian structures of 
both countries, and these processes have themselves been shaped (to very different 
degrees and in very different ways) by peasant movements. However, policies of agrarian 
reform at the national level have been applied unevenly within Mexico and Ecuador across 
time and space as a result of regionally and historically specific constellations of class forces, 
state formation and capital penetration, among other factors. This chapter will explore the 
broad impacts of agrarian reform in both countries, leaving a more nuanced analysis of 
intra-regional variations within and between the sites where fieldwork was conducted to 
subsequent chapters. Agrarian structure here refers to the conditions of production and 
class reproduction in the countryside. These ‘conditions’, in turn, relate to relations of 
property and power that shape the production and reproduction relations of rural social 
classes which struggle to shape the agrarian structure in their own interests. I will examine 
the social classes in both countries that shaped agrarian reform processes in distinct ways 
as a result of the articulation between specific regional and national social formations with 
spatially and temporally specific processes of capitalist development.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first will summarise the major impacts of the 
agrarian reform eras in both countries in order to contextualise in more detail later on the 
emergence of food sovereignty in the neoliberal era. It will show how the class forces that 
29 
 
shaped and contested processes of capitalist development led to violent upheaval and 
destruction of a pre-capitalist landlord class in the case of Mexico, with the initiation of a 
state-mediated ‘from below’ agrarian transition. In Ecuador, on the other hand, a 
hegemonic pre-capitalist landlord class was able to retain its economic and political power, 
transforming itself into a class of capitalist farmers in a far more drawn out transition ‘from 
above’ (Byres, 2003). Using Byres (2003: 2) definition, ‘agrarian transition’ refers to the 
changes in the countryside necessary for the overall development of capitalism and to its 
overall dominance in a particular social formation. The distinction between ‘from above’ 
and ‘from below’ paths of transition is based initially on the work of Lenin.  The former (the 
‘Junker’ path in Lenin’s terms) is attributed to his interpretation of capitalist development 
in central Europe and the ‘internal metamorphosis’ of pre-capitalist landed property to 
capitalist forms in which the landlord class retained control of the land.  The latter (the 
American path) is based on the development of agrarian capitalism in United States which 
Lenin interpreted the result of class differentiation among independent producers in the 
absence of pre-capitalist landed property (Bernstein, 2009: 59). The second section 
examines the post-reform, or ‘counter-reform’ eras in both countries when state 
intervention in the peasant sector was gradually scaled back and reconfigured by both 
countries’ governments from the 1980s onwards. The final section will explore how the 
impacts of neoliberalism have, despite the very different impacts of agrarian reform in 
Mexico and Ecuador, had similar destructive, immiserating effects on both countries’ 
peasantries. This led to the emergence of food sovereignty in the 1990s, variously 
interpreted by the peasant movements of both countries, and which has become a unifying 
banner that articulates a rejection of, and radical alternative to, neoliberalism.  
 
Agrarian Reforms in Mexico and Ecuador 
1.1 Mexico’s Agrarian Reform  
Large, privately owned estates came to dominate the Mexican countryside during the late 
19th Century. The dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911), (also referred to as the 
Porfiriato) was responsible for the violent dispossession of indigenous populations to set up 
or expand haciendas, and the expansion and entrenchment of coercive labour relations. 
The impulse to regain community lands lost during this period drove tens of thousands of 
peasants to war against the dictatorship, the Porfirian restorationists of the Huerta 
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government (1913-1914) and the anti-Porfirian bourgeoisie of the Carranza government 
(1917-1920) (Markiewicz, 1993: 13). By 1910, 54 percent of Mexico’s national territory was 
under the control of the latifundia, 20 percent by small, independent agriculturalists and 
ranchers, and just 6 percent by peasant communities (Ibid: 15). The 1910-1917 revolution 
led to the transformation of Mexico’s agrarian structure but in a spatially and temporally 
heterogeneous way, applied as it was over territories differently shaped by Spanish 
colonisation and the Porfiriato’s state-building project and export-led growth model4.  
Following the Revolution, Mexico’s early post-revolutionary governments were forced to 
enshrine agrarian reform into the new constitution and respond to peasant demands for 
land for the sake of social and regime stability. Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution for the 
first time instituted a social conception of property. This broke with the dominant Franco-
American model in which private property was a sacred, natural and inviolable right 
(Castañeda, 2002: 36). Article 27 reflected the plurality of ideas and distinct currents that 
came together in the armed struggle and gave constitutional recognition to two basic 
models of property - private and communal. In response to peasant demands the state 
created the ejido form of social property that, to this day, acts as an obstacle to the 
generalisation of landed private property rights (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 10). Also, by 
restricting the subordination of land to capital it provided the peasantry with relative 
protection from the capitalist market, reducing forces of dispossession and 
proletarianisation. In terms of private property, legally defined extension limits were 
implemented that prevented the massive concentration of land. These limits varied 
depending on a number of factors including land quality, land use, and whether or not 
landholdings were irrigated. For example, a 300 hectare limit was established for important 
export crops such as sugar cane, banana and coffee while domestic crops grown on 
irrigated land were subject to a 100 hectare limit (Castañeda, 2002: 45). 
                                                          
4 The revolution was a complex process which will not be explored in detail here. For a history of the Mexican 
Revolution, see Markiewicz (1993). For an analysis of regionally distinct processes of capitalist development in 
Mexico stemming from Spanish colonisation and Porfirio Diaz’s state building project see Williams (1990) and 
Davis & Figueroa (2003). In summary, colonial expansion took the route north where land was flatter, natural 
resources more abundant and climate more favourable than in the south (Davis & Figueroa, 2003: 90). The 
latifundio (large-estate) system organised by expanding frontier colonisers moved northwards, dispossessing 
indigenous communities and concentrating land first in the hands of Spanish colonisers and, following 
independence from Spain, in those of mestizo landowners. In the South where colonisation and (subsequent) 
capitalist social relations penetrated later and more slowly, local populations were better able to contest 
dispossession which, as a result, was and has been far less complete than in the north (Knight, 2002: 81). The 
latifundios that emerged in the south tended to take the best lands leaving the local indigenous population to 
make a living by moving to commercially unfavourable higher altitudes with poorer soils and generally less 
favourable agricultural conditions where many remain to this day. 
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Despite enshrining agrarian reform into the Mexican constitution in 1917, by the early 
1930s rural conditions had changed very little; landlords had successfully resisted mass 
expropriation and the majority of the peasantry remained landless. According to official 
statistics, of the original 41.3 million hectares controlled by private landowners, only 6.9 
million, or about 17 percent, had been expropriated by 1934. Concentration of land 
remained extremely high with 1.5 percent of all landowners in control of 83 percent of 
agricultural land nationally (Markiewicz, 1993: 84). 
Between 1934 and 1940 the Cardenas administration distributed land to more peasants 
than all previous administrations combined. For the first time the government 
fundamentally challenged the power of landlords and the rights of private property, and 
consolidated the ejido as a permanent element of rural Mexico (Hamilton, 2011: 53). 
However, rather than destroying private property, Cardenas selectively challenged it and in 
other instances supported it. This reflected the complex prevailing agrarian structure of the 
time and the country’s regional diversity in terms of capitalist development and landlord 
and peasant power. Agrarian reform was not simply responsible for the system of social 
property created by the state and donated to the peasantry in the form of ejidos and 
communities; it also created, or at least moulded, the majority of agricultural and livestock 
private property (Mackinlay, 2004: 120). When Cardenas’ agrarian reform began the 
government urgently needed to find support among rural privileged classes. As a result 
cattle farmers and independent producers, especially in the Northern regions, obtained 
concessions that allowed them to begin accumulating huge tracts of land in spite of legal 
extension limits (Ibid: 123). The government continued to protect private property and the 
interests of the bourgeoisie and this allowed so called ‘small proprietors’ (pequeños 
propietarios) to possess far larger expanses of land than were granted to ejidatarios 
(Markiewicz, 1993: 3). The simultaneous protection of private property in areas with small 
or politically weak peasant populations, the attack on landlords in regions of intense 
peasant unrest, and the creation of social property which existed side by side with private 
property, indicate the intense contradictions present in Mexican society at the time, and 
within the (geographically and ideologically) fragmented state in the post-revolutionary 
period. Bourgeois class rule was not yet hegemonic, the economic and political power of 
the traditional landlord class remained a major obstacle to capitalist development, and the 
subaltern classes that had taken up arms to overthrow Porfirio Diaz were a political force 
whose demands had to be acknowledged and at least partially met by the nascent regime. 
Agrarian reform was, for the peasantry, a case of righting historical injustices by returning 
32 
 
to them access to land that was rightfully theirs but to which they had had been illegally 
and immorally dispossessed under the Porfiriato. For the Mexican regime, which 
legitimated itself by claiming to be the official party of the revolution, making peasants pay 
for access to land as was the case under many later agrarian reform programmes across 
Latin America, including Ecuador, was simply not an option. Cardenas’ agrarian reform must 
therefore be understood as part of an attempt to consolidate the legitimacy of the post-
revolutionary regime through sweeping redistribution, the elimination of the pre-capitalist 
landlord class and the creation of the pre-conditions for large scale capital accumulation. 
Cardenas aimed to foster a new sense of popular identification with the state and therefore 
lay the basis for organised mass support that was to transform both its social basis and its 
function (Morton, 2010: 23). 
The simultaneous existence of both property types - private and social - despite apparent 
contradictions, were consistent with Cardenas’ goal of establishing the conditions for 
capitalist agriculture. Through the creation of the ejido the great peasant demand for land 
was met in the granting of individual usufruct of parcels. The same act broke the back of 
the pre-capitalist landlords, the goal of the modern bourgeoisie. The whole process ensured 
the regime’s control of the peasants as a defence against assault from conservative, 
reactionary sectors, cutting them off from the possibility of once again concentrating great 
areas of land, in the most part unproductively (Bartra, 1993: 90).  
The result of the 1934-1940 period was a fundamental change to the national agrarian 
structure. Whereas in 1930 the ejidal sector was tiny, covering just 6.3 percent of the 
agricultural land and 13.4 percent of the cropland, in 1940 it had come to control 22.5 
percent of the former, and 47.4 percent of the latter. By 1940 it also controlled 57.4 
percent of the country’s irrigable land, up from 13.1 percent in 1930. The ejido had now 
become entrenched against attacks from more conservative elements of the regime. 
(Markiewicz, 1993: 88). Under Cardenas the ejido became the central component of 
populist politics in the countryside, and a key element in the consolidation of an unstable 
regime (Ibid: 113).  
To ensure the peasantry’s political support, Cardenas established the ‘Confederación 
Nacional Campesina’ (CNC) in 1938. The CNC aimed to incorporate independent peasant 
organisations into the regime’s own organising structure, consolidating its hegemony in the 
countryside. In the same year the CNC claimed to have incorporated 2,400,000 peasants, 
now without an independent organisational base and isolated from the working class which 
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had its own separate corporatist structures. Corporatist institutions for the peasantry and 
the working class were kept apart through fear that an alliance between the poorest groups 
in both sectors could potentially threaten the regime (Ibid: 104). Following Cardenas’ 
agrarian reform and his sweeping transformation of Mexico’s agrarian structure, 
subsequent administrations reverted to favouring the private over the social sector and 
have since attempted to reverse the impacts of Cardenista policy, discussed in sections two 
and three. 
 
1.2 Ecuador’s Agrarian Reform  
Ecuador’s first agrarian reform law of 1964 aimed to modernise agriculture, eradicate 
precarious forms of labour, foster a capitalist rationality on the land, and place unexploited 
public lands under production (Cosse, 1984: 37). Until the second half of the 1950s, 
Ecuador’s land tenure structure had remained largely unchanged since colonial times. In 
1918 debt servitude was legally abolished but in reality continued to be the foundation of 
landed production until the 1960s under the ‘huasipungo’. Under this system, tenant 
farmers were obliged to work between four and six days per week for the landlord in 
exchange for the use of a small subsistence plot of land (the huasipungo). While specific 
production relations varied from hacienda to hacienda, peasants living and working under 
these conditions also had rights to some degree of use of hacienda resources, such as water, 
pasture and forest products (Blankstein & Zuvekas Jr, 1973: 74)5. This agrarian structure 
predominated in the Andean Sierra, where Ecuador’s population was concentrated and 
production for the internal market predominated. Land concentration was extreme; the 
1954 agricultural census shows that 56.7 percent of the country’s agricultural land was 
concentrated by just over one percent of the total number of production units. Production 
was based on extensive cultivation and the vast majority of hacienda land, the best quality, 
was in possession of the landlord and destined for production for the national market. The 
worst quality land was divided into small subsistence plots for dependent ‘huasipangueros’ 
(Saenz, 1980: 307). However, this data disguises huge differences between the agrarian 
structures of Ecuador’s coastal plain and the Andes which remain to this day. 
                                                          
5 This situation was much the same in Mexico, with the specificities of peasant rights and obligations varying 
between individual haciendas. 
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Cacao plantations developed on Ecuador’s coastal plain from the late 19th Century until 
1920 in response to favourable geographical conditions for growing the crop at a time 
when European demand was expanding. National and transnational capital appropriated 
huge tracts of productive land, dispossessing the region’s peasantry and creating a mass of 
surplus labour and semi-capitalist social relations on new cacao plantations (Chiriboga, 
1988). A small (around 20 families) cacao oligarchy came to dominate the coast, with some 
landlords concentrating over 100,000 hectares each (García, 2013: 186). Rather than the 
tight relationship of social domination and control between landlords and peasants that 
characterised Andean and southern Mexican haciendas, peasants on these newly emerging 
coastal plantations were relatively much ‘freer’, or at least more independent in terms of 
their reproduction strategies. Andean peasants left their home regions to colonise the 
largely unpopulated coastal plain on landlords’ uncultivated estates. Wage labour relations 
developed as a result of labour scarcity, a condition that made it difficult to fully establish 
semi-feudal social relations tying producers to the hacienda. In order to attract the labour 
necessary to maximise production it was necessary to offer workers better conditions than 
those on Sierra haciendas, and to also pay them wages in cash (Redclift, 1978: 44).  The 
imperatives of the capitalist market began to increasingly establish themselves in the early 
1910s following the development of massive cacao plantations on Africa’s western coast 
financed by British capital.  This reduced world cacao prices and forced Ecuadorian 
plantation owners to operate under capitalist rationality and increase productive efficiency 
in order to remain viable producers of the bean. This included placing all available land 
under production, leading to the expropriation of peasants occupying subsistence plots 
within the hacienda and the conversion of some of these peasants into wage labourers on 
capitalist plantations (Chiriboga, 1988: 170). This contrasted with landlords in the Sierra 
supplying the national market, relatively independent from the capitalist world system and 
retaining pre-capitalist, extensive production relations. Until around the 1950s they did not 
confront the imperative to improve production and efficiency.  
The pre-capitalist landlord class in the Sierra’s central and northern valleys began to 
undergo processes of class differentiation from the late 1950s as a result of capitalist 
development on a world scale and the growing dependence of Ecuador’s pre-capitalist 
haciendas’ on the world market (Guerrero, 1988: 90). By the latter half of the 1950s, pre-
capitalist market integration had become simply unsustainable economically for a growing 
number of landlords, leading to huasipungo liquidation and the generalisation of wage 
labour relations as capitalist efficiency became an imperative for survival. Industrial growth 
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- at 6-8.5 percent per year between 1960 and 1972 - had begun to take off from the late 
1950s and the urbanisation that accompanied it (Velasco, 1988) led to increased demand 
for food in industrial centres. An increasing percentage of national demand for basic 
foodstuffs was being met through imports as inefficient haciendas in the Sierra could simply 
not meet growing national demand (Velasco, 1988). They were increasingly unable to 
compete with the prices of food imports and so were forced to modernise in order to 
survive. This involved mechanisation and the uptake of emerging green revolution 
technologies purchased from the world market. Commodity relations were thus 
internalised within the hacienda as the need to sell in order to provide the monetary 
income to continually improve production and lower unit costs came to condition survival. 
Market imperatives forced capitalist efficiency as population growth and capitalist 
development in the rest of the economy increased the opportunity cost of the land 
(Guerrero, 1988: 111). The huasipungo became an obstacle to capitalist accumulation and 
efficiency as well as a social problem within the hacienda; peasant demands for huasipungo 
expansion were increasingly rejected in the face of capitalising hacienda owners needing to 
place all hacienda land under production for the market. This is why many hacienda owners 
wanted to generalise wage labour in the 1960s and relieve themselves of their 
responsibilities towards huasipungo populations (Martínez, 1984: 86) (See Barksy, 1980 and 
Archetti & Stolen, 1988, for more in depth analysis of capitalist development on Ecuador’s 
sierra haciendas).  
The promulgation of the Agrarian Reform and Colonisation Law (Ley de Reforma Agraria y 
Colonización) on 11 July 1964 explicitly combined both reform and colonisation, the latter 
implemented far more extensively than the former for reasons elaborated below.  Rather 
than addressing the country’s massively unequal land distribution its central objective was 
to end all forms of precarious land tenure, namely the huasipungo, but also absentee 
landlordism. ‘Absentee landholdings’ or lands ‘not efficiently exploited’ were to be 
redistributed to a new class of ‘independent’ - formerly huasipungo, or ‘precarious’ - 
peasants in the form of cooperatives. These cooperatives were created by the state and 
were to be financed through state loans to this new class of independent peasants. The 
government created IERAC (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización / 
Ecuadorian Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonisation), a semi-autonomous public body 
that would administer the reform process. Land to be redistributed by IERAC included: 
unused public land ceded to the institute under the law; ‘deficiently utilised’ private land 
subject to expropriation; and land left unexploited for ten years that would then revert to 
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IERAC. The law also established maximum holding limits of 2,500 hectares on the coast and 
800 hectares in the sierra, in addition to 1,000 hectares of pasture in either region. These 
limits were much higher than those implemented by Cardenas in Mexico (see above), 
allowing Ecuadorian landlords to concentrate much more land than their Mexican 
counterparts. Also, in contrast to Cardenas’ no compensation policy in Mexico, Ecuador’s 
expropriated landlords would be paid with newly created government agrarian reform 
bonds and be sold on to beneficiaries at a price fixed in accordance with its productive 
capacity and beneficiaries’ ability to pay. The Ecuadorian peasantry did not have the 
political power of its Mexican counterpart to force expropriations without landlord 
compensation. 
The impacts of the reform on inequality of land access were minimal. Little was done to 
enforce maximum extension limits and IERAC only intervened in 50 haciendas from 1964-
1969, with only 14 of these interventions involving actual expropriation (Blankstein & 
Zuvekas Jr, 1973: 82). The gini coefficient for land inequality fell from 0.86 in 1954 to 0.85 in 
1974, only a very small improvement in overall land distribution considering the scale of the 
problem (Zapata, Ruiz & Brassel, 2008: 23).  
Table one shows that most progress was made in the liquidation of the huasipungo, and by 
1969, 88.4 percent of the estimated number of huasipungo families had become 
landowners. However, the average size of their plot was only 3.5 hectares (Ibid: 81). For 
these peasants agrarian reform had limited itself to handing them a small plot, almost 
always less than they effectively had access to before (Cosse, 1984: 45). The reform, while 
giving them land in the form of free private property titles that formalised access to the 
(usually poor quality) subsistence plots at the edge of the hacienda they had previously 
worked, at the same time denied them access to what were previously communal access 
resources, namely pastures, forests and water. As a result, most were materially worse off 
following the reform than before it and far more exposed to forces of dispossession and 
proletarianisation than their Mexican counterparts occupying land under the ejidal system. 
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Table 2. Goals and accomplishments of agrarian reform and colonisation projects in 
Ecuador: 1964-1969. 
 
Projects 
Goals Accomplishments 
Families Hectares Families Hectares 
Agrarian Reform: 
Abolishment of huasipungos 
Other redistributions of land 
Subtotal 
Colonisation: 
Legalisation of property 
holdings and new 
adjudications on colonisation 
lands 
Total: 
 
19,459 
37,041 
56,500 
 
25,500 
 
 
82,000 
 
235,000 
425,000 
660,000 
 
709,000 
 
 
1,369,000 
 
17,026 
10,831 
27,857 
 
10,542 
 
 
38,399 
 
60,093 
92,022 
152,115 
 
364,934 
 
 
517,049 
(Taken from: Blankstein & Zuvekas Jr, 1973: 81. Original source: Goals - Plan general de 
desarrollo economic y social, tomo II, libro sexto, capitulo 2, pages 80 and 107; 
accomplishments - IERAC unpublished data). 
In terms of land area, colonisation took precedence over agrarian reform from the outset. 
Table one also shows that of the 517,049 hectares in total that was handed over to 
beneficiaries during the period 1964-1969, 364,934 hectares (just over 70 percent) was 
done so in the form of colonisation of uninhabited (typically Amazon) zones. As a result of 
the 1964 law one fundamental characteristic of the country’s agrarian structure - the 
concentration of land, political power and income by landlords - remained unchanged, 
while another - the huasipungo and the generalisation of non-capitalist production 
relations in the sierra - was transformed. It forced an accelerated process of (semi-) 
proletarianisation as the small marginal plots could not sustain a growing peasant 
population. Population growth on haciendas had previously been incorporated into the 
hacienda system via huasipango expansions granted by landlords in response to peasant 
pressure. Landlords had now rid themselves of their obligations towards huasipangueros 
and established capitalist enterprises on the best hacienda lands. Over time, population 
growth led to a process of fragmentation of already small plots, further eroding the 
capacity of household units to meet basic subsistence requirements (Breton, 2013: 96-97). 
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There was a strong contraction of labour demand in the Andes due to mechanisation of 
remaining haciendas which further increased pressure on peasant holdings and processes 
of (semi)proletarianisation and impoverishment.  
If, as some writers argue (Jordan, 2003; Barksy, 1980; Zapata, Ruiz & Brassel, 2008), the 
1964 law was not influenced by the country’s weak, unorganised peasantry, the results of 
the law itself were to radicalise and mobilise peasants. The law had made peasant 
reproduction even more precarious than under pre-capitalist, so-called ‘precarious’ forms 
of land tenancy.  This radicalised the peasantry, now better able to organise resistance as 
‘independent’ subjects than as hacienda bonded huasipangueros, and contributed to the 
eventual implementation of Ecuador’s second, and more radical, agrarian reform law of 
1973.  
Despite the emergence of an ‘independent’ peasantry it was not yet strong enough to 
directly influence state policy as an organised political force. In 1965 FETAP (Federación de 
Trabajadores Agropecuarios / Federation of Agricultural Workers), which would later 
become FENOCIN, was established in the Central and Northern Andes to force the 
implementation of the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law in its territories6. The organisation 
worked especially in the provinces of Chimborazo, Imbabura and Pichincha where it 
distributed land to around 3,000 campesinos from 70 haciendas. At the end of 1965 it 
affiliated 10 agrarian unions and 75 associations within a pyramidal organisational structure 
inherited from urban unionising (FENOCIN, 1999: 24). In 1967 FETAP extended to the coast, 
the province of Rios especially where 44 organisations integrated, and in Guayas seven 
more joined. Seeing the lack of progress with reforms as a result of IERAC’s underfunding, 
bureaucratic and government indifference to the interests of the peasantry and the 
complicity of state authorities with landowners, FETAP’s coastal organisations pressured for 
radicalisation of the struggle and demanded peasant participation in shaping and 
implementing agrarian reform policy. Pressure from coastal organisations led to the 
displacement of FETAP’s original conservative tendencies as struggles radicalised. This was 
manifested at FETAP’s third national congress in November 1968 where it was decided to 
rename the organisation FENOC (Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas / 
National Federation of Peasant Organisations) and reiterate the state’s obligation to 
                                                          
6 In 1938 the Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers (CEDOC) was set up as a joint initiative between the 
Catholic Church and the Conservative Party to create a union distanced from Leftist tendencies. In the 1950s, 
under the perceived threat of Communism, CEDOC turned its attention to the countryside and constituted 
FETAP which would later free itself from conservative and Catholic influences and ally with the Ecuadorian 
Socialist Party in 1977 (Altmann, 2014: 5). 
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(re)distribution. The organisation demanded support for the newly constituted 
independent peasant sector and regulation of lands leased to its coastal rice growers (Ibid: 
25). 
The 1964 Law had raised peasant hopes of revolutionising Ecuador’s agrarian structure and 
improving their lives through democratisation of land access. The failure to deliver on these 
promises intensified and generalised a crisis of peasant reproduction and spawned new 
organisations fighting for land. The first agrarian reform law had achieved its main ends for 
those most responsible for its promulgation - modernising landlord fractions in the 
Northern and Central Andes and the emerging industrial bourgeoisie. The abolition of the 
huasipango was rapid and, once complete, signified the end of agrarian reform in their eyes. 
Figure one shows how the number beneficiaries and of total hectares legalised through 
agrarian reform fell significantly following the immediate aftermath of the 1964 law’s 
implementation, only to rise significantly once more following the second law of 1973.  
 
Figure 1. Total number of hectares legalised and total number of beneficiaries annually in 
Ecuador under agrarian reform. 
(taken from: Gondard & Mazurek, 2001: 17 & 18) 
As shown in figure one, from the legalisation of over 50,000 hectares annually in 1965, this 
area had fallen to under 10,000 by 1970. The initial wave of legalisations had formalised 
peasants’ access to the subsistence plots they had held as huasipungueros in the interests 
of modernising landlords wishing to rid themselves of responsibility towards huasipango 
populations. It is important to note that from 1964 to the mid-1970s, colonisation remained 
an important and stable element of state policy, but was not enough to eliminate growing 
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calls for action to be taken to redistribute land in the sierra under a comprehensive agrarian 
reform that had yet to be implemented. Between 1964 and 1974, the average land area 
legalised via colonisation was 65,983 annually, with an average of 1,820 beneficiaries per 
year, the vast majority in the Amazon region (Gondard & Mazurek, 2001: 22). 
In 1968 former president Velasco Ibarra had returned to the presidency following a 
successful populist campaign. However, once in office he governed from the right, 
effectively ending the agrarian reform process and implementing sweeping austerity 
measures. This led to widespread social unrest and by 1970 Ibarra’s government was 
cracking under the pressure. In 1972 a military coup led by General Rodriguez Lara seized 
control of the country and sent Ibarra into exile (Pineo, 2007: 178). Although Lara’s military 
government may have proposed a radicalisation and deepening of the reform process when 
it came to power in 1972, the 1973 law in reality represented a counter-reform and the 
eventual termination of agrarian reform as a policy intended, at least rhetorically, to 
redistribute land, power and wealth in the countryside. IERAC’s underfunding had 
combined with landlords’ entrenched political and economic power to limit the 
redistributional impacts of the first reform law. The combination of growing social unrest 
and the discovery of oil in 1967 triggered the military government of Rodriguez Lara to push 
for a sweeping agrarian reform. It was hoped that this could incorporate a growing and 
potentially destabilising peasant population, increasingly impoverished through lack of land 
access and employment opportunities, into Ecuador’s social and economic development. 
However, proposals for the new law led to dispute between the reformist government and 
the powerful Chamber of Agriculture, a state body representing conservative landlords of 
the Sierra (Martz, 1987: 120). The result was a much watered down law than the military 
government had initially promised when it first took power. According to Guillermo 
Maldonado-Lince, Minister of Agriculture from 1972-1977, the military government had 
planned to stipulate in the law that land had to fulfil a ‘social function’, with lands subject 
to expropriation that did not do so. Lands would not be fulfilling their social function if they 
were: 
a) Deficiently exploited 
b) Not conserving renewable natural resources 
c) Not under the direct responsibility and administration of the landowner 
d) Being ‘hoarded’ 
e) Not fulfilling the requirements of the country’s labour laws 
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The first of these functions was the most contentious between the government and the 
Chamber of Agriculture. The former had in 1972 stated a commitment to expropriate 
holdings in which at least 80 percent of the land area was not under production, with a 
level of productivity not meeting the Ministry of Agriculture’s average measures and/or 
without infrastructure investment to allow its productive exploitation (Maldonado-Lince, 
1979: 25-27). However, as a result of on-going confrontations between the Chamber of 
Agriculture and the Lara government the ‘social function’ of land was redefined to suit the 
interests of landlords and came to be interpreted as a productivity and efficiency issue, 
rather than one based on the distribution of resources. This demonstrates the political 
power that landlords continued to wield within the state apparatus. According to the 
Chamber, landlords had already begun to modernise and were now being threatened with 
calls for redistribution that would destroy the agricultural base of the country and threaten 
the viability of Lara’s plan to industrialise Ecuador (Ayala, 1998: 163).  
FETAP/FENOC was a central protagonist in channelling growing rural unrest through the 
end of the 1960s and into the 1970s and won important victories for its members in terms 
of the break-up of inefficient estates passed into peasant hands (FENOCIN, 1999: 25). 
However, these were relatively isolated victories and neither FETAP nor the national 
peasant movement as a whole could prevent landlord interests prevailing and reversing the 
more revolutionary elements of Lara’s proposals.  From a project designed to break 
landlord control of the land and incorporate an increasingly impoverished and dangerous 
peasantry into oil-funded national development, the 1973 Reform Law had become focused 
on promoting capitalist development of large scale agriculture. From this point on 
productivity would trump redistribution as the central objective of state rural policy.  The 
aim of democratising landed property was replaced by that of pressuring all producers to 
produce more efficiently, with efficiency interpreted as large-scale, green revolution 
agriculture.  
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Agrarian Counter-Reform in Mexico and Ecuador and the 
Onset of Neoliberalism 
1.3  The Scaling Back of Agrarian Reform in Mexico 
From 1940 to the mid-1960s there was a significant slowdown in the agrarian reform 
process nationally as large-scale, state-subsidised commercial agriculture was promoted 
and thrived. The mass of the peasantry had been incorporated into the PRM (the ruling 
‘Partido de la Revolución Mexicana’, later renamed the ‘Partido Revolucionario Institucional’ 
[PRI] in 1946) via the CNC through Cardenas’ massive land redistribution programme, 
dampening unrest and institutionalising direct channels of negotiation and resource 
distribution between the state and the social sector. This to a great extent legitimated the 
state in the countryside and created the social stability necessary for the bourgeois regime 
to consolidate its political power. For around 30 years following the end of Cardenas’ 
presidency, legal measures7 increasingly favoured private property and policy tended to 
promote the productive development of private capitalist units to the detriment of the 
increasingly maligned social sector. It became clear immediately following the end of 
Cardenas’ term that productive goals were now to subsume social objectives. Mexico began 
to embark upon a model of import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) as imports from the 
USA, now at war, dried up. This led to a growing divergence between what Bartra (1993: 34) 
terms Mexico’s ‘two agricultures’; the state-supported development of the capitalist 
(private) sector fostered the concentration of capital, land and mechanisation and 
inevitably assisted the erosion of the social/ejidal sector which was left under-capitalised, 
under supported, and increasingly unable to compete with the modern sector. Rather than 
forming the basis of Mexico’s agricultural sector as it had been conceived by Cardenas, the 
ejido became a necessary institution for the regime to manage the social costs of capitalist 
development in the countryside. By effectively slowing down the process of 
proletarianisation and decomposition of the peasantry through allowing the social sector to 
keep hold of its own means of subsistence, the ejido system could retain a mass of the 
peasantry that neither agriculture nor industry could absorb, thereby reducing the potential 
for rural unrest. 
                                                          
7 The ‘Ley de Tierras Baldias, Nacionales y Desmasais’ came into effect on 30 December 1950 under the Alemán 
government and consolidated the legal process of redistribution of state-held national lands to individuals. 
Again in 1962, the ‘Ley de Colonisacion Privada’ established that national lands occupied and solicited before 
1963 could be titled freely to individuals (Ramos, 1992: 74-75). 
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During the ISI period (1940-1980) Mexico’s economy grew at six percent per year, the so-
called ‘Mexican miracle’, in which the one-party regime not only consolidated but also 
became extremely centralised and powerful. Investment in agriculture focused on massive 
irrigation projects in the north and north-west of the country creating an important agro-
export sector; between 1940 and 1945, 15 percent of all federal government investment 
and almost 90 percent of agricultural investment went into creating these huge irrigation 
districts (Foley, 1991: 45).  As state investment poured into the development of private 
northern irrigated zones state support for the ejidal sector, which predominated in the 
centre and south of the country, was progressively withdrawn (Hamilton, 2011: 80). 
Population growth in the social sector combined with the slowdown of land redistribution 
led to growing division and fragmentation of social property, depeasanisation and (semi) 
proletarianisation that has continued to this day. However, the state’s attempts to free 
itself from obligations to the peasantry did not go uncontested. Independent peasant 
movements emerged in the centre and south of the country and the government 
responded with a combination of coercion, co-optation of leaders, partial concessions and, 
as a last resort, repression to demands that it could not contain or control (Ibid: 85-87). As a 
result of peasant resistance the regime could never abandon land redistribution and the 
social sector. It kept with its revolutionary rhetoric of social justice for the peasantry and 
commitment to the ejido despite overwhelming state focus on the private sector. It was 
forced to make concessions to the peasantry, sometimes minimal, sometimes significant, 
depending on the strength of national and regional peasant mobilisations at different 
historical conjunctures.  
 
By the beginning of the 1960s agricultural growth, booming since 1940, entered into crisis. 
Commercial agriculture concentrated in the north, although highly productive, was based 
on the production of export, industrial, and ‘luxury’ rather than domestic crops. The 
peasant/social sector, responsible for the production of the vast majority of Mexico’s staple 
crops, had continued to deteriorate, decapitalised and abandoned as it had been by the 
state. Domestic food demand was increasingly outstripping supply as industrialisation 
continued apace. It was within this context that in 1961 the CCI (Central Campesina 
Independiente / Independent Campesino Central) - precursor to the CIOAC - emerged as the 
first post-revolutionary national peasant organisation outside of the corporatist control of 
the official party. From the end of Cardenas’ administration to this point the state had 
managed minimal land redistribution and colonisation as a social pressure valve, combined 
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with selective acts of repression and the CNC as the dominant corporatist force in the 
countryside on which the peasantry depended for any chance of receiving land (Hernández, 
2011: 28). However, Hernández (2011: 31) argues that ‘everyday forms of resistance’ (Scott, 
1985) were ever present among landless and land poor peasants excluded from the state’s 
corporatist structures (namely the CNC). By 1958 this resistance became increasingly overt 
taking the form of land invasions in response to growing inequality, injustice and the loss of 
patience and hope that land could be acquired via institutional channels. There was also 
growing internal inconformity within the CNC which faced growing criticism from within its 
ranks for ‘agrarista’ abandonment, caciquismo, and lack of action over the stagnation of 
agrarian reform and the change in direction of rural policy in favour of the private sector. 
This triggered the formation of the CCI as a critical breakaway section of the CNC (Ibid: 28-
34). The organisation profiled itself as an alternative pole in the representation and 
intermediation of the peasantry while maintaining a centralist organisational model 
inherited from the CNC. Its central organisational principle of associative independence 
from the state and political parties articulated with a wave of dissent nationally, both rural 
and urban, that centred on criticism of the PRI project - its failings to meet the promises of 
the revolution, corporatism, repression, lack of democracy, growing inequality and 
economic slowdown. In the countryside it began to represent a serious threat to CNC/PRI 
hegemony (Ibid: 57-59). 
From mid-1961 to 1964 the CCI maintained its position of independence with regard to the 
government. It managed to unite sporadic unrest as an independent national movement 
and began to increasingly challenge the established order and associated state corporatism 
- it had to be neutralised (Ibid: 67). In 1964 internal problems within the CCI regarding 
strategy and ideology led to the expulsion, with police support, of eleven ‘communist’ 
leaders, including one of the founders of the CCI itself, Ramon Danzos Palomino. As a result 
the organisation effectively split into two groups; ‘CCI Roja’, headed by Danzos Palomino, 
linked to the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), and which would later become CIOAC; and 
‘CCI Blanca’, headed by the less radical factions which, by the end of the decade, 
reintegrated itself back into the PRI (Terán, 2010: 38).  
The impetus to renew the regime’s commitment to agrarian reform strengthened following 
the 1968 police massacre of students in Mexico City. In an attempt to restore credibility in 
the countryside the Echeverria administration (1970-1976) focused on land redistribution 
and the ejido to increase productivity (Ibid: 96). However, this focus was on redistribution 
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to a very particular fraction of the peasantry - the better endowed (economically and 
climatologically) and more market-oriented fraction that could benefit from increased 
market integration (Fox, 1985: 38), and not the already marginalised, fragmented, 
increasingly proletarianised peasants that predominated in much of the south of the 
country. In the context of the Echeverria government’s professed support for land 
redistribution, 1975 and 1976 saw peasant land invasions across the country (Foley, 1991: 
45), many led by the CCI Roja. The invasions were so widespread that they forced the 
expropriation of almost 100 thousand hectares of irrigated land in Sonora and the 
collectivisation of over 600 ejidos nationwide (Ibid: 47). Despite these victories for peasant 
agriculture they were still isolated events in the overall context of Mexico’s agrarian 
transformation and could not reverse the tendential ruin of the peasant economy.  
As a response to rural protest and the PRI’s growing legitimacy crisis a whole set of 
interconnected state owned enterprises (SOEs) were established or restructured to ‘assist’ 
the ejidal sector and its productive development in the 1960s and 1970s. Mediated through 
the CNC and based on Green Revolution technologies, these included CONASUPO, a storage, 
distribution and marketing parastatal for basic grains; FERTIMEX for the provision of 
subsidised fertilisers; BANRURAL to deliver subsidised rural credit; and PRONASE for 
subsidised seeds. Through these institutions the state could intervene directly in 
community decision making and politically channel access to public resources and political 
participation. The dependency on compensatory resources was a powerful instrument for 
the state to establish and maintain control over ejidatarios, especially those thinking about 
joining independent organisations such as the CCI/CIOAC. This dependency also allowed the 
state to better manage processes of proletarianisation resulting from Mexico’s capitalist 
development that could potentially destabilise the regime. Ejidal subsidies held in check 
social differentiation between and within ejidos as better entrepreneurs could not 
accumulate land and the worst could not lose it (Foley, 1995: 72). With the support of these 
state institutions the ejidal sector, extraordinarily heterogeneous as it was (and still is), 
came to shelter and conceal extremely unproductive, pauperised and/or proletarianised 
sectors of the peasantry. This allowed Mexico’s capitalist agricultural sector to concentrate 
capital and land, especially in the irrigated north of the country.8 
From 1976 to 1992 state-support for the peasant sector was gradually cut back and land 
redistribution significantly slowed down, applied sporadically in isolated cases as a political 
                                                          
8 In practice, illegal sale/leasing of ejido land was and is widespread, but its illegality by nature has 
prevented significant accumulation by more entrepreneurial ejidatarios. 
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tool to manage unrest and more often than not with poor quality land and no attempt to 
provide the necessary inputs to make it produce. This strategy was particularly effective in 
demobilising CIOAC and other groups demanding land by (re)distributing it among the most 
militant factions whose attention and energies then shifted to the struggle to make a living 
from land won with little or no state support. The progressive weakening of the state’s 
commitment to redistribution from the Lopez Portillo administration (1976-1982) onwards 
culminated in the official termination of agrarian reform in 1992. The SAM programme 
(Sistema Alimentario Mexicano) was the cornerstone of Lopez Portillo’s agrarian policy, and 
promised to increase staples production to achieve national food self-sufficiency in basic 
grains and revitalise the traditional state-peasant alliance without the need for 
redistribution. However, the distribution of SAM fell largely to the private sector and the 
highly capitalised peasant classes. The result of state intervention therefore was actually to 
widen the gap between small and large producers, while increasing the power of agri-
business to block most subsequent reform initiatives (Fox, 1993: 57-86).  
The SAM programme was eventually disbanded when Miguel de la Madrid came to power 
in 1982 in the context of the Mexican debt crisis; by August 1982 Mexico could no longer 
service its external debt which stood at US$ 80 billion, 42 percent of GDP. In November the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided Mexico with US$3.84 billion in credit over the 
next three years to keep up with debt repayments on the condition of adopting a Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) that forced the government to implement stringent austerity 
measures, reduce trade barriers and open the economy to foreign investment (Cline, 1982). 
De la Madrid officially ruled out land redistribution as a solution to Mexico’s agricultural 
problems and further cut productive supports for the social sector. SOEs geared towards 
the productive development of the peasant sector began to undergo processes of 
privatisation and/or dismantling.  
Before discussing its official termination in section three, it is useful to examine the 
quantitative results of over 70 years of agrarian reform nationally on the eve of the 1992 
changes to Mexico’s Constitution. Table two, taken from national agricultural census data 
of 1991, shows the total number of land holdings and area owned for the peasant 
(community and ejido), private and mixed sectors in rural Mexico.  
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Table 3. Land holdings and area owned for the peasant (community and ejido), private and 
mixed sectors  
 
Sectors Number of 
Holdings 
Percent Area (millions of 
hectares) 
Percent 
Community-based 3,040,495 66.3 103.29 59.0 
Private 1,410,742 30.8 71.69 40.9 
Mixed 133,912 2.9 0.13 0.1 
Totals 4,585,149 100 175.11 100 
(Source: VII Censo Ejidal Nacional Agropecuario y Ejidal: Taken from: Toledo, 1996: 253) 
 
Despite 50 years of post-Cardenas governments’ attempts to reverse agrarian reform and 
promote private, capitalist agriculture, in 1991 59 percent of Mexico’s total agricultural 
land area was constituted as social property under peasant production and made up over 
66 percent of the total number of landholdings nationally. However, this national level data 
masks important regional variations, especially those between the irrigated, capitalised, 
private agriculture that characterises the north of the country and the rain-fed, pauperised, 
ejidal/community production that characterises much of the south of the country. Table 
three demonstrates this contrast in terms of the size of the rural population and mean size 
of individual holdings for four northern and three southern states. 
 
Table 4. Area of landholdings and producer numbers in Northern and Southern States of 
Mexico.  
(Source: INEGI 2007, Censo Agropecuario) 
 
 
  
State 
Total land area under 
agricultural/forest 
production (Ha) 
 
Total number of 
producers 
Mean size of 
individual 
landholding (Ha) 
 
Northern 
States 
Nuevo Leon 2,270,099 34,171 66.4 
Sinaloa 1,783,466 72,999 24.4 
Tamaulipas 3,197,919 54,807 58.3 
Sonora 8,439,571 32,063 263.2 
 
Southern 
States 
Chiapas 3,059,530 406,599 7.5 
Guerrero 2,029,012 275,899 7.4 
Oaxaca 2,030,507 354,201 5.7 
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The data in table three shows that larger landholdings tend to be found in Mexico’s 
northern border states while on average much smaller landholdings and a more populous 
rural sector characterises the southern parts of the country.  Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca 
are the three poorest states in the republic while those of the north shown in the table are 
some of the wealthiest. In the latter, private property is the predominant form of land 
ownership and has historically been favoured through access to state subsidies of various 
direct and indirect forms. In the three southern states in the table social property 
predominates which, as we have seen, has become increasingly fragmented, exhausted and 
unviable, left to slowly decompose and attenuate the potentially socially destabilising 
effects of capitalist development.  
 
1.4 The Scaling Back of Agrarian Reform in Ecuador 
 
When the military government handed over power in 1979 it was the final point in a long 
process of agrarian reform that was uneven, sporadic, and ultimately minimal in the face of 
strong organised resistance from traditional landlord elites. From the 1980s onwards the 
role of the state would gradually be transferred to the market (Jordan, 2003: 298) and the 
importance of colonisation to meet peasant demands for land would take on increasing 
importance. 
The 1973 reform law in reality represented another victory for the embedded landlord class 
and yet another nail in the coffin of an already minimal land reform in terms of its 
redistributional effects. It would not resolve the problem of growing peasant unrest as 
population pressure on peasant holdings continued to grow and expulsion of landless/land-
poor producers into already saturated urban labour markets continued to threaten social 
stability. With ‘agrarian reform’ now focused on the capitalist development of agriculture, 
the Lara government and subsequent administrations would have to address this problem 
without tackling the country’s massive inequality of land ownership. Colonisation of the 
Amazon region was seen as the solution. Figure two demonstrates the growing dependence 
on colonisation as a state policy to meet demands for land from an expanding peasant 
population. 
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Figure 2. Annual surface area legalised and average number of beneficiaries per year from 
colonisation in Ecuador.  
(taken from: Gondard & Mazurek, 2001: 21) 
Figure two shows a marked increase in both the land area legalised under colonisation and 
the number of colonisation beneficiaries from 1983 onwards, four years after the end of 
military rule and the effective termination of state-led agrarian reform as a means for 
peasants to gain access to land. Despite the emphasis on colonisation, the policy has not 
solved the problem of growing pressure on peasant holdings and the related processes of 
fragmentation of production units and (semi-) proletarianisation.  
FENOC was becoming increasingly frustrated with continued land concentration despite 
successive administrations’ stated commitment to redistribution. In 1975, faced with the 
vacillation of the military government, the organisation launched its radical motto ‘with the 
law, without the law, we will carry out agrarian reform’ (‘Con ley, sin ley, haremos la 
reforma agraria’). The radicalisation of FENOC’s demands evidenced the growing influence 
of the PSE (Ecuadorian Socialist Party) within its ranks. That same year an acute struggle 
within the organisation took place between socialist and Christian democrat factions, the 
latter of which had, since FENOC’s inception, dominated its leadership. This conflict was 
mainly ideological between radical and conciliatory positions regarding how to engage with 
the government to bring about land reform and whether extra institutional tactics such as 
land invasions should form part of FENOC’s strategy (FENOCIN, 1999: 37). By 1977 the PSE 
supported leadership controlled the organisation. However, the use of state colonisation 
policies in the Amazon demobilised Ecuador’s increasingly militant and powerful peasant 
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movement, ensuring that landlord control of the best land in the Andes and on the coast 
remained intact. 
The military government used oil revenues to increase state expenditure in the agricultural 
sector, up from 2.1 percent of the share of total state budget in 1972 to 10.3 percent in 
1975. However, the distribution of this budget only deepened existing rural inequality, with 
provision of rural infrastructure and benefits of public expenditures highly correlated with 
prevailing distribution of wealth and land. In 1974, over 80 percent of credits were received 
by large (>100Ha) and medium (5-100Ha) producers, the rest left to smallholders (<5Ha), or 
around two-thirds of the country’s total number of producers (Vos, 1988; 26). Those 
already most impoverished, with least access to land (and mostly poor quality land), were 
unable to access credit and benefited least from state agricultural policy. They were also 
the group that produced the country’s staple crops. Similarly to Mexico, domestic crop 
production had stagnated as state policy favoured a private sector dedicated primarily to 
exports. Staples production, on the other hand, was carried out predominantly by 
decapitalised small producers, forced to produce on increasingly fragmented, marginal 
holdings with soil exhaustion and increasing proletarianisation growing issues (Treakle, 
1998; 221-222).  
The high oil prices that prevailed during the 1970s had allowed the Ecuadorian state to 
significantly increase both spending and borrowing. The government had prioritised social 
spending that had delivered health and education programmes to some of the country’s 
poorest inhabitants, but events of the 1980s, internal and external, sent Ecuador into 
economic crisis. The combined effects of the debt crisis, the 1985-1986 oil price collapse 
and a massive earthquake in 1987 that destroyed the main pipeline and shut down oil 
production for five months led to a disastrous economic decline. With external debts 
amounting to 37 percent of GDP, Ecuador was forced to accept a structural adjustment 
programme from the IMF in 1983. Most rural and industrial subsidies were reduced or 
eliminated, price controls and import quotas were removed and exports promoted. State 
spending was drastically cut, the Sucre (Ecuador’s then currency) devalued and interest 
rates were increased. During the adjustment period (from the early-1980s to the early-
1990s) Ecuador went into recession and per capita income fell 32 percent from US$ 1,444 
in 1982 to $977 in 1988. Indigenous peasants were particularly hard hit as prices of basic 
goods, namely food and fuel, rose dramatically while crop prices fell and credit sources 
dwindled further (only accessible anyway to more ‘viable’/market integrated producers, 
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never an option for the majority of the Andes’ indigenous peasants), driving many rural 
inhabitants to the burgeoning cities and abroad in search of a means of survival that 
remaining on the land could no longer provide them (Treakle, 1998; 221-222). 
 
The End of Agrarian Reform 
1.5 Neoliberalism and the Rise of Food Sovereignty 
Up to this point in the analysis of Mexico and Ecuador’s agrarian structures we have seen 
that the agrarian reform processes and rural transitions in both countries have historically 
been very different, the former characterised as far more ‘from below’ than the latter’s 
very much ‘from above’ nature. However, the application of neoliberal policies from the 
early 1980s onwards - culminating in the 1992 and 1994 agrarian laws in Ecuador and 
Mexico respectively - has seen the increasing convergence of the two in terms of the 
neoliberalisation of rural policy and its impacts on the production and reproduction 
strategies of various subaltern rural classes. The official termination of agrarian reform, the 
specific nature and objectives of the 1992 and 1994 laws, and ongoing neoliberal 
restructuring has led to the rise of food sovereignty as a unifying discourse for diverse 
peasant movements in Mexico, Ecuador, and across Latin America struggling against the 
neoliberal model. 
Salinas’ 1992 agrarian law was the most drastic and polemical characteristic of Mexico’s 
neoliberal turn in the rural sector (Hamilton, 2011: 121). Without doubt, the most 
controversial element of the new law was the amendment of Article 27 of the Constitution 
which had, since the revolution, promised land to the landless and restoration of land to 
the displaced. Under the 1992 amendments, designed to encourage private investment and 
‘modernise’ the countryside, specifically lands occupied under social property regimes, the 
following changes stand out: 
a) The state is no longer obligated to continue land reform or provide land 
b) The Mexican government has no power to expropriate land 
c) Ejidatarios now have the option to buy their own ejido, to lease it, transfer it, or use 
it as collateral for loans or to mortgage it (previously ejido lands were inalienable, 
non-transferable and could not be leased or mortgaged). 
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d) Ejidatarios may now form associations or joint ventures with commercial groups. 
e) Extension limits for private property were significantly relaxed; commercial 
associations can now accumulate 25 times the extension limit of individual private 
properties corresponding to a region and land use criteria (Castillo, 2004: 2-3 & 
243). 
The main thrust of the reforms aimed to create a fully capitalist land market by encouraging 
the dissolution of the ejidal sector through a combination of legal reforms to the social 
property regime and gradually withdrawing productive support for the peasant sector9. The 
reform of Article 27 was the culmination of a long process of de facto cancellation of land 
distribution and the ultimate indication that the state was once and for all abandoning the 
peasant model (Vergara-Camus, 2012; 15). Within six years (1988-1994) the institutional 
framework of rural Mexico was completely transformed in order to promote a model of 
economic growth based entirely on the market and private investment (Appendini, 1998: 
25). The goal of national food self-sufficiency present during the ISI period was abandoned 
as government deemed that it had become a cheaper and more effective policy to import 
food rather than support an inefficient staples producing peasantry. The same logic of 
focusing on comparative advantage was applied in Ecuador where state policy similarly 
abandoned support for peasant staples production to focus increased support on large-
scale, privately capitalised production of export crops.  
Ecuador’s 1994 Agrarian Development Law was backed by conservative landlords organised 
in the Chamber of Agriculture and fractions within political parties that favoured economic 
liberalisation. Its main objective was to achieve state guarantee of private property and, 
like Mexico’s 1992 law, the generalisation of private property as the basis of rural 
production with guarantees for landlords that their holdings could not be expropriated. 
IERAC was converted to INDA (Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Agrario / National Institute 
of Agrarian Development) in 1995, signifying not only the end of land redistribution 
(Guerrero Cazar & Ospina, 2003: 20), but also an effort on the part of the state to decouple 
the question of rural development from that of the concentration of land and wealth. In 
addition to the cancellation of land reform, the new agrarian laws of both countries 
removed the major institutional obstacles to efficient land transfers in an attempt to create 
capitalist-efficient land markets. 
                                                          
9 Despite the state’s attempt to create a fully capitalist land market, a combination of legal safeguards on ejidal 
property and ongoing rural crisis has prevented the rapid privatisation of land in Mexico. This is explored in 
more depth in chapter three. 
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Salinas’ comprehensive liberalisation of the agricultural sector in 1992 was planned with 
the intention of entering into The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. 
In order to do so, the role of the state in the rural sector had to be altered drastically. For 
Mexico, NAFTA implied a process of modernisation in which competitive exports crops such 
as winter vegetables and fruits would replace less profitable basic grains. A 15 year gradual 
phase out of grain tariffs was negotiated in order to ease the competitive pressures on 
Mexico’s grain producers (Rodarte, 2003: 131-134). However, just three years after NAFTA 
was implemented the Mexican government, citing supply shortages of basic grains, 
unilaterally approved imports from the US above the agreement’s quotas. Corn prices fell 
by nearly 50 percent at the same time as the government ended its price support system 
and other rural extension programmes (Wise, 2003). Figure three shows the amount of 
maize and wheat, two of the country’s most important basic staples, Mexico imported 
between 1980 and 2011 (The vast majority from the USA).  
Figure 3. Total volume of corn and wheat imported by Mexico 1985-2010 (metric tonnes).  
 
(Source: FAOSTAT, 2014 - my elaboration) 
 
For the nine years before NAFTA came into effect in 1994, Mexico was importing between 
0.5 and just under 5 million metric tonnes of corn annually, with import dependence 
fluctuating violently depending on national supply conditions year on year. From 1994 to 
2011 both corn and wheat imports increased significantly relative to the years prior to 
NAFTA’s implementation. Mexico’s dependence on the importation of both products has 
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more than tripled from the 1980s to the late-2000s. A similar trend is displayed by 
Ecuador’s imports of the same two products, both major staples there also. 
 
Figure 4. Total volume of corn and wheat imported by Ecuador 1985-2010 (metric tonnes).  
 
 
(Source: FAOSTAT, 2014 - my elaboration) 
 
Like Mexico, Ecuador demonstrates a similar trend of a marked, steadily increasing 
dependence on imports of staple foodstuffs from the mid-1990s following the 
implementation of neoliberal policies that saw the state withdraw from productive support 
for the peasant sector while the national market was simultaneously opened up to foreign 
imports. Between 1980 and 1995 maize imports were highly variable but only rose over 
four million tonnes in two of these 15 years. By 1998 over five million tonnes were 
imported annually and from that point onwards imports increased rapidly, reaching over 
nine million tonnes in 2008. From the mid-1990s onwards wheat imports have more than 
tripled. Up until the early 1980s both countries’ agricultural sectors were relatively 
protected from cheap imports of basic grains behind high tariff walls that were flexibly 
raised and lowered in response to internal demand. In years when national demand 
outstripped national supply, tariffs were lowered to accept imports and keep down food 
prices. However, from the early 1980s, especially following the implementation of IMF SAPs 
in 1982 (Mexico) and 1983 (Ecuador), tariff barriers were significantly reduced or 
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eliminated leading to the flooding in of cheaper (subsidised) grains from Northern 
producers. 
Salinas’ rush to liberalise in order to meet the NAFTA deadline meant that the government 
did not implement measures for a phased transition to neoliberasation of the countryside. 
The lack of articulation between the reforms and the institutional vacuum left by state 
withdrawal threw smallholders dedicated to production of staples for national consumption 
into new market and production contexts that they were poorly prepared to enter (Mhyre, 
1998: 39). In 1990, BANRURAL’s budget was severely cut as the bank reoriented towards 
farmers who had access to high quality lands dedicated primarily to production of export 
products. The bank’s total financed area reduced from 7.2 million to 1.2 million hectares 
between 1988 and 1991, mainly withdrawing credit from maize production and focusing in 
on the production of non-traditional exports (Ibid: 52).  
The food sovereignty movement emerged on the world stage in the 1990s in the context of 
an intensifying global agrarian crisis exacerbated by trade liberalisation and SAPs that saw 
national states withdrawing from domestic agricultural sectors across the global South. Its 
struggles and discourses were built in opposition to the consolidating corporate food 
regime and demanded the democratisation of national food and agricultural policies and 
the end of food dependency and depeasanisation wrought by neoliberalism (McMichael, 
2014: 934). The movement contests the increasing capitalisation of world agriculture and 
unprecedented market power and profits of monopoly food corporations (Holt Giménez & 
Shattuck, 2011: 111) that has resulted in a form of production that responds to foreign 
market demands while local/national production for local/national consumption is 
neglected (Teubal, 2009: 14). The threat posed by neoliberalism to rural livelihoods led 
diverse regional and national peasant organisations around the world to form their own 
transnational movement, the Via Campesina, in 1993. The internationalisation of the 
peasant movement was seen by many peasant leaders as a necessary response to the 
increasing internationalisation of capital which could no longer be contested effectively 
solely within nation states (Borras, 2004: 4). During the 1990s, food sovereignty emerged as 
a discourse in Mexico and Ecuador and developed to become the main organising principle 
of national peasant movements in both countries, CIOAC and FENOCIN included.  
Mexico’s food sovereignty movement, influenced ideologically by the VC’s establishment, 
emerged specifically in the context of NAFTA and the impacts of trade liberalisation on the 
ejidal sector. The country’s national peasant movement was in crisis following Salinas’ 
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reform of state-peasant movement relations (analysed in detail in chapter four), the reform 
of Article 27, and Mexico’s entry into NAFTA in 1994. These experiences were fundamental 
in shaping interpretations of, and demands for, food sovereignty. Luis Meneses, an 
influential national peasant leader at the time and a central protagonist in bringing the VC’s 
second international congress to Mexico in 1996, highlights how his organisation’s historical 
struggles articulated with the implementation of NAFTA to shape not only the Mexican 
peasant movement’s emerging calls for food sovereignty, but also those of the VC itself. 
‘For us as UNORCA (Unión Nacional de Organisaciones Regionales Campesinas 
Autónomas) it seemed that there was a total distancing of the state from 
agrarian activities, an abandonment. We said that we had to discuss (NAFTA) 
with the campesinos and that the state should not approve the agrarian 
chapter of the agreement, but the government paid us no attention... so we put 
forward a theme that the VC began to embrace, that it still embraces, which is 
the issue of the defence of food sovereignty....In the context of NAFTA it 
became a unifying banner for us and other organisations. We proposed that to 
defend food sovereignty meant that the government could not abandon the 
countryside. It meant organising a national system of production - with 
campesinos. It meant defending the small producer. It meant that we and the 
campesinos themselves form our own instruments to confront the market, to 
feed Mexico’. Luis Meneses, founder and ex-national president of UNORCA 
(21 February 2013, Mexico City). 
Leticia López Zepeda, national coordinator for ANEC (National Association of 
Commercialising Enterprises / Asociación Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras), locates 
the historical origins of the Mexican peasant movement’s conceptions of food sovereignty 
in the rural policies of the ISI period. 
‘Previously Mexico had a closed economy so fundamentally the concept of food 
sovereignty is based on this experience, in us producing what we 
consume...However, it’s not just a question of production but also of who 
produces and for what... Peasants, on their land, to feed themselves and the 
general population, that includes also the issue of our natural resources. It has 
a social, environmental and cultural content - for example a lot of money has 
been invested in Sinaloa and other states on the north to produce high yields 
with agrochemicals, fertilisers, but this isn’t the concept of sovereignty’. Leticia 
López Zepeda, national coordinator for ANEC (8 February 2013, Mexico City). 
For CIOAC, as well as Mexico’s other VC member organisations, the notion of food 
sovereignty remains strongly related to, even constructed on the basis of, a contestation of 
NAFTA. One of the organisation’s guiding principles is stated as ‘defence of food 
sovereignty’, understood as ‘the constitutional right of the nation to produce its own food’. 
CIOAC also states that ‘food sovereignty should be the principle axis of public policies 
towards the countryside, sustained in state policy’. To do so, they argue, requires first and 
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foremost the revision of NAFTA as the basis upon which a new agrarian programme can be 
developed ‘which places at its centre the interests and aspirations of the population, 
especially the men and women of the countryside’ (CIOAC, 2010). 
Neoliberal restructuring in Latin America led states to focus on (or create) ‘comparative 
advantage’ in agriculture, diversify export production and further integrate into the world 
market. Since the 1980s, Ecuador’s (neoliberal) development model has been built on the 
export of oil and agro-industrial and primary products. The crisis of the peasant economy 
that began immediately following the elimination of the huasipungo has intensified ever 
since, especially from the onset of neoliberalism. It has forced many of the urban, but 
particularly rural poor, to migrate abroad in search of employment and survival. 
Smallholder peasants in particular have had to diversify their reproduction strategies away 
from purely or even predominantly landed production in order to retain their access to land. 
In 1994, the ability of peasants to petition for land was dealt a major blow as a new law was 
passed that formally ended the state’s role in agrarian reform. Ecuador’s 1994 ‘Ley de 
Desarrollo Agrario’ (Agrarian Development Law) aimed to fully subject land to capital 
through the creation of a liberalised land market. Like Mexico’s 1992 agrarian reform law 
and its amendment of Article 27 of the constitution, the overriding aim on the Agrarian 
Development Law was to facilitate capital accumulation in the countryside through the 
removal of the remaining legal, social and institutional obstacles to a fully liberalised rural 
sector. In terms of land tenure, land titling programmes have been carried out since the 
1990s in an attempt to formally legalise peasant holdings as individual private property and 
thus fully subject land to capital. One of these, PRODEPINE (Development Project for 
Ecuador’s Indigenous and Black Peoples / Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y 
Negros del Ecuador), a World Bank funded development project targeted at the country’s 
poorest indigenous and black communities, legalised over 250,000 hectares between 1999 
and 2003 (Cabrera, 2004). However, many of Ecuador’s most marginalised rural producers 
have rejected these schemes (according the latest census data from 2002, 992,000 
landowners are without formal property titles). Legalising their land holdings may allow 
peasants to have access to much needed credit but simultaneously comes with the 
possibility of indebtedness and dispossession (Laforge, 2010). Even without formal titles it 
is possible to buy and sell land through informal exchanges in Ecuador. With or without 
formalised property rights 94.5 percent of Ecuador’s total agricultural land is held as de 
facto private property (SIPAE, 2011; 9) making exposure to market forces and associated 
forces of dispossession far greater than for Mexican producers that access land under the 
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ejidal, or social property system (see chapter three for a more in depth analysis of the 
implications of these distinct property regimes for peasant production and reproduction 
strategies and processes of class differentiation). 
Across Latin America, market liberalisation and state withdrawal has reduced the role of all 
but the most entrepreneurial/capitalised peasant classes in national food production and 
increased national dependence on food imports. In Ecuador, the diversification of export 
production under neoliberalism and the search for ‘comparative advantage’ is typified by 
the cut flower industry. By 2000, flowers had come to represent 61.9 percent of the total 
value of non-traditional export products - up from a value of $19.2M to $194.6M in the 
period 1991-2000 (FAOSTAT, 2014). Other export crops, both traditional (banana) and non-
traditional (palm oil), saw massive increases in their production as a direct result of market 
liberalisation and renewed foreign capital investment in Ecuador’s rural sector, produced as 
they are highly capitalised mono-crop plantations. According to FAOSTAT (2014), Ecuador’s 
annual production volume of bananas more than doubled from 3,054,566 tonnes in 1990 to 
7,931,060 tonnes in 2010, while palm oil annual production rose from 150,424 to 400,000 
tonnes over the same period. However, Ecuador’s export boom has been limited to crops 
produced on large-scale, highly capitalised production units. Figure five shows how the 
production of barley and wheat, important staple crops typically grown by Andean peasant 
households, has declined significantly over the neoliberal era while the production of non-
traditional cauliflower and broccoli has increased dramatically. The latter are 
overwhelmingly produced on capital and input intensive production units due to the high 
initial costs of planting and the export quality standards that producers have to meet. 
Under-capitalised Andean smallholders with little or no access to credit find it extremely 
difficult to enter these niche markets. At the same time the entry of subsidised basic grains 
from northern producers following market liberalisation has left them increasingly unable 
to compete, in what were their traditional markets, against cheaper imports of staples such 
as barley and wheat.  
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Figure 5. Total annual production volume (metric tonnes) of barley, wheat and 
cauliflower/broccoli in Ecuador (1980-2012). 
 
(Source: FAOSTAT, 2014 - my elaboration) 
In Mexico the contrast between coffee and tomato production similarly highlights how 
production in the peasant sector has stagnated over the neoliberal era while that of the 
private sector, variously supported and subsidised by the state, has increased. 
Figure 6. Annual production volume (metric tonnes) of coffee and tomatoes in Mexico, 
1980-2012. 
 
(Source: FAOSTAT, 2014 - my elaboration) 
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As shown in figure six, the production of tomatoes has increased steadily over the 
preceding two decades, especially after the implementation of NAFTA and associated 
market liberalisation policies in 1994. Mexico’s tomato production is concentrated in the 
northern border states, Sinaloa in particular, on large, (state) irrigated private holdings 
destined predominantly for export markets. Coffee, on the other hand, is another 
important export crop but produced overwhelmingly by the social/peasant sector. Its 
production has stagnated over the past 20 years as formerly state provided and subsidised 
credits and technical assistance for the peasantry have been slashed or eliminated. The 
termination of land reform signified the end of the possibility of extending the social sector 
geographically. In addition, the intensification of production is not an option for the vast 
majority of coffee producers concentrated in southern Mexico who are unable to access 
the resources required, credit in particular, to improve production.  
Despite thirty years of agrarian reform, Ecuador’s agrarian structure is still characterised by 
extreme concentration of land, power and wealth and by an impoverished peasant sector 
occupying small, fragmented (and fragmenting) holdings and increasingly dependent on off-
farm sources of income for survival. The greatest achievement of the reform process - the 
elimination of precarious, indentured forms of labour exploitation - was also its greatest 
weakness. It created an ‘independent’ peasantry with access to minimal and marginal plots 
with little state support for production, and exposed from the outset to forces of 
dispossession that would only increase with the extension and deepening capitalist social 
relations as Ecuador underwent neoliberal restructuring. Structural inequality of land 
access continues to this day and is confirmed by Ecuador’s most recent agricultural census 
data (2000), shown in table two and compared with data from the two previous censuses in 
1954 and 1974. 
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Table 5. Structure of land tenancy in Ecuador.  
Number of Properties 
Area of holding 1954 Census 1974 Census 2000 Census 1954 
Census 
(percent) 
1974 
Census 
(percent) 
2000 
Census 
(percent) 
Under 5 ha 251,686 346,877 535,309 71.1 66.8 63.5 
From 5 to 20 ha 67,650 96,360 176,726 19.1 18.6 21.0 
From 20 to 100 
ha 
27,742 64,813 111,290 7.8 12.5 13.2 
More than 100 
ha 
7,156 11,091 19,557 2.0 2.1 2.3 
Total 354,234 519,141 842,882 100 100 100 
Hectares 
Area of holding 1954 Census 1974 Census 2000 Census 1954 
Census 
(percent) 
1974 
Census 
(percent) 
2000 
Census 
(percent) 
Under 5 ha 432,200 538,700 774,225 7.2 6.8 6.3 
From 5 to 20 ha 565,800 935,300 1,706,794 9.4 11.8 13.8 
From 20 to 100 
ha 
1,138,700 2,664,700 4,614,436 19.0 33.5 37.3 
More than 100 
ha 
3,863,000 3,810,800 5,260,375 64.4 47.9 42.6 
Total 5,999,700 7,949,500 12,355,830 100 100 100 
(Created by Ruiz P. in: Zapata, Ruiz & Brassel, 2008: 21. Source: Ecuador’s national 
agricultural census data) 
Table four demonstrates how both the total number of production units, and the number 
measuring less than five hectares, more than doubled between 1954 and 2000 despite the 
massive increase in colonisation of the Amazon region shown in figure two. It also shows 
that, in the 2000 census, 63.5 percent of all units measured less than five hectares, but 
occupied just 6.3 percent of the total land area under production. On the other hand, while 
production units measuring 100 hectares and above represent just 2.3 percent of all units, 
they concentrate a massive 42.6 percent of the agricultural land. Despite the country’s two 
agrarian reform laws, the gini coefficient for land had fallen by just 0.06 from the pre-
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reform period (0.86) to the year 2000 (0.80), with inequality of land access remaining 
extremely high.  
In Mexico, where land reform was much more radical in terms of its (re)distributional 
impacts than in Ecuador, CIOAC and other national level VC organisations are united in their 
belief that the land reform era is now over and that further redistribution is neither 
possible (no land left to (re)distribute) nor desirable. Their struggles for food sovereignty 
are centred on demanding state support for the social sector - ejidos and communities - 
with demands for peasant production to form the basis of Mexico’s agricultural system and 
the provision of national food supply. This contrasts with most of the VC organisations in 
Ecuador where the continuing massive inequality of land distribution remains the 
fundamental point of contention for FENOCIN and other VC member organisations in the 
country and their struggles for, and conceptions of, food sovereignty. For these 
organisations, food sovereignty cannot exist without first enacting a radical redistribution 
of land to the peasantry, backed up by ongoing state support for sustainable peasant 
production, as the basis of local, regional and national food production systems. 
‘If a government does not carry out an agrarian reform, an agrarian revolution, 
nothing is going to change. It (the land) is the source of a country’s wealth, but 
until now (agrarian reform) hasn’t affected the big landowners…If there is not 
expropriation, there is no agrarian revolution. And there is no expropriation if 
there is no confiscation.’ José Agualsaca, National President of the FEI 
(Ecuador Indian Federation / Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios) (10 April 
2013, Quito). 
For FENOCIN in particular, food sovereignty will never be possible in Ecuador without an 
‘agrarian revolution’ that democratises land access as the starting point for the subsequent 
strengthening of peasant agriculture as the basis of local, regional and national food 
production systems (FENOCIN, 2014). In contrast to Ecuador’s ‘from above’ history of 
agrarian change, Mexico’s land reform transformed the class structure of the countryside, 
shattering the basis of landed production formerly controlled by a powerful pre-capitalist 
landlord class. Mexico may not represent a textbook case of ‘from-below’ transition, 
heavily mediated or even controlled as it was by the Mexican state. However, it was still 
responsible for the effective elimination of a pre-capitalist landlord class and, owing to the 
political power of the peasantry, the institution of the country’s unique system of social 
property. Despite the very different histories of agrarian reform and the changing agrarian 
structures of both countries, on-going neoliberalisation has meant that all but the most 
capitalised peasants in Mexico and Ecuador confront increasingly difficult yet similar 
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challenges to their survival on the land. State withdrawal of productive support for the 
peasant sector, the process of creating a fully capitalist land market, unrestricted imports of 
staple foodstuffs from subsidised northern producers and falling and increasingly volatile 
prices for peasant produced products are all phenomena that both country’s peasantries 
have faced over the past 30 years, albeit to different extents both between and within the 
two countries geographically and in terms of social class. It is within this context; the 
immiseration, dispossession and (semi-) proletarianisation of all but the most capitalised, 
entrepreneurial peasant classes under the neoliberal or ‘corporate’ food regime 
(McMichael, 2007) that food sovereignty has emerged to become an emblematic banner of 
struggle for national peasant movements in Mexico, Ecuador, and across Latina America. 
Deeper analysis of these movements, their diverse (and contested) interpretations of its 
meaning, and the various political strategies which guide them, will all be dealt with in the 
chapters that follow.  
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Chapter 2. A Class Based Analysis of Food Sovereignty 
2.1 Class and the Food Sovereignty Movement  
The Via Campesina’s (VC) central goal of ‘food sovereignty’ is presented by the movement 
and its agrarianist proponents as a viable and necessary alternative to the neoliberal or 
‘corporate’ food regime (McMichael, 2006) which is dispossessing the peasantry on mass, 
causing food crises and wreaking environmental destruction on a world scale. According to 
Araghi (2009: 134 & 135) the agrarian programme in the era of neoliberal globalisation has 
intensified both depeasanisation and deproletarianisation via displacement across the 
world and represents a historically specific form of the food regime of capital. It is a 
continuation of the global division of labour at the expense of home markets, national 
divisions of labour and national food security.  The food sovereignty movement struggles 
against this programme and for its replacement with ‘sustainable’ food systems based on 
small-scale peasant production. As a result of what Araghi terms ‘the enclosure food 
regime’, agriculture’s direct producers become redundant on a daily basis and are thrown 
out of national divisions of labour into a globalisation vortex as masses of surplus labour in 
motion (Ibid: 135). Davis (2004: 10) argues that neoliberal policies of agricultural 
deregulation have accelerated the exodus of surplus rural labour to urban slums even as 
job creation has generally fallen in urban centres. By the end of the 1980s the vast majority 
of the poor in Latin America (115 million in 1990) were living in urban slums or colonies 
rather than in farms or villages (80 million) (Ibid: 20). Rural dispossession has fuelled the 
unprecedented growth of the informal working class (Ibid: 24) and in 2009 the percentage 
of the working populations of Mexico and Ecuador employed in the non-agricultural 
informal sector stood at 53.7 and 60.9 percent respectively (ILO, 2012). The growing urban 
informal sector, composed mainly of expropriated and semi-proletarianised peasants, is an 
indication of an increasingly exclusionary system as evidenced by growing levels of 
temporary work, labour expulsion from manufacturing, stagnant or falling real wages for 
most, rising wage inequality and higher rates of unemployment (Jonakin, 2006: 292).  
However, far from disappearing as a result of processes of capitalist development, 
proponents of food sovereignty argue that peasants are reproducing themselves as a social 
force capable of bringing about systemic change with ‘food sovereignty’ based on 
sustainable peasant and ‘small scale farmer’ production at its core (Desmarais, 2007: 37; 
McMichael, 2008; Rosset, 2011). This chapter will examine the importance class dynamics 
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that have shaped, and continue to shape, peasant organisations and the nature of their 
demands. It will show that FSM claims and assumptions of a unified ‘movement of 
movements’ (Araghi, 2009: 138) in which all classes of ‘the peasantry’ are united against 
the neoliberal food regime is difficult to sustain given the diverse - often contradictory - 
class characteristics and class based interests within and between peasant organisations of 
the VC. The chapter will examine how class dynamics within CIOAC and FENOCIN condition 
how they interact with other national level organisations with similar and differing class 
compositions. It will show that their interpretations of, and demands for food sovereignty 
are significantly influenced by the historical development of their organisations’ mass bases 
in their national contexts and the relationships with their national states and governments.  
The VC consists of a diverse range of organisations, each with their own constellations of 
class composition, political affiliations and ideological currents. All VC organisations 
subscribe to the central goal of food sovereignty, but how they interpret this, and the 
actions they take to try to achieve it, correlate with these and many other case specific 
factors. Analyses of the internal workings of VC national level peasant organisations are 
almost entirely absent from a literature which tends to assume rather than interrogate 
unity. Borras (2008: 277) criticizes this analytical neglect, emphasising the need to engage 
with class differences both within and between national peasant movements rather than 
ignoring or dismissing their significance. This is an important step towards finding ways to 
ensure truly inclusive and effective representation of the highly diverse and heterogeneous 
classes and groups of the rural poor. In a 2010 article examining the VC’s Global Campaign 
for Agrarian Reform he shows how the Philippines’ three VC affiliated member 
organisations, each sharing very similar mass bases composed of poor peasants and 
landless rural labourers, are divided by ideology rather than class (Ibid: 2010: 783-784). As 
Borras argues, this highlights the importance of ideological and political differences as 
significant points of conflict and collaboration among national level peasant organisations, 
as we will see in the cases of Mexico and Ecuador in chapter four. Edelman’s (2008: 235) 
study of Central American regional peasant organising is a similar exception to the general 
lack of class analysis and examination of internal movement dynamics in the contemporary 
food sovereignty/peasant movement literature. His article shows how ASOCODE 
(Asociación de Organisaciones Campesinas de Centroamérica para la Cooperación y el 
Desarrollo), a regional Central American peasant association, divided in the late 1990s as a 
consequence of ideological and class differences. These came to a head in the context of 
inter-organisational competition for expanding donor funding and deepening rural 
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economic crisis as markets for peasant goods became increasingly unviable and mass out 
migration from the countryside reduced the political weight of member organisations. 
According to Edelman, the diversity of constituent organisations and their social bases - 
agricultural workers, indigenous groups, independent peasants, cooperative members - 
once seen as a strength, became a source of polarisation and division as the rural crisis 
deepened (Ibid: 239). In this chapter I hope to complement these analyses with evidence 
from the Ecuadorian and Mexican peasant movements. However, I will embed the class 
analysis of contemporary VC organisations in their historical contexts to show that the class 
bases of national peasant movements are not static, but highly dynamic, as evidenced by 
the changing class bases of these organisations from the developmentalist period into the 
era of neoliberal globalisation. This dynamism has been, and remains, central to intra-
movement processes of conflict and collaboration as well as the nature and forms of 
expression of peasant movement demands.  
 
The failure to interrogate class differences among and within peasant movements and the 
neglect of inter- and intra-movement dynamics disguises important internal tensions within 
and between VC organisations nationally as to what food sovereignty actually means as a 
focus of organisational struggle. It also represents a major gap in the food sovereignty 
literature. With the balance of forces between the FSM and corporate agricultural interests 
certain to determine to a large extent the possibilities for reform or transformation of the 
neoliberal food regime (Holt-Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011: 117), analysis of the internal 
dynamics of individual peasant organisations is essential for examining the extent and 
causes of unity and disunity within the peasant movement itself. Without such investigation, 
as is the case at present, unity is typically assumed rather than analysed. This may result in 
the transformational potential of the food sovereignty movement being overstated and the 
legitimacy of its claims to represent all ‘people of the land’ exaggerated. By analysing the 
issue we may be able to suggest ways to better achieve the ‘unity in diversity’ the VC strives 
for without necessarily assuming its existence in the first place. We may also be able to 
better incorporate marginalised rural classes and groups currently under represented or 
not represented at all by the VC and its organisations at present. For clarification 
‘marginality’ is, throughout this chapter, referred to on the basis of the productive system. 
It is conceptualised on the basis of Kay’s (2006: 459) definition to mean un-, under-, or 
insecure employment, and/or a lack of assets (land, inputs etc.) and credit that generate 
vulnerability to production and reproduction crises. 
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Despite the assumption of food sovereignty as a unifying project for a seemingly 
homogenous ‘people of the land’, or at least one that unites all classes of the peasantry 
against the ‘corporate food regime’ (McMichael, 2006), this chapter will argue that VC 
organisations define and struggle for food sovereignty based to a great extent on the social 
class of their mass bases. It will be argued food sovereignty is itself a class project 
representing principally peasant producers of staple crops that produce both for the 
market and their own subsistence, as well as depending to varying degrees on wage labour 
to meet household reproduction requirements. In the cases of Mexico and Ecuador, the 
food sovereignty movement tacitly excludes three major peasant classes which will be 
examined in more detail in the following pages; a) rural labour; b) landless/land poor 
peasants heavily dependent on off-farm sources of income; and c) small peasant producers 
dependent on export crop production as a central component of their production and 
reproduction strategies. ‘Small’ peasant producers is here taken to mean peasant 
households that are net sellers of labour power. The lack of representation of these classes 
within the food sovereignty movement questions claims by the VC and its advocates that 
food sovereignty is a unifying project for all ‘people of the land’. Moreover, it will be argued 
that the movement favours the interests of small staple producing peasants to the 
exclusion of the interests of the three other classes mentioned. This generates a tendency 
toward tension rather than unity within national peasant movements. In order to examine 
the class dynamics of the food sovereignty movement this chapter will examine the internal 
dynamics within and between national level VC organisations in Mexico and Ecuador. It will 
do so by focusing on one national level organisation in each country (CIOAC in Mexico and 
FENOCIN in Ecuador), the historical development of their class compositions and struggles, 
and how this has influenced their interpretations of, and struggles for, food sovereignty. It 
will then examine how each engages with other VC organisations at the national level and 
how the differing class bases of national level VC organisations shape their relationships.  
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2.2 Interpreting ‘Class’ in the Food Sovereignty Movement 
Edelman (2013) argues that the FSM has not translated the term ‘food sovereignty’ into 
concrete policy proposals or dealt with issues such as regulatory apparatus necessary to 
manage such questions as farm size, product and technical mixes, trade etc. This argument 
not only fails to recognise the real, concrete achievements made by the food sovereignty 
movement in terms of broad aspects of government rural policy - at least in the cases of 
Mexico and Ecuador, as we will see in the following chapters - but it also over-simplifies the 
multi-faceted nature of the term and how it is strategically employed by peasant 
organisations that compose the movement. For Mexican and Ecuadorian peasant 
organisations ‘food sovereignty’ is not only a struggle for a set of policies that favour 
peasant production, the peasant economy, and socio-cultural practices of diverse peasant 
groups. It is also a unifying banner that articulates an ideological response to the 
exclusionary, impoverishing and proletarianising neoliberal food regime. It is at once an 
attempt to unify diverse peasant groups and classes which, although occupying different 
class ‘positions’ in local, regional and national class structures (i.e. various degrees of 
integration into/dependence on off-farm wage labour, subsistence production, cash-crop 
markets etc.) nonetheless share a common enemy in neoliberalism and the rural policies 
that it shapes. In analysing the class base of the food sovereignty movement it is therefore 
essential to understand the multifaceted nature of class, how it is experienced, and how it 
is constructed by the food sovereignty movement and the organisations on which it is built.  
Processes of class differentiation among the peasantry are central in shaping the struggles 
of contemporary agrarian movements in Latin America. Studies that focus on these 
processes (Bernstein, 2001 & 2006; Brass, 2002; Lerche, 2010; Byres, 1995) as the 
fundamental dynamic of rural capitalist development either overtly or tacitly define class in 
terms of ‘positions’ within the social relations of production. These ‘positions’, are, in turn, 
derived from relations of exploitation that arise from different forms of asset inequality. 
From these positions in a given structure of social relations it is assumed that a matrix of 
exploitation based interests is generated specific to each location (Wright, 1990). Important 
as these analyses are for understanding differentiation and modes of exploitation, they are 
limited in their power to explain contemporary peasant struggles as they ignore the central 
issues of political class formation, class consciousness, and the role of ideology in shaping 
class and resistance to actually experienced modes of exploitation. Ethnicity and gender are 
two particularly important factors in Mexico and Ecuador that shape how class is 
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experienced, its formation and class consciousness. The banner of ‘food sovereignty’ and its 
locally, regionally, and nationally specific interpretations by the organised peasantry has a 
unifying, symbolic value that constitutes an important political tool in the struggles of 
diverse peasant classes with the agents of the ‘corporate food regime’, namely national 
states and governments at all levels. It constitutes a guiding set of mobilising principles that 
shape organisational discourse internally and in negotiations with various levels of 
government and state institutions. The discourse of food sovereignty may also bridge the 
gap between certain structural positions within exploited classes. As Otero (2004a: 41) 
argues, the trajectories of class differentiation cannot be inferred from class positions, but 
are also heavily shaped by how people come together and organise to interpret their 
situation, construct their demands, defend and promote their interests, and establish 
alliances with other organisations in ways that contest and resist proletarianisation and 
dispossession. A political understanding of class can transcend the seemingly inevitable 
trajectory of differentiation if class is understood purely on the basis of relations of 
production, without incorporating political and ideological elements. 
Official interpretations of ‘food sovereignty’ within individual organisations in Mexico and 
Ecuador, and the policy proposals that they shape, are heavily influenced by past histories 
of organisational struggles for agrarian reform and in this both countries’ peasant 
organisations have a rich history. As we saw in chapter one, both CIOAC in Mexico and 
FENOCIN in Ecuador have historically been part of important movements that have shaped 
the form and content of past agrarian reforms and have themselves been reconstituted by 
these processes. These historical experiences shape the organisations’ contemporary calls 
for food sovereignty both as concrete demands and proposals for pressing rural issues and 
also their more utopian, less clearly defined conceptions of a food sovereign society. Such 
interpretations and demands are based on the historical development and shifting internal 
constellations of class and political and ideological currents. Experiences with past agrarian 
reforms in particular have changed the class composition of both organisations’ mass base; 
many that were once landless became landed as a result of their own struggles while, for 
the most part, those that remained landless often found themselves no longer represented 
by their organisations. This shift was accompanied by new demands and struggles based on 
both different structural conditions between the landed and the landless peasantry and 
how new forms of exploitation were experienced, interpreted, and contested by land 
beneficiaries and their organisations. With this change in internal class composition came a 
significant political change, aided by a more advantageous political opportunity structure as 
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a result of neoliberal restructuring and ‘democratisation’ from the 1980s. Both 
organisations moved from a focus on more militant tactics such as land invasions and anti-
state rhetoric in the context of forceful state repression to a relationship with the state and 
government defined by these organisations as a kind of ‘critical engagement’ - proposal 
first with recourse to (generally peaceful) mass mobilisation if deemed necessary - which 
have since run the risk of morphing into new forms of state corporatism and a loss of 
organisational autonomy (see chapter four for an in depth analysis of the changing 
relationship between national state and governments and the organised peasantry). 
However, the diverse and often conflicting class, political and ideological currents within 
CIOAC and FENOCIN create tensions as to how to manage this difficult balance of protest 
and proposal. These currents flow through national territories with regionally diverse 
histories of capitalist development, organisational presence, agrarian reform experiences, 
indigenous populations and state formation, all of which shape interpretations of ‘food 
sovereignty’, the specific  constellations of grassroots organisations, and their ideologies of 
resistance. The following section will examine the shifting class bases of FENOCIN and 
CIOAC as the basis for current struggles for food sovereignty.  
 
2.3 Class Origins and Shifting Class Bases of CIOAC and 
FENOCIN 
By examining how the class characteristics of peasant organisations have changed 
throughout their histories we can better understand the class-based nature of their specific 
interpretations of food sovereignty today. Rather than a unified ‘people of the land’ 
struggling against the neoliberal food regime we see that this very regime is present and 
experienced in very different ways both geographically and depending on peasant class. 
The peasantry is not the homogenous entity assumed by much of the food sovereignty 
literature, but instead consists of various classes and class fractions, from landless rural 
labourers to small and medium sized producers who occupy shifting semi-proletarianised 
positions, usually unable to reproduce themselves without engaging in some form of part-
time or seasonal wage labour and variously integrated into the market through production 
of cash crops. The neoliberal food regime acts to differentiate this already class-
differentiated peasantry which contests specific aspects of this regime in different ways 
based in large part on their class characteristics. By examining the shifting class 
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characteristics of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s mass bases the following pages will attempt to 
show that organisational internal class differentiation is a significant factor in shaping VC 
peasant organisations’ struggles for agrarian reform and food sovereignty. Internal class 
contradictions constantly threaten unity as a result of on-going processes of class 
differentiation. Both organisations have a history of internal divisions as a result of shifting 
class constellations, with one class’ interests and proposals being favoured at the expense 
of others.  
 
 
2.4 CIOAC’s Class Origins 
We saw in chapter one how the CCI (Central Campesina Independiente), precursor to CIOAC, 
emerged in 1961 as a response to widespread rural unrest based on the belief in the 
countryside that Cardenas’ agrarian reform had been abandoned. At the beginning of the 
1960s the ‘agrarista’ project had stagnated, land redistribution had almost come to a halt 
and the CNC - the PRI’s corporatist peasant organisation through which state resources and 
political interests were channelled - was controlled by the ruling party with no intention of 
pushing for a restart of the agrarian reform process. For many, patience and hope of 
gaining land via institutional channels had become exhausted. For the first time since the 
1930s, rural social movement of the 1960s, led by the CCI, began carrying out land 
invasions with landless peasants and rural workers (De la Fuente, 2011). With a 
heterogeneous class base combining rural workers, landless and landed peasants, agrarian 
reform was conceived of as both access to land and state support for peasants to make a 
viable living from it. As time passed and conditions changed from the initial fervour of the 
first case of peasant independent organising since the Mexican revolution, the shifting 
constellation of class interests within the organisation began to shift in favour of the 
demands of the landed in place of those of the landless. 
Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, CCI-Roja continued its struggle for land in the 
face of state repression and, with a membership composed primarily of landless peasants 
and rural labourers, productive issues were not a major concern. Small and medium 
peasants with some form of ownership or access to land were far better served by the CNC 
or the CCI Blanca (the PRI reincorporated CCI group) than they would have been by CCI-Roja. 
Indeed, following successful land struggles many of CCI-Roja’s producers lacked 
organisational support for production and many that had gained land through their 
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organisation’s struggles joined or re-joined the CNC with its promises of resources to 
support production channelled from federal government (Lúa et al, 1988: 164). 
Since its formation the CCI Roja had focused on the land redistribution aspect of agrarian 
reform over demands over productive issues as its mass base consisted primarily of landless 
peasants and rural wage workers. The growing proportion of agricultural workers in both 
the national rural class structure and the organisation’s own membership led CCI-Roja 
leaders to the conclusion that the fundamental contradiction in the countryside at the time 
was that between capital and labour, between the rural bourgeoisie and the agricultural 
proletariat. As such, the priority task was agricultural unionisation in combination with the 
land struggle (Lúa et al, 1988: 39). On 5 November 1975, at the organisation’s national 
congress, the CCI Roja renamed itself CIOAC in order to re-emphasise the need for labour 
unionising of agricultural wage workers of which they calculated to be over three million 
nationally (Terán, 2010: 39). At the same congress the leadership decided to create three 
distinct entities, each focused on a specific aspect of their struggle for agrarian reform 
(Consuelo et al, 1987: 213). The National Union of Agricultural Workers and the National 
Union of Land Claimants formally institutionalised the two main strands of the CIOAC’s 
struggle to that date. However, the third entity, UNCAFAECSA (National Union of 
Agricultural and Forestry Credit, and of ‘Ejidatario’, ‘Comunero’ and Small Landowners’ 
Agro-industries) was created in response to the needs of a newly emerging class of CIOAC 
militants that had gained land through the organisation’s struggles but had up until this 
point been left to try to make a living from it without CIOAC support and, as a result, were 
often drawn back to the ranks of the CNC. UNCAFAECSA’s specific role varied depending on 
the region, but fundamentally it was responsible for supporting peasant production with 
subsidized credits, inputs and commercialising assistance. 
From the mid-1970s to the beginning of the 1990s the relative success of CIOAC’s land 
struggles and its relative inability to retain its members as land beneficiaries combined with 
growing difficulties in the labour unionising aspect of its struggles. This period saw a shift in 
organisational focus from agrarian reform founded on the class struggle - agricultural 
workers taking control of large production units - to an emphasis on the production based 
interests of a growing class of small landholding peasants. As we saw in chapter one, this 
shift in organisational emphasis was heavily shaped by the national political context at the 
time; in 1975 and 1976, under the Echeverría administration, peasant land invasions swept 
the country forcing the government to respond with a significant renewed wave of land 
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(re)distribution. As mobilised land claimants became beneficiaries of state land concessions, 
their organisations’ focus had to shift more towards land based issues to represent their 
mass bases’ emerging, increasingly land-based needs. The struggle for land remained 
central to CIOAC but there was growing disillusionment within the organisation’s leadership 
on the labour unionising front. Efforts to establish legally recognised unions were 
constantly rejected by government and labour struggles continually repressed by state 
forces. However, deeper internal issues based on landless workers not interested in 
organising around work began to emerge. Two cases in particular highlight this change in 
CIOAC’s focus of struggle as a result of its shifting class base during this period and will be 
examined in more detail. They also emphasise the importance of a political understanding 
of class not limited to structural positions in the relations of production. 
 
2.5 CIOAC in the Mountains of Guerrero 
National CIOAC leaders first arrived in the Mountains of Guerrero in the municipality of 
Tlapa de Comonfort in 1976 with the aim of fostering political support for the Mexican 
Communist Party (PCM) of which they were also leading figures. In 1979 the organisation 
began integrating various dispersed and marginalised rural communities under the 
umbrella organisation ‘El Consejo de la Montaña’ (The Mountain Council) consisting of 
isolated communities eking out an ever more precarious subsistence existence on 
mountain slopes as fragile soils were being exhausted through overpopulation and 
deforestation. The mountains of Guerrero have, since the mid twentieth century, served as 
a source of cheap, seasonal labour for the agro-export zones of Northern Mexico, especially 
the tomato plantations of Sinaloa. With little or no state presence in the zone and its 
central role in the reproduction of cheap labour, CIOAC saw fertile ground for peasant and 
labour organising. However, through the creation and expansion of the Council, CIOAC’s 
national and state leaders came to realise that the Mountain’s small, landholding peasants 
which formed the base of the organisation in Guerrero were far more interested in 
organising around production and the provision of basic services in their region than in 
organising around labour issues they confronted as seasonal workers. This was in spite the 
fact that men, women and children could spend as much as six months of the year on 
northern plantations and wage-labour was the overwhelmingly dominant source of 
household income for the majority. Access to more land was an important demand for only 
a small number of the council’s organisations whose members worked on fertile estates in 
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the valley of the municipal urban centre of Tlapa. In 1982 and 1983 these groups 
successfully fought for the redistribution of two estates to the benefit of 150 former 
workers and their families, one of 120 hectares and the other 180. The process was 
surprisingly relatively peaceful as it had the support of one Council leader who had become 
a national congressman just before the invasion took place. However, these were the only 
two cases of land redistribution as a result of the CIOAC’s actions in the region and land 
demands were outweighed by demands for basic service provisions such as potable water 
and electricity, as well as the means to make the marginal land that the council’s peasants 
already owned produce (personal interview with Roberto Cabrera Solis, CIOAC’s leader in 
Guerrero, 2013). This reflected the class characteristics of the Council’s base; small 
peasants whose rights to (relatively poor quality) communal lands had been granted in the 
Cardenas era, but who still lacked basic services and the capacity to make a viable living 
from the land itself. In summary, the class base of the Council was dominated by 
smallholders with a class consciousness more ‘peasant’ than ‘worker’, not interested in 
labour organising despite overwhelming dependence on wage labour for reproduction, 
with little demand for land and focused on mobilising for basic services first and foremost 
followed by production based issues. This highlights an important aspect of peasant class 
formation that more structuralist interpretations of class fail to account for. In structural 
terms, household income among CIOAC’s peasant in the Mountains of Guerrero has long 
been dominated by off-farm wage labour with the household plot serving as a wage subsidy 
rather than a viable production unit. As such, in structural terms of class position these 
peasants can be categorised more as wage labourers than producers, or alternatively 
heavily proletarianised peasants. From this perspective the assumption that  contemporary 
struggles for land constitute an ‘agrarian question of labour’ (Bernstein, 2001 & 2006), 
driven by growing dependence of a mass of the world’s peasantry on increasingly scarce, 
oppressive and informal sources of wage employment would appear valid. What this 
conclusion fails to recognise is that struggles for land - both access to it and the ability to 
make a viable living from it - at least in the cases of Mexico and Ecuador, are fundamentally 
based on both non-economic and economic associations with the land and originate not so 
much from negative labour market experiences, but rather from long held desires to live 
viably from the land. This is not so much because of the increasingly difficult conditions 
facing them in the labour market, but because of the desire to be viable peasants living 
from the land they own. This is fundamentally tied to the discussion in the next chapter 
regarding peasant struggles for (relative) autonomy from and within the market. However, 
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the argument being made here is that contemporary land struggles originate primarily from 
the land itself, from the ‘peasant fraction’ of fragmented rural classes of labour, rather than 
the ‘wage labour fraction’ emphasised by Bernstein which, in purely quantitative terms, 
increasingly dominates the reproduction strategies of the marginalised peasantry. The 
extract below, taken from a conversation with one of many female heads of household left 
to work the family land as male members migrate seasonally to Sinaloa, demonstrates this 
desire to live from the land rather than depending on the relatively stable seasonal 
migration to Sinaloa’s export tomato plantations: 
‘They go to Sinaloa because there’s no work here…they go because of necessity.  
(Me) What should CIOAC do to support the migrants?  
Whatever it is, it has to be here, not there. If there was something (for them) 
here they wouldn’t have to migrate. Better to focus here so that my husband 
doesn’t have to go, so that there’s no need for him to go. Many come back with 
nothing.’ Carmen Ovalle Ramírez, CIOAC member (12 January 2013, village of 
Copanatoyac, Tlapa, Guerrero). 
The quote above highlights another issue that the Bernstein’s agrarian question of labour 
argument fails to explain. As McMichael (2006: 410) points out, why would labour struggle 
for land rather than unionising on the basis of struggling for improved working conditions if, 
as Bernstein (2006: 12) contends, the ‘agrarian question of labour’ is now ‘manifested in 
struggles for land against “actually existing” forms of capitalist landed property’? Given the 
quantitative predominance of wage labour in marginalised peasant household reproduction 
strategies and the lack of interest of CIOAC members in organising around labour issues 
(examined below), any answer to this question would have to engage with the qualitative 
aspects of political class formation in the mountains of Guerrero and peasants’ relationship 
with the land. 
The presence of powerful caciquismo in the state of Guerrero dating from before the 
Mexican Revolution meant that land reform simply did not reach the Mountains of 
Guerrero until Cardenas’ presidency. From 1934-1940 more land was redistributed than all 
the other post-revolutionary governments combined, but by the 1960s this process had 
once again stalled. More radical groups demanding further redistribution emerged in this 
period, most notably ‘the Party of the Poor’ (El Partido de los Pobres) headed by communist 
ex-teacher Lucio Cabañas who was assassinated by state forces in 1974. However, 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s smaller communist based groups demanding land 
distribution and influenced by Cabañas continued to operate. According to Roberto Cabrera 
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Solis, CIOAC’s current leader in Guerrero and founding member of CIOAC in the mountains, 
these Communist inspired groups attracted many of CIOAC’s landless members, frustrated 
with the organisation’s production and basic services based demands and its lack of 
attention to latent, land based demands that were present but not being represented. 
Many subsequently left CIOAC’s ranks as they found their class interests better represented 
by organisations struggling for radical agrarian reform based on redistribution than they did 
with the CIOAC’s more service/production based demands. 
On the issue of labour organising, CIOAC’s efforts were hindered by repeated rejections by 
federal government which refused to grant legal recognition to the organisation’s National 
Union of Agricultural Workers at both national and state levels. In 1979 and again in 1981 
CIOAC tried to gain national union recognition from government, but on both occasions this 
was denied under the pretext that the Secretary of Work and Social Provision lacked the 
federal competence to deal with activities of an agrarian character (Terán, 2010: 39). At this 
time Lopez Portillo’s administration (1976-1982) was enacting rural policy focused on the 
attempt to regain self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs through increasing the productivity of 
the most capitalised/entrepreneurial fraction of the peasantry. The government’s rhetoric 
stressed the importance of improving rural incomes rather than redistributing property as 
his predecessor Echeverría had done (see chapter one). An integral component of this 
strategy was the active support of corporatised sectors of labour and the peasantry, 
certainly not the legitimation and recognition of autonomous unions being proposed by 
CIOAC.  
Despite Lopez-Portillo’s anti-unionising policies, CIOAC managed to mobilise up to 15,000 
agricultural workers from the mid- to late-1970s in the state of Sinaloa (Lúa et al, 1988: 
180), many of which originated from the Mountains of Guerrero, to carry out some isolated 
strikes on plantations and packing facilities. But the limited effectiveness of these 
mobilisations, and of CIOAC’s rural labour unionising more generally, was based more on 
internal contradictions among the organisations’ members than on the impossibility of 
institutionalising a legal union under the prevailing national political situation. In 1992 
Sinaloa and Guerrero state CIOAC branches united in an attempt to improve working 
conditions and wages on Sinaloan tomato plantations despite not being able to legally 
negotiate with or mobilise against plantation owners. Despite this limitation leaders 
managed to arrange meetings with some of Sinaloa’s most important plantation owners 
who, to their surprise, were willing to meet CIOAC’s core demands. One of the major 
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problems faced by plantation owners was - and remains - the day to day difficulty of 
securing the necessary labour force on their holdings; the arrival of workers’ friends and 
relatives on nearby farms as well as constantly circulating information regarding better 
wages with other employers meant that plantation owners could find most of their labour 
force had left overnight creating massive difficulties for the harvesting of their tomatoes. As 
a result, they agreed to construct dignified living conditions and pay a competitive wage to 
CIOAC’s workers if they would guarantee to stay on the same plantation for a minimum of 
three months. These conditions were agreed to by CIOAC’s leaders, in constant dialogue 
with their members in the fields, and a significant achievement was hailed for CIOAC’s rural 
labour organising efforts. However, the plan failed as workers simply broke their 
agreements with employers in order to return periodically to their communities in Guerrero 
for family events and religious and community ceremonies. This relates to far deeper issues 
of peasant class consciousness that will be discussed later on, but for the moment it is 
important to note that from the failure of this initiative onwards, CIOAC in Sinaloa and 
Guerrero have ceased to work on any issues regarding agricultural labour. Instead, focus 
shifted even more towards production issues through UCAFAECSA and demands for basic 
social services from the state. 
The formal end to land redistribution in 1994 with Salinas’ reform of Article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution terminated the state’s obligation to redistribute land, but this aspect 
of Salinas’ more extensive neoliberal reforms was not a strong point of contention for 
CIOAC in Guerrero. Pressure on the land in the Mountains has not been intense since 
Cardenas’ redistribution as seasonal and more permanent national and international 
migration has acted as a social and political pressure valve in the region. Instead CIOAC has 
successfully fought for basic services such as clean water, electricity, housing and access to 
healthcare. Its struggles for productive issues have continued to grow since the 1990s in 
particular as more basic needs have been met and now the priority is to make the land 
produce. Seasonal migration to Sinaloan plantations remains the major source of family 
income but is no longer an issue taken up by CIOAC; rural labour is simply not represented 
by the organisation. 
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2.6 CIOAC in Chiapas 
CIOAC began operating in Chiapas at the end of the 1970s at a time when the national 
leadership was convinced that agrarian reform must be based on rural labourers’ struggles 
against agricultural capital. They saw Chiapas as a key location for the development of this 
struggle. The south-eastern state was characterised by very different agrarian property 
relations than those found in the Mountains of Guerrero where CIOAC established itself by 
bringing together dispersed communities with already formalised communal rights to land 
that had been established in the Cardenas administration. The Mexican revolution had 
arrived in Chiapas with Carranza’s forces in 1914 which attempted to impose a law 
abolishing debt servitude. Thousands of indentured native workers were freed from 
ranches in central and western Chiapas yet no real land redistribution took place and most 
of the state’s landowners were left unaffected. The Carrancistas were eventually defeated 
by landowners, yet ideas of the revolution and a growing agrarianist discourse began to 
take hold. This led to peasants making more demands on landowners for the application of 
newly introduced labour laws. These demands were given further impetus by Cardenas’ 
agrarian reform programme from 1934 which for the first time since the revolution 
attempted to enact significant land redistribution in the state, again primarily in northern 
and western Chiapas. However, the political power that the embedded, pre-capitalist 
landlord class retained in the state meant that actual implementation was minimal. 
According to Villafuerte (2002: 93), the most fortunate land claimants had to wait over 
three years to access a plot of marginal land, while the vast majority were forced to wait 
between six and 17 years as the state’s landlords continually refused or delayed transfers in 
their negotiations with federal government. In addition, these peasant gains were attacked 
and often reversed in subsequent years as government policy reverted to a renewed focus 
on agro-export favouring large, private landowners (Collier, 2005: 28). By 1948 only 581 
land reform processes had been enacted in the state since the revolution, benefitting a 
total of 62,201 claimants and representing 12 percent of the surface area Chiapas, 
overwhelmingly on marginal lands (taken from de la Peña [1951] : cited in Villafuerte, [2002: 
94]).  
Overall, land redistribution was successfully resisted by the vast majority of Chiapas’ 
entrenched land owning class and it was only from the 1970s that independent rural 
movements were able to successfully push for more extensive land reforms. It was into this 
context that CIOAC arrived in Chiapas in 1977. With national CIOAC leaders convinced that 
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the struggles of agricultural workers were the key to socialist revolution, Chiapas was 
considered to have the perfect conditions for organising this struggle.  
The organisation first established contact with agricultural workers on coffee estates in the 
municipalities of Simojovel and Huitiupan in northern Chiapas. Typical of the social relations 
of coffee production in the state, these workers were given marginal subsistence plots on 
the edge of the estates on which to live in exchange for three days of their labour for the 
landowner per week. CIOAC used federal labour laws as the basis of their demands for 
agrarian reform, arguing that landowners violated minimum wage and fair labour standards 
(Ibid: 77), and an already developed agrarianist discourse among the region’s peasants 
provided CIOAC with workers keen to mobilise against estate owners. Despite not being 
granted permission to register an official union at the state level on two occasions in 1981 
(Garcia, 2002: 156) CIOAC did manage to organise strikes on 30 coffee plantations in 
September, and on 26 in October that same year. Some landowners were intimidated by 
the strikes and negotiated debt repayments or land transfer to CIOAC members, while 
others increased repression with their own armed forces (Lúa et al, 1988: 182-183). This 
tactic of land invasions based on landowners’ failure to implement labour laws was 
expanded as CIOAC pushed into other regions of the state throughout the 1980s, especially 
the south-eastern municipality of Las Margaritas. However, despite CIOAC’s desire to 
establish cooperative production systems on coffee estates and ranches that had been 
taken over by their militants, peasants had other ideas. The vast majority prioritised 
individual rights to their own plots of land for both subsistence and cash crop production. In 
the case of coffee estates, the area cultivated with coffee was divided up among ex-
workers into distinct plots each of which was to be the responsibility of individual ex-
workers. Peasants were not against communal land for grazing or communal systems of 
commercialisation or accessing resources but first and foremost they wanted individual 
autonomy regarding the main production decisions of their households. This focus on 
individual rights was a surprise for CIOAC’s national leadership as it went against their 
prevailing socialist ideals of collectivised production. However, they could not go against 
the interests of their members. As a result of CIOAC’s successful land demands and 
invasions, the class base of the organisation in Chiapas gradually shifted from landless 
workers to smallholder peasants. This shift in class base resulted in new forms of class 
consciousness based on the struggle to remain on the land against proletarianising market 
forces and state policy geared towards managing the political consequences of the 
peasantry’s disintegration, rather than a class consciousness built fundamentally in 
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opposition to a pre-capitalist landlord class as it had been during the land struggle era. This 
had, and continues to have, important implications for class consciousness and the role of 
ideology in shaping and directing peasant struggles not just for CIOAC and Mexico’s 
national peasant movement, but also FENOCIN, Ecuador’s and Latin America’s peasant 
struggles in the era of neoliberal globalisation. As Teubal (2009: 11) asserts, in contrast to 
those of the 20th Century, contemporary agrarian movements are not concentrated on 
fighting a land owning oligarchy. The present global context has given rise to new types of 
transnational and globalised dominant classes and current struggles are about resisting the 
hegemonic industrial agricultural model promoted by transnational corporations (TNCs) 
and national states. Exploited and dominated as they were by a landed oligarchy as landless 
peasants, variously dependent on and subordinated to landlords for their survival, class 
consciousness was constructed on a physical entity: the landlord. This common, visible 
enemy acted as a unifying entity for CIOAC’s (and FENOCIN’s) members. Collective struggle 
developed on this basis to eventually overthrow landlords and/or reform pre-capitalist 
landed property relations. As land claimants became beneficiaries the landlord was no 
longer the class opposite around which class consciousness was constructed. Instead, 
mediated via the market rather than directly embodied in a recognisable group of people, 
exploitation; its sources and its forms, became more opaque and distanced - both physically 
and conceptually - from the site of production. Neoliberal globalisation, at the core of the 
food sovereignty movement’s struggles, has further obscured the mechanisms of 
exploitation and generated an organisational crisis for contemporary peasant organisations 
such as CIOAC and FENOCIN in terms of fostering and disseminating ‘food sovereignty’ as 
an ideological project. As we will see in chapter four, this has significantly shaped these 
organisations’ political and mobilisational strategies.  
As the class composition of CIOAC’s mass base shifted as a result of the organisation’s own 
successful land struggles, so too did the nature of its demands. As mentioned earlier, CIOAC 
had experienced the problem of its land reform beneficiaries turning to the CNC once they 
had gained the rights to land. If this was not to occur in Chiapas and ex-workers were not 
willing to collectively run the estates they were formerly employed on, CIOAC had to meet 
the more individualistic demands of an emerging class of small, under-capitalised peasants. 
As in Guerrero, it mobilised against the state to demand basic service provision in newly 
formed ejidos and communities and, through UNCAFAECSA, attempted to provide 
production based support for its members. The class structure of the organisation 
experienced a gradual shift, as members and their local leaders went from being landless to 
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landed. This represented a transition away from agricultural workers and rights to land as 
central to the struggle for agrarian reform, to a focus on social and productive issues. 
Agricultural workers and landless peasants, typically one and the same thing, were 
increasingly under-represented by the organisation through the course of this transition 
from the 1980s to the early 1990s as land struggles culminated in land grants to formerly 
landless peasants. By the mid-1990s CIOAC at the national level had all but in name ceased 
to work issues related to rural labour. This reflected a dramatic shift in the class base of an 
organisation that had first entered Chiapas less than two decades earlier precisely with the 
intention of bringing about socialist transformation based on the struggles of the rural 
proletariat.  
Salinas’ reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution ended the state’s obligation to 
redistribute land and this was not strongly contested by CIOAC. Its leaders claimed, as they 
do to this day, that the land reform era had come to its natural conclusion and was no 
longer the necessary basis for agrarian reform. The CIOAC leadership claimed (and 
continues to claim) that its mass base, dominated by marginalised, yet now landed  
peasants, were (and remain) satisfied with their land but demanding social infrastructure 
and provision first and foremost, closely followed by productive support. However, CIOAC’s 
termination of the land struggle masked a latent and growing internal contradiction; since 
the early 1980s and within a national context of debt forced neoliberal structural 
adjustment and ‘democratisation’, formerly state repressed social organisations such as 
CIOAC were now being incorporated into electoral politics as a means of legitimating the 
neoliberal state. By the end of the 1980s/early 1990s some CIOAC leaders had come to 
occupy important political positions at local, state and even national levels. With this ‘wave 
of democratisation’ came increasing control by municipal governments over municipal 
budgets and those budgets were the main source of finance for the very kind of social 
programmes prioritised by CIOAC and its members. The issue of electoral politics is 
discussed in chapter four and so will not be examined in detail here. However, to briefly 
summarise for the sake of our examination of CIOAC’s shifting class characteristics, success 
in electoral politics at all levels increasingly conditioned the organisation’s ability to meet 
the social (and to a lesser extent during the 1980s and 1990s) and productive demands of 
its members. As a direct result of the political positions reached by local CIOAC leaders the 
organisation was able to provide water, electricity and roads to many of the communities 
formed from their earlier land struggles. However, the price of this relative success and the 
entry into municipal electoral politics was effectively the end of CIOAC’s commitment to 
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land and rural labour struggles, and, in turn, its representation of landless peasants and 
rural labour. Budgets were still channelled from a highly centralised federal government 
and any actions such as land invasions or labour organising were liable to be punished with 
budget cuts or withdrawal, threatening CIOAC’s ability to meet the core demands of its 
mass base now dominated by small landed peasants. However, ever since its members had 
received land as a result of such struggles during the preceding two decades, community 
populations had continued to grow, pressure on the land was increasing, and the next 
generation was once again struggling to make a viable living from the land. Internal 
ejido/community land fragmentation processes had been taking place and dependence on 
seasonal and more long-term, typically national migration for work, was growing. Simply 
put there was growing demand for land, this time from within peasant communities 
created following land reform rather than from estates and plantations. However, this 
demand was not being taken up by CIOAC’s leadership.  
The 1994 Zapatista uprising provided a decisive rejection of CIOAC’s official position that 
following the reform of Article 27 land was no longer in demand and, as a result, no longer 
represented a necessary component CIOAC’s struggles. The latent, internal class 
contradiction within CIOAC between landholding and landless peasants had not been 
resolved and the Zapatista rebellion provided the latter, and CIOAC, with an opportunity to 
resolve this growing tension. Zapatista inspired land invasions were mimicked by CIOAC 
members who invaded 86 properties with a total area of 9,046 hectares from the mid-
1990s to the early 2000s. Many of the lands invaded were actually small properties, some 
no more than eight or nine hectares, therefore under legal levels for redistribution. In the 
process of carrying out the invasions and convinced by the Zapatista’s calls for more radical 
structural change than the struggle for social and productive support from the state to 
peasants, many of CIOAC’s members abandoned the organisation and joined the EZLN  
(Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) (Villafuerte, 2002: 228). According to estimates 
of CIOAC leaders in the municipality of Las Margaritas, the organisation lost around 60% of 
its membership base in 1994/1995 to the EZLN. 
‘The Zapatistas pulled in a lot of people from the CIOAC. According to the EZLN 
we were ‘gubernmentalistas’ and many (of our members) left. Three years later 
some began returning to us because of the achievements we had made with 
our form of working with the government. But originally they took 60 percent 
of our members’.  José Antonio Vázquez (‘El Camarón’), State Leader of CIOAC 
Chiapas (19 October 2012, Las Margaritas, Chiapas). 
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The EZLN reignited the hopes of an emerging younger generation that they may one day 
have their own land despite the official end of both the land reform process and CIOAC’s 
own land related struggles. Despite CIOAC’s tacit agreement with the end of the need for 
land reform it took advantage of the uprising and the political opportunity that it opened 
up to receive land from the state in response to invasions. Despite this, the ideological 
commitment of the EZLN to deeper, structural changes appealed more to many of CIOAC’s 
landless and land poor peasants who decided to shift allegiance rather than invade land in 
the name of CIOAC on an opportunistic basis. Once the Zapatista movement had lost 
momentum as a result of selective government concessions, leadership co-optation, land 
grants, repression and militarisation of the state of Chiapas, CIOAC returned to its discourse 
of the need for social and productive development without the need for further land 
redistribution. It remains clear that the class interests of the organisation’s remaining 
landless and land poor peasants will not be represented unless favourable conditions once 
again open up for them to do so, but such conditions are unlikely to be opened up by the 
actions of CIOAC itself. Instead this will depend on the mobilisations of the landless and 
land poor themselves, outside of CIOAC. In the meantime, this growing class within the 
organisation will be forced to find work elsewhere, out of their communities. CIOAC in 
Chiapas, as in Guerrero, has ceased to represent rural workers. Nor does it represent the 
interests of landless or land poor peasants whose calls for further redistribution are 
effectively silenced by the organisation. The majority are forced to try to make a living in 
urban centres nationally and internationally, namely in the US, under increasingly informal 
and scarce employment conditions and contributing to the unprecedented growth of the 
informal working class. 
 
2.7 CIOAC and Food Sovereignty 
We have examined the historical development of CIOAC’s class base, from broadly landless 
rural workers to marginalised, land-poor peasants heavily dependent on wage labour to 
meet household reproduction requirements. But how are the organisation’s contemporary 
struggles for food sovereignty shaped by its class composition? Officially CIOAC subscribes 
to the VC’s 2003 very broad definition of food sovereignty as: 
‘The right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced 
through sustainable methods and their right to define their own food and 
agriculture systems. It develops a model of small scale sustainable production 
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benefiting communities and their environment. It puts the aspirations, needs 
and livelihoods of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart 
of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and 
corporations’ (Via Campesina, 2003a). 
Periodically the national leadership reaffirms its commitment to the principle of food 
sovereignty as a national level system of food supply and distribution ‘producing nationally 
the food that we all eat, and not importing it from abroad’ in the face of increasing national 
dependence on imported grains (Ovalle, CIOAC’s national leader, 2013). Food sovereignty is 
an official guiding principle of the organisation and among the national level leadership it is 
contrasted against neoliberalism, embodied in NAFTA, with the need to protect and 
support the production of basic foodstuffs produced by peasants. However, beyond this 
very general interpretation of what food sovereignty is or should be, CIOAC has no concrete 
policy proposals as to how this should begin to be achieved and there is no diffusion of a 
food sovereignty discourse through what is a very vertically structured organisation. Why is 
this the case? To a great extent the food sovereignty movement embodied by the VC has, 
by focusing on the production of staples and ignoring the dependence of the majority of 
the peasantry in Latin America on export (cash) crop production and/or wage labour, 
marginalised these groups to favour the interests of a specific fraction of the peasantry 
dedicated to the production of staple crops. This represents a cross-class fraction as the 
VC’s discourse pays no attention to class differentiation as a fundamental characteristic of 
the peasantry; this staples producing fraction as conceptualised by the VC, however, does 
not represent a homogenous grouping. In Mexico and elsewhere, peasant producers of 
basic foodstuffs may be net-buyers or net-sellers of labour power, market 
oriented/dependent, or predominantly relatively autonomous from the market/subsistence 
producers.   
For CIOAC, the vast majority of its members in the south eastern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca 
and Guerrero are land poor (on average 0.25-2Ha of marginal land) and depend on a 
combination of off-farm income and coffee production for survival. As we will see in 
chapter three, subsistence production and a reproduction strategy guided by the goal of 
retaining relative autonomy from the market predominates. They are also overwhelmingly 
net sellers of labour power at the household level. In the coffee growing regions of the 
states where research was conducted around half of CIOAC members’ land is dedicated to 
subsistence production and the other half to coffee. Most years the subsistence plot does 
not provide enough to meet household requirements and must be supplemented through 
market purchases. There is a marked difference between how subsistence and coffee plots 
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are conceived that significantly shapes the nature of CIOAC members’ demands. Provided 
that household subsistence needs are by and large met from subsistence production, 
demands are focused primarily on basic service provision, housing materials in particular, 
followed by support for improving coffee production. CIOAC’s mass base in south east 
Mexico consists of extremely marginalised peasants, many of which remain without 
electricity, basic healthcare provision, dignified housing and community road access. As 
such, CIOAC’s focus of struggle in such regions remains social rather than productive in 
nature. For the CIOAC leadership in these states, food sovereignty’s production focus is 
desirable but only possible once such basic social needs have been provided for by the state. 
In regions and communities where such basic requirements have been met, typically as a 
result of CIOAC’s own struggles, organisational focus has turned to ‘productive 
development’, but with a focus on export crop (coffee) production rather than on staple 
crops that again distances their demands from those of the food sovereignty movement 
and the VC. The latter has yet to articulate the potential role of peasant export crop 
production in a ‘food sovereign’ system (Edelman, 2013) and, in the case of CIOAC’s coffee 
producers, they are doubly marginalised by the VC, firstly as export coffee producers and 
secondly as dependent on wage labour, an issue not addressed by the movement. Although 
CIOAC remains part of the VC there is growing internal criticism of what the organisation’s 
leadership perceives as a restricted struggle for food sovereignty, limited to and benefitting 
organisations whose focus is predominantly based on staples production and that 
represent relatively better off producers, often net buyers of labour, and with a lesser 
degree of dependence on wage labour than CIOAC’s own members. The extract below, 
taken from an interview with CIOAC’s national secretary, highlights the organisation’s 
critical stance towards the VC:  
‘(Me) Is there the possibility to discuss these kind of problems during 
international VC congresses?  
No, because the theme of the congress tells you the issues (to be discussed) and 
the congress follows these issues; there’s no space to discuss other things. It’s 
not possible to discuss fundamentals. When you arrive to a meeting you can’t 
put forward this kind of thing because the issue (being dealt with) is 
another...We still don’t think it’s pertinent for us to leave (the VC), but we think 
something has to change because if you ask - How has it (the VC) served us as 
CIOAC? Well, in truth, not much’. José Dolores López Barrios, CIOAC’s national 
secretary (11 February 2013, Mexico City). 
Before examining in more detail the issue of class (under) representation within the VC we 
will first examine FENOCIN’s shifting class base from the land reform era to the present day. 
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2.8 FENOCIN on the Ecuadorian Coast and Andes 
The changing class composition of FENOCIN’s mass base has become a significant point of 
internal contention in recent years as uneven application of agrarian reform from the 1960s 
to the present has resulted in regionally distinct patterns of capitalist development 
between Ecuador’s coastal plain and the Andean Sierra. These differences have been 
shaped by peasants’ own mobilisations and demands for agrarian reform, state policy that 
has favoured export production on the fertile coastal plain over production of staples 
concentrated in the sierra, and transnational capital investment concentrated on the coast. 
Since the 1960s these dynamics have significantly differentiated FENOCIN’s mass base in 
class terms between the coast and the Andes. In general, the former has benefitted far 
more than the latter from land redistribution carried out in the 1960s and 1970s when 
indentured hacienda workers became small landowners as a result of the breakup of 
traditional estates. In the sierra this process was less extensive as landlords were more 
entrenched and state and capital less concerned with the generalisation of more efficient 
relations of production. Population concentration in the Andes was also much higher, 
limiting the amount of land redistributed. The result in the sierra was a slow, uneven 
process of hacienda break up which created a class of still land poor peasants unable to 
make a viable living from the land and with reproduction strategies based primarily on 
wage labour in nearby urban centres and increasingly abroad. It also resulted in growing 
pressure on that land as the years passed and populations grew. The process of class 
differentiation that this uneven application produced is also inflected with ethnicity as 
coastal, predominantly mestizo peasants are seen to have benefitted more than highland, 
predominantly indigenous producers.  
Regionally specific processes of class formation between the coast and the Andes have 
been shaped not only by the material consequences of distinct agrarian reform processes, 
but also significantly by ethnicity and the role that this has played historically in the 
country’s social movements. Social class and ethnicity are not only inextricably linked 
(Hristov, 2009: 42), but mutually constitutive as ethnic groups have been reproduced for 
centuries in a subordinate interaction with other groups and classes (Bartra & Otero, 2008a: 
402). Returning to Otero (2004a), economic issues are as important as cultural ones for the 
political constitution of class, and ethnicity has historically shaped the course of class 
struggle across Latin America. Economic and cultural issues have combined to shape class 
consciousness and diverging interpretations of what food sovereignty means and how it 
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should be applied between the coast and the Andes. The tensions between these very 
different, often contradictory interpretations, has generated significant internal conflict 
within FENOCIN and contributed to the organisation’s internal division in 2012. To 
understand the roots of these differences we must first look at how FENOCIN emerged in 
the 1960s to force the application of Ecuador’s first Agrarian Reform Law. The 
geographically uneven application of these reforms fostered distinct processes of class 
differentiation within FENOCIN and the organisation experienced growing difficulties in 
accommodating diverging class interests that eventually grew to the point of rupture. 
 
2.9 FENOCIN’s Diverging Class Base from the Land Reform Era 
As we saw in chapter one, peasants in conflict with landowners found an ally in the new 
military junta which seized power in 1963. The interests of coastal peasants to own the land 
they worked and evict (often absentee) landlords coincided at this historical conjuncture 
with national and international capitalist interests that had come to dominate the 
Ecuadorian state as a result of the banana and sugar booms (the hold of the traditional 
landowning class on the state, which it had dominated before and during the cacao boom 
era, had been dwindling from the 1920s). Both the capitalist class and the class of coastal 
hacienda land renting peasants shared the desire to end pre-capitalist social relations on 
the coast which were seen by the former as a significant barrier to capitalist development 
and to the latter as the cause of their poverty and subjugation, and a parasitic obstacle to 
improving their conditions as producers and as communities. The 1964 Agrarian Reform 
Law was the first attempt by the Ecuadorian government to modernise the country’s 
agrarian structure and put an end to pre-capitalist, traditional hacienda-minifundia 
relations that were hindering the development of the coastal export sector as well as 
proving increasingly unable to provide staples, predominantly produced in the Andes, for 
national consumption. Peasant resistance from below combined with national and 
international foreign capitalist interests within the state to attempt to accelerate the 
decomposition of forms of semi-feudal social relations and trigger the 1973 agrarian reform 
law. This second law aimed to eliminate remaining obstacles to accumulation on the coast 
while also accelerating the provision of inefficiently operating hacienda land to tenants 
under precarious tenancy arrangements to help contain a potentially revolutionary 
peasantry (Phillips, 1985: 17-20).  
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The law required ‘efficient exploitation’ of a plot in order to not be subject to expropriation 
and also the complete elimination of non-salaried employment relations. In effect, 
haciendas were obliged to become efficient capitalist enterprises or risk expropriation. As a 
result, the process of land redistribution on the coast greatly increased but it lacked the 
support of other policies, mainly technical assistance and credit. The cooperatives created 
by IERAC and the productive plans they were incorporated into often failed as peasants 
were unable to pay back the credits they had taken out to purchase their land. As a result 
IERAC, during the course of the following decade, dispossessed the majority of ex-workers 
and handed over their lands to an emerging class of capitalist producers. Hacienda workers 
had become peasants only to become workers once again. Cooperatives were underfunded 
and therefore unable to bring large tracts of land into production despite a productive plan 
and credit scheme based on market efficient use of all the land under their control (Striffler, 
2002: 129-135). It is also important here to keep in mind the very different nature and 
application of agrarian reform between Mexico and Ecuador as this has significantly shaped 
the struggles of both countries’ peasant movements. As we saw in chapter one, Mexico’s 
land reform process radically altered the class structure of the countryside, shattering the 
basis of landed production formerly controlled by a powerful pre-capitalist landlord class 
and creating a social sector which still controls around half of the country’s total 
agricultural land area. In contrast, the redistributional impact of Ecuador’s agrarian reform 
was far more limited, impacting just 3.4 percent of the surface area (Zapata et al, 2008: 21). 
In addition, political and economic power remained in the hands of a modernising landlord 
class and, rather than the institution of social property relations, land reform beneficiaries 
became de facto small private property owners far more exposed to proletarianising 
market forces than their Mexican counterparts occupying land under social property 
relations. 
In the coastal provinces of Los Rios and El Oro, cacao producers in FENOCIN’s provincial 
organisations of UNOCAR (Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas de Los Ríos) and UROCAL 
(Unión Regional de Organizaciones Campesinas del Litoral) were part of the national 
movement to push for the application of the land reform of 1973. As we saw in chapter one, 
prior to land reform rural property relations on the coast were complex and highly diverse, 
ranging from various forms of hacienda production combining tenant farmers and wage 
labourers with hacienda specific obligations to landlords. In the case of UROCAL, its 
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members occupied cacao plots (worked under the ‘redención’ system10) on the edge of 
hacienda Tenguel, a 20,000 hectare banana plantation owned by the United Fruit Company 
(UFC) and spanning the provinces of Guayas, El Oro and Azuay. Following the cacao collapse 
of the 1920s, Tenguel was bought by an Ecuadorian Bank (Banco Territorial) and eventually 
sold to the UFC in the late-1930s. In the intervening years the bank, lacking the capacity to 
administer a hacienda of Tenguel’s size, had either rented out sections of the estate to 
individual producers or simply left peasants to occupy and cultivate the abandoned land 
(Striffler, 2002: 27). Once UFC took over it began intensive banana production that radically 
changed hacienda’s production relations.  Peasants retained their subsistence and cacao 
plots under the ‘redención’ system while at the same time, as Striffler’s (2002) study shows, 
an elaborate system of labour control was employed by UFC. The company had its own 
police force, controlled transport in and out of the hacienda and owned all infrastructure, 
including workers’ housing. It applied a Fordist system of management and discipline, 
including high wages, exceptional benefits and considerable paternalism. These practices 
would be used and reworked by workers and their families, transforming them into an 
oppositional culture that would drive land invasions and eventually force UFC from the 
country (Ibid: 43-48). Contrastingly, many of the landlords in the canton of Vinces where 
UNOCAR was based were absentee and so ‘precarious’ tenants were able to organise 
themselves and apply to IERAC for expropriation without a great deal of resistance from 
landowners. Arnaldo Banchen, former FENOCIN national finance secretary and ex-leader of 
UNOCAR, describes the process:  
‘First we formed an agrarian cooperative and the government legalised us. 
With this legal recognition we could go to IERAC, as we were wage workers on 
the hacienda, and we said to IERAC that this is where I work and this part 
corresponds to me. There were also precarious workers who paid the hacienda 
owner in kind in order to rent a piece of land and they did the same. Now our 
lands are where we were born, where we used to work. It wasn’t very 
conflictive; sometimes the landowners threatened us but it really wasn’t a 
violent process’. Arnaldo Banchen, former leader of UNOCAR y ex-finance 
secretary of FENOCIN (1995-1999) (24 April 2013, Vinces, Los Ríos). 
In 1962 hacienda Tenguel was taken over by organised ex-workers following a decade long 
conflict over deteriorating working conditions and labour cut backs on the estate as UFC 
experimented with arrangements in which the company itself would no longer be involved 
in direct production. These experiments threatened the workers’ access to employment 
                                                          
10 At the onset of the cacao boom in the late 19th century, many Andean peasants left their home regions to 
colonise the largely unpopulated coastal plain on landlords’ uncultivated estates. These they cleared, planted, 
and then worked for a number of years until production began, at which point the landowner retook charge of 
the land and paid the worker a fixed sum for each plant (Cosse, 1984: 22). 
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and to land which they primarily dedicated to cacao production (Striffler, 2002: 98). In 1974, 
following sustained collective action by workers, UFC withdrew from Tenguel and its lands 
were divided among the workers. Tenguel’s land reform beneficiaries and those of 
neighbouring haciendas united to form UROCAL which then joined FENOC, now FENOCIN. 
IERAC’s productive plan for Tenguel was based on collective production through the 
creation of four relatively large cooperatives of 160 families in which each household would 
have access to their own one hectare plot for subsistence and work collectively another 
1,600 hectares. However, the reality of IERAC’s underfunding meant that effectively each 
family accessed around 10 hectares that soon came to be worked on a de facto private 
household basis. Under resourced, many of these supposedly ‘communal’ lands came to be 
sold individually to local capitalists by land reform beneficiaries over the following years 
(Ibid: 135). In the case of UNOCAR, during the land reform process members each received, 
on average, between five and ten hectares of land. Again, the results were limited primarily 
to redistribution without the necessary extension services to make living from the land a 
viable option and many beneficiaries were similarly forced to sell the land they had won to 
local capitalists. From when UNOCAR’s members received their land up until today, those 
that remain on their plots have almost all had to combine peasant production of cacao and 
banana with permanent wage work, typically on nearby banana plantations that operate 
year round.  
On the coast as a whole the underfunding of both IERAC and the agrarian reform 
cooperatives meant that beneficiaries were often unable to bring all of their land into 
production. With peasants already indebted to the government and with many unable to 
meet repayment obligations given their inability to cultivate all of their land, they became 
prey to highly capitalised neighbouring banana plantations looking to expand their holdings 
(Striffler, 2002: 135). From the moment that FENOCIN’s coastal peasants gained access to 
land they were dependent on the market for their production and reproduction strategies, 
yet underfunded, under-resourced, and surrounded by highly capital intensive capitalist 
production units with which they had to compete. Having taken out state loans to purchase 
the land they were obliged to continue producing bananas on the basis of IERAC’s 
productive plan. This plan, which in turn assumed state support that was never forthcoming, 
aimed to repay these state loans through a continuation of banana export production, now 
under collective rather than a private property regime. Given their lack of state support, 
loan repayments for the majority became impossible and many of UNOCAR and UROCAL’s 
members were forced to sell most of the land they had gained and work full time either on 
91 
 
the plantations or increasingly in urban areas, especially the sprawling port city of 
Guayaquil. They were left with small plots, primarily devoted to cacao production as it is 
much less labour and input intensive than banana cultivation, on the basis of seeking 
relative autonomy from commodity markets and dependence on relatively stable sources 
wage labour on the region’s export plantations. As we will see in chapter three, the cacao 
plot acts more as a wage supplement rather than the central component of peasants’ 
reproduction strategies for the majority of FENOCIN’s coastal members.  IERAC’s 
underfunding and subsequent peasant struggles to remain on the land, as opposed to 
previous struggles to gain access to it has, according to Arnaldo Banchen and UROCAL’s 
leader Jouaquin Vazquez, led to the significant weakening of both organisations. Both 
groups shifted from representing a class of rural wage and tenant labourers that struggled 
for land, which many subsequently lost, to becoming managers of production cooperatives 
of which they had no prior experience. This lack of experience was exacerbated by direct 
competition from surrounding large-scale capitalist production units and increasingly 
competitive and deregulated markets for their products. Following redistribution both 
organisations dedicated themselves to representing solely land reform beneficiaries. As 
many of these were being forced to sell their plots and become wage labourers once more, 
they no longer found their interests represented by UNOCAR or UROCAL. The organisations 
found themselves representing a dwindling number of smallholder peasants with a tenuous 
hold on their land, the majority forced to depend on credit from usurious intermediaries to 
stay on their plots, and surrounded by massive capitalised banana plantations looking to 
expand their operations.  
The 1983 El Niño event had a massive impact on UROCAL’s land reform cooperative as 
production collapsed and members began to default on the government loans they had 
taken out to buy their plots. This provoked conflicts between the organisation and its 
members as many were forced off their land, accelerating a process of internal class 
differentiation within UROCAL that continues to this day as the organisations’ more 
successful producers, which now dominate the decision making structures of UROCAL, have 
been able to buy more land and expand banana production for foreign markets. The 
majority of UROCAL’s small producers dedicate their land mainly to cacao while those with 
no land no longer have their interests represented by the organisation. 
Since its formation FENOCIN has focused on the land struggle and, in a country with one of 
the highest levels of land concentration in Latin America, access to land remains a central 
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concern for small and landless peasants. The problem that FENOCIN has faced has been to 
combine representing the needs of small and medium peasants on the coast - like those of 
UROCAL and UNOCAR who gained access to land in the 1960s and 1970s - with the very 
different needs of FENOCIN organisations in the Andes that represent land poor and 
landless indigenous peasants. While this is a very general categorisation, a ‘small’ peasant 
on the coast typically owns from four to six hectares dedicated mostly to market (cacao) 
production, a ‘small’ peasant in the Andes owns between a quarter and three hectares of 
marginal land dedicated almost exclusively to subsistence production with the majority of 
household income derived from off-farm wage labour. Processes of class formation and the 
development of class consciousness have differed significantly between the two regions as 
a result of their distinct history of production relations and the fundamental role of 
ethnicity in constituting experiences and conceptions of class in the Andes. In both regions 
the struggle for land was synonymous with the struggle against landowner power and 
exploitation. However, the relationship between FENOCIN’s coastal, predominantly mestizo 
peasants and landowners, upon which class consciousness and class based struggle were 
constructed, differed hugely from that of FENOCIN’s indigenous Andean peasants. For the 
latter, exploitation articulated with racism, social and political discrimination and cultural 
negation on the basis of ethnicity. This has generated struggles in which class and ethnic 
based demands are mutually constituted and which have generated tensions with 
FENOCIN’s mestizo bases on the coast. Before examining these tensions it is worth 
reiterating a point made earlier regarding the formation of class consciousness on the basis 
of a common class enemy in the case of CIOAC.  
As in Mexico, the shift from landlessness to land access triggered the formation of new 
forms of class consciousness based on the struggle to remain on the land against 
proletarianising market forces rather than a class consciousness built fundamentally in 
opposition to a pre-capitalist landlord class as it had been during the land struggle era. For 
FENOCIN’s mestizo coastal peasants the struggle to remain on the land generated struggles 
to attempt to force the Ecuadorian state to carry out its promises of supporting the newly 
created producer cooperatives. When this failed, FENOCIN’s coastal organisations 
abandoned those forced off the land and increasingly shifted focus to issues of productive 
and marketing support for those that remained on it. For FENOCIN’s Andean peasants, on 
the other hand, access to land had not eliminated the ethnic discrimination that had 
historically shaped indigenous class formation. Nor has it tackled the issues of land 
concentration in the Andes. The struggle to remain on the land and exploitation via the 
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market, which they shared with their coastal mestizo counterparts, combined with ongoing 
struggles for further redistribution and social and cultural discrimination that, as we will see 
in chapter four, led to the development of one of Latin America’s most powerful indigenous 
movements over the course of the 1990s. The power of Andean groups relative to coastal 
organisations within FENOCIN, and the former’s increasing focus on issues of ethnicity and 
land reform, has damaged organisational unity over the past few decades. 
 
2.10 FENOCIN and Food Sovereignty 
Over the last 25 years the FENOCIN national leadership has been dominated by Andean 
organisations which have focused FENOCIN’s struggles - and definitions of food sovereignty 
- on democratisation of land and water access, agroecology, and indigenous autonomy. 
Commercialising concerns of coastal peasants have been left to FENOCIN’s coastal 
organisations to resolve independently and this has led to growing criticism from these 
groups of FENOCIN’s ‘indigenous control’ and of being concerned only with land access, not 
the ability of peasants to make a living form the land once such access had been achieved. 
In 2012 FENOCIN experienced an internal division which broadly, though not entirely, 
followed the geographical contours of coast-Andes. While this was also caused by more 
recent political divisions which will be discussed next, the deeper issue of historical coastal 
under representation was a fundamental underlying cause of the fissure that also combines 
with political factors. To understand the division it is necessary to examine how coastal 
organisations interpret ‘food sovereignty’ in the 21st century and how this differs from 
FENOCIN’s national food sovereignty discourse based fundamentally on the expropriation 
and redistribution of land.  
‘A redistribution of land isn’t suitable now; we already lived this process and 
now we have land...Agrarian reform in this country is not a problem of 
redistribution, it’s one of productivity, credit, technical assistance and 
commercialisation. Andrango (FENOCIN president 2008-2013) carries on with 
an old argument that isn’t for today’. Arnaldo Banchen, former leader of 
UNOCAR y ex-finance secretary of FENOCIN (1995-1999) (24 April 2013, 
Vinces, Los Ríos). 
‘Since I ended my term as FENOCIN’s vice-president (1999) FENOCIN began to 
use a more indigenous discourse. Since the growth of CONAIE (La 
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador) it became very 
‘indigenista’ in the sense that first the indigenous, then the rest. We on the 
coast tried to reach agreements with them but it was impossible because they 
controlled the organisation’s (decision making) spaces...We have already 
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gained land for producers so now we have to address production. It’s okay to 
struggle for land still, but you can’t just stay in this without struggling for 
production and commercialisation’. Joaquin Vazquez, President of UROCAL 
and former Vice-President of FENOCIN (1995-1999) (30 April 2013, Shumiral, 
Azuay). 
The lack of focus on land redistribution on the coast reflects the class composition of 
groups like UROCAL and UNOCAR, based as they are on land reform beneficiaries struggling 
to improve their production and not for access to more land that they would not have the 
resources to make produce anyway. The long running tensions between FENOCIN’s coastal 
and Andean organisations came to a head in 2012 as a result of Correa’s rural policy based 
on a conception of agrarian reform and food sovereignty that very much coincides with 
coastal organisations’ own ideas regarding these issues (see chapter four for an in depth 
analysis of this issue). This policy is based on the idea that agrarian reform needs to 
increase the productivity and efficiency of peasant agriculture while paying lip service to 
redistribution issues. According to Correa, food sovereignty can be achieved through 
improved productivity on existing holdings without the need to expropriate and divide large 
landed properties. Peasant organisations, those on the coast in particular as producers of 
cash crops, are set to play an important role in administering state resources channelled 
into productive development. FENOCIN’s coastal organisations are overwhelmingly 
supportive of Correa’s government. This support from coastal organisations that have the 
potential of receiving state projects and resources became increasingly at odds with an ever 
more critical discourse of Correa’s rural policy emanating from FENOCIN’s national 
leadership. Not only did FENOCIN’s coastal groups not share this criticism, they also wished 
to actively distance themselves from association with it believing that it could jeopardise 
their access to state resources. 
‘In July last year in FENOCIN’s national assembly Andrango put forward that 
FENOCIN was anti-Correa, anti-government. He represents everyone (in 
FENOCIN) but the bases don’t think this way, they aren’t against the 
government. From there came the internal conflict...he put himself against the 
bases.’ Arnaldo Banchen  (23 April 2013). 
As was argued in the case of CIOAC’s peasants in southern Mexico, the struggles for land of 
FENOCIN’s Andean peasants are not founded on experiences of increasingly scarce, 
informal and oppressive conditions in the labour market, as argued by Bernstein’s (2001 & 
2006) agrarian question of labour thesis. Although FENOCIN’s Andean members, similarly to 
those of CIOAC, derive the majority of household income from wage labour (in quantitative 
terms their reproduction strategies are based predominantly on off-farm employment) they 
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struggle for land - both for access to it and for the ability to make a viable living from it - 
more on the basis of non-economic values associated with the land and the relative 
autonomy from the market that viable household production can provide. This argument is 
corroborated by one of the national leaders of FENACLE (National Federation of 
Agroindustry Workers), another Ecuadorian VC member organisation, quoted below. He 
also indicates how this association with the land, and the importance of being ‘campesino’ 
rather than ‘worker’ - as we also saw in the case of CIOAC - makes labour organising among 
the marginal landholding peasantry particularly difficult: 
‘In the sierra there’s a problem (for union organising) because the conception is 
of being one hundred percent campesino and the (wage) work that they do, 
despite their dependence on it, isn’t viewed as being important. The people in 
the sierra say - “I work from Monday to Saturday for the company and in the 
evening they give me one hour to work my plot”. It’s the culture, to work to 
save some money for the family but think more about the family land as their 
main occupation even though they work five days as wage workers and one 
day on their land...the children and the women work the land and the money 
that they (the men) earn is for the family and the land’. Elías Arias, Member of 
FENACLE’s national directive (7 May 2013, Guayaquil). 
That demands for land in Ecuador originate primarily from the countryside, and not from 
increasingly oppressive, informal and insecure urban labour markets as suggested by 
Bernstein’s agrarian question of labour thesis, is not only restricted to the Andes. The 
struggle of FENOCIN’s coastal organisation AACH (Artisan Association of Chucaple) in the 
province of Esmeraldas for the redistribution of a 500 hectare hacienda bordering its 
community derives from a fundamental desire of the organisation’s members to live as 
producers rather than workers, not so much because of negative experiences of wage work 
but much more because of the positive associations held over landed production. In the 
extract below one of AACH’s members describes his situation and explains why he is 
currently petitioning for the hacienda’s division. 
‘I have 3.5 hectares and ten children. Only one, the youngest, lives here with 
me...the rest live away. My daughters are married and my other two sons work 
in the city. If the organisation manages to get the land then the family will 
return. This is what I want, so that all the family are here together.  
(Me) Are your children involved in the process (of petitioning for the land)?  
Not directly, but if we (AACH) get it (the land), they’ll return’. Antonio Espinoza 
Sánchez, member of AACH (16 April 2013, Chucaple, Esmeraldas). 
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2.11 Class Representation within CIOAC and FENOCIN 
Both CIOAC and FENOCIN’s experiences demonstrate the difficulty of representing all the 
‘people of the land’, all classes of peasantry, within the same organisation. While the food 
sovereignty literature and the movement itself laud unity in diversity there is often little 
appreciation of class differentiation among and within the organisations that compose the 
VC. Both organisations studied have experienced an important shift in their class 
compositions as a result of their own struggles as landless members gained access to land. 
The focus and content of demands have moved towards the interests of small landholders 
and away from the landless and rural labourers in the case of the CIOAC, and remained with 
the landless and land poor in FENOCIN at the cost of marginalising smallholder land 
beneficiaries from the agrarian reform era whose calls for productive and commercialising 
improvements have been left for individual organisations to deal with independently. In 
both contexts, forces of dispossession and proletarianisation in the neoliberal era (cut 
back/elimination of state supports for the peasants sector, end to price guarantees and 
national crop marketing boards, market opening and falling, more volatile prices etc.) have 
increasingly driven CIOAC and FENOCIN’s small peasant producers off their land. This is 
especially the case for the generations that followed land reform as redistribution 
processes were gradually cut back and eventually eliminated. As both organisations 
experienced the gradual transition from a landless to a landholding membership the 
tensions involved with representing both broad class categories within the same 
organisation emerged and deepened; CIOAC’s end to the struggle for land meant landless 
and land poor peasants would have to leave the organisation to have their interests served 
while the hegemony of landless and land poor groups in the Andes that have dominated 
FENOCIN for the past 25 years have not represented coastal peasants struggling for 
productive and marketing improvements, a major factor leading to FENOCIN’s division. 
However, this is not to imply that combining the interests of various peasant classes and 
class fractions is impossible to achieve. In the case of CIOAC and FENOCIN, internal 
organisational dynamics which have led to the elimination of landless/labour class interests 
from these organisations’ struggles cannot be universalised across Latin American peasant 
movements on the whole. Brazil’s MST (Landless Rural Workers' Movement), one of the 
region’s largest and most influential rural movements, has managed - not without 
challenges - to combine the demands of a landless and landed mass base. Kröger (2011: 
443) suggests that the MST’s strategic shift from a narrow agrarian reform process to a 
more general contestation of multinational capital has helped unite the movement with 
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sympathetic urban groups and other marginalised (labouring) classes, broadening its 
support base. Vergara-Camus (2009: 372) also demonstrates how the movement has 
managed to combine struggles for land as the basis of subsistence for landless peasants 
with productive and marketing support for already relatively well established producers 
seeking to successfully integrate into market production. 
In the process of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s successful land struggles and the shifting 
organisational class base that has resulted, another important issue emerges for peasant 
organising in addition to changing nature and (under)representation of certain class 
interests. In the era when both organisations’ mass bases were landless peasants their 
movements were stronger as members shared common goals focused on, but going 
beyond, access to land and social justice issues. This changed as land was won but not 
worked collectively as members’ demands for individual, household autonomy on the basis 
of prioritising rights to a family plot took precedence over communal systems of control 
and production. Communal land was almost always demanded and granted as part of any 
land redistribution in both countries, but this tended to be created with family access to 
grazing and other services in mind rather than fostering a communally operated system of 
production.  This issue, the individualisation of the peasantry, is recognised by both 
organisations’ leaderships as a significant factor in understanding the weakening of the 
peasant movement at the national level which has limited their ability to counter neoliberal 
reforms and defend against forces of peasant impoverishment and dispossession.  
‘At the beginning all the communities demanded their rights, respect, that they 
could access land, education, health, with the same rights (as non-indigenous). 
This meant that the people had the same general objective. This happened and 
the people had more needs, and these needs aren’t very collective, they’re 
more personal. This means that UNORCAC (Unión de Organizaciones 
Campesinas de Cotacachi) weakened a little…So now the people’s needs aren’t 
necessarily focused on the same things. Now what they demand are sources of 
employment, and UNORCAC can’t give them sources of employment. And if a 
project comes (from government or an NGO), it comes for three, four people. It 
used to be easy for UNORCAC to be able to help them because there was one 
idea, one objective. Now there are many objectives and they are not collective, 
they are individual’. Ruminahui Anrango, leader of the FENOCIN organisation 
UNORCAC (6 April 2013, Cotacachi, Imbabura). 
‘The people aren’t interested in unionising. In the past we could find a reason, 
which could be that these peasants, agricultural workers, landless peasants, 
were dreaming of one day having their own land...it was different when we 
were struggling for land to today when we’re involved in government 
programmes. Because now the people come to us individually wanting a 
support, a programme for fertilizer, etcetera. They have a need and they come 
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looking for us. In the past people wanted land, and it was a combined, 
conflictual struggle and people participated. But this isn’t the situation now. 
They aren’t looking for who can help them organise as a union. Now they are 
thinking about returning to their individual plots and not doing anything that 
could cause them to lose their jobs’. José Luis Hernández Andrade, CIOAC 
national secretary for labour issues (29 January 2013, Mexico City). 
The relative weakening of CIOAC and FENOCIN that followed successful land struggles must 
also be understood in terms of the generally more fragmented class experiences of a now 
landed mass base in comparison to their historical class experiences as landless peasants. 
This fragmentation has impacted on the class consciousness of both organisations’ 
members and the strategies formulated by their leaders to try to address this more 
fragmented mass base. Not only have forms of exploitation become more opaque than 
during the land struggle era, mediated as they are through the market rather than 
embodied in a visible landlord class; they have also become increasingly diverse and harder 
for their organisations to articulate as part of a coherent strategy and ideology. CIOAC and 
FENOCIN’s peasants reproduce themselves via varying degrees of integration into and 
dependence on commodity and labour markets as well as subsistence production. An 
increasingly class-complex mass base (in terms of the diversity of their reproduction 
strategies), the ‘individualisation’ of demands following successful land struggles described 
by CIOAC and FENOCIN leaders above, the relative opacity and diversity of modes of 
market-mediated exploitation compared to direct landlord control, and the growing 
dependence of both organisations’ mass bases on off-farm wage labour which they are 
largely unwilling to organise around - all of these factors have combined to weaken peasant 
movement struggles. The political strategies that both organisations have pursued, built 
largely on these fundamental shifts in the class characteristics of their mass bases, have 
also played a major role in determining the capacity of both organisations to effectively 
represent the interests of their members and will be explored in chapter four. The main 
point here is that both CIOAC and FENOCIN have struggled to unite a now more diverse and 
fragmented class mass base in a coherent and consistent manner under neoliberalism than 
they did during the land struggle era. This is not simply due to the relatively more 
homogenous class bases they had when all were struggling for land. The role of both 
organisations in developing class consciousness through a collective ideological struggle 
around a common class enemy - the landlord - was much more effective in mobilising their 
mass bases than contemporary struggles against ‘neoliberalism’, ‘TNCs’, and the many and 
varied, yet often indirectly experienced forms of exploitation that these entities embody 
and reproduce. The VC’s failure to incorporate the interests of labour or any classes of 
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producers of export crops into not only its demands but, as importantly, its ideological 
construction of a potential world to be struggled for, reduces the scope of the movement 
and its capacity to appeal to and mobilise many of the most marginalised rural social classes. 
The move from collective to more individual struggles of the mass bases of both FENOCIN 
and CIOAC has important implications for how these organisations interpret and struggle 
for food sovereignty. The reduced representation of rural labour, the landless and the land 
poor in both organisations has, in the case of the CIOAC, led to the organisation’s official 
stance that agrarian reform based on land redistribution is no longer necessary or desirable 
and so forms no part of their struggle for food sovereignty. This organisational shift in 
emphasis must also be understood within the overall context of the impact of Mexico’s 
national land reform era following which around half of the nation’s agricultural land is now 
in peasant hands under social property arrangements. Instead, struggles focus on state 
support for peasant producers in terms of productive improvement and social development, 
namely dignified housing, transport infrastructure and decent education and healthcare 
provision in rural areas. Food sovereignty, interpreted by CIOAC broadly as a national 
system of food production and distribution based on ‘peasant agriculture,’ can only be 
achieved on the basis of these preceding developments. That the more market 
oriented/dependent peasants that compose CIOAC in many cases already employ wage 
labour that does not receive the now supposedly obligatory social security or minimum 
wage is not considered to be in any way important. The class interests of rural wage labour 
and small peasants are not discussed by CIOAC’s leaders and the idea that landowning 
peasants should have to contribute to workers’ social security is considered impossible, 
something that CIOAC would fight against if necessary, on the basis that it would punish 
already impoverished landholding producers.  CIOAC’s national secretary for labour issues 
confirms the organisation’s stance in the interview extract below: 
‘The vast majority of workers in the countryside don’t work for big landowners, 
they work for their neighbour. How can you organise unions against (his 
emphasis) these small producers? From the point of view of justice it’s an 
aberration because they (small producers) would be left less protected because 
of union action. They are smallholders with four or five hectares; they aren’t a 
great employer of labour. In the countryside where there’s an important 
concentration of agricultural workers is in the irrigation zones of the north’. 
José Luis Hernández Andrade, (29 January 2013, Mexico City). 
In the case of FENOCIN, conceptions of food sovereignty vary enormously between the 
coast and the Andes. While Ecuador’s land reform process on the national scale had far 
more limited redistributional effects than was the case for Mexico, as we saw above, 
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significant regional divergences emerged between the coast and the Andes with land access 
remaining far more restricted in the latter than in the former. However, as with CIOAC, in 
neither region does agricultural labour have a voice in these conceptions and its role in any 
‘food sovereign’ society is never considered even when, like with CIOAC, many of 
FENOCIN’s already struggling producers employ seasonal wage labour and would surely do 
so more if their goals relating to the promotion of peasant agriculture were to be achieved.  
While the Andean dominated leadership of the FENOCIN has interpreted food sovereignty 
as both national and regional systems of food production and distribution on the basis of 
agroecology and land redistribution, the organisation’s coastal organisations have different, 
under-represented conceptions. Food sovereignty is less of a focus than in the Andes as 
coastal peasants have always produced most, if not all of their crops for export. While they 
tend to support the idea of a national system for staples production and distribution it is 
not something they struggle for, and neither is agroecology widely practiced or valued 
(apart from UROCAL which has a well established certification system for organic banana 
and cacao). They struggle for state support for improved production capacity, marketing 
channels and price stability/security for export crops and this does not find support either 
in FENOCIN’s struggles nationally or those of the VC internationally. They actively seek 
improved integration into world markets rather than extraction from it, but these issues are 
not taken up by either FENOCIN or the food sovereignty movement in general. This is 
despite the fact that issues relating to cash crop production are central areas of concern for 
the majority of both organisations’ peasants. As such, the food sovereignty discourse not 
only under represents or fails to represent entirely a whole class of the peasantry; rural 
labour, but also selectively represents small and medium peasants in terms of staple 
production while ignoring cash crop issues that are so integral to most peasant household 
reproduction strategies. Both organisations’ experiences with attempting to foster 
collectivised production systems at local levels also demonstrates that the VC’s promotion 
of collective forms of peasant agriculture is problematic. While critical of market led 
agrarian reform (MLAR) in its various guises with its focus on individual property rights, it 
would appear, at least in the cases of Mexico and Ecuador, that much of the peasantry is 
eager to secure individual control of a landholding over participation in a collective system. 
The latter is not rejected, especially in terms of marketing and credit channels where 
peasant access favours collective association. However, when it comes to decisions over 
production, which are the most important for securing household production and 
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reproduction, and ultimately access to their land, CIOAC and FENOCIN’s members have 
been and remain strongly in favour of individual control. 
 
2.12 CIOAC, FENOCIN and the Via Campesina: Class Bases, 
Collaboration and Conflict 
The VC’s stated role is as an institutional space for bringing together international peasant 
movements across the globe to represent the interests of small farmer/peasant agriculture 
on a global scale. It is therefore natural to assume that the first point of ‘unity in diversity’ 
and the promotion of collaboration would be at the national level, in this case between the 
various VC organisations within Mexico and Ecuador. As noted by Borras (2010) however, 
the VC and its proponents have preferred to publicise the unity of the movement rather 
than any potential frictions or even conflicts that are sure to exist within such a diverse 
movement. As has already been shown, important class based tensions within both CIOAC 
and FENOCIN have significantly shaped their organisational forms and development. Other 
VC organisations in both countries also represent specific constellations of class interests 
that may promote or inhibit collaboration with their national counterparts. This section will 
examine how the class bases of other VC organisations in Mexico and Ecuador impact their 
conceptions of food sovereignty and how this contributes to conflict and collaboration 
between them. 
For FENOCIN (its official stance representing landless/land-poor indigenous Andean 
peasants), agrarian reform based on land redistribution and expropriation of large holdings 
is a prerequisite for ‘food sovereignty’. This official position puts it at odds with FENACLE, 
an organisation that represents agricultural workers mainly on coastal banana plantations 
that has recently begun organising highland floricultural workers. That FENACLE’s mass 
base of rural workers organised around labour issues on export plantations should conceive 
of and struggle for food sovereignty in a very different way to FENOCIN, with a mass base of 
landed, land-poor and landless peasants, is an issue that the VC and supporters of the FSM 
in general have failed to adequately address. The differing class bases of national peasant 
organisations are a major source of tensions within national peasant movements that 
appears non-existent in much of the FSM literature (Borras, 2008, is a notable exception). 
Proponents of peasant agriculture tend to assume a unity of purpose, action and ideology 
that correspond to these organisations’ stated commitments to shared goals put forward in 
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official documents and national and international meetings. These statements and 
professed unity with other rural movements both nationally and internationally disguise 
the everyday practices of these organisations that often hinder rather than foster unity, 
with differences in organisations’ class bases, politics and ideologies three major factors 
determining the relative levels of conflict and/or collaboration within national peasant 
movements. This section will focus on how the first of these factors, organisational class 
bases, shape relationships between FENOCIN, CIOAC and other VC members in Ecuador and 
Mexico. Politics, ideology and other factors may be equally if not more important than class 
base depending on specific contexts and will be examined in more detail in chapter four. 
In June 2012 FENOCIN, in collaboration with the CNC-EA (National Campesino 
Confederation Eloy Alfaro), another of Ecuador’s VC member organisations, presented a 
new land law proposal to the National Assembly (the issues surrounding this proposal are 
discussed in detail in chapter four). The CNC-EA is based overwhelmingly in the Ecuadorian 
Andes and represents organisations with very similar class bases as those of FENOCIN’s 
Andean groups. For FENACLE the proposal, whose fundamental point of contention was the 
plan to expropriate landholdings of 500 hectares or more on the coast, and 200 hectares 
and above in the Andes, represented a significant threat to their own members, the vast 
majority of which work on large plantations that would be subject to expropriation if the 
land law proposal were implemented. 
‘They collected signatures. We as FENACLE didn’t agree because there were 
issues we didn’t share...The law proposes limiting monopolies with a maximum 
of 500 hectares. We were worried because we have unions in businesses that 
own over 2000 hectares. So what happens to the workers? Passing this law the 
union automatically disappears. The law could benefit one but punish another. 
And we can’t let this happen. We don’t defend the businesses, but we defend 
the workers that would suffer the consequences. As FENACLE they’re going to 
damage us, so we weren’t in agreement with them (FENOCIN). We kept our 
distance because they don’t consider the unions’. Elías Arias (7 May 2013). 
FENACLE saw FENOCIN’s initiative as not only against the interests of its bases, but also as 
something potentially damaging to its members. This reflects the importance of analysing 
disunity in diversity instead of simply assuming unity without any foundation on which to 
do so. Although both organisations subscribe to VC’s basic principle of food sovereignty, 
beliefs as to what the concept means and how it should be carried out vary considerably 
between the two organisations as a consequence of their different class bases. For 
FENACLE, unlike FENOCIN, food sovereignty does not necessarily require expropriation of 
existing plantations, rather the reform of their operations to provide better wages and 
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working conditions for rural labour. FENOCIN’s conceptualisation of food sovereignty as 
involving primarily national staples produced agroecologically is also at odds with export 
plantation production, something that FENACLE deems beneficial not only for Ecuador as a 
nation but also as a means of valuable and valued employment for and by workers 
themselves. As highlighted by Edelman (2013) the role of export production in any ‘food 
sovereign’ system has yet to be addressed comprehensively by the VC and the food 
sovereignty literature. It is clear that how VC organisations such as CIOAC and FENOCIN 
incorporate the demands of their export crop producing members into their national 
strategies for food sovereignty is still an issue, especially for FENOCIN whose coastal 
peasants, as discussed above, consider their needs as cacao producers at best under-
represented by the organisation. However, while FENOCIN’s coastal peasants demand 
resources and infrastructure to enable them to improve production and better compete on 
the world market with their cash crops, FENACLE’s focus is not the improvement of 
production per se but the improvement of employment conditions, wages and possibilities 
for labour organising on existing plantations. As seen with the land law proposal, the 
interests of rural plantation workers and landed peasants can be contradictory and inhibit 
the peasant movement as a whole if it attempts to unify all ‘people of the land’ under one 
homogenising discourse. In this case the generalised demand for land redistribution based 
on extension limits is claimed by FENOCIN to be in the interests of ‘the peasantry’ as if 
different classes of peasants were non-existent and the results of such a policy without 
class-specific effects, specifically to the potential detriment of plantation workers. 
The different class bases of Mexico’s VC organisations is also a source of tension and 
outright conflict that has inhibited the peasant movement nationally. ANEC (National 
Association of Commercialising Enterprises) emerged in the aftermath of NAFTA coming 
into force on 1 January 1994, and continues to mobilise against what it sees as the 
aggressive implementation of neoliberal policies that it claims are devastating peasant 
livelihoods and communities, and forcing more and more small and medium sized 
producers off their lands. ANEC established to fill the vacuum left by CONASUPO, the state 
run agency responsible for monitoring and supporting the basic grain markets that was 
completely dismantled forcing producers to create their own channels to market their 
harvests. It joined the VC in 1996 and aims to address producers’ social and economic 
needs via mutual support, democratic participation, cooperative management as well as 
seeking out the best markets for grain. The association formed as a response by formerly 
state managed Peasant Commercialising Enterprises to coordinate their dispersed activities 
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around the country and produce policy proposals to present to government in favour of 
peasant production (Antal et al, 2010: 66). ANEC is today composed of around 230 such 
enterprises in 19 states and aims to promote this model at local, regional and national 
levels through the direct participation of basic grain producing peasants in both marketing 
of their produce and transforming policies related to the conditions of their existence, 
production and marketing (ANEC, 2003: 13). However, the mass base of ANEC is composed 
of relatively well established small-medium sized grain producers with a history of state 
supported production of basic grains. Many of ANEC’s producers are also net buyers of 
labour, unlike CIOAC’s who are overwhelmingly net sellers. The demands of its members 
reflect this class composition, based as they are on production issues, access to credit and 
improved marketing channels. This contrasts with the majority of CIOAC’s mass base of 
small peasants who, particularly in the southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero, 
have had minimal state productive support, occupy marginal lands typically of under two 
hectares, and whose production of basic grains is almost solely for subsistence with 
undercapitalised, unproductive coffee production combined with (typically seasonal) wage 
labour as a basis for family income.  
According to the CIOAC leadership, ANEC’s focus on commercialising issues of relatively 
successful grain producing peasants is not only distanced from their own struggles to 
secure the basic conditions of life in the countryside for their members, but can even 
represent a direct threat to their own organisations. Although the organisational tensions 
between CIOAC and ANEC are in large part based on membership class mass base, their 
differences cannot be reduced to class alone and also involve important political and 
ideological factors that will be discussed in chapter four. CIOAC claims that some of its own 
members who gained land as a result of the organisation’s struggles, and that have 
benefitted subsequently from state supports achieved through further organisational 
mobilisations, have left and joined ANEC to benefit from its marketing knowledge and 
infrastructure. According to José Dolores López, CIOAC’s national secretary, the difference 
between CIOAC and ANEC is fundamental, based on the different peasant groups (classes) 
both organisations represent: 
‘They (ANEC) work with people that are already producing well, they work with 
people already constituted in a project. That is the great difference because we 
work the whole process from below, but they don’t. They struggle for resources 
(from government) for businesses, for social enterprises, mainly from SAGARPA 
(The Ministry of Agriculture). Their work is more business oriented, ours is more 
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socially focused’. José Dolores López Barrios, CIOAC’s national secretary (11 
February 2013, Mexico City). 
ANEC’s work is centred on the struggle for food sovereignty as this concept relates far more 
directly to the needs and desires of its mass base than those of CIOAC. The former have 
concrete proposals for what a food sovereign society entails and the necessary reforms that 
need to take place to current rural policy in order to achieve this. One of ANEC’s central 
proposals for beginning to tackle Mexico’s lack of food sovereignty is the reform of 
PROCAMPO, a subsidy programme for corn producers. This proposal, while potentially 
beneficial to the great majority of Mexico’s small-medium producers, is not supported by 
CIOAC which interprets the subsidy very differently to ANEC due primarily to the class 
differences between the organisations’ mass bases. PROCAMPO was introduced to support 
producers following the implementation of NAFTA in 1994 and the sharp decline in 
domestic prices that Mexico’s formerly state-supported producers experienced. Cash 
transfers are made on a per hectare basis across the whole country for a range of basic 
crops with payments regressively distributed, proportional to area planted (Sadoulet et al, 
2001: 6-7). The regressive nature of the subsidy means that, in effect, it acts as a poverty 
subsidy rather than a productive one when given to small-scale, subsistence peasants. 
According to Victor Suarez, ANEC’s national leader, this subsidy is poorly distributed, does 
not contribute to productive development, and must be reformed in order to promote 
national self-sufficiency in staple food crops. ANEC proposes a 30 hectare limit for 
assistance (currently 100), with money saved from not supporting large producers used to: 
double assistance to producers of under 1Ha; increase by 75% assistance to producers with 
1.1-5HA; increase by 50% those with 5.1-10 hectares; and keep the same level of assistance 
to those with 10.1 - 30 hectares (Suarez, 2010). 
Despite such measures potentially benefitting many of CIOAC’s own members the 
organisation has not supported ANEC’s proposals. Firstly, many of CIOAC’s members do not 
receive PROCAMPO in the first place and the organisation focuses much energy on assisting 
members with the necessary paperwork to register for the programme and formalise their 
legal rights to tenancy. ANEC’s mass base of small-medium peasant producers with 
established tenancy contrasts with CIOAC’s own whose members’ production is typically 
geared more towards subsistence/survival than on productive improvement. Whereas 
ANEC conceives of PROCAMPO as a production subsidy with limited effectiveness in its 
current forms given its regressive distribution and poor administration, CIOAC conceives of 
PROCAMPO as a survival subsidy. Its members are keen to access it not so they can invest in 
106 
 
improving their land but as an income subsidy to better meet basic household needs. It 
provides the household with a little extra space or relative autonomy from labour and 
commodity markets, a small income supplement to meet basic needs. The contradiction 
between CIOAC’s stated commitment to promotion of peasant production and its need to 
keep its uncompetitive, unproductive and under-resourced members on their land at any 
cost is recognised by CIOAC’s leaders as something very difficult to resolve: 
‘Socially and politically PROCAMPO should continue (as it is). In my opinion the 
programme is terrible; many members don’t even plant corn but they still 
receive PROCAMPO and really it should be based on amount produced, not 
land area. The problem is that we’re all comfortable with it as it is - we and the 
government. The government gets stability in the countryside with this kind of 
subsidy and we’re not going to try to make changes that in the end could 
damage our producers, many of which receive the subsidy without cultivating 
the land’. Raúl Abarca, CIOAC Head of Productive Projects in the state of 
Chiapas (31 October 2012, Tuxtla Gutierrez). 
 
Originating from the differing class bases of ANEC and CIOAC arise distinct interpretations 
and varying proposals for rural policy reform that, as had been demonstrated, can generate 
contradictory stances on the nature and content of key aspects of rural struggle11. These 
differences can be so great that they break out into open conflict that severs any ties 
between national level VC members organisations despite the latter’s promotion of ‘unity’ 
among diversity and its core principles and proposals that supposedly all member 
organisations adhere to. Currently there is no joint work or even communication between 
CIOAC and ANEC, with the latter equating the former’s focus of struggle on state resources 
for rural social development with clientelism. In contrast, ANEC claims that its own 
demands for productive development (for a relatively better-off class of production focused, 
market-oriented staples producing peasants), is the only organisation really struggling for 
food sovereignty and peasant led rural policy.  
 
2.13 Concluding Comments 
This chapter has examined the class dynamics of contemporary peasant organising in 
Mexico and Ecuador at two levels; firstly within two national level VC organisations and 
secondly between these organisations and other VC organisations in the two countries. It 
has done so in an attempt to highlight the importance of peasant class and processes of 
                                                          
11 The differences and tension between CIOAC and ANEC are as political in nature as they are class-based (see 
chapter four). 
107 
 
peasant class differentiation that have shaped, and continue to shape, peasant 
organisations, their struggles, and the potential for alliance and conflict within the FSM as a 
consequence of class dynamics. Peasant organisations’ interpretations of, and demands for, 
food sovereignty are significantly influenced by the historical development of their mass 
bases in their national contexts and the relationships with their national states and 
governments. Their class bases have changed significantly as a result of their own struggles 
embedded in nationally and regionally specific dynamics of capitalist development, which 
have of course also been shaped by phases of capital accumulation on a world scale. This 
has resulted in a shifting balance of class forces within CIOAC and FENOCIN which has 
shaped the nature and content of their demands and struggles over time. 
We have seen that rural labour is not represented by either CIOAC or FENOCIN in the 
present day as both organisations have moved from representing predominantly landless 
to landed (even if land poor) peasants from the late 1960s onwards. In turn, non-land based 
components of their landed members’ reproduction strategies, namely (growing) 
dependence on off-farm wage labour, are likewise not represented or significantly under-
represented.   As a result, both organisations’ conceptions of food sovereignty and their 
demands for ‘rural development’ more generally, in no way represent the specific interests 
of rural labour, not only as a distinct class but as a class fraction of land-poor/semi-
proletarianised peasants forced to depend to varying degrees on the labour market for 
their reproduction. Out of all of the VC organisations operating in both countries only 
FENACLE in Ecuador focuses on rural labour issues and, as discussed above, their demands 
and interpretations of food sovereignty are often contradictory to those of other VC 
organisations that represent landed peasants. This lack of focus on rural labour issues is a 
major problem for the VC and the food sovereignty movement more generally that claims 
to represent all ‘people of the land’ given the overwhelming dependence on wage labour 
for the social reproduction of the peasantry in both countries and in Latin America as a 
whole. The lack of recognition of, and engagement with, the wage labour component of 
peasant reproduction strategies by the majority of Mexico and Ecuador’s peasant 
movements and the VC in general needs to be addressed if labour is to be better 
represented in contemporary agrarian movements in Latin America. This chapter has also 
shown that the under-representation of landless and land-poor peasants has been a major 
source of tensions and divisions for both CIOAC and FENOCIN. The former claims that land 
reform is no longer necessary for the economic and social development of Mexico’s 
countryside and does not represent a necessary component of a food sovereign Mexico. 
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However, pressure on land in south eastern Mexico is a central concern for many of its 
members, as demonstrated by the EZLN uprising and defection of many of CIOAC’s 
members whose need for land was not being represented by their organisation. FENOCIN’s 
deeper, national division in 2012 was based on the internal division between the 
production based demands of landed, coastal peasants and the calls for democratisation of 
land and water access by the organisation’s more land poor and landless Andean members. 
However, although the demands of the landless and landed are very different in content, 
they are not necessarily contradictory in nature. The contradiction lies in the organisational 
strategy required to meet these demands; production based supports are best achieved via 
proposal and dialogue with state-legitimating institutions with recourse to (generally 
peaceful) mass mobilisations if these demands are not addressed. However, demands for 
land made on a neoliberal state typically require more militant tactics of land invasions that 
may jeopardise an organisation’s work on production based issues if it tries to combine the 
two sets of class based demands.  
Both the CIOAC and FENOCIN leaderships have, historically, attempted to struggle for the 
promotion of peasant production and livelihoods in collective rather than individual terms. 
This has often been at odds with peasant demands in Ecuador and in Southeast Mexico for 
individual rights to land taking precedence over, while in no way rejecting, collective 
systems. Following redistribution both organisations’ leadership attribute the weakening of 
the peasant movement nationally at least in part to the changing nature of peasant 
demands from a collective to a more individual basis. FENOCIN’s cacao producers on 
Ecuador’s coast and CIOAC’s coffee growers in Southeast Mexico divided ex-estates into 
individual plots rather than organising collective control over existing enterprises against 
the desires of their organisations’ national leaders who pushed for collective systems. This 
raises some important questions for the food sovereignty movement as to whether peasant 
agriculture with production organised on an individual family farm/plot basis (production, 
not marketing, credit and input associations etc. which both organisations’ peasants are 
actively working to establish) could meet national/regional/international demand for food 
if it were to replace the contemporary corporate food regime. Also, the issue of peasant 
production of export crops has not been properly addressed by the VC, another important 
omission given that so many peasants depend on this and their interests are currently 
under represented in food sovereignty discussions and mobilisations. 
The second part of the chapter analysed differences in the class bases of CIOAC and 
FENOCIN in comparison to other national level VC organisations, highlighting how this 
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significantly impacts the relationship between national peasant organisations, in this case 
their varying and often contradictory interpretations of food sovereignty. These differences 
demonstrate the problem of assuming unity in diversity based on a wide range of 
organisations’ stated commitment to broad principles such as food sovereignty, agrarian 
reform, rights to land etc. without interrogating how these issues are defined and 
addressed by specific organisations that represent different rural classes. By assuming a 
unity of purpose while ignoring class based differences among ‘people of the land’, the VC 
and proponents of peasant agriculture are blind to one of the most pressing issues that 
needs to be addressed if a serious countermovement to the neoliberal food regime is to be 
developed. Although VC organisations are massively diverse in class terms, often with 
conflicting interests, that does not mean that they cannot engage in important joint work 
and forge cross-class alliances over many key issues. However, this will not take place 
unless the class bases of these organisations are analysed, first at the national levels, in 
order to locate specific points of convergence in which alliances can be developed. At 
present the VC in both Mexico and Ecuador acts as merely a talking shop where 
contemporary rural issues are discussed by national organisation leaders, rather than acting 
as a space for planning and engaging in joint action to contest neoliberal food and 
agricultural policies.  
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Chapter 3. Autonomy and the Market: Peasant 
Production and Reproduction Strategies under 
Neoliberalism 
Having examined the shifting class compositions of CIOAC and FENOCIN, this chapter will 
analyse the specific production and reproduction strategies of both organisations’ bases. It 
will argue that peasant struggles for ‘autonomy’ both from and within the market have 
significantly shaped past and contemporary relations of production and reproduction in 
rural Mexico and Ecuador. The development of capitalism in the countrysides of both 
countries has dispossessed, subsumed, but also consolidated various classes of the 
peasantry and the following pages will analyse the role of capital, the peasantry, and the 
state in shaping these relations in Mexico’s coffee and Ecuador’s cacao sectors. It will argue 
that CIOAC and FENOCIN’s small, landholding peasants in both sectors are currently being 
exposed to new forces of capitalist development based on quality driven coffee and cacao 
market dynamics that attempt to wrest further control of production from them, reducing 
one aspect of peasant autonomy - control of the labour process, while potentially 
consolidating another - access to, and viability of, the land itself. It will also contend that 
the food sovereignty movement has failed to engage with and articulate the role of peasant 
produced cash crops within its vision, a major weakness given the importance of these 
crops to the production and reproduction strategies of many of the Via Campesina’s (VC) 
grassroots members and an integral component of their struggles for autonomy. 
 
3.1 Peasant Autonomy 
Throughout this chapter ‘peasant autonomy’ refers to economic rather than political or 
other forms of autonomy. It refers to relative autonomy from the imperatives of the market 
for survival, that is, peasant household capacity to make decisions regarding their 
livelihoods not determined entirely by market forces, be they in commodity or labour 
markets. This autonomy is inextricably linked to ownership or control of land and to 
decisions regarding the production process and use of the means of production. At its core 
is the concern for ensuring that the household can meet its own subsistence requirements 
year on year. However, derived from this most basic concern comes the inseparably linked 
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desire for autonomy over decisions regarding what is produced and how, household control 
of production from seed to final product, and its sale or consumption. This desire for an 
element of control over the household’s production and reproduction strategies is shaped 
by experiences, direct or indirect, of increasing fragmentation of classes of labour in the 
global South under neoliberal globalisation; labour is being expelled from the countryside 
while urbanisation has been decoupled from industrialisation and the growth of sources of 
formal wage employment (Bernstein, 2009; Davis, 2004). By remaining on the land, 
marginalised peasants deem themselves to have a far greater control over their destiny and 
the ability to meet household reproduction needs than they would if they were 
dispossessed and forced to depend entirely on wage labour for survival. Even when, as is 
the case for many small peasant producers in Mexico and Ecuador today, the majority of 
household income is derived from various forms of wage labour, the ability to produce their 
own means of subsistence as a fall back in the context of increasingly scarce, informal and 
unpredictable wage employment is a highly valued element of autonomy from the market. 
The struggle of CIOAC and FENOCIN peasants to make a viable living from the land must be 
understood as a struggle to improve the conditions of, and returns for, peasant production 
in order to thereby reduce, or even eliminate, the need for labour market integration.  
As we will see in more detail below, recent developments in the coffee and cacao sectors in 
Mexico and Ecuador respectively have seen transnational export companies attempting to 
take increasing control of the production process, further subsuming the peasant labour 
process to capital as a response to growing quality demands for chocolate and coffee in 
expanding Northern niche markets. As a result, growers face a contradiction in their 
struggle for autonomy - hand over important production decisions to the agents of capital, 
consolidating peasants’ hold on the land and reducing their dependence on the labour 
market (increasing relative autonomy from the [labour] market) at the expense of 
significantly reducing control over productive decisions and the labour process itself 
(autonomy within the market); or refuse to cede such control to capital, retaining a greater 
degree of control over the labour process but with a relatively higher level of dependence 
on labour markets and at greater risk from the immiserating, and potentially 
proletarianising forces of volatile primary commodity markets. This entails retaining the 
power of decision making over production but at the expense of threatening peasants’ 
long-term viability; they have to compete with increasingly capitalised producers and are 
potentially at risk of being forced from the land in order to survive. 
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The following section will begin by examining how ‘autonomy’ is understood in much of the 
literature on the peasantry and how this compares and contrasts with this chapter’s own 
understanding. The impacts of the very different landed property relations between Mexico 
and Ecuador under which CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao smallholders base their 
production and reproduction strategies will then be discussed in relation to how this shapes 
autonomous struggles. The chapter will then examine the specific struggles for autonomy 
carried out by CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao producers in southeast Mexico and 
coastal Ecuador respectively. It will do so by investigating the changing nature of such 
struggles from their initial role in pushing for redistributive land reform as plantation 
workers, to subsequent efforts to retain their land as viable producers in the face of 
neoliberal restructuring, and the lack of representation of these struggles in the 
contemporary FSM. The final section will look at an important contemporary development 
affecting both sets of producers; the expansion of transnational coffee and cacao export 
firms into production via arrangements with producers that closely resemble contract 
farming. The nature of these arrangements and the reasons for entering into them, both on 
the part of capital and of peasant producers, will be explored with an emphasis on what 
this signifies for peasant autonomy.  
 
3.2 Land as Autonomy 
‘Peasant autonomy’ is here a relative term given that all of Mexico and Ecuador’s coffee 
and cacao producers are integrated into the market as commodity producers, and the vast 
majority of households as wage labourers as well. However, the degree of control they 
exert over production and livelihood decisions is based on their continued ownership of the 
land - the foundation of autonomy. While past struggles of coffee and cacao plantation 
workers in Mexico and Ecuador for redistribution of the land on which they worked may 
appear very different in nature to contemporary struggles for autonomy based on retaining 
hold on land won, the underlying desire for control of production and therefore an element 
of security of livelihood still lies at its core.  
Unlike capitalist producers who are fully integrated into the market, landholding peasants 
typically have a greater degree of autonomy regarding their degree of market integration. 
The fact that they retain ownership of the land - a ‘self-controlled resource base’ in Ploeg’s 
(2010) terminology - gives them a certain degree of flexibility over production decisions in 
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order to meet household reproduction requirements year on year. In the case of CIOAC’s 
coffee and FENOCIN’s cacao producers, these decisions rest primarily on striking a balance 
between household labour time dedicated to a) cash crop production; b) subsistence 
production; and c) off-(family) farm work. Wood’s (2002) distinction between the market as 
an imperative or an opportunity is useful for analysing peasant autonomy in the context of 
peasant coffee and cacao producers in Mexico and Ecuador. As Wood highlights, it is 
difficult to determine at which point a producer becomes dependent on the market for 
survival short of complete separation from the means of production (Ibid: 54). However, for 
fully capitalist producers the market presents itself as an imperative; their survival depends 
on it, generating competition between similar capitalists to produce the most for the 
lowest cost (Ibid: 53). Cash crop producing peasants, on the other hand, do not always face 
this same situation as their survival often depends on combining production for the market 
with subsistence production and other varied forms and degrees of dependence on off-
farm work; their control of the land is not based on the full commodification of either 
production or labour. Again, in Woods’ terms, in the sense that they must sell what they 
produce in order to buy what they cannot (rather than being compelled to continually 
improve the productive forces and reduce unit costs through reinvestment of surplus as a 
capitalist would), non-capitalist producers have a certain ‘room for manoeuvre’ (Ibid: 62). 
‘Room for manoeuvre’, or relative space to exercise autonomy from the market that land 
access confers, enables CIOAC and FENOCIN’s cash crop producing peasants to adjust 
production to both changing commercial demand and their own consumption needs in 
ways and degrees ruled out by capitalist competition. This autonomy is of course relative as 
virtually all peasant households are integrated into commodity and labour markets to 
varying extents. Production is therefore conditioned to some degree by the level of this 
integration, as well as by landed property arrangements that (relatively) restrict (e.g. 
private property in Ecuador) or expand (e.g. social property in Mexico) the degree to which 
such autonomy can be exercised (examined below). However, household production and 
reproduction decisions can and do shift according to changing market conditions, with 
labour time spent on cash crop production, subsistence crop production, and wage labour 
varying in response to such changes. This (relative) autonomy over household labour acts as 
a buffer against adversity in commodity and labour markets in particular, with for example 
a reversion to a focus on subsistence production at times when both of these markets are 
adverse, or by drawing family labour from subsistence production and wage work when 
cash crop prices are high. 
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Most of the literature that engages with autonomy (Ploeg, 2008 & 2010; Barkin, 2006; 
Schneider & Niederle, 2010; Isakson, 2009; Brookfield & Parsons, 2011) equates it with the 
capacity of landed peasants to withdraw from commodity markets, i.e. increasing 
subsistence production, reducing cash crop production, and thereby reducing 
commoditisation of peasant production. Increasing production for the market, on the other 
hand, increases commoditisation and market integration (and dependence) and, in turn, 
reduces autonomy from the market. According to Ploeg (2010: 6), self-provisioning 
augments and sustains autonomy as it enlarges the capacity of the peasantry to reproduce 
itself under any conditions. Control over the means of production, the basis for the 
household to secure its own subsistence and survival even if dependent on the market 
(commodities and labour) for anything more than that, represents the main component in 
peasant interpretations of, and aspirations for, ‘autonomy’. As household reproduction 
becomes increasingly difficult via simple commodity production for increasingly globalised 
and competitive markets, and sources of wage labour become increasingly insecure, 
oppressive, and scarce (Bernstein, 2009: 250), the ability of the household to produce its 
own means of subsistence without reliance on the market becomes even more highly 
sought after. However, struggles for autonomy are not limited to withdrawal from 
commodity markets and a move towards self-provisioning. With some degree of integration 
into commodity markets a necessity for the vast majority of the peasantry in the 
contemporary era, we will see that struggles to carve out spaces of relative autonomy 
within commodity markets in the form of shaping the terms of this integration and exerting 
an element of control over production and marketing decisions, is also a key element of 
autonomous struggles. 
Two fundamental elements of autonomy need to be examined in combination in order to 
understand the nature of specific peasant struggles in the context of capitalist penetration 
of the countryside. The first is ownership of the means of production, of the land itself, as a 
source for providing both household subsistence requirements and monetary income 
generated from production. It provides a degree of subsistence provisioning that allows 
(non-market dependent) peasants to exercise a degree of autonomy both from and within 
markets. The second aspect of autonomy is control of the labour process. It is how 
autonomy is exercised and is derived from ownership of the land and the control of 
household production and labour decisions that this confers. It is exercised in different 
ways, at different times, and in different locations, with labour time devoted to cash crops, 
subsistence production and wage labour varying according to market conditions and 
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household needs. The shifting degrees of focus on each one of these activities is based not 
on profit maximisation, but on calculating the best use of family labour to ensure the long 
term viability of the household unit, on securing continued access to the land as the very 
foundation of peasant autonomy. In line with Chayanov’s theorisation, based on the 
Russian peasantry in the 1920s and 1930s, the nature of this economic calculus of peasant 
households distinguishes them from conventional capitalist enterprises whose strategies 
are based on profit maximisation and accumulation (Bernstein, 2009: 59). However, rather 
than the ‘motivation’ of the peasant economy being to meet the needs of simple 
reproduction while ‘minimising the drudgery of labour’ (Chayanov, 1966 - cited in 
Bernstein, 2009: 59) in general, I will argue that it is a very specific form of labour which 
contemporary peasant struggles for autonomy attempt to minimise; off-farm wage labour.  
Aside from functioning as a buffer from the market, the exercise of autonomy of decision 
making over the production process is in itself highly valued by peasant producers. Control 
over the labour process associated with both subsistence and commodity production 
contrasts with the oppressive labour conditions experienced by most of CIOAC and 
FENOCIN’s smallholders as seasonal agricultural labourers especially. Desire for 
autonomous control of the labour process drives struggles to minimise engagement from 
an oppressive, insecure labour market, or withdraw from it altogether if possible. Senior 
members of both organisations, many of which are indigenous, experienced even worse 
conditions as peons on pre-capitalist estates in the not so distant past. They fought for land 
in terms of control over their own labour no longer to be controlled and dictated by 
another, and these ideas feed into contemporary struggles for, and interpretations of, 
autonomy. However, as we will see in the cases of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao 
growers, in the context of growing difficulties facing peasant production and reproduction 
in the countrysides of both countries as a result of the advance of neoliberalism, peasants 
may be forced to make a trade-off, sacrificing one aspect of autonomy - control of the 
labour process - with the hope of consolidating another - their access to land.  
 
3.3 Property Relations and Autonomy  
Although the struggle for relative autonomy from and within the market characterises the 
production and reproduction strategies of CIOAC’s coffee producers and FENOCIN’s cacao 
growers, it does so in very different institutional contexts. Salinas’ 1992 reform of Article 27 
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of the Mexican constitution formally ended the state’s obligation to land distribution. In 
reality, it had been withdrawing itself from this responsibility for decades, interrupted by 
sporadic moments of rapid redistribution forced by peasant uprisings such as those of the 
Yaqui and Mayo valleys of Sonora in 1976, and the Zapatistas in the late 1990s to early 
2000s in Chiapas. In the past, rights to social property - an individual plot and access rights 
to common land - were equal and inseparable, passed from one owner to one family 
member. Both parcel and communal land rights were protected by the same document. 
Under the constitutional changes, the right to social agrarian property was fragmented as 
rights to parcels were made independent from those over common lands. Both are now 
accredited with distinct certificates and can be transferred separately, effectively ending 
the right to ejidal social property. The reform established the legal basis for the 
commodification of land by allowing the use and usufruct of ejidal lands to be transferred 
to others, provided that this is agreed in the ejidal assembly on the basis of majority 
decision. Given the consent of the assembly an ejidatario may convert his or her plot 
(parcela) into private property and sell it without affecting the social property status of the 
rest of the ejido (Castañeda, 2002: 115-123). These changes imply the possibility for the 
complete incorporation of formerly social property into a land market. However, despite 
establishing the legal basis for the subjection of land to capital and a potential market for 
collectively owned land converted to private property, no significant concentration has 
taken place. The deep economic crisis of the Mexican countryside since Mexico’s entry into 
NAFTA in 1994 has actually slowed down privatisation as peasants cling to land as a basis of 
meeting their subsistence needs (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 15), something most feel is far 
more securely met through continued access to land than through complete dependence 
on the labour market. In addition to economic crisis, ejidal assemblies still exert a great deal 
of control over land transfers and this has impeded the generalisation of capitalist social 
relations in Mexico’s countryside. As a result of Mexico’s unique and generalised system of 
ejidal and community land tenure that legal reforms have been unable to transform, 
CIOAC’s peasants are generally more protected from forces of dispossession and class 
differentiation than those of FENOCIN. As a result of non-capitalist landed property 
relations, they have a greater space, or ‘room for manoeuvre’, within which to exercise 
autonomy than their Ecuadorian counterparts without the risk of losing their land. They are 
able to significantly withdraw from cash crop production in bad years when the market 
drops, shifting household labour to subsistence and off-farm wage work, while retaining 
access to common land, usually pasture and forest. This is not the case on Ecuador’s coast, 
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where land is a commodity, private property that can be bought and sold on the market 
without the conditions and restrictions in place in Mexico. FENOCIN’s coastal peasants are 
more exposed to forces of dispossession, especially when cacao prices crash, surrounded as 
they are by highly capitalised banana plantations looking to expand their operations. As 
detailed in chapter one, their lands have been held in the form of individual private 
property following the dismantling of the land reform cooperatives they struggled to 
create, but could not make viable as the state did not fulfil its promises to provide support 
for their initial years of operation. FENOCIN and CIOAC’s producers are, in many cases, 
dependent on usurious credit arrangements from local intermediaries to finance 
production. However, in Mexico forced dispossession to repay loans is far less likely than in 
Ecuador (theoretically possible in the case of money lent between ejidatarios) and other 
forms of credit repayment (such as negotiated quantity of next harvest, non-monetary 
exchanges, later repayments, or extra-economic coercion) are typically used without 
threatening access to land. 
The following section will give a brief overview of the international and national dynamics 
that have shaped the coffee and cacao sectors in Mexico and Ecuador respectively as a 
necessary historical backdrop for contextualising the autonomous struggles of CIOAC and 
FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao producers. This will be followed by an examination of how 
different groups of peasants within CIOAC and FENOCIN struggle to gain some degree of 
autonomy both from and within markets, and how they have exercised their (relative) 
control over the labour process in specific historical contexts to shift dependence between 
cash crop cultivation, subsistence production, and wage work. These shifting patterns of 
dependence are ultimately driven by the overarching aim of securing ongoing access to 
land in order to secure the subsistence requirements of the household.  
 
3.4 Historical Dynamics of the Coffee and Cacao Sectors in 
Mexico and Ecuador 
During the developmentalist era (1940s to late 1970s) the world coffee and cacao sectors 
were regulated and relatively stable compared to the current neoliberal model, divided as 
they were according to imperial trade dynamics. However, the expanding global production 
and consumption of coffee and cacao in the decades following the Second World War led in 
most cases to the establishment of bilateral alliances between producer and consumer 
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nations (Losch, 2002: 208). These alliances became formally institutionalised through the 
1962 International Coffee Agreement and the 1972 International Cacao Agreement. Both 
aimed to balance international supply and demand through the application of quota 
systems whereby supplies of coffee and cacao in excess of consumer requirements were 
withheld from the market. Supply in producer countries was coordinated by centralised 
public systems geared towards ensuring production kept in line with national quota 
requirements.  
INMECAFE (Instituto Mexicano de Café) was a state run coffee enterprise created in 1958 as 
a means of improving the productive and marketing capacity of small and medium size 
coffee producers in the context of increasing world prices for the commodity and the 
Mexican state’s goal of increasing coffee production to generate foreign exchange for 
industrialisation. The institute’s basic objectives were to provide technical assistance to 
producers, stabilise prices nationally, improve varieties, and control crop diseases (Jiménez 
& Hernandez-Diaz, 1998: 15). From 1962 the Institute administered Mexico’s production 
quota under the International Coffee Agreement.  In Ecuador the Ministry of Agriculture, 
similarly to INMECAFE in Mexico, took charge of the administration of the nation's cacao 
supply as a means to earn foreign exchange to fuel industrialisation following the 1964 and 
1972 agrarian reforms. Cacao production increased from 37,494 metric tonnes in 1964 to 
over 50,000 by the end of the decade (Arosemena, 1991: 519). In 1977, the Ministry 
formed the National Cacao Programme (PNCC - Programa Nacional de Cacao) with the aim 
of further improving productivity and quality through the uptake of new technology, 
rehabilitation of plots, improved methods and the use of technology (Soria, 1986: 6). Cacao 
production in Ecuador, like that of coffee in Mexico, is dominated by small producers. Since 
the collapse of the cacao boom years at the beginning of the 20th Century and the 
abandonment of large-scale cacao plantations, cacao production in Ecuador’s coastal plain 
has been dominated by peasant smallholders. Today there are around 100,000 cacao 
production units nationally in Ecuador, the majority of which (58 percent) measure less 
than ten hectares (Cepeda et al, 2013: 21). Mexico’s 2006 coffee census reported that 84.2 
percent of a national total of approximately 487,000 coffee production units were of two 
hectares or less, covering 47.2 percent of the land area under coffee production. As such, 
coffee production in Mexico, like that of cacao in Ecuador, is predominantly carried out by 
peasant smallholders (Berlanga, 2011: 29). 
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Until the early 1970s INMECAFE’s impact on coffee growing smallholders was limited; it was 
underfunded and competing with other government agencies for state resources and 
against opposition to state intervention in the sector from a coffee oligarchy in south 
eastern Mexico. This situation changed in the period 1971-1976 as world coffee prices rose 
dramatically as a result of frosts and crop disease in Brazil. This coincided with the 
presidential administration of Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) that was implementing an 
aggressive agrarian policy focusing on small peasants and indigenous producers as part of a 
strategy intended to restore state legitimacy following years of social unrest (Hamilton, 
2011: 96). By the early 1970s INMECAFE had still not dealt with the basic problem of small 
producer dependence on credit from local caciques and intermediaries, and their constant 
indebtedness binding them to their usurious creditors and to persistent poverty. With these 
local dependence relations still pervasive in the sector much of INMECAFE’s policy on prices 
was ineffective as local bosses controlled the collection and selling of indebted producer’s 
coffee to the institute. In 1970, to tackle this problem, INMECAFE began a rapid phase of 
expansion; between the 1970/1971 and 1972/1973 harvests its direct purchases from 
producers quadrupled from 265,536 quintals12 to almost one million quintals. By the 
1974/1975 harvest a record 36.8 percent of the national harvest was bought by the 
institute which had become a serious competitor to the private sector (Downing, 1988: 
185-187). 
However, the end of the Echeverría administration in 1976 also marked the beginning of 
the end for INMECAFE. The period of high coffee prices that had both triggered and 
financed INMECAFE’s expansion - and also dampened class conflicts within the sector - 
came to an end. As prices fell INMECAFE’s collection and marketing functions were scaled 
back to the detriment of more marginal producers in particular. Credit available to coffee 
producers became more scarce and national agrarian policy focus began to shift towards an 
emphasis on productive goals, i.e. more market efficient producers (Downing, 1988: 188-
189). By 1989 INMECAFE had been completely dismantled with the total elimination of 
productive supports, price controls and government managed marketing channels that had 
come to serve over 200,000 small coffee producers (Snyder, 1999: 184). Throughout the 
1980s INMECAFE’s functions were progressively scaled back until it eventually became 
simply another buyer in the market competing with the private sector for producers’ coffee 
and without the credit and extension services that it had previously provided. The final nail 
in the institute’s coffin was the termination of the International Coffee Accord in 1989 that 
                                                          
12 one quintal is just over 46 kilograms 
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had maintained the international system of export quotas to stabilise international prices. 
In 1990 prices fell 50 percent from the previous year. In 1989 Mexico was in economic crisis 
as a result of falling oil prices and an increasing rate of foreign debt interest repayments. 
This led the PRI government to cut back and eliminate traditional corporatist institutions as 
the country underwent neoliberal structural reform (Jiménez & Hernandez-Diaz, 1998: 18-
19). 
In Ecuador, the Ministry of Agriculture and the PNCC had never had anything like the 
coverage or the impact of INMECAFE in Mexico. The overwhelming majority of cacao 
farmers had very little access to even the most rudimentary services and were forced to sell 
individually through local intermediaries that typically paid farmers less than the market 
price of their products. PNCC’s target group were producers with between 5 and 50 
hectares. Following the de facto generalisation of individual private property relations in 
the wake of the Ecuadorian state’s failure to support producer cooperatives created 
through land reform, Ecuador’s National Development Bank loans were effectively 
inaccessible to an emerging class of independent cacao producing smallholders simply 
because most lacked legal land titles (Soria, 1986: 6). As such, they were largely dependent 
on usurious credit from either local intermediaries or through kinship ties to local political 
and economic elites. The cacao boom years of 1977 and 1979 were followed by a price 
crash in 1980 that the International Cacao Agreement could do little to prevent or 
ameliorate (Losch, 2002: 211). Following the crash the agreement was effectively 
terminated in 1980 when international price controls, quotas and buffer stocks were 
eliminated. This effectively ended international supply management for the crop and 
precipitated the Ecuadorian state’s abandonment of its already extremely limited 
interventions in the sector. 
In Mexico in the late 1970s and early 1980s thousands of small coffee farmers had already 
begun to organise autonomously, forming cooperatives aimed at opening new marketing 
channels free from the control of both INMECAFE and the agro-industrial elite. By this time 
INMECAFE was already in decline, scaling back its operations and areas of influence and 
subject to growing criticism from producers of corruption, cooptation of institute officials 
by private elites, delays and non-delivery of credits, and that it had become simply the 
biggest intermediary in the market despite its original intention of ending producer 
dependence on intermediaries (Snyder, 2001: 35). Nationally, in both Mexico and Ecuador, 
neoliberal restructuring from the 1980s onwards saw the state withdraw from the peasant 
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sector and increase support for agro-export production financed by transnational capital. 
Peasant agriculture was seen as an obstacle to productivity and development and as having 
no place in the modernising projects of both states. It is within this context that alternative 
forms of production and marketing - organic and fair trade - emerged as a response to 
market liberalisation and the generalised crisis of the peasant economy that has 
accompanied neoliberal restructuring. It was to these market alternatives that organised 
peasant coffee and cacao producers in Mexico and Ecuador increasingly turned following 
the withdrawal of state support and market liberalisation.  
 
3.5 The Struggle for Autonomy of CIOAC’s Coffee Growers 
When CIOAC first began organising workers on coffee estates in Northern Chiapas in the 
late 1970s the labour force was controlled by landowners in several ways. Under the 
‘enganche’, or advanced payments system, contractors would offer workers a small 
monetary sum or alcohol to establish a debt. The terms of the debt would be manipulated 
and workers would become permanently indebted and obliged to work for the patron in 
exchange for a small plot of land (Lynn, 2002: 97). Although indebted estate workers were 
paid a minimal, symbolic wage, this was typically recouped by landlords in the estates’ own 
‘tiendas de raya’, or basic goods stores which sold simple consumption goods and alcohol at 
inflated prices.  
CIOAC’s initial struggles were based on overthrowing the exploitative labour conditions on 
these coffee estates which, they argued, should be expropriated and handed over to 
indebted labourers to be managed as workers’ cooperatives. The struggle was based 
primarily on workers’ collective control over the labour process under the rallying call of 
‘land for those who work it’, rather than on redistribution of estates into individually held 
peasant plots. The form these struggles took were examined in more detail in the previous 
chapter, but the point here is to highlight the internal contradiction within CIOAC that 
existed at the time between two very different conceptions of peasant economic autonomy 
emanating on the one hand from the organisation’s national leadership, and on the other 
from the estate workers themselves. The national leadership, many of whom were also 
leading figures in the Mexican Communist Party at the time, wished to simply place coffee 
estates under worker control, therefore breaking the social relations of production based 
on debt bondage and relations of patronage and exploitation between landlords and 
122 
 
workers. It was assumed that production itself would remain largely unchanged; peasants 
would collectively work the coffee estate as they had done before, only now with their own 
control over the labour process, free from landlord exploitation. They would still maintain 
their subsistence plots and the productive matrix of the estate would remain similar in form 
to the pre-expropriation era. However, once the land had been expropriated, the plans set 
out by CIOAC confronted the contradictory desires of the workers whose own conceptions 
of autonomy differed from those of their leaders. Rather than collectively managing coffee 
production, workers on every one of CIOAC’s expropriated estates decided to divide the 
land into individualised plots to be controlled and managed at the level of the household. 
This was a shock to CIOAC’s leaders who feared the consequences of this policy. Their 
worries centred on the potential loss of both organisational unity and of economies of 
scale, the initiation of a process of land fragmentation, and ultimately the potential threat 
that this represented to the organisation’s overarching goal of achieving socialism. While 
CIOAC conceived of autonomy as a collective concept, with peasants able to organise 
themselves and operate production units as a group, the members themselves valued 
individual (household) autonomy regarding land and production decisions over collective 
control. In their eyes, collective land access would still limit their autonomy in terms of 
control over the labour process, which would be determined at the organisational rather 
than the household level. This desire for individual control over land, and production 
decisions on it, is fundamental for understanding how peasants strive for and exercise 
autonomy. The land itself is the basis on which autonomy rests, and control over family 
labour, on and off it, the means by which it is exercised. In the case of Chiapas this desire 
originates in the experiences of oppressive labour conditions and dependency relations on 
estates. However, this desire, and the production and reproduction strategies used to 
retain it, has since been shaped by the need for CIOAC’s coffee growers, now with access to 
their own land, to reproduce themselves subsumed as they are by the capitalist mode of 
production.  
Despite being integrated into the capitalist mode of production, I will argue that the 
production and reproduction strategies of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao 
producers remain fundamentally non-capitalist in nature. This contrasts with Bernstein’s 
(2001) argument that small-scale, or household production in capitalism should be 
categorised as ‘petty commodity production’. According to this conception, the modern 
‘peasantry’ is unable to reproduce itself outside the relations and processes of capitalist 
commodity production and ‘agents of this form of production are capitalists and workers at 
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the same time because they own or have access to means of production and employ their 
own labour’ (Ibid, 29). However, I will contest this argument on three main levels to 
demonstrate the non-capitalist logic that underlies the production and reproduction 
strategies of both organisations’ members. Firstly, despite cash crop (commodity) 
production, they are not completely dependent on this form production for their 
reproduction requirements. As we will see, they are periodically able to reproduce 
themselves outside the relations and processes of commodity production as a result of the 
spaces of relative autonomy from the market that they constantly carve out and occupy. 
This allows them to shift dependence between commodity production, subsistence 
cultivation and wage labour. Secondly, they are not ‘capitalists’; they produce commodities 
not for profit maximisation and accumulation but predominantly in order to earn money to 
buy the things they cannot produce themselves; the sale of coffee and cacao is not oriented 
towards capital accumulation but simply towards acquiring a monetary income necessary 
to meet family needs. Unlike a capitalist enterprise, these peasant households do not 
reinvest ‘profits’ in order to expand commodity production, but rather use the money 
income that their production generates to ensure household subsistence requirements are 
met and that their space of relative autonomy from the market is maintained. Thirdly, to 
class the modern peasantry as ‘workers’ on their own land misrepresents the nature of 
peasant labour, how it is employed, and how it fundamentally differs from wage labour. 
While it is obvious in analytical terms that peasants are not workers doubly free (from the 
means of production and to sell their labour power), in practical terms the implications are 
less so; they do not work for the requirements of capital, but instead on the basis of 
retaining relative autonomy not just from commodity markets but also the external labour 
market, and this significantly shapes the way that CIOAC and FENOCIN’s (landed) peasants 
engage with and conceive of wage labour and work on their own land.  
As highlighted above the non-capitalist nature of peasant production and reproduction, 
despite their various forms and degrees of integration into commodity and labour markets, 
means that they have a certain ‘room for manoeuvre’ in terms of production decisions that 
capitalist producers simply do not have. This relative autonomy from the market and the 
non-capitalist basis of peasant household production strategies drives a logic of production 
in which avoidance of failure that could ruin them or lead to dispossession/expulsion from 
the land takes precedence over profit maximisation. This involves constructing a space of 
relative autonomy from complete dependence on either commodity or labour markets 
which, given the inherently volatile and low paying nature of the former, and increasingly 
124 
 
precarious, oppressive and poorly paid conditions in the latter, could lead to eventual ruin 
and dispossession from, or abandonment of, the land. Examining just how this logic has 
driven CIOAC’s coffee growers since they became independent producers will shed more 
light on the importance of autonomy to them, and the ways in which it shapes their 
production and reproduction strategies, as well as the nature of their ongoing struggles. 
The exercise of, and struggles for, relative autonomy from the market by CIOAC’s coffee 
producers in Chiapas have been shaped by experiences as indentured workers on semi-
feudal estates, and subsequently by various degrees of integration into capitalist markets 
(commodity and labour). The production strategies of coffee growing members of CIOAC in 
the Sierra Mazateca of Northern Oaxaca are also conditioned by a similar logic of seeking 
relative autonomy from commodity and labour markets. However, their very different 
history of land access, state intervention in coffee production and distribution, and labour 
market participation mean that how this principle is put into practice has varied 
significantly between the two regions. 
In the Sierra Mazateca, large foreign owned coffee haciendas first introduced the crop to 
the region under the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz in the late 19th Century. However, 
hacienda production did not dominate the landscape to the extent that it had done in 
Chiapas, even though at least two foreign owned plantations employed over one thousand 
workers each, with workers paid in the estates’ own currencies which, of course, could only 
be used to buy necessities on those same estates (Feinberg, 2003). Following the Mexican 
Revolution these haciendas were dismantled and converted or integrated into ejidos and 
communities. The members of these communities began cultivating coffee on their own 
plots which had previously been dedicated to subsistence milpa production (diversified 
production of predominantly intercropped corn, beans and squash, with surpluses sold on 
local markets). The process of expansion and deepening of capitalist social relations in 
Mexico as a whole, and in the agrarian sector in particular, throughout the early 20th 
Century meant that the Sierra’s peasants were forced to integrate into capitalist markets in 
order to meet their own reproduction requirements, requirements that subsistence 
production alone was increasingly unable to meet.  
Under the Porfiriato (1876-1910) Oaxaca received major foreign capital investment, 
becoming the fifth most important state of the republic in terms of US capital received 
(Chassen-Lopez, 1989: 170). Much of this capital was invested in infrastructure, namely 
railroads, that connected the city of Oaxaca with Mexico City in 1892 as well as smaller lines 
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connecting Oaxaca’s emerging mining and capitalist agricultural regions (Ibid: 171). The 
state underwent a mining boom from 1892 to 1911 as well as the development of capitalist 
agriculture which significantly modified tenure arrangements. Either through buying up 
indigenous communal lands or simply forced dispossession, commercial plantations, 
especially coffee and tobacco, were established (Ibid: 172). As the indigenous population 
was increasingly forced from the land it was incorporated into diverse labour arrangements 
on mines and plantations that varied from debt-bondage to ‘free’ wage labour. Integration 
of the sierra’s peasants took the form of either coffee production on ever fragmenting 
small plots as land access became ever more restricted by mining and capitalist agriculture, 
and/or increasingly off-farm wage labour in mines or on plantations. The 1910-1917 
revolution did not reverse the tendency towards increasing dependence on commodity 
production; it consolidated it. Ejidos were created on the edge of haciendas, near villages, 
so that workers could continue to work for landlords and supplement their wages/survive 
through access to their own land when labour was not needed on the hacienda. The 
development of the capitalist sector fostered by the Mexican state since the revolution, 
including under the Cardenas administration (1934-1940), inevitably assisted the erosion 
and destruction of the non-capitalist peasant economy (Ibid: 34) and its insertion - as 
labourers and commodity producers - into the capitalist system. However, the nature  and 
form of this peasant market integration in the Sierra, as with CIOAC’s producers in Chiapas, 
is based not entirely on imperatives imposed by the market, but instead on retaining (or in 
some cases expanding) land access and the relative autonomy from the market that this 
confers. CIOAC’s coffee growers can no longer reproduce themselves without integration 
into both commodity and labour markets. However, market imperatives do not drive their 
production strategies as they would for fully capitalist enterprises. These strategies are 
instead driven by a logic of seeking to exercise and expand relative autonomy from the 
market rather than being driven and totally conditioned by market imperatives. They may 
be market oriented, but they are not commodity market dependent. 
In both Chiapas and Oaxaca, CIOAC’s peasants faced the growing need to commoditise 
household production in isolated regions where market access for selling coffee depended 
on relatively wealthier peasant intermediaries, normally politically connected and part of 
historically established ‘cacicazgos’ - local and regional political networks controlled 
hierarchically by politically connected strongmen. Employment sources in these regions 
were scarce and so if wage labour was to form a component of household reproduction 
strategies then it would have to be out of the municipality, in Mexico’s urban centres, in 
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expanding mining or agro-export sectors, especially in the North of the country, or 
increasingly abroad, predominantly the United States. The logic behind cash crop 
production, however, has remained strongly rooted in retaining relative autonomy from the 
market and both coffee production and wage labour tend to revolve around continuing to 
ensure the viability of the household’s land in meeting household subsistence needs year 
on year rather than on short-term concerns with maximising incomes or profits. If peasants’ 
decisions regarding cash crop production or wage employment are considered 
independently, without taking into account peasant desires for (relative) autonomy from 
the market (both as securing continuing access to land and control over the labour process 
that this confers), then they may appear ‘irrational’ both in terms of capitalist efficiency and 
labour struggles, for example manifesting themselves as lack of interest in both profit 
maximisation and labour organising (Bartra, 1982: 27). Off farm labour for CIOAC peasants 
in Chiapas and Oaxaca is typically not valued and income generated from it tends to be 
used to maintain the household’s land, especially the viability of subsistence production. It 
may also be used to lease additional land from within the community/ejido in order to 
support growing families and reduce the need to seek employment elsewhere. Wage 
income supports the family production unit and subsistence cultivation even when, in 
purely economic terms, it would often be better spent buying staple foodstuffs on the 
market and abandoning subsistence production altogether. However, such decisions are 
better understood by analysing such behaviour through the lens of peasant autonomy; 
seeking to secure the long term viability of their production units as a buffer against volatile 
primary commodity markets and insecure conditions of increasingly scarce wage 
employment in the labour market, both of which could critically impact their ability to buy 
their own means of subsistence. Subsidising the family plot in this way increases autonomy 
from the market necessary for the household’s long term survival. 
In both Chiapas and Oaxaca one of the main aspects of struggle for CIOAC has been trying 
to escape from dependence on intermediaries for the commercialising of members’ coffee. 
The majority of peasants have experience, both past and present, of selling their coffee in 
the form of patio dried beans to local intermediaries in their municipalities’ urban centres 
from which they receive credit in return for a promised volume of coffee at the next 
harvest. According to CIOAC producers in both states not only are these credit 
arrangements extremely unfair, demanding an overly high volume of coffee for the credit 
given, but the intermediaries also trick producers in the weighing of the coffee. Their scales 
are said to be biased while excuses are always given for discounting prices paid, for 
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example for beans containing too much humidity, being diseased, or of poor quality. Both 
the Mexican state and CIOAC have attempted to tackle the problem of intermediation at 
various times and in various ways, the former especially in the 1970s through the creation 
of INMECAFE and more recently through the promotion of direct export company-producer 
relations. CIOAC, in turn, has experimented with regional cooperatives that have sought to 
provide alternative marketing channels for their members. How CIOAC’s members have 
interpreted and engaged with these initiatives corroborates the argument presented above 
that their central objective is to retain a level of autonomy from the market in which cash 
crop failure would not result in jeopardising household subsistence and the absolute 
dependence on off-farm wage labour for survival. Subsistence production has continued on 
all holdings in all the communities in which fieldwork was conducted in both Chiapas and 
Oaxaca despite the fact that full conversion to cash crop production would have yielded far 
higher financial returns for the majority of these producers for most of this time if analysed 
from the perspective of a capitalist logic of profit driven production. The specific nature of 
CIOAC members’ experiences with the state coffee company and producer cooperatives 
differs significantly between both states and will be examined separately in order to show 
that a logic of relative autonomy from the market holds in both cases. It is driven by the 
same fundamental objective of retaining a degree of autonomy, conditioned by household 
subsistence requirements, from the dangerous, potentially immiserating forces of the 
market. 
As capitalist social relations deepened and expanded in both the Sierra Mazateca and 
nationally, so too did peasant integration into commodity and labour markets. In this 
context, the region’s peasants turned to coffee production to provide monetary incomes. 
This necessarily entailed an increasing level of conversion from subsistence to cash crop 
(coffee) production. By the 1970s the proportion of land under subsistence and coffee 
cultivation on peasant holdings now belonging to CIOAC members had gradually increased 
to an average of 50 percent for both. In this same period, CIOAC’s indentured workers in 
Chiapas benefitted from the expropriation of the semi-feudal coffee estates on which they 
worked. Once the land had been distributed among CIOAC’s members into individualised 
family holdings, the same average land area dedicated to subsistence and coffee 
production became the norm, once again 50 percent for each (figures based on interviews 
with coffee growers in the Sierra Mazateca, Oaxaca, and Jitotol, Chiapas). Fragmentation of 
holdings has intensified from the 1970s onwards as the state first reduced and later ended 
its commitment to land redistribution. Despite average land area per household falling with 
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each generation, this proportion has held with family members unable to be supported by 
the family production unit’s subsistence and coffee production being forced to leave their 
land and enter labour markets in order to survive. Complete commodification of production 
has been universally resisted despite long periods of favourable market conditions that, to 
a capitalist producer, would provide incentive to place all land under cash crop production. 
This ties into the previous point that peasants value a minimal self-provisioning capacity 
that can provide for household subsistence requirements in the event of cash-crop failure 
or complete loss of wage employment for the household. Only in one very specific 
circumstance since the 1970s have some of CIOAC’s coffee growers decided to expand 
commodity production, therefore heightening their market integration, at the expense of 
subsistence production, but without ever giving up subsistence production altogether. This 
involved CIOAC’s members in the Sierra Mazateca and their relationship with INMECAFE. 
While CIOAC’s producers in the Sierra Mazateca were heavily influenced by the Institute, 
especially in the early to mid-1970s, INMECAFE’s programmes never reached any of 
CIOAC’s producers in Chiapas. A combination of geographical isolation and historical 
landlord political control of the state and its indigenous peasantry meant that the institute 
never entered much of Chiapas’ territory. The only impact it had for a minority of these 
producers was as a competitive pressure on intermediaries through acting as it did simply 
as another competing buyer in the marketplace. For coffee growers in the Sierra Mazateca 
in the mid-1970s, a sharp increase in world prices combined with production subsidies from 
INMECAFE which also guaranteed to buy their coffee for a predetermined price above that 
offered by local intermediaries and without the latter’s manipulation of scales, quality 
standards and credit terms. Under such conditions, many peasants decided to expand land 
area under coffee production at the expense of subsistence area. 
‘During this epoch the producers in my municipality had three to four hectares 
of coffee (of an average of five hectares total land area per household in the 
1970s according to interviewee); now the average is one and a half (of an 
average of three hectares total land area per household currently). Andrés 
Graciada, CIOAC member and Community Delegate of San Mateo 
Yoloxochitlan, (29 November 2012, Huautla de Jiménez, Oaxaca). 
‘Now the producers have an average of one to one and a half hectares. During 
INMECAFE they had three to four. (Interviewer) What did they do with the 
coffee fields? They were converted to planting corn, just for subsistence. Felipe 
Palacios Chazares, Leader of the ‘Organización de Cafeticultores del 
Eloxochitlan de Flores Magon’, part of CIOAC (5 December 2012, City of 
Oaxaca). 
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The above accounts regarding land areas under coffee and subsistence production given by 
CIOAC members in the Sierra Mazateca are confirmed by a local CNC leader also from 
region: 
‘The majority here have two to three hectares (of coffee). During INMECAFE 
they had four to five. The people converted their coffee fields to plant corn and 
beans’. Gerardo Herrera García, Leader of the CNC organisation ‘Paz y 
Libertad’ (1 December 2012, municipality of San José Tenango, La Cañada, 
Oaxaca). 
That Oaxaca’s producers opted for increased market integration at the expense of 
subsistence production, with subsistence requirements met increasingly through purchases 
on the market with income earned from coffee cultivation, does not violate the argument 
that producers on the basis of retaining a degree of autonomy from the market. Firstly, 
INMECAFE provided producers with a stable, reliable market for their coffee in an 
international context in which national production volumes and world prices were set by 
the International Coffee Organisation (ICO). The prices INMECAFE paid to producers were 
tied to the ICO set prices. By expanding its operations into the Sierra Mazateca the Institute 
could offer CIOAC’s producers better prices than those offered by exploitative 
intermediaries. However, more importantly than better prices in themselves was the fact 
that the these prices were tied to the ICO and that the Institute was keen to dominate the 
Mexican coffee market and so promised to buy all the coffee that growers could produce. 
INMECAFE’s strategy must be understood within the context of the Echeverría 
administration’s need to revive its deteriorating legitimacy. It attempted this through a 
neopopulist programme of political and social reforms to forge a populist coalition with the 
peasantry and other marginalised and disillusioned sectors (Morton, 2011: 113). The 
institute’s strategy conferred a high degree of certainty to producers that conversion of 
subsistence to coffee production would bring stable higher incomes at very little risk. It 
should be stressed however that such conversion was not driven by a capitalist logic of 
profit maximisation. Instead, it was carried out primarily in order to consolidate the viability 
of peasants’ land as a source of livelihood and as a means of exercising autonomy, i.e. 
employing household labour on their own land as opposed to being forced to sell that 
labour, losing control over it, via the alienating experiences of labour markets. As 
mentioned earlier but important to keep in mind during the course of this chapter, the 
social property relations of ejido and community production in Mexico offers relative 
protection for coffee producers from direct threats of dispossession in the event of crop 
failure, credit repayment difficulties etc. in a way that Ecuador’s cacao producers, 
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occupying land on the basis of private property, do not enjoy. Despite land access (the basis 
of peasant autonomy) not being considerably threatened if CIOAC’s members become 
completely dependent on the commodity market, control of the labour process (the 
exercise of peasant autonomy) is; difficulties in commodity production and/or markets will 
likely result in the need to integrate further into labour markets, even more so if 
commodity market dependence increases at the expense of subsistence capacity. 
Before INMECAFE’s arrival, dependence on intermediaries and the exploitative terms of 
trade producers were forced to accept represented a major threat to peasants’ capacity to 
reproduce themselves on the land and therefore a significant immiserating force. 
INMECAFE’s arrival significantly reduced this problem and through working with the 
Institute peasants could actually consolidate their families’ livelihoods on the land and, 
importantly in terms of the second issue highlighted above, decrease household 
dependence on labour markets for survival, a major aspect of peasants’ struggles for 
relative autonomy from the market. From the perspective of CIOAC’s producers, household 
reproduction and the wellbeing of its members could be better guaranteed by increasing 
both land area and family labour dedicated to coffee production. This reduced dependence 
on typically oppressive and insecure wage labour and minimised subsistence production to 
a level that could at least provide for short-term household survival in the event of cash 
crop failure or other environmental risks inherent to agricultural production. During the 
INMECAFE era all of the CIOAC members interviewed stated that they had maintained the 
subsistence plot at such a level of production and supplemented household consumption 
needs with purchases from income generated mainly from coffee sales, but also wage 
labour, dependence on which was reduced but certainly not eliminated through working 
with the Institute.  
‘We all had coffee (in the INMECAFE era), but we still kept the milpa as 
well...We received our money in cash, it was more direct. Everything was more 
stable. Afterwards everything went to ruin. Many people migrated, left their 
coffee plots. They went to Puebla, Tehuacán, Mexico City.’ Felipe Palacios 
Chazares (5 December 2012). 
By the end of the 1970s, INMECAFE was being scaled back as both the state and a number 
of social organisations, including CIOAC, turned against the institute for very different 
reasons. The former needed to shed itself of corporatist institutions ideologically and 
financially as it underwent neoliberal restructuring in the context of the debt crisis. 
Independent organisations demanded that control over the running of the sector be their 
responsibility under a participatory democratic governance structure in which producer 
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interests were truly represented, free from the paternalistic control of the state. With both 
the state from above and social organisations from below uniting in their calls for the 
dismantling of INMECAFE (if not in their reasons why, or in how the sector should be 
governed), Snyder (1999) argues that the institute’s termination was politically relatively 
simple. Its formal cessation in 1991 as part of Salinas’ sweeping neoliberal reforms, coupled 
with the collapse of the ICO quota system in 1989, pitted producer associations against 
coffee oligarchs in a struggles for control of the productive chain, to access international 
markets, and to influence and fill the institutional void left following state withdrawal. The 
largest and best organised groups within the independent producer movement were able 
to take control of some of the institute’s former infrastructure following its demise. They 
saw the new context as an opportunity to move small producers closer to international 
markets as well as strengthening their capacity to seek out emerging ethically and 
environmentally driven markets that could offer better prices for their coffee. However, the 
oligarchs, consisting of national and international processing and export firms, saw the exit 
of what was for them a major competitor as an opportunity to force smallholders to sell to 
them at much lower prices than before, especially now that the market distorting export 
quotas of the ICO had disappeared in a market prone to oversupply (Snyder, 2001: 21). 
Production under INMECAFE was sustained with green revolution inputs so when the 
institute was abolished producers were left in an especially difficult situation; having 
increased their market dependence for basic goods, price crash in the coffee market and 
dependence on chemical inputs (FERTIMEX, the state owned fertiliser company that made 
and provided subsidised chemical inputs to the peasant sector, was also privatised as part 
of Salinas’ neoliberal project in 1992) meant that the latter had to be bought without state 
subsidies or the soil would simply not produce. The inability of most producers to afford 
now unsubsidised chemical inputs was the central initial impetus for the promotion of 
organic production in the emerging independent coffee organisations of the 1980s (not 
growing environmental concerns as is often assumed, but which now constitute an 
important organising principle of cooperative producers). As indicated in the interviews 
with producers in the Sierra Mazateca, the Institute’s termination led to reconversion of 
coffee cultivation back to subsistence production and increasing dependence on wage 
labour in household reproduction strategies as well as a return to intermediary dependence 
for the sale of coffee. In many coffee growing regions it was this situation which spurred 
the emergence of independent producer organisations aiming to eliminate intermediation, 
this time independently rather than via the state. The emergence of autonomous producer 
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organisations and the nature of their struggles following state withdrawal will be examined 
for both Mexico and Ecuador after looking at how the logic of relative autonomy from the 
market also drives the production and reproduction strategies of FENOCIN’s cacao 
producers.  
 
3.6 The Struggle for Autonomy of FENOCIN’s Cacao Producers  
FENOCIN’s coastal peasants typically farm a smallholding of four to six hectares, planted 
overwhelmingly with cacao, some subsistence crops, and the rest uncultivated due to lack 
of resources (Striffler 2002: 141). 94.5 percent of Ecuador’s agricultural land area is owned 
on the basis of private property (SIPAE, 2011: 9) and all of FENOCIN’s cacao producers 
occupy their land on this basis. In contrast, a ‘small’ coffee growing peasant in Southeast 
Mexico owns between a quarter and three hectares of marginal land dedicated to an equal 
combination of subsistence production and coffee cultivation, and has access to communal 
pastures/forestry resources. As we saw above, CIOAC’s coffee growers produce under ejido 
or community forms of social property relations. Both organisations’ members depend to a 
significant but varying degree on income derived from off-farm wage labour that varies 
between households.  
FENOCIN’s coastal peasants, like those of CIOAC in Chiapas, gained access to land through 
the breakup of pre-capitalist haciendas and capitalist banana plantations as a result largely 
of their own struggles. Similarly to Chiapas, the state’s role was decisive in redistribution 
but minimal thereafter, playing a major role in altering production relations on Ecuador’s 
coast through the establishment of producer cooperatives, support for which was 
insufficient from the outset and increasingly withdrawn in the few years following 
redistribution. Initially IERAC was intent on continuing the collective work methods 
employed on banana plantations, much like CIOAC’s leaders had hoped for when coffee 
estates were redistributed to workers. It developed productive and credit plans with ex-
plantation workers that would permit repayment of state loans to expropriated landlords. 
The banana plantations would be run collectively with each member typically receiving 
between one and two hectares to produce household food crops on an 
individual/household basis. However, in the cases of UROCAL and UNOCAR, IERAC’s 
underfunding following initial redistribution meant that peasants were unable to put all 
cooperative land under production, a necessary component of the productive plan 
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designed for servicing debt repayments. The illegal sale of cooperative lands ensued, 
encouraged by peasant poverty, indebtedness, and the eagerness of local capitalists to 
purchase high quality lands. IERAC did nothing to prevent these sales. Once communal 
lands were sold off the cooperatives ceased to exist in any meaningful sense and remaining 
members began obtaining legal titles for the lands they had been individually holding (as 
‘informal’ private property) for years (Striffler, 2002: 132-140). FENOCIN’s resource and 
land poor peasants could no longer continue relatively capital intensive banana production 
for export markets, yet faced the challenge of reproducing themselves subsumed within, 
but isolated from, highly capitalised agricultural operations in the region. This reproduction 
strategy forced peasants to turn to cacao production, continued subsistence cultivation, 
and varying degrees of dependence on wage labour, a reproduction strategy similar to that 
shared by CIOAC’s coffee growers. However, the nature of this strategy and degree of 
dependence on each component differs as a result of factors specific to each social 
formation. These will be discussed and compared in order to demonstrate that the struggle 
for autonomy is a core component of peasant production and reproduction strategies, 
although how this autonomy is conceived, and peasant strategies employed to try to 
achieve it, depend on specific contexts. 
Production of Ecuador’ native cacao strain (cacao nacional) is relatively low input and 
climate and pest resistant. Most of FENOCIN’s coastal peasants were already cultivating it 
on a small scale on their individual plots as a supplementary source of income when IERAC 
first set up cooperatives. However, once the cooperatives began to fail and were eventually 
broken up, its production became increasingly necessary to provide peasants with the 
monetary income that bananas could not. Cacao’s growing importance for the peasant 
household economy since the 1970s especially has been accompanied by the growth and 
increasing dependence on local intermediaries for credit needed for its production and as a 
buyer in marginalised rural areas. UNOCAR’s cacao producers, much like CIOAC’s coffee 
producers, have been forced to depend on credit from these local merchants and usurers 
to finance their production. Unlike CIOAC’s coffee producers who dedicate half of their land 
area to subsistence (milpa) production, and the other half to coffee, UNOCAR’s members 
typically dedicate their land to commercial crop production (cacao mainly) with subsistence 
crops - namely plantain and fruit trees - used simultaneously for subsistence and to provide 
the shade needed by cacao trees. Coastal Ecuador has, since the late 19th Century cacao 
boom to more recent export banana production, been strongly integrated into the world 
market. Much of the labour needed to establish and operate cacao plantations over one 
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hundred years ago was drawn from predominantly subsistence Andean communities. 
However, the inability to produce Andean subsistence crops on the coastal plain combined 
with the generalisation of wage labour has meant that peasant market integration has 
historically been much stronger on Ecuador’s coast than in the Andes and coffee producing 
regions of southeast Mexico. As such, subsistence production for Ecuador’s coastal cacao 
producers has been, and remains, geared towards the shade requirements of cacao plants 
whose health and productivity is prioritised over subsistence crops. Production for the 
market and purchases from it to meet consumption needs is the norm. Important also in 
shaping this dynamic is that land on the coast, in contrast to the Andes and much of 
Chiapas and Oaxaca in Mexico, does not typically have the social and culturally imbued 
meanings derived from generations of subsistence production and community ceremonies 
based on traditional crops that have developed from this. Demand for labour and its 
availability and stability are also important factors that shape this relative lack of emphasis 
on subsistence production, examined in more detail below.  
As we have seen, the production focus of FENOCIN’s coastal peasants today is cacao 
intercropped with shade producing fruit trees and plantain that provide for a proportion of 
household subsistence requirements. However, rice is the dietary staple on Ecuador’s coast 
and FENOCIN’s cacao producers must buy this with money earned from cacao production 
and wage employment. Unlike CIOAC’s coffee growers who cultivate spatially distinct 
subsistence and cash crop plots, the symbiotic relationship between cacao (cash) and shade 
(subsistence) trees means that household labour cannot shift focus from subsistence to 
cacao production, or vice versa, depending on prevailing conditions in commodity markets 
in ways that CIOAC’s coffee growers can. As such, the exercise of autonomy, rather than 
shifting between three distinct activities as it does in the case of Mexico; subsistence 
(milpa) cultivation, coffee production and wage labour, is instead restricted to shifting 
reliance between subsistence and cacao production as a single, symbiotic whole, and wage 
labour. As a result of this and other factors that will be elaborated below, the struggles for 
autonomy for these peasants revolve around cacao in a different way to those of CIOAC’s 
coffee producers. For the latter, subsistence production remains the foundation of the 
peasant household and any decisions regarding coffee are made with ensuring the 
continuation of subsistence production at the forefront, followed by minimising labour 
market integration. FENOCIN’s cacao producers similarly attempt to minimise their 
integration into labour markets; however, instead of struggling for relative autonomy from 
commodity markets they are attempting to create and occupy a space of autonomy within 
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it. They are attempting to exercise an element of control within the cacao market by 
differentiating the country’s genetically distinct strain of cacao - produced overwhelmingly 
by peasants - from commercial varieties with which it is currently mixed by transnational 
exporters (TNEs). Ecuador’s cacao market is dominated by TNEs and the chain of 
intermediaries they fund, and is characterised by the same features that CIOAC’s members 
complain of with regard to the Mexican coffee market; usurious credit and unfair buying 
arrangements with local intermediaries and average low prices that are highly volatile. One 
of FENOCIN’s cacao producers describes the extent of this volatility: 
‘I sell to the intermediary in Quininde…last year the price rose as high as $120 a 
quintal, but some years it has fallen to just $50 or $60. What’s more is that it 
can fall during the harvest - for example, now the price is $100 a quintal, but 
tomorrow it could fall to $90. It goes like this depending on the world market. 
Antonio Espinoza Sánchez, member of AACH (16 April 2014, Chucaple 
Esmeraldas) 
Freedom from dependence on such an unpredictable market is the principal objective for 
FENOCIN’s cacao growers. Like CIOAC’s coffee growers, market stability is more highly 
sought after than any potential situation in which average prices increase but volatility 
remains. However, whereas CIOAC’s coffee producers can fall back on a combination of 
subsistence and wage labour dependence during periods of low prices, for FENOCIN’s 
members the former is not a viable means of ensuring household survival, leaving recourse 
only to the latter, which is already a relatively substantial and constant component of 
household reproduction strategies. As a result, these peasants have placed a strong 
emphasis on seeking out alternative outlets for their cacao in the form of certification 
schemes and direct producer-consumer linkages.  
Both CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao producers have sought alternative production 
techniques and marketing channels for their cash crops in the neoliberal era as part of a 
logic that remains driven by the struggle for autonomy. However, as mentioned above, 
such struggles - although founded on the basis of seeking relative autonomy from 
commodity markets - cannot be reduced to this alone; they also involve attempts to 
exercise a degree of autonomy within commodity markets, defined here as relative control 
over production and marketing decisions regarding cash crops on the basis of securing long-
term household reproduction on the land, rather than on the basis of capital accumulation. 
The exercise of autonomy in the neoliberal era involves both the relative withdrawal from 
adverse commodity markets while at the same time struggling to renegotiate and influence 
the terms upon which commodity market integration is based. The next section will provide 
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an overview of the emergence of organic and fair trade initiatives and the issues that have 
surrounded their application and development in order to contextualise the nature and 
form of both organisations’ contemporary struggles for autonomy. 
 
3.7 The Search for Alternatives in the Neoliberal Era  
The end of international supply management through international commodity agreements 
and the accompanied elimination or drastic scaling back of direct state intervention in 
production and marketing for the peasant sector during neoliberal transition had profound 
impacts on the peasantry. The disappearance of regulation, falling prices, market volatility, 
lack of credit and state withdrawal increasingly transferred control of the coffee and cacao 
sectors in Mexico and Ecuador to the private sector (Renard, 2010: 23) and has reduced the 
proportion of profit destined to the initial link of the chain - direct producers (Perez-Grovas 
et al, 2001: 4). In the cases of Mexican coffee and Ecuadorian cacao, as we saw above, 
these are overwhelmingly peasant smallholders. The termination of international 
commodity agreements precipitated the dismantling of INMECAFE and the Ecuadorian 
Ministry of Agriculture’s interventionist roles in their national coffee and cacao sectors 
respectively within the international context of the emergence of neoliberalism as a 
response to the crisis of accumulation at the end of the 1970s (Harvey, 2005: 14-15). 
INMECAFE’s dismantling was part of more sweeping reforms in Mexico under the Salinas 
administration and the Ecuadorian state’s withdrawal from its already limited role in 
supporting peasant cacao producers from the mid-1970s onwards was heavily influenced 
by the debt crisis and SAP implementation. The end of international coffee and cacao 
supply management and market liberalisation hit producers by reducing prices and 
increasing price volatility. Withdrawal of various state supports - productive, marketing, 
credit etc. - increased smallholders’ exposure to the negative impacts of liberalisation.   
From the mid-1970s onwards coffee and cacao markets have been characterised by 
massive volatility (see figure 1), a general trend of falling prices (real and nominal) and 
devastating unpredictability for producers. This, as we will see below in the cases of CIOAC 
and FENOCIN’s smallholders, has had major implications for their struggles for autonomy.  
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Figure 7. World coffee and cacao prices per kilo in US dollars (nominal) 1960-2013. 
(my elaboration, taken from World Bank’s ‘Global Economic Monitor’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org>) 
As figure one demonstrates, the end of the International Coffee Agreement (coinciding with 
INMECAFE’s termination) in 1989 saw international prices plummet until 1994, when prices 
spiked once more, and again in 1997, namely as a result of frosts in Brazil. From 1999 to 
2004 - the so called ‘coffee crisis’ - real coffee prices fell to some of their lowest levels in 
history as a result of massive global oversupply, devastating smallholder coffee 
communities around the world and bringing with it reductions in income of about 60 
percent in areas of Mexico that were already marginalised (Calo & Wise, 2005: 7). Poor 
harvests in Vietnam and Central America in 2010 led once more to massive price increases 
as demand outstripped supply.  
 
The cacao price peak of 1977-1979 was followed by a price crash that the International 
Cacao Organisation could do little to avert or remedy (Losch, 2002: 211) and subsequently 
(1980) quota controls were eliminated in the context of global market liberalisation. Cacao 
prices continued to fall until the mid-2000s until 2010 when political instability in the Ivory 
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Coast, the world’s leading cacao producing and exporting nation, reduced its production 
volume. Concentration in the coffee and cacao commodity chains has also compounded the 
impact of liberalisation on prices. In Mexico, Ecuador and elsewhere, the retreat of the 
state created a vacuum into which stepped transnational traders and processors, leading to 
rapid corporate consolidation following the breakdown of managed markets (Calo & Wise, 
2005: 7).  
 
For most of Mexico and Ecuador’s coffee and cacao producing smallholders, falling prices 
and increased volatility, combined with significant or complete state withdrawal from 
productive support for the peasant sector from the late 1970s onwards, generated 
production and reproduction crises. The contemporary fair trade movement and various 
strands of ‘ethical’ and ‘environmentally sustainable’ initiatives developed as a response to 
the neoliberal onslaught as attempts not only to increase and stabilise producer incomes, 
but also create a more just social and economic system in which human and environmental 
wellbeing, rather that capital accumulation, would be the guiding principle. A brief 
overview of the history of these initiatives and the forces that have shaped their 
development over the course of the neoliberal era is necessary before going on to look 
specifically at  how CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao growers have engaged with 
them in their struggles for relative autonomy from and within the market. 
 
In the wake of market deregulation, new coffee and cacao fair trade (FT) and organic 
production initiatives emerged and developed as market based efforts to engage 
consumers with the plight of producers, and correct the failure of the market to value the 
non-market aspects of smallholder production, namely social justice and environmental 
protection (Calo & Wise, 2005: 8). The FT movement, at its inception, was centred on a 
fundamental critique of the structural injustice of global trade. It framed itself as an effort 
to redress social and economic inequalities by linking direct producers in the global South 
with consumers in the North, bypassing traditional intermediaries (Jaffee & Howard, 2010: 
5). During the 1970s and 1980s newly emerging FT organisations came to characterise 
themselves as alternative trade organisations, social economy actors whose primary goal 
was to help small producers in developing countries not simply by selling the latter’s 
products in the North, but also by working to change the systemic causes of their problems 
rooted in the international trade system.  
139 
 
From 1988 the FT movement decided on a strategy of certification in order to expand its 
market reach that would have major consequences for the social economy aspects of its 
objectives and its capacity to act as an alternative, rather than an appendage, to the 
international trade system to which it had initially set up against. The Max Havelaar 
Foundation, established in 1988 in the Netherlands, is generally recognised as the first Fair 
Trade labelling organisation (FLO) and was initiated by the coffee cooperative UCIRI (Union 
of Indigenous Communities in the Region of the Isthmus) in Oaxaca. The founders of Max 
Havelaar believed that the fair trade market could not be substantially increased if it did 
not spread beyond alternative outlets to mainstream retail chains. A certifying body was 
therefore set up with the aim of incorporating major retailers into the FT distribution 
network and FLOs began to accept corporations as licensees of fair trade products (Reed, 
2009: 5). According to Jaffee & Howard (2010: 6-11) the involvement of corporations in the 
fair trade network has boosted demand but ruled out of bounds the most transformative 
elements of the movement, namely the urgency of creating truly alternative and socially 
just trading relations. The regulatory function and social principles upon which FLOs were 
founded clashed with the economic interest of increasing demand and this has simplified 
the initiative to a single variable: payment of a minimum price, the level of which is no 
longer linked to actual family livelihoods.  
Much has been written on the minimum price issue and the mainstreaming of fair trade; 
the incorporation of major retailers into the fair trade distribution network and the move 
from direct producer-consumer linkages to certification in order to expand FT markets 
(Reed, 2009); how TNCs involve themselves with FT and organic to ‘fairwash’ and 
‘greewash’ their products (Johannessen & Whilite, 2010: 540), the proliferation of less 
stringent company own certifications that compete with producer led FLOs (Renard, 2010: 
30) and the falling real value of FT minimum prices as a result of corporate interests co-
opting the FT movement (Jaffee & Howard, 2010). A study by Bacon (2010: 130) 
demonstrates that real prices for FT Arabica coffee prices lost 41 percent of their value 
between 1988 to 2008, echoing other writers on the topic (Jaffee & Howard, 2010; Taylor 
et al, 2005; Reed, 2009) in attributing the cause of this fall to the now central role of 
corporate licensees in selling FT goods and the power of retailers to influence FLO decisions 
regarding minimum prices based on their own sales and profit requirements as opposed to 
the best interests of producers that the FT movement initially set out to serve. The purpose 
of this chapter is not to examine all the factors that have shaped alternative trade 
networks, but rather how such networks have been engaged with by coffee and cacao 
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producing smallholders in Mexico and Ecuador in their struggles for autonomy. As such we 
will restrict our analysis to the specific aspects of organic and FT coffee and cacao initiatives 
that shape such struggles. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to briefly explain how 
organic and fair trade markets work in order to better understand the mechanisms by 
which CIOAC and FENOCIN’s cash crop smallholders seek and exercise autonomy both from 
and within their respective commodity markets. 
Organic coffee and cacao are third party certified and require the use of production 
methods that promote biodiversity, protect and improve soils, and minimise dependence 
on inputs. Both are indexed to global market prices and receive premiums above prevailing 
conventional prices with variations in these premiums based primarily on quality 
characteristics. Aside from quality, the values of these premiums are also determined by 
supply and demand in the markets for organic coffee and cacao themselves (Calo & Wise, 
2005: 10). Currently, organic Arabica coffee receives a premium of US$ 0.10 to 0.50/lb 
above conventional coffee prices. For non-Fair Trade organic certified cacao beans there is 
no fixed price premium as it is subject to market fluctuations, usually ranging from US$100 
to $300 per tonne above conventional cacao prices, again depending on quality and origin. 
Fair Trade certified organic cacao beans receive a fixed price premium of US$200 per tonne 
(ICCO, 2006: 5). Organic coffee and cacao are much more labour intensive to produce than 
their conventional counterparts and because it generally takes two to three years to gain 
certification and therefore to begin receiving a premium price, the initial labour 
investments by producers are significant. The other principle cost associated with organic 
production is the certification process itself, an annual expense to cover inspections that 
can easily amount to five percent of total sales (Calo & Wise, 2005: 10). 
FT coffee and cacao certification does not guarantee that beans can be sold on FT markets 
as quality remains the key. Rather than market indexed premiums (organic), the FT market 
offers guaranteed floor prices that are supposed to guarantee a reasonable return to 
producers. As of 1 April 2011, the floor price for conventional FT arabica coffee is 
US$1.35/lb while that for organic is US$1.65/lb. If market prices rise above these floor 
prices then these coffees receive a FT premium of US$0.2/lb. From 1 October 2012 the floor 
prices of conventional and organic FT cacao have been US$2,000/tonne and 
US$2,300/tonne respectively and both receive a FT premium of US$200/tonne when 
market prices rise above these levels (Fair Trade International, 2014). The costs associated 
with FT coffee and cacao production are far lower than those for certified organics as there 
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are no additional labour requirements and certification costs are largely borne by the FLO 
(Calo & Wise, 2005: 12). For CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao producers, the labour 
requirements of organic production and FT minimum prices are major determinants that 
shape production and reproduction strategies geared towards seeking relative autonomy 
both from and within the market.  
 
3.8 Struggles for Autonomy in the Neoliberal Era 
In 1992, CIOAC formed UREAFA (Unión Regional de Ejidatarios Agropecuarios, Forestal y de 
Agroindustrias de los Pueblos Zoques y Tzotziles de Chiapas) in Chiapas, an independent 
ejidal union consisting of 54 families and focused primarily on the production and 
marketing of coffee. UREAFA’s leaders entered into organic and Fair Trade certification 
schemes during the early 2000s and began selling directly into the United States where 
demand for ethically produced coffee grew throughout the decade. From the mid-1990s 
many of FENOCIN’s cacao producers have had similar experience with organic cacao 
production and markets, and one of its member organisations - UROCAL - is currently a FT 
certified cooperative as well. UROCAL began producing FT, organic certified cacao in 1994 
in response to the impoverishing market conditions facing their producers and with the 
hope of entering more stable markets offering better returns and opportunities for 
improved production. Despite initial optimism and positive results regarding FT and organic 
agreements, CIOAC and FENOCIN encountered increasing limitations in the capacity of 
these markets to confer greater autonomy over production and marketing decisions and, 
ultimately, shape coffee and cacao markets in their own interests and provide better and 
more stable incomes than conventional production. Leaders and members argue that these 
once alternative markets in which they negotiated directly with buyers have now become 
mainstream, market-mediated, increasingly competitive and quality driven, prone to 
volatility, and with prices paid to producers that have stagnated over the last decade while 
production costs have continued to rise. The relative space within the market to exercise a 
degree of autonomy over production and marketing decisions has been gradually closed to 
cooperatives as corporate control of certified markets has increased.  
As a result of the above, a growing number of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s producers have 
focused their production and reproduction strategies on reducing their exposure to such 
markets in order to devote more labour to subsistence production (CIOAC) and wage labour 
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(CIOAC and FENOCIN) i.e. they have increasingly exercised autonomy from commodity 
markets as spaces of autonomy within these markets have been gradually reduced or 
eliminated. Unlike Oaxaca’s CIOAC members working with INMECAFE, UREAFA’s growers 
could not rely on certified markets to pay a stable price year on year that could justify some 
degree of conversion of their subsistence plots to coffee cultivation. This is due to the fact 
that although FT organic coffee receives a minimum price guarantee and a (typically but 
certainly not always) higher price per kilo than conventional coffee, the former is so low 
given the extra effort (labour time) required to produce certified coffee and the latter 
remains pegged prevailing world prices on the New York stock exchange. 
The end of the international coffee and cacao agreements saw international prices for 
these commodities crash and they have since remained both relatively low and highly 
volatile since producer nation quotas were withdrawn for commodities whose demand 
remains relatively stable. In this context, increased (commodity) market integration via 
conversion of subsistence to coffee cultivation represents a significant risk for CIOAC’s 
members in Chiapas. As such, no significant conversion has taken place as peasants have 
decided to retain reproduction strategies that maximise their autonomy from such a 
volatile and unpredictable market, integrating into it selectively depending on prevailing 
conditions without ever sacrificing the household’s subsistence capacity. Instead they have 
focused on shifting dependence for monetary income between off-farm wage labour - 
typically in Mexico’s urban centres - and coffee production, based on current and expected 
received coffee prices. In contrast, the symbiotic relationship between cacao trees and 
subsistence (shade) crops means that it is much more difficult for FENOCIN’s cacao growers 
to shift production and household labour between cash and subsistence crops than it is for 
CIOAC’s coffee growers, whose subsistence and commercial plots are geographically 
distinct. For the former, any attempt to intensify subsistence production would significantly 
reduce the production of cacao. As such, adverse conditions in cacao markets have led to 
increased integration into labour markets with wage work on local banana and palm oil 
plantations predominating. 
As mentioned in the previous section, a significant factor shaping the reproduction 
strategies of coffee and cacao producing households in the neoliberal era has been the 
growing influence of TNCs in the control of the coffee and cacao supply chains and the 
expansion of their operations into certified beans in the context of an inherently volatile 
world market. This has had significant impacts on CIOAC and FENOCIN’s producers who are 
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finding it increasingly difficult to make a living from their coffee and cacao. With real prices 
for certified coffee and cacao falling year on year and costs of production increasing, many 
producers are leaving their organisations as the extra work required to fulfil certification 
requirements is not worth the extra income that certification generates.  
‘We currently work with 110 producers. Before we worked with over 600. 
Quality requirements were less strict before - now we have to carry out 
inspections to ensure buyers that all our produce is organic’. UREAFA 
Representative (2 October 2012, Jitotol). 
‘I used to sell to UREAFA, but they became too demanding - they want clean 
beans, (all the) same size. Prices rose with the coyote (intermediary) so it 
seemed better to sell to them and have more time for other things, especially 
for the milpa’ Rojas Lopez, CIOAC member in the community of Amate, Jitotol 
(30 September 2012, village of Amate, Jitotol). 
‘Now the price is at $102 a quintal but two years ago it rose to a maximum of 
$170. But just before this, about three years ago, it fell to just $70. At $100 we 
can only cover our production costs; if it falls to less than this we have to think 
twice about spending money, the family suffers because we have almost 
nothing.’ Luis Cabrera, FENOCIN (UROCAL) cacao producer (30 April 2013, 
Shumiral, Azuay Province). 
In Chiapas many producers have left UREAFA because of the increasingly demanding 
production requirements for organic coffee. They agree that it is better to lose their organic 
certification and sell conventional coffee for slightly less and have more time for the milpa 
(subsistence production) and ‘other things’, i.e. various forms of wage labour. The majority 
of the growers that left UREAFA did so between 2000 and 2002 when the prices fell to 
between MX$ 3 and MX$ 5 per kilo (US$ 0.2 - 0.3). In that period the coffee was just left to 
rot on the trees as it wasn’t worth harvesting. During these years labour time expended on 
the subsistence plot and engaged in wage work predominated in household reproduction 
strategies. Producers exercised the degree of autonomy from the market that ownership of 
the land confers to them by distancing themselves from unfavourable commodity market 
conditions to depend more on producing their own subsistence, and further securing it via 
deeper integration into the labour market. The capacity to partially withdraw from, and 
shift between, varying degrees of integration into commodity markets, labour markets and 
subsistence production that land access and subsistence production provides acts as a 
refuge from neoliberal restructuring (Vergara-Camus, 2014: 28). Indeed, in the 1970s and 
1980s coffee plots had themselves become a refuge for peasants that could no longer 
generate surpluses in milpa production for the money income necessary to survive. Over 
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the course of these two decades, the number of coffee producers doubled nationally 
(Bartra, 2001: 44).  
In contrast to the first years of the 21st Century, in 2011 UREAFA’s remaining members 
received the best prices in the history of the organisation, reaching a maximum of MX $53 
per kilo (US$ 4.5). Household labour time expended on coffee plots was therefore 
maximised during the harvesting period (3-4 months) and drawn away from subsistence 
production and wage labour. It was also common to employ wage labour for three or four 
weeks during the picking period to maximise harvests at a time when market prices were so 
high. Those that remain part of UREAFA, and producers of organic coffee more generally, 
must typically employ wage labour for at least one month a year owing to the quality and 
standard requirements demanded by their cooperatives. This is because (relatively) high 
quality coffees that characterise organic markets require uniformity in terms of grain sizes 
and maturity and so must be harvested more intensively (in a smaller harvest window 
based on optimal cherry ripeness) and more extensively (repeat visits to the plot in order to 
select cherries only when they ripen). This represents a significant expense that contrasts 
with conventional producers that typically sell mixed size and maturity (therefore quality) 
beans to local intermediaries. These are, in turn, bought by exporters and used to make 
blended, low quality coffees. Those CIOAC members that had left UREAFA still received 
between MX$40 and MX$48 (US$ 3.5 - 4.1) per kilo in 2011 for conventional coffee from 
local intermediaries and have not since been tempted to try to re-join UREAFA. The extra 
household labour time required to meet organic quality standards and the need to contract 
labour during the harvest period is not considered worthwhile given current price 
differentials between organic and conventional coffee, and the inherently volatile nature of 
those prices. Instead, devoting relatively more time to subsistence plots and wage labour is 
deemed a more secure and predictable reproduction strategy.  
Analysis of CIOAC and FENOCIN members’ reproduction strategies gives important insights 
into the importance of relative autonomy from the market for peasant producers and how 
it is exercised in order to try to ensure household reproduction and its continued access to 
land - itself the basis of that autonomy. Despite subsequent conversion of coffee to milpa in 
Oaxaca following INMECAFE’s departure the fact remains that producers never completely 
turned their land over to coffee during the years in which the institute guaranteed certain 
minimum prices and security that all coffee produced would be sold. CIOAC’s coffee 
producers still decided to retain milpa when in purely financial terms it would appear to 
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have made more sense to devote all land to coffee and buy staples with the extra income 
earned from the sale of the cash crop. This reluctance to completely integrate household 
production with the market is part of a logic of production that values a degree of 
autonomy from the market that better secures the long term maintenance of the family on 
the land far more than the possibility of receiving higher prices at the cost of increased 
exposure to potentially immiserating market forces. Although social property relations in 
Mexico mean that dispossession is not the threat that it is in Ecuador, increased exposure 
to the vicissitudes of volatile coffee markets through increased devotion of land and/or 
household labour to coffee production could force family members from the land and into 
the labour market in periods of low prices. This market is increasingly insecure and 
informal, and CIOAC’s coffee growers attempt to avoid it as much as possible through the 
maintenance of subsistence production as a space of relative autonomy. As we saw earlier, 
wage labour is a significant and relatively stable component of household reproduction 
strategies for FENOCIN’s coastal peasants. Their proximity to highly capitalised banana and 
palm oil plantations makes wage labour a predictable source of income for peasant 
household reproduction strategies. Banana production is year round, relatively labour 
intensive and, importantly, local. This contrasts with CIOAC’s coffee producers in regions 
where sources of wage employment are locally scarce, making seasonal migration to 
harvest export crops in northern Mexico, and more long-term migration to the country’s 
urban centres and abroad, necessary to secure household reproduction. Whereas 
subsistence production acts as the ultimate fall back for CIOAC’s coffee growers, for 
FENOCIN’s cacao growers plantation labour can reliably provide the necessary income to 
meet family subsistence requirements in bad years for cacao prices or production without 
having to convert cultivation from cash to staple crops. However, the importance of wage 
labour for both organisations’ members is often under-reported. There is significant 
reluctance on the part of cacao producers to admit that wage labour represents anything 
more than a minor supplement of their incomes, only carried out at times when all family 
labour is not required on the family production unit. 
The desire to reduce dependence on the labour market is a strong incentive for both 
CIOAC’s coffee growers and FENOCIN’s cacao producers. In the case of the former the 
reasons appear more obvious; local sources of stable wage employment are scarce, forcing 
seasonal migration far from the family plot for up to five months a year on export 
plantations in northern Mexico, or more permanent migration to Mexico’s urban centres 
and abroad, namely the USA. In both of these situations predominantly indigenous 
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peasants, many of which speak Spanish as a second language, household dependence on 
wage labour means leaving families and communities for extended periods and suffering 
what are often extremely difficult, insecure and oppressive employment conditions. For 
FENOCIN’s producers there is also a strong desire for increased autonomy from the labour 
market despite very different employment experiences from those of CIOAC’s indigenous 
members. The vast majority of FENOCIN’s coastal peasants work year-round on nearby 
banana plantations close to their own production units and are not forced to leave their 
families for extended periods in order to meet household reproduction requirements. 
Wage income is therefore a relatively predictable component of peasant reproduction 
strategies, more predictable in fact than cacao production in a volatile commodity market. 
With land accessed on the basis of private property relations and cacao production 
financed largely by local intermediaries, dispossession in the event of production and/or 
market difficulties is a real and ever present threat for FENOCIN’s cacao growers. 
When both organisations’ producers talk about the period of internationally managed 
markets it is not the higher relative prices that they used to receive that they miss most 
now, but the security that guaranteed prices and purchase provided them. This degree of 
certainty meant that peasant families could plan for the future and have a relatively stable 
and predictable production cycle with costs and expenses that fluctuated little year on year. 
Now the biggest concern these producers have is that prices can fluctuate enormously not 
just year on year but even during the harvest, making it very difficult to plan a stable 
household survival strategy; in years of high coffee prices in Mexico, small producers often 
hire labour, normally neighbours’ children, to help with the harvest as economically it is 
worth maximising the harvest and paying for the labour to do so. For CIOAC’s coffee 
growers in Chiapas this practice is extensive; when prices are good labour is hired locally, 
typically ejidatarios’ and comuneros’ children, in exchange for nominal wages and meals. In 
years where prices fall, little time is spent on the harvest with fruit left to rot on the trees 
and household labour seeks work off the family land. Most years no labour is hired and the 
family makes do with its own labour, as much on the coffee field as is deemed worth the 
prevailing price with varying degrees of off-farm work to meet the families’ reproduction 
requirements. However, this strategy applies only to the harvest period (three to four 
months a year) when prices are known. The problem is that during the rest of the year 
when maintenance of the coffee field needs to be carried out i.e. pruning, replacement of 
old trees, fertilisation etc. future prices, and therefore the returns that this work will 
eventually receive, is still unknown. As such there is naturally a tendency to carry out 
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minimal maintenance and very little investment in renovation of the field given that this 
labour and expense may very well constitute a significant loss come harvest time. To 
minimise risk, increase household income security and, ultimately, retain the family on the 
land for the relative autonomy from the market that it provides, peasant families instead 
take up various forms of seasonal and permanent wage labour where security of 
remuneration is (usually) known in advance and risks of not meeting family survival needs 
minimised. Family labour time dedicated to the milpa throughout the year exceeds that of 
the coffee field as security of subsistence is thus assured, while future coffee prices are 
always unknown. As with CIOAC’s coffee producers, the volatility of the cacao market 
creates a disincentive for FENOCIN’s members to devote household labour to the cacao 
plot above basic maintenance, or invest in inputs and improvements, as future prices 
(therefore remuneration of labour and the covering of costs) is unknown until the harvest 
season. Devoting too much household labour on the plot and financing improved 
production through credit arrangements with local intermediaries runs the risk of 
dispossession if the market drops. Work on local plantations is relatively much more secure, 
and cacao production currently acts as a supplement to household incomes which are 
derived primarily from off-farm wage labour. 
Subsistence production is then an essential fall back in the context of usually unpredictable, 
insecure and oppressive labour markets for CIOAC’s predominantly indigenous coffee 
producers, and volatile coffee prices. For FENOCIN, wage labour on local plantations 
represents a similar fall back, year-round and predictable as it is as a component of 
household reproduction strategies. The combined effects of coffee and cacao market 
volatility, increasing costs of production and reducing or stable real prices for coffee on 
average has resulted in even less time being spent on maintaining and improving 
commercial production. Those members of both organisations still producing certified 
coffee and cacao face a similar dilemma as organic prices are as volatile as those for 
conventional; while price received is slightly higher the peasant household is more 
concerned with stability than price per se so the dangers of market dependence remain 
comparable. Although fair-trade always pays a minimum price, supposedly providing an 
important level of security for producers, CIOAC and FENOCIN’s members complain that 
this minimum price has not increased in line with ever increasing production costs and is 
simply not sufficient for survival. In addition, the premium paid for organic beans is simply 
not worth the extra costs and effort required to meet certification standards.  
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‘The difference between organic and conventional coffee prices are too 
small...now we don’t have the certification; we continue to produce organically 
but it’s really expensive to get the certification and it’s not worth it at the 
moment with the price difference...In the first years of Fair Trade supports 
arrived and the producers benefitted. But within CEPCO (the Fair Trade coop he 
was part of) expenses increased and the benefits stopped reaching the 
producers’. Celso Jiménez, Leader of Pergamino Mazateco, a CIOAC affiliated 
cooperative in Huautla de Jiménez, Oaxaca (28 November 2012, Huautla de 
Jiménez). 
As a result of the fall in real prices, anything more than one production cycle receiving the 
FT minimum price would be very difficult for producers to sustain and so increasing 
dependence on it as part of a household reproduction strategy would expose peasants to 
significant hardships and the need to integrate further into labour markets.  
Although the focus here has been on producers’ struggles to increase their autonomy from 
coffee and cacao markets as attempts to carve out autonomous spaces within it via FT and 
organic schemes have been progressively restricted, this has not simply led to the 
termination of the latter struggles and a reversion to a logic in which autonomy from the 
market alone prevails (i.e. Ploeg 2008 & 2010). Some of FENOCIN’s coastal organisations 
are renewing attempts to exercise autonomy within the market by differentiating their 
product entirely from conventional cacao varieties. They are using the unique flavour 
characteristics of Ecuador’s national variety in an attempt to market it as a different 
commodity, a commodity over which producers themselves will have autonomous control 
over production and marketing, and therefore a great deal of control over the market itself. 
For some of FENOCIN’s coastal organisations, certification schemes in all their forms are 
simply not sufficient to provide the level, or even form, of autonomy within the market that 
they desire. These schemes still force peasant livelihoods to be based upon selective 
integration/disintegration into a volatile, exploitative commodity market and dependence 
on external plantation and/or urban labour. Instead they believe that real autonomy can 
only be achieved by completely withdrawing from a market dominated by transnational 
exporters and processors, and the creation of a new one based on producer control of 
production and marketing. Only by generating and controlling their own market do these 
producers believe they can really secure a significant degree of autonomy, thus improving 
and stabilising their incomes and consolidating their production units and their ownership 
of the land.  
In attempting to remove themselves from the conventional cacao market by achieving 
market recognition for their unique variety of cacao, these producers are not only 
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attempting to renegotiate or re-establish their integration into commodity markets on the 
basis of producer control of the value chain, from production to marketing They are also 
striving to free themselves from dependence on the labour market. There is widespread 
hope among FENOCIN’s coastal peasants that if such recognition can be gained, a better 
and more stable income will result from cacao production which, in turn, will encourage 
more labour time to be spent on improving cacao production, further improving incomes in 
a positive feedback cycle. As a result, dependence on wage labour on banana plantations 
may be reduced, if not eliminated, from the reproduction strategies of the most successful 
cacao producer households. The hope is that increased autonomy within the cacao market 
through peasant control over the production and marketing of the crop can deliver 
increased autonomy from the labour market as well.  
The proposal to differentiate Ecuador’s national cacao from other standard varieties is 
being actively taken up by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAGAP) under President Correa’s 
administration, but currently the programme is still in the early phase of certifying national 
cacao producers and tracing beans from farm to port and so its impacts on autonomous 
struggles are yet to be seen. Whether producers can create and control their own market, 
autonomously manage it, and defend it not only from transnational capital but also the 
Ecuadorian state, will be a major challenge. As we will see below, new forms of 
autonomous struggles within coffee and cacao markets are also developing in response to 
emerging quality dynamics in both sectors.  
The preceding analysis of peasant struggles in the neoliberal era demonstrates that the 
logic of production for CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao growers cannot be 
determined by purely economic rationality with household labour employed solely on the 
basis of where it will receive the best returns. In Bartra’s (1982: 92) terms, the peasant 
economy is constituted by diverse activities, from commodity and subsistence production 
to wage labour, all organically intertwined. There is no specific logic for each one of these 
considered separately; the economic logic of the peasant household is regulated by a 
combined rationality of all household activities, not with profit maximisation as a goal, but 
the reproduction of its socio-economic existence (Ibid; 44).  And this long-term existence 
depends on the maintenance and exercise of a degree of autonomy from commodity and 
labour markets which allows the peasant household to shift the application of its labour 
power between various activities depending on market conditions, for example, protecting 
itself from adverse conditions in the commodity market through withdrawal, and increased 
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integration into the labour market. To categorise the modern peasantry as ‘petty 
commodity producers’ and the over-simplified claim that ‘agents of this form of production 
are capitalists and workers at the same time’ (Bernstein, 2001: 29) cannot explain (non-
capitalist) peasant production and reproduction strategies other than by attributing a 
separate logic to the supposedly distinct (and contradictory) realms of ‘capitalist’ and 
‘worker’, eliminating peasant agency from shaping these strategies. However, the capacity 
to shift labour in the ways described above demonstrates that the household does not 
operate under capitalist rationality as the market remains, in Wood’s (2002) terms, more of 
an opportunity rather than the imperative that it is for capitalist producers. For CIOAC’s 
producers that occupy land on the basis of social property relations, this is even more the 
case as outright dispossession is not the threat that it is for FENOCIN’s peasants. They may 
be forced to leave the land as a consequence of unviable production, but they cannot be 
forced to sell to repay loans in the way that FENOCIN’s private property holders can.  
As we have seen in the case of both FENOCIN and CIOAC, even though quantitatively 
household labour power can be employed in shifting constellations depending on prevailing 
market conditions, qualitatively this labour is not the same. Household labour employed on 
the family production unit, whether this be in cash crop or subsistence production, is much 
more highly valued than off-farm wage labour. Under cash crop production, while labour is 
formally subsumed under capital, which now dominates world agriculture in the 
contemporary ‘corporate food regime’ (McMichael, 2007) and has subordinated peasants 
into global circuits of production, trade and finance (Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2010: 178), 
producers still retain a significant degree of autonomy regarding production decisions and 
the organisation of household labour. Apart from retaining access to land as a means of 
possessing a degree of autonomy that acts as a buffer against, and insures against the risks 
of, depending entirely on the market for existence, the land itself defines who these 
peasants are. Even if, quantitatively, wage labour is the greatest contributing factor to 
peasant household incomes, qualitatively these households conceive of themselves as 
independent producers on their own land and this significantly shapes the nature of their 
struggles for autonomy and their class consciousness. Contrasted with peasants’ 
experiences in oppressive, exploitative and insecure forms of wage employment, the 
(relative) autonomy from the market and control over the labour process afforded by 
control over the means of production is highly valued by CIOAC and FENOCIN members, 
even if this control in reality entails subordination to capital and a difficult struggle for 
survival. Land represents a degree of control over the labour process and of their own 
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destinies that dispossession and/or proletarianisation would destroy. This is the 
fundamental basis of peasant struggles for land, both for access to it for the landless, and 
for improved access and the ability to make it produce for marginalised smallholders. The 
lack of interest for struggling for better conditions in the labour market is difficult to 
understand if peasant household dependence on wage labour is examined only 
quantitatively, and separate from an analysis of the peasant household logic of production 
and reproduction as an organic whole. This whole consists of diverse activities, all geared to 
sustaining the long term integrity and viability of the production unit, the nucleus of the 
peasant household. However, if we understand this logic as being based on ensuring the 
peasant household’s socio-economic existence and wellbeing, with complete independence 
from the labour market and (relative) autonomy in the commodity market constitutive of 
this, then we are better able to analyse the nature and content of contemporary peasant 
struggles.  
So far the struggle to reduce or completely eliminate dependence on wage labour from 
household reproduction strategies has been explained in terms of adversity experienced by 
peasants in the labour market, and, in the case of CIOAC’s coffee growers, the need to 
migrate far from home communities in order to find work. However, other no less 
important factors also shape this desire. The social status of the peasantry in southeast 
Mexico and coastal Ecuador is strongly tied to the land and making it produce. The shame 
expressed by some FENOCIN members that depend on wage employment, but who 
downplay its importance for their survival, is tied to the negative interpretation of wage 
labour dependence as an expression of failure as a producer on the land.  
Another factor driving struggles for complete autonomy from the labour market, in addition 
to social status as a successful peasant producer, is related to control of the labour process 
itself. As owners of the land and their means of production, peasants as commodity 
producers are not fully subsumed by capital and still retain relative control over the labour 
process. As such, they do not experience the alienation and marginalisation associated with 
their experiences in the labour market. For indigenous coffee producers in southeast 
Mexico, the labour market imposes racial forms of oppression, exploitation and 
marginalisation. For both FENOCIN and CIOAC members, the contrast between working for 
themselves as subsistence and commodity producers, or having their labour controlled by 
others as wage labourers, drives their struggles to improve production as a means of 
escaping from the labour market. This desire for control of the labour process is also 
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highlighted by Vergara-Camus’ (2009: 382-383) work with the EZLN in Chiapas and the MST 
(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra) in Brazil, where ‘the desire to be free of the 
dependence on someone else’s will in the effort to sustain their families came up again and 
again’ in interviews with these organisations’ members. The desire for withdrawal from the 
labour market helps explain why CIOAC and FENOCIN’s members have shown little interest 
in labour organising in the past, or, as is the case for coffee growers in Chiapas, have 
willingly broken agreements with landlords which would appear to go against their own 
best interests (see previous chapter). Not only are both organisations’ peasants 
uninterested in organising around wage employment, seeing it as a temporary necessary 
evil that will eventually be rendered unnecessary through improved production, but any 
form of labour organising risks jeopardising the overriding goal of eliminating household 
dependence on off-farm employment altogether. It could result in peasants losing their 
jobs, threatening the viability of household reproduction strategies, and, ultimately, losing 
access to or being expelled from the land itself. This is why struggles are focused on 
productive issues, not on wage labour. The latter, which is not valued anyway, needs to be 
escaped from, not improved. Ultimately, it is hoped that dependence on it will be reduced, 
and eventually eliminated, through successful struggles to promote peasant production.  
 
3.9 Cash Crops and Food Sovereignty 
Given the preceding analysis and the argument that struggles for autonomy form the basis 
of contemporary demands for land (both access to it and the ability to make a viable living 
on it), the issue of how this articulates with and shapes (or not) the food sovereignty 
movement as a whole needs to be addressed. Burnett and Murphy (2014: 1069) rightly 
claim that there is little evidence that the food sovereignty movement works with small-
scale farmers whose production is exported. There is no clear agenda presented for them, 
leaving uncertain what place there is within food sovereignty as a concept and as a 
movement for small-scale producers whose production is exported. For Mexico and 
Ecuador’s coffee and cacao producing VC members, this argument is certainly accurate. 
State withdrawal from the peasant sector affected producers of coffee and cacao in very 
similar ways to staples producers, yet the former’s interests have not been incorporated 
into the discourse and struggles of the VC and its conception of food sovereignty. The 
authors also state that, while not explicitly rejecting trade, the movement is identified with 
a strong preference for local (or national, particularly in the case of Mexico) markets. It 
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challenges existing international trade structures and, on the whole, its official position on 
trade remains ambiguous (Ibid: 1065). This is a problem given that tens of millions of 
smallholders worldwide depend on international trade of the cash crops they produce for 
survival and so this aspect of their production and reproduction strategies, and of their 
struggles for autonomy, are marginalised or even ignored by the food sovereignty 
movement.  
Since its inception, the VC has contested the legitimacy of the WTO as an institution for the 
governance of food and agriculture (Burnett and Murphy, 2014: 1065) and demanded that 
agricultural policies be exempt from WTO trade rules. International trade has been a 
central focus of the VC’s work which has aimed to transform international trade structures 
and the rules institutionalised in trade agreements and upheld by the WTO (Ibid: 1067). For 
the VC, the WTO promotes and defends neoliberal trade policies that naturalise the market 
as a site of agricultural efficiency for heavily subsidised and institutionally protected 
(through trade agreements) corporate producers (McMichael, 2009: 299), and has 
generated a systemic international agrarian crisis. However, despite the VC’s critical stance 
on agricultural trade under neoliberalism, there is no necessary contradiction between cash 
and staple crop production within the food sovereignty movement. The Via Campesina 
(2003a) defines ‘food sovereignty’ as ‘the peoples’, countries’ or state unions’ right to 
define their agricultural and food policy, without any dumping vis-à-vis third countries’. As 
Patel (2009: 663) states, food sovereignty is fundamentally ‘a call for peoples’ right to 
shape and craft food policy’ and does not limit itself simply to staples production for 
domestic consumption.  
While not rejecting trade, the food sovereignty movement has however come to be 
characterised by its criticisms of existing international trade structures. Its failure to address 
the role of peasant cash crop producers under food sovereignty has led to misplaced 
assumptions that the movement, rather than being against contemporary institutions and 
practices of international trade, is against trade per se. For example, Aerni (2011: 27) claims 
that the food sovereignty movement implies that every country is capable of producing and 
distributing sufficient food for its inhabitants without any need to resort to agricultural 
trade. This claim originates not from the movement itself, but rather from the ambiguity 
that results from its lack of engagement with the issue of international trade. The Via 
Campesina (2003b) clearly states that ‘food sovereignty does not negate trade, but rather, 
it promotes the formulation of trade policies and practices that serve the rights of peoples 
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to safe, healthy and ecologically sustainable production’. However, it has failed to 
adequately elaborate or engage with the mechanisms by which trade should be conducted 
under food sovereign systems. Burnett and Murphy even make the assumption that the 
movement wishes to actively convert export-producers to staples producers when they 
state that ‘the food sovereignty movement has not explained how such producers might 
make the transition to a new livelihood, nor whether it is a transition that the producers 
involved actually want to make’ (Ibid: 1071). Edelman (2014: 974) similarly asks the 
question ‘what will become of the millions of smallholders who depend for their livelihoods 
on export production and whose unions would plummet if they were required to switch, 
say, from cacao or African palm production to cassava and maize?’. Common to these 
perceptions is the lack of identification of who precisely is suggesting that producers be 
forced to change their production strategies. The idea that such a change be made is 
absurd at the level of peasant organisations themselves and their grassroots members in 
Mexico and Ecuador and far removed from their demands and proposals. Rather than 
seeking to ‘transition’ peasant producers, the VC and its organisations instead strive for 
their rights as producers to shape their own food and agricultural systems whether these 
be staples, export crops or various combinations of the two. The VC’s Nyéléni declaration of 
2007 clearly proposes this and in no way rejects the role of trade under the banner of food 
sovereignty. 
 
‘Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate 
food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their 
right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations 
and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of 
food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and 
corporations... Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees 
just incomes to all peoples as well as the rights of consumers to control their 
food and nutrition’ (Via Campesina, 2007, Nyéléni declaration). 
Even if contemporary institutions and practices of international trade under neoliberalism 
are rejected by the food sovereignty movement, export crops are clearly central to the 
livelihoods of many rural households, especially those of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and 
cacao growers. Yet this importance has not been adequately addressed by the VC, begging 
the question put forward by Koning and Jongeneel (2006: 2) as to what role can export 
crops play in a policy that has adopted food sovereignty as its driving strategy? It is clear 
from both the VC’s own definition of food sovereignty as producers’ rights to define their 
own food and agricultural systems, and peasant organisation leaders, that there is no 
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necessary contradiction between staples and export cash crop production. At the 
grassroots level, the struggles for autonomy analysed demonstrate the articulation 
between cash crop and subsistence production (as well as wage labour) as part of the 
overall struggle to make a viable living from the land. The fundamental issue here is not a 
dichotomy between staples and export production - it is that the peasantry’s own 
organisations, not transnational capital, have a key role in shaping policy and that the state 
intervenes to support sustainable peasant production, regardless of whether production is 
for national consumption or for export. The extract below, taken from an interview with the 
leader of a FENOCIN organisation on the Ecuadorian coast, is instructive as the changes his 
organisation calls for regarding the cacao sector are akin to the VC’s core demands for food 
sovereignty. 
‘What we are trying to do is make the state intervene and, as a country, have a 
clear position regarding how to manage the system of production, how to be 
sustainable, efficient and competitive. This applies to cacao as well. This has to 
do with productivity, with infrastructure and marketing. The government 
should support the peasant sector much more, in services, market information, 
in helping the peasantry organise autonomously. It’s also a struggle against 
TNCs and for market power...There is a need for producers to create alliances 
that strengthen production and marketing and establish direct links between 
organised producers and organised consumers in the US and Europe. The state 
needs to support these direct linkages...involve itself much more directly in 
processes of commercial exchange’. Joaquín Vázquez, UROCAL president (1 
May 2013, Machala). 
Rather than articulating a separate discourse for cash crops and incorporating it into the 
food sovereignty movement, the VC would do well to articulate staple and cash crop 
production as mutually constitutive elements of struggles for peasant control of food and 
agricultural systems in much the same way as both are currently mutually constitutive 
elements of peasants’ own struggles for relative autonomy from and within the market. 
The separation between the two is artificial in terms of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s peasants’ 
struggles for autonomy and survival. The VC’s tendency to focus on trade as an instrument 
of oppression without acknowledging its importance to many grassroots struggles and the 
proposals put forward by its cash crop producing members has led critics of food 
sovereignty to question the feasibility of the movement’s demands. It has also marginalised 
a numerically and politically important fraction of the movement whose issues specific to 
cash crop production are currently largely ignored by the VC. This lack of representation is a 
serious issue for CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao growers given newly emerging 
production relations developing in both sectors in response to increasing demand for 
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quality, single origin beans. Through analysis of the nature these emerging dynamics and 
CIOAC and FENOCIN’s members’ engagement with these processes, the following section 
will attempt to demonstrate how such struggles for improved production and viability of 
the peasant production unit are playing out in concrete terms. 
 
3.10 TNE-Producer Relations in Mexico and Ecuador’s Coffee 
and Cacao Sectors 
During the era of the International Coffee and Cacao Agreements the commodity chains of 
these products were not ‘driven’ by any particular actor, nor was it possible to claim that 
either producing or consuming countries controlled them (Ponte, 2002: 253). Liberalisation, 
however, has placed these chains into buyers’ hands and international processors have 
become the dominant agents (Ibid: 254). Large transnational exporters (TNEs) now control 
most of the coffee and cacao chains and both value and surplus have been increasingly 
transferred to consumer countries (Johannessen S & Whilite, 2010: 540). 
The end of international supply management and subsequent price drops following 
liberalisation, the bankruptcy of many national and international exporters, lack of credit, 
and state withdrawal from the peasant sector returned control of the coffee and cacao 
sectors to TNEs and private intermediaries (Renard, 2010: 23). A process of capital 
concentration has taken place in both sectors in both Mexico and Ecuador. In the former, 
control of the coffee sector is now concentrated in five main companies; Nestlé, AMSA 
(United Agro-industries of Mexico), Jacobs, Expogranos and Becofisa-Volcafe (Hernandez 
Navarro, 2004). In Ecuador, control of the cacao sector is similarly concentrated by 
Transmar, Olam, Armajaro and Nestlé (Reyes, 2014). In both countries these TNEs have 
increasingly put local buyers out of business and installed their offices and warehouses in 
the most important production regions. Much of their power lies in their financial capacity, 
able to finance local intermediaries to supply their warehouses with beans from across 
producer regions. Producer organisations compete with TNEs and their buyers for the 
purchase of coffee and cacao, and do so at a distinct disadvantage. Private buyers - often 
financed by transnational exporters - normally have the capacity to pay producers the full 
amount at the moment they purchase the beans, whereas coops typically pay a first 
instalment on receiving the produce and complete the payment on receipt of funds from 
the final (usually foreign) buyer (Pérez-Grovas et al, 2001: 11). 
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Since 2010 Mexico’s coffee sector has seen the rapid development of a quality driven 
initiative by the handful of transnational coffee exporters that concentrate power in the 
sector. With Northern consumers - driven by retailers’ marketing strategies - increasingly 
demanding high quality, single origin, traceable coffee, these exporters have been forced to 
expand further upstream into their supply chains in order to ensure that they can meet 
these growing quality requirements. Even though they still source the majority of their 
Mexican coffee through contractual credit arrangements with intermediaries, an increasing 
proportion of the coffee they buy now originates from direct relationships that they have 
established with producer groups. They have set up installations in the commercial urban 
centres of coffee growing municipalities where they buy coffee and from where they 
organise production systems with the producers they work with. AMSA, Mexico’s biggest 
coffee buyer, currently sources around ten percent of its coffee through such relationships 
and is keen to emphasise the social development, rather than market driven aims for doing 
this (Source: Juan Carlos Morales, Head of AMSA in the Highlands of Chiapas). 
‘We have supply chains (like this) in order to, firstly, avoid intermediation - the 
producer suffers in times of low prices, the intermediary doesn’t. The 
intermediaries always have their profits. Secondly, for quality. Now, everything 
has to do with quality and we have to continue improving it if we want to push 
forward.  Juan Carlos Morales, head of AMSA in the highlands of Chiapas (27 
December 2012, San Cristóbal de las Casas). 
Despite recognising the problems producers face as a result of being forced to sell to 
intermediaries, AMSA still finances intermediaries to buy 90 percent of its beans, the 
majority of which is sold to Nestlé for making cheap, instant coffee. There is no incentive 
for these producers to improve quality as intermediaries pay the same price for all volumes 
regardless of bean size and quality characteristics. Coffee exporters are not interested in 
differential payment based on quality and have no quality separation system at their 
installations as their goal is to buy 90 percent of their coffee as cheap as possible while 
sourcing ten percent of their coffee as high quality through direct intervention in 
production. Since the INMECAFE years Mexican coffee has received a negative price 
differential of, on average, between five and ten percent below prevailing world market 
prices. According to national peasant and coffee organisation leaders (Javier Galvan, 
UNORCA; Fernando Celis, CNOC - National Coordinator of Coffee Organisations), this price 
punishment is maintained by TNEs as it gives them a competitive advantage over other low 
quality coffee producing companies in other countries. By continuing to buy Mexico’s poor 
quality coffee without attempting improve the product, and passing on the negative price 
158 
 
differential to producers, they claim that the role of Mexico as a low quality supplier is 
sustained, keeping producers in poverty. Their quality driven certified markets for which 
they source ten percent of their coffee operate under different conditions of supply and 
demand, not based primarily on maximum production for minimum costs, and thus do not 
receive the stock exchange price ‘punishment’ conventional Mexican coffee receives. 
Direct TNE-producer relations are very similar to contract farming arrangements, despite 
not involving paper contracts themselves. The producers assume all the risks of production 
(see Clapp [1988], for an overview of the social relations of contract farming in Latin 
America) in return for TNE provided plants, technical assistance and basic infrastructure. 
According to TNE representatives they do not want to enter into contractual relations with 
producers as they are concerned with fostering community development and relationships 
based on trust and mutual respect that, they claim, a contractual relationship cannot 
achieve. However, the following exchange with AMSA Mexico’s head of operations offers a 
different perspective as to why contracts are not signed: 
‘(Me) Why do you not have contracts with the producers in your direct supply 
chains? 
If you want to form a long-term relationship with producers you have to do it 
through trust - if you force things on your providers and another buyer comes 
along, your clients will leave you from one day to the next.  
(Me) And also, if the market for their coffee falls, you (AMSA) don’t have the 
obligation of buying from them either? 
 Exactly’. Santiago Arguello, National Director of AMSA (14 February 2013, 
México City. 
In addition, TNEs simply do not need to enter into contracts with producers in a market 
characterised by massive oversupply and in which no other buyer can compete with TNE 
prices. As part of the relationship, TNEs pay producers the prevailing New York stock 
exchange price for their coffee at the moment of sale, a price that only this handful of 
companies can offer. Cooperatives producing for certified European coffee markets, 
typically the best paying, can rarely match this price, let alone better it, and typically cannot 
pay producers the full amount until their coffee has been paid for following shipping. As a 
result, this new dynamic represents a significant threat to their futures as viable 
organisations. Many cooperative leaders believe that TNEs’ decision to pay the Stock 
Exchange price to producers is a direct attempt to increase their market share, and 
eventually control the market, by destroying cooperatives as a source of competition.  
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‘AMSA, their employees, arrive in the communities. They increase prices. It’s a 
strategy to finish us off. The people don’t understand - if they pay five dollars 
more than us it’s a benefit in the short term’. Alfonso López Santiz, director of 
operations, Kulaktik cooperative in Chiapas (25 October 2012, Tenejapa). 
For those which enter into direct selling agreements with the TNEs there is a great deal of 
variation in producer opinions regarding the situation. 
‘Last year we sold five tonnes to AMSA and received 42 pesos per kilo. They 
didn’t take anything away from the people like the coyotes do, that’s why the 
people like it. The people here think that this group (AMSA) is going to work 
well. But they don’t help us directly - we had the opportunity to work directly 
with them with their supports for certification but we said no. 
 (Me) Why, are there risks?  
Yes, they want to gather all the producers. But we want to retain our 
independence and search for alternative markets; we don’t want obligations 
with AMSA’.  
Felipe Palacios Chazares, Leader of the ‘Organización de Cafeticultores del 
Eloxochitlan de Flores Magon’, part of CIOAC (5 December 2012, City of 
Oaxaca). 
 ‘We sold to AMSA last year. The agreement is that they buy all our coffee and 
they help us with certification. 
 (Me) What certification?  
‘Adopta un cafetal’ (Adopt a coffee plot, AMSA’s own certification scheme). 
They haven’t fulfilled the majority of their promises - they told us they were 
going to give us invoices on time (in order to receive the state production 
subsidy ‘sistema fomento productivo’) but they haven’t. They don’t really want 
to help us. But they are supporting the certification transition and they gave us 
all the training they promised. But now they’ve hooked us as we have to keep 
selling to them to continue the transition’. Arturo Carrera González, member 
of ‘Organisación de Cafeticultores Na-Davii’, San Juan Cuautsospan (30 
November 2012, Huautla de Jiménez, Oaxaca). 
The above interviews with coffee growers in Oaxaca are representative of the opinions of 
the majority of peasants considering entering into direct agreements with TNEs. While 
prices received for their coffee are set to be much higher than those offered by local 
intermediaries, there is a general lack of trust of the TNEs and what direct linkages with 
them may signify for their autonomy in the future. Once entered into, CIOAC’s peasants 
worry that their autonomy will be significantly constrained by TNE relations, as they will be 
increasingly unable to seek out alternative, potentially more stable and better paying niche 
markets, as production is geared to the requirements of the company, not the producers. 
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The strategy of transnational cacao companies operating in Ecuador bears a striking 
resemblance with that of Mexico’s coffee TNEs. Since 2009/2010 these companies have 
begun buying directly from producers at source, with installations set up in cacao growing 
regions to ensure maximum control of the production process by providing plants, technical 
assistance and a guaranteed payment for producers’ cacao at prevailing New York stock 
exchange prices which, owing to organisational expenses, most cooperatives simply cannot 
match. This strategy, as with similar systems in place for Mexican coffee, has been driven 
by increasing quality requirements that can only be met by standardising and controlling 
the production process at origin. As with Mexican coffee TNEs, Ecuador’s cacao companies 
like to stress both the quality and the social credentials of their policy. Alberto Nacer, head 
of marketing at TRANSMAR, the country’s biggest cacao buyer, explains the reasons behind 
company policy: 
‘We want to directly reach the producer because it’s the only way to control 
100 percent the quality, the processes of drying and fermentation. There’s also 
the social aspect. Working with the producer we’re eliminating intermediation 
and giving a better price to the producer’. Alberto Nacer, TRANSMAR’s head 
of marketing (7 May 2013, Guayaquil). 
And again, as with CIOAC’s coffee producers in Mexico, FENOCIN’s cacao producers’ 
experiences and opinions regarding TNE policy varies depending largely on their past 
experiences with independent organising around production and relationships with 
intermediaries. In Chucaple in the province of Esmeraldas, despite being recipients of a 
number of NGO (non-governmental organisation) development projects, FENOCIN’s 
members have always depended on local intermediaries for credit and the marketing of 
their products. This year (2013) the association (Asociación Artesanal de Chucaple - AACH) 
for the first time sold to Armajaro, a London based international cacao trading company, 
that has set up a collection warehouse in the City of Santo Domingo around two hour’s 
drive north of the community. With no experience of independent certification schemes or 
any form of marketing in the past, members are overwhelmingly positive about the 
relationship and keen for it to develop further, having been promised plants and training by 
the company for next year. 
‘(Me) What is the difference between Armajaro and the intermediary?  
With Armajaro it’s much better. They pay us US$20 a quintal more than the 
intermediary. Right now the intermediary is paying $90 a quintal and Armajaro 
pays us $110...They are going to buy as much as we can produce. This year is 
like a trial, but for next year they say there is training, certification and plants.  
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(Me) Do you eventually want to stop selling to Armajaro and sell directly to 
foreign buyers?  
We’re going to see how it goes with Armajaro. If they carry on paying well, 
we’ll carry on with them’. Manuel Morales, AACH President and part of 
FENOCIN’s national leadership committee (15 April 2013, Chucaple, 
Esmeraldas) 
As we have seen for both CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao growers, income stability 
is more highly sought than increased incomes per se. This problem is not going to be 
resolved through direct relations between producers and exporters, and both 
organisations’ members are acutely aware of this. 
‘(Me) With Armajaro are you going to resolve the problem of low prices?  
No, they’re going to pay us about US$20 more per quintal, but this price still 
goes with the market price. The price isn’t going to stabilise with Armajaro’. 
Antonio Espinoza Sanchez, AACH member (16 April 2013, Chucaple, 
Esmeraldas). 
While AACH members were keen to establish a direct relationship with a transnational 
cacao buyer, UNOCYPP (Unión Noroccidental de Organisaciones Campesinas y 
Poblacionales de Pichincha), another FENOCIN cacao producing organisation based in the 
market town of Puerto Quito on the Western edge of the Andes, was far more sceptical of 
working this way and eventually did so more or less through compulsion. As with Mexico’s 
independent coffee associations, Ecuador’s cacao organisations risk losing their members if 
they cannot compete with the prices (and increasingly services) now offered by 
transnational buyers. As a result, some organisations have converted themselves into 
suppliers for these transnationals in the hope of maintaining their organisations and the 
more socially oriented services they provide and that go beyond simply paying the market 
price for cacao and production training. 
‘Now we sell all our cacao to Nestlé. We started with them in 2010, but I saw it 
(as something) really bad at the beginning. I didn’t know what to do. It’s one of 
the biggest buyers in the country and I didn’t want to work with, let’s say, the 
enemy. But I didn’t have any other option - carry on selling to the intermediary 
or sell directly to Nestlé. Here there is no other option so we decided to 
eliminate the intermediary.  
(Me) And how has it been since?  
Very good. Nestlé pays between US$15 and $20 more per quintal and they 
don’t cheat with the scale - effectively we earn $30 more per quintal because 
they weigh it correctly’. Malaquias Santos, President of UNOCYPP and part of 
FENOCIN’s national leadership committee (14 April 2013, Puerto Quito, 
Pichincha). 
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As with AACH in Chucaple, price fluctuations are a pressing concern for UNOCYPP’s 
producers and something they believe will not be resolved through the current relationship 
with Nestlé. Malaquias continues: 
‘Nestlé pays more but there’s a limit; if we want to carry on improving we have 
to stop selling the bean and become producers of processed cacao products in 
order to overcome the problem of low prices that fluctuate massively. But I see 
it as a step (selling to Nestlé) - we don’t want to carry on with them forever’. 
As we saw earlier, CIOAC and FENOCIN’s experiences with fair-trade and organic 
certification schemes have become increasingly negative over the past decade. Both 
organisations claim that the difference between certified and conventional prices is ever 
decreasing, making the extra work necessary to retain these certifications increasingly 
difficult to justify within household reproduction strategies. With certified and conventional 
coffee and cacao prices as volatile as they are and production costs that increase year on 
year, both organisations’ members have been forced to integrate further into the labour 
market and/or seek out further niche markets for their coffee and cacao through attempts 
to gain recognition from a variety of social and environmentally based certification schemes 
that have proliferated over the past decade in particular. Having experienced such difficult 
conditions in their commodity markets throughout the neoliberal era, the opportunity to 
enter into direct agreements with TNEs offers apparently significant advantages to not only 
increase incomes through both productivity gains and intermediary avoidance, but also to 
consolidate peasants’ hold on the land (in the case of Ecuador) and their capacity to make a 
viable living from it, reducing to a degree, or eliminating altogether, labour market 
integration (in the cases of both Mexico and Ecuador). However, while this strategy does 
indeed consolidate peasants’ viability on the land, at least in the short to medium term, and 
so in itself represents an important victory in the struggle for autonomy from the market, 
there is also a limit to how far such arrangements can increase this autonomy.  
Throughout this chapter the term ‘subsumption’ has been used to describe how the labour 
of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s producers is varyingly, yet not totally, subordinated to capital. The 
term, as elaborated by Marx, provides a useful analytical framework for understanding how 
capital penetrating the rural sphere, in this case the peasant coffee and cacao sectors, 
shapes the labour process of producers and how it is engaged with and contested by 
peasants in their struggles for autonomy. Marx distinguishes between ‘formal’ and ‘real’ 
subsumption to examine different mechanisms of subordinating the labour process to 
capital; initially capital ‘formally’ subsumes the labour process, essentially via mercantile 
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and monetary relations, a labour process which pre-exists it and in which the cooperation 
of workers does not require mechanisms of capitalist direction of production (Vercellone, 
2007: 19-20). Capital must first subordinate the labour process to its valorisation process 
(process of surplus value creation) - it must formally subsume it - if it is to reshape that 
process in its image, or really subsume it. Capital therefore extracts surplus value from the 
labour process as it is given (Endnotes). 
Subsumption of the labour process becomes ‘real’ when capital moves beyond formal 
possession of that process to transform it in its own image. Capital steps in to increase 
labour productivity through technical innovation and other direct alterations to the labour 
process itself. Why does capital strive to real subsumption if surplus value can already be 
extracted through formal subsumption i.e. without transforming (and investing in) the 
labour process itself? The answer lies in the nature of capitalist competition. Formal and 
real subsumption are closely tied to absolute and relative surplus value. Under the former, 
surplus value is extracted by capital effectively extending the length of the social working 
day i.e. coffee and cacao producing peasants expending more labour time on their 
coffee/cacao plots. Through technical innovation and transformation of the labour process 
itself, real subsumption enables capital to increase productivity, reducing the labour 
required to produce a given product. As the value of commodities are determined by the 
socially-necessary labour time for their production, any capitalist that successfully 
introduces technical innovation (i.e. successfully increases the productivity of labour) will 
be able to sell their products at a greater margin of profit (Endnotes). This spurs competing 
capitalists in the same sector to do the same, driving the transition from formal to real 
subsumption of labour. However, this distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘real’ subsumption 
is not as clear cut in reality as theoretical debates on the issue tend to assume. In reality the 
transition from formal to real subsumption may be partial, halted, or even reversible. In 
addition the transformation itself, and the forms in which subsumption manifests itself, are 
heavily influenced by peasant struggles. As Das (2012: 184) points out, real subsumption is 
less likely to emerge as long as absolute surplus value can be appropriated through formal 
and hybrid forms of subsumption and there is no strong imperative on the part of property 
owners to resort to methods of relative surplus value. Indeed, as is the case for some of 
CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao growers, capital may very often subsume peasant 
labour through such hybrid forms that actually consolidate the peasantry (Akram-Lodhi & 
Kay, 2010: 182). 
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Formally, CIOAC and FENOCIN producers that enter into direct relationships with TNEs 
retain control of the labour process and are therefore not fully subsumed by capital. 
Despite the application of TNE financed inputs and technologies on producers’ coffee and 
cacao plots, capital cannot fully subsume the labour process - really subsume it - as it does 
not own the land itself. It can only increase the degree of formal subsumption of the 
peasant labour process. This is not simply a question of land ownership as an economic 
factor of production that lays outside the full control of capital; this land, as the basis of 
peasant autonomy, confers upon its owners a significant ‘room for manoeuvre’, or space of 
relative autonomy from the market, within which a non-capitalist logic of production 
prevails. As long as this logic prevails, and land remains in the hands of CIOAC and 
FENOCIN’s cacao producers, real subsumption cannot take place as capital cannot fully 
transform the labour process in its own image. However, the degree of formal subsumption 
increases as household production and reproduction strategies alter in response to the 
requirements of capital, and a significant degree of control over the labour process is 
wrested from them to meet the production and quality demands of exporters. As such, 
peasants’ capacity - or space - to exercise relative autonomy within the market in the form 
of negotiating the terms of market integration and exerting an element of control over 
production and marketing decisions, is also restricted. 
Relative autonomy from the market, or ‘room for manoeuvre’ that land access confers is 
also reduced through the commodification and monetisation that household production 
and reproduction strategies undergo as a consequence of deeper market integration and 
the increasing formal subsumption to capital that result from TNE-producer relations. As 
such, the imperatives of the market come to condition these strategies more and more as 
production becomes ever more geared towards - and dependent on - the demands of 
capital, for example in the form of TNE production requirements. This loss of autonomy is 
central to understanding why many producers, especially those with a history of 
cooperative production, are critical of entering into arrangements with exporters. They 
know that decisions regarding production will in large part be taken from them and they 
will be forced to implement methods on their land determined mainly by export 
companies, further subsuming their labour to the requirements of capital at the expense of 
a reduction in their relative autonomy both from and within the (commodity) market. Two 
aspects of peasant autonomy are therefore strengthened; access to/viability of the land 
itself as production becomes more lucrative/viable, and reduced dependence on the labour 
market. An increasing degree of formal subsumption would seem to entail the 
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consolidation of peasants that enter into TNE agreements on the land as viable producers. 
These relative gains are at the expense of a reduction in control of the labour process and 
the capacity to exercise autonomy from and within commodity markets. However, while 
this may be the case in the short to medium term, in the long term there are other risks to 
peasant autonomy that need to be considered, as well as the impact that these direct 
producer-exporter relations are likely to have on the autonomy of producers unable or 
unwilling to enter into these arrangements. 
 
3.11 Longer term Projections 
In the long term, the implications of direct producer-TNE relations for peasant autonomy 
are far from clear. So too are the class dynamics of these relations that will continue to act 
on an already class differentiated peasantry. On the one hand, consolidation of access to 
land (Ecuador) and the capacity for smallholders to make a viable living from it (Mexico and 
Ecuador) would appear to result at the expense of a relative loss of both control over the 
labour process (increased formal subsumption to capital) and the ability to selectively 
integrate (the exercise of autonomy) into and out of commodity markets, labour markets 
and subsistence production depending on prevailing market conditions. However, the 
nature of the unequal power relations behind arrangements made between TNEs and 
producers means that peasants have very limited capacity to shape the terms on which 
they are based. Entering into TNE arrangements significantly restricts, even eliminates, the 
capacity to exercise autonomy within the market. The vast majority of producers wish to 
either maintain the certifications which they already hold, namely organic and to a lesser 
extent, fair-trade, or to receive assistance from TNEs to gain these certifications. However, 
the current market conditions to which these TNEs are responding through direct linkages 
with producers are quality, not certification driven. For these exporters, certification is 
merely a minimum entry requirement for accessing quality coffee and cacao markets, but it 
is the quality of their products, not the certification itself, that brings in the premiums. As a 
result, most transnational exporters, including Nestlé and AMSA, have developed their own 
certification schemes which confer legitimacy on their products for Northern consumers, 
but which are not as rigorous in their content or application as independent, producer led 
certification schemes. For example, CIOAC coffee producers in Oaxaca selling to TOMARI, 
Nestlé’s regional buyer, are keen to retain or regain organic certification. However, they 
have been told that all production will be carried out under the ‘sustainable practices’ of 
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the 4C coffee association certification, an industry dominated scheme that effectively 
defines and certifies TNC’s own interpretation of ‘sustainability’. 4C is dominated by Nestlé, 
the world’s biggest coffee buyer, and the latter’s ‘Nescafe Plan’, launched in Mexico in 
2012, aims to double the amount of Nescafe coffee bought directly from producers from 
2012 to 2017, eventually reaching 180,000 tonnes from 170,000 producers annually. All of 
this coffee, the company claims, will meet internationally recognised 4C sustainability 
standards by 2015 (Nestlé, 2012). 
4C standards, like those of other private sector certification initiatives, are heavily criticised 
both in the Fair Trade literature and by producer cooperatives themselves for potentially 
confusing consumers through the proliferation of ‘faux-fair’ standards (Jaffee & Howard, 
2010: 8). Industry initiatives compete with producer initiated Fair Trade and organic 
certifications without any of the latter’s price and social benefits and have far less rigorous 
and clearly stated standards (Renard, 2010: 30). 4C’s environmental standards are certainly 
far less rigorous than those required for organic certification. Its principles promote that 
‘use of pesticides is minimised’, that ‘application of fertilisers is in accordance with the 
needs of the crop’, and for ‘preferential use of sustainable energy’. All of these principles 
are clearly open to interpretation with no specifically prohibited chemicals or production 
practices (The 4C Association, 2010).  
Forced to comply with industry designed certification requirements as part of producer-TNE 
arrangements, which are designed to meet the needs of capital accumulation rather than 
those of peasant producers, not only further subsumes the latter to capital, but as a result, 
increases their dependence on their transnational ‘partners’. It jeopardises their continued 
existence as producers because if the company they are working with decides to move its 
operations elsewhere for improved profit opportunities, producers will be left without any 
certifications. Industry own initiatives such as 4C are tied to transnational exporters and 
retailers. This not only means that producers can only claim such certifications through 
continuing to sell to their transnational buyers; these certifications themselves are 
effectively established and administered by export companies and their technicians, not by 
producer groups themselves as is the case with Fair Trade and organic certifications which 
promote producer independent organising, knowledge sharing and training. The executive 
director of Certimex, Mexico’s biggest third party organic certification organisation, 
highlights the fundamental organisational difference between organic certification and 
industry own ‘sustainable’ certification schemes. 
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‘Some of the producers certified with us went over to AMSA (to AMSA’s 
industry own certification scheme, similar to 4C), but we asked them - why did 
you organise in the first place? To avoid intermediation and have control over 
your own production. With AMSA they are returning to the same thing again, 
selling to the intermediary, but now the biggest intermediary. Some have 
returned to us after working with AMSA but they lose the knowledge of the 
(organic) rules because with AMSA there is no autonomous organising, 
management and inspection - AMSA does it all. They lose internal 
(organisational) control’. Taurino Reyes Santiago, executive director of 
Certimex (Certificadora Mexicana de Productos y Procesos Ecológicos) (6 
December 2012, City of Oaxaca). 
As part of current arrangements between CIOAC’s coffee producers in Oaxaca, AMSA and 
TOMARI provide growers with new plants, fertilisers and pesticides. The same is the case 
for the FENOCIN organisations UNOCYPP and AACH, working with Nestlé and Armajaro 
respectively. Whereas traditionally these peasants work with native ‘criollo’ varieties of 
coffee and cacao, locally adapted to the specific environmental conditions in which they are 
grown, those provided by TNEs are ‘improved’ varieties, more high yielding, but not locally 
adapted. They are more input demanding in terms of fertiliser and pesticide application, 
without which crop failure is a real possibility. In the event of TNEs reneging on their 
arrangements with producers, not only will heavily subsidised inputs no longer be available 
for now input dependent plant varieties, but the soil will also have become fertiliser 
dependent, making subsequent reconversion still more difficult both physically and in cost 
terms. As we saw earlier, some of FENOCIN’s cacao producers are part of a national, state-
supported drive to create a new market for Ecuador’s ‘cacao nacional’, and producers 
which enter into agreements with TNEs effectively end the possibility of being involved in 
this, as traditional varieties are supplanted for TNE provided ‘improved’ varieties. 
In the case that producer-TNE relations remain stable over time, productivity and quality 
improve, and in the long term peasants consolidate access to, and viable production on, the 
land, it would seem inevitable that growing dependence of peasants on the TNE’s they 
work with will increase over time. However, does this mean that increasing formal 
subsumption will eventually lead to the inevitable transition to real subsumption in the 
future as part of the historic development of capitalism (Vercellone, 2007)? CIOAC and 
FENOCINs’ historic and contemporary struggles for land and autonomy, and their desire to 
keep hold of land won and make a viable living from it, combined with the inherent risks of 
agricultural production and transnational capitals’ historic experiences with plantation 
production would seem to point to the conclusion that, while formal subsumption is likely 
to increase in both cases, full (real) subsumption is far more likely to occur in Ecuador than 
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in Mexico. Owing to the latter’s unique landed property relations, significant concentration 
of land has historically been blocked as a result of the agrarian reform processes (1917-
1992). As we saw with CIOAC’s coffee producers in Chiapas, peasant struggles ended 
plantation production in the north and southeast of the state, and with it peasants’ real 
subsumption to capital. The degree of formal subsumption may now be increasing in cases 
of TNE-producer arrangements, but even with the 1992 agrarian counter-reform law, 
significant institutional obstacles remain for capital’s ability to concentrate land, and 
therefore fully subsume producers.  
In the case of Ecuador, the predominance of private property relations would appear to 
make the possibility of a transition to full subsumption - and the complete loss of autonomy 
- more probable as existing processes of capitalist development and class differentiation in 
the banana sector demonstrate. As Striffler’s (2002) study of agrarian restructuring on the 
Ecuadorian coast over the course of the 20th Century shows, transnational capital bought 
up great swathes of productive land to set up banana plantations, dispossessing (and fully 
subsuming the labour process of) the region’s peasants, only to later be forced to leave 
direct production as a result of popular struggles, political turmoil and crop failures. Control 
of the land was once again returned to peasants as part of the 1964-1972 land reform 
process, while transnational capital restructured its operations in the territory on the basis 
of contract farming. With little or no state support for land reform beneficiaries and 
without the institutional protection afforded to Mexican coffee growers through the social 
property system, national rather than international capital began buying up coastal land for 
intensive banana production on the basis of contractual arrangements with transnational 
banana companies. Plantation production that fully subsumed the labour process in the 
region was briefly substituted for peasant production, the labour process of which was only 
formally subsumed to capital; the peasantry exercised a degree of control of the labour 
process impossible to conceive of under plantation production, even if this labour process 
was significantly shaped by the need to produce bananas for sale to transnational buyers in 
order to survive and remain on the land. A transition to real subsumption subsequently 
followed as the majority of land reform beneficiaries were forced to sell their plots and 
work as wage labourers on expanding highly-capitalised export plantations. In the case of 
contemporary TNE-producer relations in the cacao sector it is foreseeable that those 
unwilling or unable to enter such agreements and/or improve production will be left unable 
to compete with TNE financed growers and eventually forced to leave the land. 
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On the basis of the very different landed property relations between Mexico and Ecuador, 
FENOCIN’s cacao producers are therefore more exposed to processes of dispossession and 
class differentiation than CIOAC’s coffee growers as a result of TNE direct intervention in 
production among selected peasant groups in coastal Ecuador, within the global dynamic of 
increasing quality requirements for Arabica coffee and shade grown cacao. UROCAL, one of 
FENOCIN’s biggest coastal organisations, has already been experiencing a process of 
internal class differentiation since its formation. This accelerated following the 1983 El Niño 
event as production collapsed and members began to default on the government loans 
they had taken out to buy their plots. Conflicts ensued between the organisation and its 
members as many were forced off their land. As a result, the organisations’ more successful 
producers, which now dominate the decision making structures of UROCAL, were able to 
buy more land and expand banana production for foreign markets. This process of internal 
class differentiation, with the dispossession of increasingly unviable members by larger, 
more successful ones, continues to this day. The majority of UROCAL’s small producers 
dedicate their land mainly to cacao, unable to produce more capital intensive bananas. 
However, within this group of cacao producers, the growing need to invest in improved 
production for quality is again likely to stimulate processes of internal differentiation. 
Presently UROCAL’s members are attempting to do this through the cooperative, with state 
subsidised credits and technical assistance to do so now an option as of May 2013. 
Ecuador’s National Development Bank, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
now offers producers individually based credits of $15,000 maximum per producer at a rate 
of interest of 5% with negotiated repayment periods. However, TNEs are offering to 
provide producers with all the necessary inputs to improve production at no cost, and a 
guaranteed market where prices match those on the New York Stock Exchange. Whether 
UROCAL’s cacao cooperative can sustain itself in the long run in the context of various 
transnational exporters pushing to attract producers into direct relationships with them 
under terms in which peasants do not become indebted is yet to be seen. The loss of 
organisational autonomy, relative control over the labour process, and the potential to 
move into more value-added markets may seem attractive for many producers if this 
means they can increase household incomes derived from production, and augment their 
hold on the land as a result. On the other hand, Mexico’s system of ejidal and community 
land tenure means CIOAC’s peasants are generally more protected from forces of 
dispossession and class differentiation than those of FENOCIN. Mexican coffee producers 
unable to improve quality will be forced to seek another cash crop, depend more on 
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subsistence production, or increase integration into labour markets, but the risk of losing 
their land is much lower than that experienced by FENOCIN’s cacao growers.  
Contrary to the hopes of many CIOAC and FENOCIN members to use TNEs as a stepping 
stone to improve production and then end relations with them in order to seek out their 
own direct buyers in the North and subsequently begin processing their primary materials 
to add value, it is far more probable that producers will become locked into arrangements 
with TNEs that become increasingly difficult to leave as production is gradually tailored to 
the requirements of capital. If producers terminate the relationship their certifications will 
be revoked, production support withdrawn (plants, inputs, technicians etc.) and they will be 
forced to return to selling their products on conventional markets controlled by TNE 
financed intermediaries. Even well established producer cooperatives that have begun 
selectively selling surplus coffee and cacao to TNEs that they cannot sell into certified 
markets, and that do not receive plants, inputs or technical assistance from them, are 
threatened by the mere presence of these companies in their regions. They have seen their 
members either leave to sell directly to TNEs or only fulfil the organisations’ minimum 
quotas, selling the rest at a higher price to exporters. 
‘TRANSMAR pays more than us. It does so to eliminate intermediaries, but also 
to break the organisations. They pay the stock exchange price and we can’t 
compete with that - we have office, technician and technical assistance related 
expenses...Now we have around 300 members; around 30 have left (since 2010 
when TNEs began working directly with producers), and some (remaining) 
members sell part of their production to the companies, but we don’t know 
how many.  
(Me) Given the competition will APOVIN (Organic Producer Association of 
Vinces) be able to continue as the transnationals operating in the canton 
attempt to attract more producers?  
It’s difficult. For example, Olam is now paying above market prices due to inter-
company competition; Nestlé, Armajaro, TRANSMAR and Olam all now have 
presence in the region.’ Julio Cerezo, founder and head of APOVIN cacao 
cooperative (22 April 2013, Vinces, Los Ríos). 
Many cooperative members feel strongly about supporting the very producer associations 
that they themselves set up and run, and value the economic and extra-economic benefits 
these associations bring. These typically include retaining greater autonomy in the form of 
control over production decisions and the labour process relative to TNE influenced 
production units, the fostering of a sense of community through various social 
development projects many cooperatives are involved with beyond their crop focus, the 
hope of moving beyond production to value added processing activities, and political 
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representation locally and nationally through their incorporation in national level 
organisations like CIOAC and FENOCIN. However, the sustained presence of TNEs in regions 
where cooperatives operate, especially given that they often pay above the prices the latter 
can offer their members, is likely to significantly weaken, and even break, many 
independent producer associations in the near future. Most of their members face a 
difficult struggle for survival and, despite genuine concern for the success of their 
associations, are likely to be forced to sell to TNEs in bad years, or enter into direct relations 
with them, due to economic necessity. TNE focus on quality improvement through selective 
direct intervention in the productive process on peasant plots not only brings with it the 
benefits and potential risks already discussed. It is also likely to impact on producers unable 
or unwilling to enter into similar agreements. With markets for both CIOAC and FENOCIN 
producers’ coffee and cacao increasingly quality rather than certification driven, those 
unable to improve quality are likely to be further marginalised and at increased risk of 
dispossession and/or dependence on subsistence production and wage labour to meet 
household reproduction requirements. Processes of class differentiation seem inevitable.  
TNEs’ quality drive is an international strategy not limited to just Mexico and Ecuador, and 
represents an effort to further differentiate high and low end markets for coffee and cacao. 
In the case of coffee, high-yielding, sun grown mono-cropping of robusta varieties on large, 
mechanised holdings is internationally the predominant form of production for coffee that 
makes instant blends and is typically grown on capital intensive production units. Arabica 
varieties, on the other hand, like those grown by CIOAC members, are typically shade-
grown, dominated by peasant production, and used to make high quality coffees. Already 
some of the poorest quality Arabica grown in Mexico is bought by TNEs (via the 
intermediaries they finance) at very low prices and combined with robustas to make instant 
coffee. The likelihood is that peasants unable to improve their production will be forced 
further into low price markets as Arabica quality increases internationally, further reducing 
the share of household income derived from coffee. In an interview with the head of AMSA 
in Chiapas I was told that, in the future, the majority of the state’s Arabica coffee will no 
longer reach export-quality as quality increases internationally while Mexican coffee quality 
continues to fall or stagnate due to aging plants, lack of investment in the sector and a 
general lack of basic crop maintenance on many peasant holdings for reasons explored 
above. It will therefore be blended into cheap instant varieties for national consumption. 
This same international process is at work in the cacao sector too, as sun-grown, high 
yielding CCN cacao predominantly under mechanised production on large holdings is used 
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to make lower grade chocolate, while high quality, adapted varieties under peasant 
production are typically used to make high quality chocolate. Again, FENOCIN’s producers 
unable or unwilling to improve the quality of their production face being forced to sell their 
cacao for lower prices for the elaboration of relatively low quality chocolate. 
 
3.12 Concluding Comments 
This chapter has argued that contemporary peasant struggles in southeast Mexico and 
coastal Ecuador are struggles for land as the basis of autonomy. Access to land provides 
CIOAC and FENOCIN’s peasants with the ability to shape their own production and 
reproduction strategies in ways ruled out for capitalist enterprises and fully proletarianised 
wage labourers. A degree of autonomy from primary commodity (cash and consumption 
crop) markets and the labour market is highly valued by these peasants. Historical 
experiences as indentured hacienda workers, and more recent employment in increasingly 
oppressive, insecure and poorly remunerated labour markets have contributed to struggles 
of these peasants to retain control over their own labour, and the fruits of that labour. 
Under neoliberal globalisation, coffee and cacao prices received by CIOAC and FENOCIN’s 
peasants have fallen in real terms and become highly volatile. Increased dependence on 
subsistence production and/or wage labour has been the response, as these peasants have 
been able to shift household labour between these three activities (cash-crop/subsistence 
production/wage labour) in response to prevailing market conditions. However, struggles 
for autonomy within commodity markets - in the form of FT, organic and other certification 
based schemes - have also developed as peasants attempt to shape not only the level, but 
also the form, of their commodity market integration. 
Demands for support for peasant agriculture are based on securing  access to, and viability 
of, land itself (the basis of that autonomy), control over household productive decisions and 
the labour process (the exercise of autonomy) and freedom from dependence on the 
alienating experiences of the labour market (complete loss of autonomy). While CIOAC and 
FENOCIN’s members may be forced to depend on the capitalist market which subsumes 
them for their reproduction, it is important to recognise that they still retain a degree of 
autonomy from the market that allows them to make decisions regarding production and 
survival ruled out for capitalists and fully-proletarianised wage labourers. They 
demonstrate logic of production based on securing continued access to land as the nucleus 
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around which relative independence from the vicissitudes and proletarianising forces of 
commodity and labour markets can be retained and exercised. This is not a logic based on 
profit maximisation but on maximising long-term access to, and viability of, land through 
making decisions regarding production and family labour use that minimise risks of losing 
or being forced from their land. Many peasants leave their homes to work and send 
remittances to subsidise unprofitable household plots, not so much because of a desire to 
preserve peasant tradition, but as part of a strategy to retain the land as a means of 
reducing their vulnerability to neoliberal globalisation and creating a relatively autonomous 
space from the imperatives of the market to practice and protect their own social 
structures and lifestyles (Barkin, 2002: 83).  Confusion as to why peasants with land tend to 
reject labour organising efforts, or decide not to convert subsistence cultivation to 
apparently much more lucrative cash crop production, result if this logic - with the 
maintenance of the household production unit as the peasant nucleus at its core - is not 
appreciated or understood.  
The discourses and practice of food sovereignty must not only incorporate, but be built 
upon, peasant struggles for autonomy. However, the VC currently under-represent the 
needs of cash crops producers with its ambiguous stance towards international trade, thus 
marginalising what could be a significant social force in struggles to reverse neoliberal rural 
policies. The food sovereignty movement must do much more to address the issues 
discussed above facing peasant cash crop producers if its political and ideological project to 
transform the neoliberal food regime is to unify the diverse subaltern rural classes currently 
experiencing unprecedented forces of immiseration and proletarianisation. 
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Chapter 4. Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony, and the 
Politics of Food Sovereignty. 
 
The Via Campesina presents the food sovereignty movement as a counter-hegemonic 
‘movement of movements’ attempting to radically transform the neoliberal food regime in 
favour of environmentally sustainable and democratically operated production systems. In 
Gramsci’s terms it is attempting to forge a new political organisation, a ‘modern 
transnational prince’, which aims to expand across the entire social formation as a new 
organisation of social and political relations (Thomas, 2013: 30). The discourse of food 
sovereignty emanating from the Via Campesina and the analysts, activists and academics 
that promote and defend it, articulate a radical alternative to neoliberalism. However, 
counter-hegemonic discourse is not synonymous with counter-hegemonic practice. This 
chapter will interrogate the transformative potential of the food sovereignty movement as 
a political project struggling to replace the neoliberal food regime with environmentally 
sustainable and democratically operated production systems. It will examine the extent to 
which the national peasant movements of Mexico and Ecuador, CIOAC and FENOCIN in 
particular, may or may not be considered as counter-hegemonic forces that challenge the 
political foundations of the current food regime. It will argue that the relationship between 
peasant movements and the state is central in shaping counter-hegemonic struggles. 
Analysis will focus on how peasant organisation structures, specifically the class bases, 
leadership, and modes of representation and interaction between the two, are central to 
determining not only the relative success of peasant movement struggles, but also the 
extent to which these struggles are, in practice, counter-hegemonic. It will also show how 
and why a counter-hegemonic discourse of food sovereignty is employed and adapted in 
response to changing political circumstances as an important political tool, even if no 
concrete organisational policies are in place to put food sovereignty into practice. 
 
Focus on the structures and internal dynamics of organisations demanding counter-
hegemonic transformation of society is essential not only for understanding the nature, 
origins and forms of expression of such demands, but also the potential of these 
organisations to actually contest the state and transform the existing neoliberal order. 
Much has been written on food sovereignty as an alternative model of food and agriculture 
(Rosset, 2011; Martinez-Torres & Rosset, 2012; Holt-Gimenez & Shattuck, 2011), the 
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contradictions within its own discourses (Patel, 2009; Agarwal, 2014), and challenges 
relating to its practical application (Edelman, 2014; Burnett & Murphy, 2014). However, 
relatively little attention has been given to the ways in which peasant organisations use the 
discourse of food sovereignty as a political tool in their engagements with the state. As 
McKay et al (2014: 1177) argue, ‘food sovereignty cannot be conceived of as a finite 
outcome; it is a political space and terrain of struggle around control over food systems’. As 
we will see, different peasant organisations use their membership of the VC, and its 
powerful food sovereignty discourse, for very different purposes. In Mexico, CIOAC and 
other VC members have been neutralised as potential counter-hegemonic threats since the 
early 1990s by the state and its clientelist policies. Their functional dependence on the state 
has encouraged the use of the discourse of food sovereignty completely decoupled from 
any form of its practice; rather than transformation of the neoliberal food system, the 
discourse is invoked as a political tool aimed at defending and increasing the organisation’s 
access to palliative state resources. However, within the restrictive conditions of neo-
corporatism the use of the food sovereignty discourse is still very useful politically. It has 
acted as a powerful political tool that has prevented the Mexican state from completely 
abandoning the peasant sector even if rural organisations have taken no concrete steps to 
put food sovereignty into practice. In contrast, Ecuador’s peasant movement - historically 
far more politically autonomous vis-à-vis the state compared to its Mexican counterpart - 
has combined a food sovereignty discourse with diverse and sustained actions for its 
practical implementation, culminating the inclusion of food sovereignty in the National 
Constitution. However, the alliance made between peasant organisations and Correa from 
2006, FENOCIN in particular, has distanced organisational leadership from its bases and 
weakened its counter-hegemonic potential in the face of Correa’s backtracking on promises 
to implement food sovereignty. As peasant leaders lost contact with their bases, Correa’s 
project reached down to rural communities, gaining widespread support not only for his 
presidency but also his own definitions of food sovereignty which are far removed from 
those proposed by the national peasant movement. Nevertheless, constitutional articles 
pertaining to food sovereignty, written by the national peasant movement, are used by the 
latter as a basis for critiquing Correa’s rural policies and holding him to account - a powerful 
political tool now that food sovereignty is enshrined in the nation’s constitution.  
The following section will begin by elaborating what is meant by ‘the state’ in the course of 
this chapter and outlining Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony with 
reference to contemporary peasant organisations. The second section will look at how the 
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debt crisis across Latin America led to a crisis of legitimacy (hegemony) for the state in 
Mexico and Ecuador, reconfiguring state-peasant movement relations under neoliberalism. 
Following from this will be an examination of how the class bases, leadership, and modes of 
representation and interaction between the two within peasant organisations have shaped, 
and continue to shape, contemporary state-peasant movement relations in Mexico and 
Ecuador. It will discuss how this affects the counter-hegemonic force of the food 
sovereignty movement in the neoliberal era and the use of the discourse of food 
sovereignty as a political strategy in engagements with the state.  
 
 
4.1 The State and Hegemony 
 
Gramsci (2007: 12) defines hegemony as ‘the “spontaneous” consent given by the great 
masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant 
fundamental group’. A dominant class secures hegemony not by forcefully repressing 
antagonistic classes, but by developing ‘universalist’ discourses and institutions that 
attempt to project the state and the class-based interests that it defends and promotes as 
the ‘natural’ order of things that work in the interests of society at large. The state, 
designed to create favourable conditions for the ruling class’ expansion, can only foster 
consent for this role if ‘the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general 
interests of the subordinate groups’ (Ibid: 182). In order to do so, it must balance 
legitimating itself to subaltern groups with the need to promote the interests of the 
dominant classes which cannot be applied narrowly and directly owing to the need for the 
former. The necessary fiction that the state transcends class distinctions can only remain 
credible if concessions are made to meet the most pressing needs, and accommodate some 
of the aspirations of, the dominated and exploited classes (Buttigieg, 1995: 13).  
 
Dominant classes can only maintain their hegemony through the formation of a ‘historic 
bloc’, an agglomeration of leading social forces within a specific national context which 
establish a relationship over contending social forces (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 90). However, 
hegemony is not simply a one-way, top-down process of domination accompanied by the 
uncontested creation of consent, but rather an ongoing political process at all levels in 
which power is legitimated, contested and redefined (Mallon, 1994: 70). Hegemony cannot 
be reproduced without the constant, though partial, incorporation of counter-hegemony 
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(Ibid: 71) in the form of concessions to subaltern groups which legitimate hegemonic rule, 
but crucially without threatening the material basis of this rule - the model of capitalist 
accumulation upon which this bloc depends, at present neoliberal capitalism.  
 
Fox’s (1993: 30) analysis of the state focuses more specifically on the balancing of the 
interests of the ruling classes with the societal consent necessary for the former to be met 
in the long-term. Accordingly, analysis needs to be based on two fundamentals of state rule 
in capitalist society; the continuation of private capital accumulation - the material basis of 
the ruling class’ power, reproduction and hegemony - and the preservation of some 
historically conditioned minimum of political legitimacy to achieve relative societal consent 
for state rule. The constitution and reproduction of the (capitalist) state is dependent on 
capital accumulation and so the state must create, develop and foster suitable conditions 
to promote such accumulation within its territory. The fact that work is organised on a 
capitalist basis means that what the state does and can do is limited and shaped by the 
need to maintain this system of capitalist organisation of which it is a part (Holloway, 2005: 
13). However, being a capitalist state - founded and reproduced on the basis of capitalist 
social relations - it is therefore a class state in which power is concentrated on the basis of 
class relations (Poulantzas, 1980: 44). The state must therefore organise and reproduce 
class hegemony by establishing compromises between the dominant and dominated 
classes that may involve certain short term material sacrifices for the dominant classes in 
order that their long-term domination be reproduced. Through certain concessions to the 
dominated classes, the dominant classes continually strive to retain and expand their 
hegemony in civil society by legitimating themselves, the capitalist state itself, and the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations as a whole (Ibid: 184-185). 
Shifts in the balance of power within civil society between different social classes and 
groups shape the state and its policies in terms of the relative importance attributed to 
accumulation and legitimation and how this is exercised and expressed. Social organisations 
such as CIOAC and FENOCIN attempt to wrest concessions from and shape the state and its 
policies/institutions through its apparatus of legitimation. As a form of capitalist social 
relations, the state’s very existence depends on the reproduction of those relations. 
However, the relation between the state and the reproduction of capital is a complex one 
and it cannot be assumed that everything that the state does will necessarily be in the best 
interests of capital (Holloway, 1994: 28). As we will see in the cases of Mexico and Ecuador, 
historical pressures from above and below that have threatened the long term viability of 
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accumulation have been accompanied by reconfigurations of the apparatuses of both 
accumulation and legitimation in an attempt to secure the long term conditions for the 
former. Although both countries’ peasant movements have been able to wrest significant 
concessions from their respective national states through mass organising, mobilisation and 
pressure from within the state apparatus, they have been unable to construct a significant 
and sustained challenge to state hegemony. This, as we will see, has been the result of the 
articulation between state strategies to neutralise counter-hegemony and specific 
organisational structures of peasant organisations - their class bases, forms of leadership 
and the modes of interaction between the two - that fundamentally shape the struggle for 
hegemony. 
To bring about the transformation of the neoliberal food regime requires a shift in the 
balance of societal forces, a shift which necessarily requires the political strengthening of 
‘autonomous’ peasant organisations such as CIOAC and FENOCIN vis-à-vis those forces 
currently reproducing the neoliberal food regime; transnational capital as the dominant 
strata of the global political economy and neoliberal states and their policies and ideologies 
that reproduce the neoliberal world order.  The question therefore arises as to how 
hegemony can and is contested by subaltern groups, and what factors shape the relative 
success of peasant struggles against the state. This chapter will argue that the articulation 
between a state’s hegemonic project and the internal structures of organisations that 
oppose it are critical to engaging with this question. 
 
4.2 Neoliberal Transition and State-Peasant Movement 
Relations in Mexico and Ecuador 
In Mexico and Ecuador the debt crisis and the implementation of SAPs led to a legitimacy 
crisis; the concessions made to subaltern groups during the developmentalist era in both 
countries had taken the form predominantly of channelling resources from the federal 
state to a subaltern clientele base (Ecuador) or corporatised sectors of the working class 
and peasantry (Mexico). The debt crisis placed severe constraints on the continuation of 
this system of managing social order, forcing the state to reconfigure its legitimising 
apparatus in order to retain its hegemony in the context of reduced federal funds, 
international financial institution (IFI) pressures to cut back on social spending, and 
mounting pressures both from above (Western liberal democracies) and below (national 
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popular movements) for increased democratisation (Postero & Zamosc, 2004; 10). The 
result in Mexico and Ecuador was the need to radically transform the state’s legitimation 
apparatus and practices in a way that was cheaper but no less effective than that based on 
the state as driver of ‘development’. Concessions ceded to subaltern groups changed in 
nature and form, as did the relationship between the state and the peasantry to deliver 
them. The reconfiguration of this relationship differed significantly depending on national 
contexts; however, across the region’s rural areas one of the generalised and fundamental 
changes that took place following democratic opening was the legitimacy conferred on 
independent peasant organisations by the state, their developing role as official 
interlocutors between their members and state institutions as well as administrators of 
state and externally financed ‘development’ projects, and their integration into the formal 
political system via alliances with political parties with which they sought to contest 
positions of political power through the liberalised electoral system. This fundamentally 
changed the nature of peasant organisation struggles and their counter-hegemonic 
potential. 
Democratic opening provided a new basis on which to accommodate subaltern interests in 
an attempt to re-legitimise the state to subaltern classes as it restructured its role in capital 
accumulation through the implementation of neoliberal policies. Relative ‘consent’ was 
achieved through disseminating a discourse among subaltern groups that their needs could 
be met through engagement with the state, not opposition towards it. However, the ability 
of subaltern groups to continue to contest neoliberal policies following their increasing 
articulation with the state and incorporation into its institutional (and ideological) 
apparatus was challenged following democratic opening. As we will see, the meaning, 
practice and scope of organisational political autonomy has become blurred and 
increasingly challenged through engagement with the state whose central function remains 
the promotion of capital accumulation and not the promotion of sustainable peasant 
agriculture and human wellbeing at the heart of the concept of food sovereignty.  
Mexico’s 1992 and Ecuador’s 1994 agrarian counter-reform laws were watershed moments 
in both countries’ transition to neoliberalism. They officially terminated the state’s 
responsibility for agrarian reform, a responsibility that had always been contingent on the 
constellation of social forces at different historical conjunctures and the ability of subaltern 
groups to force the state to fulfil its promises to redistribute land and provide services to 
the peasantry. In Mexico, rural social movements mobilised against the law and the drastic 
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cut back and elimination of rural credit programmes, agricultural subsidies and rural 
extension services - ongoing since the 1980s - that the law would only accelerate. The 
transformation of the accumulation model would require the state to radically reconfigure 
its legitimation apparatus as the law represented an outright rejection of the principles of 
the revolution that, for 70 years previous, had guided the rhetoric and ideology - if not the 
practice - of PRI hegemony. As in Mexico, Ecuador’s 1994 Agrarian Development Law 
officially ended the state’s responsibility to land reform. Unlike Mexico, Ecuador’s land 
reform had failed to resolve the massive concentration of land, power and wealth in the 
countryside and the immediate aftermath of the law’s promulgation there was heightened 
class conflict over land (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2005: 142). In both cases, the internal 
structures of the organisations contesting the laws’ implementation significantly shaped 
how they were contested and the state’s response to organised resistance. 
By the late 1980s state owned enterprises (SOEs) servicing the Mexican peasantry had 
come under increasing criticism from newly formed autonomous peasant organisations 
that had emerged and consolidated around a land-holding membership. Most were 
originally ejidal unions formed by the state over the developmentalist era with the aim of 
controlling ejidal production and marketing (Hernández, 1992: 57). During the initial phases 
of state withdrawal from the peasant sector these regional organisations began to seek the 
consolidation of peasant autonomous participation in their production units and economic 
management of their enterprises, namely through the modification of heavy state 
intervention in the ejidal sector (de la Fuente & Mackinlay, 1995: 2). In contrast to 
organisations like CIOAC that were founded on the land struggle, these new organisations 
sought a new type of relationship with the state based on consensus, support, negotiation, 
and peaceful conflict resolution (Ibid: 3). In 1985, 24 such organisations came together 
nationally to form UNORCA (National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organisations) 
whose central concerns regarded productive issues, appropriation of ejidal surpluses, and 
land tenure formalisation (Ibid: 4).  
UNORCA sought to radically transform the relationship between the state and the 
peasantry. Rather than ‘independence’ from the state, UNORCA proposed a relationship 
based on ‘autonomy’. It proposed state support for the peasant sector without, however, 
state intervention in ejidal production, storage and marketing that had characterised the 
relationship over the developmentalist era and typified the Mexican state’s rural 
corporatism through the CNC, still the most powerful peasant organisation nationally. 
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Through autonomous, democratic control of production and marketing UNORCA argued 
that the ejidal sector could be more competitive than the capitalist sector. The struggle for 
autonomy therefore necessarily involved the struggle for a new development model and 
the reform of the state (Moguel, 1992: 22)13.  
In 1989 ‘The Permanent Agrarian Congress’ (CAP) was formed - a UNORCA initiative to 
unite the peasantry in a new agrarian movement in which UNORCA’s core demands would 
predominate. From the mid-1980s, the UNORCA-led autonomous movement had been 
gaining strength as a counter-hegemonic force. Democratic, autonomous peasant control 
of production replaced land as the principle object of the national peasant movement’s 
demands and UNORCA’s discourse began to articulate a coherent ideology and strategy to 
represent and unite landed producers around production in a way that the ‘independent’ 
peasant movement until that point had failed to do (Hernández, 1992: 57). The majority of 
Mexico’s national peasant organisations, including CIOAC, joined the CAP marking a 
significant moment in CIOAC’s history; up until that point its central focus of struggle had 
been for land but by 1989 the composition of its mass base was already dominated by 
smallholders as a result of the organisation’s own struggles. Like FENOCIN in Ecuador, 
CIOAC had failed to adapt sufficiently to its changing class composition. The CAP provided 
not only the means for CIOAC to articulate emerging landed demands and refocus its 
struggles to reflect the new needs of its mass base; it also radically changed the nature of 
how these demands were presented to, and negotiated with, the state. From being an 
organisation built in opposition to the state and whose demands were based primarily on 
confrontation, land invasions and negotiations backed up by mobilisation, the CAP opened 
up official channels to state resources. 
Following Salinas’ highly controversial election ‘victory’, the institutionalisation of the CAP 
formed one aspect of Salinas’ neo-corporatist strategy in the countryside aimed at 
cementing the legitimacy of a regime lacking the consent of wide sectors of civil society. 
The president also attempted to strengthen support for his regime by forging direct links 
between himself and rural communities, a strategy that, more recently, Rafael Correa has 
implemented in Ecuador as we will see below. Through the National Solidarity Programme 
(PRONASOL), Mexico’s clientelist culture became more direct and paternalistic as resources 
of a number of similar state departments were concentrated in the hands of the president. 
                                                          
13 From the 1980s onwards ‘autonomy’ became the cry of unity between opposition and popular-democratic 
organisations, conceived of as rejection of political subordination but also social and economic self-
administration of peasant and cooperative production (Bartra and Otero, 2008: 409). 
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Salinas set up municipal solidarity committees for distributing PRONASOL funds that 
became the major rural aid channel of the neoliberal era and a powerful vote buying tool 
(Bartra, 1996: 174).  PRONASOL and the institutionalisation the CAP presented an 
opportunity for the complete reconfiguration the Mexican state’s apparatus of hegemony 
while simultaneously neutralising any potential counter-hegemonic threat from below that 
may have emerged had the UNORCA inspired movement been left to develop 
autonomously from the state. By the late-1980s the relation of political forces between the 
state and the peasant movement had moved increasingly in favour of the latter, and 
represented a growing challenge to the state’s attempt to abandon the peasantry to the 
increasingly liberalised world market. However, through engagement with the peasant 
movement’s demands Salinas was able to restructure corporatist relations in the 
countryside (Hernández, 1992: 69). Seemingly conversely, it was through selective 
engagement with UNORCA’s suggestions that Salinas consolidated the neoliberal regime by 
partially incorporating counter-hegemony into the hegemonic project - a necessary process 
for the production and reproduction of popular consent, directed by the dominant bloc, 
required for the ongoing legitimation of class rule (Mallon, 1994: 71; Hunt, 1990: 310).  
The state’s partial incorporation of counter-hegemony took the form of ‘democratic 
opening’ that created spaces of dialogue and access to state resources for peasant 
organisations, and a complete overhaul of state policy for the peasant sector from an 
emphasis on production to one of managing the social and political consequences of 
neoliberal transition. Salinas appropriated UNORCA’s discourse, took up its criticisms, and 
institutionalised the CAP not simply as an official response to growing subaltern pressure 
but as a strategy of reconfiguring the state’s apparatus of legitimation; the corporatist 
model. This would serve the PRI in two important ways. Firstly, the state could reshape the 
rural development paradigm away from agrarian reform in preparation for its termination 
in 1992 by fostering a consensus, based on UNORCA’s proposals, that rural development 
was no longer a question of land (re)distribution, but of improving ejidal production, 
marketing and appropriation of economic surpluses. Secondly, an institutionalised CAP 
allowed the state to co-opt and subsume formerly independent peasant organisations 
demanding radical structural changes that could potentially threaten Salinas’ neoliberal 
project. It attempted to not only draw a line under the land reform process but also 
reconfigure the ways in which peasant organisations conceived of, and organised to bring 
about, social change. 
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The initial optimism that CAP members could successfully represent their members through 
a new relationship with the state based on dialogue and proposal over confrontation and 
protest became increasingly frustrated as Salinas’ regime consolidated. Organisational 
autonomy to self-manage dismantled SOEs and their own cooperatives were not supported 
by training, credit and resources. By 1991 the economic and political stability of the regime 
had been secured, peasant run projects lost the initiative, and policy geared toward the 
private sector had gained weight (Mackinlay, 2004: 136). Despite the CAP’s initial strength 
it could not escape the corporatist political relations in which the state used its power to 
divide organisations and co-opt, or at least neutralise, leaders of the rural sector. CAP 
organisations were increasingly funded by, and eventually subordinated to, the state as this 
‘neo-corporatist’ model developed (Ibid: 138). Having set out as a counter-hegemonic 
force, the CAP ended up acting as a moderating influence on the peasantry and reduced 
mobilisation and confrontation (de la Fuente & Mackinlay, 1995: 6). As we will see in the 
next section, it was unable to contest the state’s failure to support the peasant sector as 
promised largely as a result of the way in which the relationships between the state and the 
‘autonomous’ peasant movement had been institutionalised.  
In Ecuador, the end of military rule in 1979 coincided with the country’s critical level of 
indebtedness. The state significantly withdrew from direct intervention in the economy and 
the 1994 Agrarian Development Law institutionalised the core foundation of neoliberalism 
in the countryside - the creation of a land market and the pre-conditions for the 
universalisation of landed private property. The general thrust of the law, and of Ecuador’s 
neoliberal transition in the countryside in general, was similar to Mexico. However, unlike 
Mexico, the Ecuadorian state needed to reconfigure the apparatus of legitimation in the 
context of the yet unresolved issue of the continuing massive concentration of land and 
wealth in the countryside. As in Mexico the peasantry would have no further productive 
role in the Ecuadorian economy, but the social and political consequences of its 
disintegration had to be managed. Whereas the Mexican state directly co-opted 
autonomous peasant organisations and reconstructed its hegemony on the basis of neo-
corporatist relations founded on access to state social projects, the Ecuadorian state 
withdrew from the peasant sector and the void was filled with a proliferation of foreign 
funded NGOs14, international development agencies and foreign foundations at the same 
time that the country’s political system was also liberalised. Unlike Mexico, however, this 
                                                          
14 See Breton 2008 for more in depth analysis of NGO proliferation and deradicalisation of class struggle in 
Ecuador in the neoliberal era. 
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strategy did not achieve relative societal consent for the neoliberal accumulation model as 
evidenced by widespread social protests and popular uprisings that overthrew two 
presidents over the course of the 1980s and into the 2000s.  
The first national indigenous uprising took place in June 1990 in response primarily to 
deteriorating economic conditions, especially in the Andean countryside. It was led by 
CONAIE (The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) in the Sierra and 
involved tens of thousands of indigenous protestors, including FENOCIN organisations, 
blocking roads and mass marching in regional capitals. The protest was called off when 
president Borja agreed to open dialogue with indigenous protestors on the issues raised by 
CONAIE; namely the economic situation and land conflicts (Zamosc, 1994: 38). However, 
the government’s response failed to resolve the demands of the indigenous peasantry and 
CONIAE convoked the second national indigenous uprising in June 1994 as a response to 
the implementation of Ecuador’s agrarian counter-reform law that same year. Again, 
FENOCIN participated. According to Guerrero (1997: 86) the main achievement of the 1994 
uprising was the definitive legitimation of an indigenous discourse and a form of 
representation with the state. Unlike the 1990 uprising which had been called off following 
government promises to respond to demands, the 1994 event demanded dialogue with the 
government regarding the counter-reform law in an attempt to ensure that the 
government could not renege on its promises. This dialogue, protracted over the course of 
one month, was ultimately unsuccessful in terms of changing the law. However, it was 
hugely important in conferring state legitimacy on the indigenous movement and wider 
societal credibility to their demands (Martinez Valle, 2003: 89). In order to coordinate this 
dialogue rural organisations, led by CONAIE, united to form the ‘National Agrarian 
Coordinator’ (CAN). Like the CAP in Mexico on its formation, this grouping became the most 
important national space of convergence for organisations defending the survival of 
peasant farming, often in combination with indigenous rights over territory (Muñoz, 2010: 
151-152). 
The political emergence of indigeneity at the centre of a counter-hegemonic movement 
generated new forms of social and political participation within the context of the failure of 
representative democracy and political parties to adequately address the needs of the 
indigenous peasantry following SAP implementation. The opening of spaces of dialogue 
within the state apparatus represented a new form of direct representation for groups that 
had previously depended on political parties, mobilisations and confrontational tactics to 
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get their demands heard. Decision making positions within the state and political parties 
opened up for these organisations’ leaders who, in turn, moved from strategies based on 
protest and confrontation to tactics based on ‘critical engagement’ and proposal. However, 
as we will see in more detail below, the internal structures of Ecuador’s peasant 
organisations and the distinct state strategies to engage with them allowed the former to 
retain their political autonomy and continue to contest neoliberalism as a counter-
hegemonic force, unlike their Mexican counterparts.  
By the mid-1990s the indigenous-peasant movement had emerged as the major force for 
social change in Ecuador and represented a serious threat to the country’s political regime 
and the neoliberal model. It had won over many societal allies with an agenda that 
subsumed ethnic demands to the wider goal of challenging the neoliberal accumulation 
model. In 1997 it overthrew the presidency of Abdalá Bucaram, forced a constitutive 
assembly in 1998, and again overthrew the Mahuad government in 2000 for failure to 
tackle the economic crisis and indigenous/peasant impoverishment stemming from, in its 
view, the neoliberal model. However, the movement would end up being a victim of its 
own success and the political strategy it followed at the height of its power.  
The indigenous movement, FENOCIN included, supported the presidential campaign of 
former general Lucio Gutierrez in the run up to the 2002 national elections. His platform of 
reversing neoliberal policies and tackling corruption led him to the presidency and for the 
first time the Ecuadorian social movement had the possibility of participating in 
government (Davalos, 2003: 5). Gutierrez’s electoral victory was viewed as a victory for the 
Left and greeted with a sense of optimism across the region - it seemed that the neoliberal 
agenda across Latin American could be effectively challenged from below (Petras & 
Veltmeyer, 2005: 136). However, his electoral campaign was not based on any specific 
programmatic plan or ideology. He used the support of the social movements to rise to 
power and then reneged on the promises he had made to reverse neoliberal policies and 
support movement initiatives and proposals. Two CONAIE leaders were appointed to 
government office and other prominent members of the same organisation were given 
various public posts. Gutierrez also channelled state resources to indigenous-peasant 
organisations, including FENOCIN, but their decision making capacity was severely 
constrained by the administration’s general policy and power structure. Contrary to its 
rhetoric, Gutierrez privileged IMF and other IFI ‘obligations’ over a policy of productive 
national investment to reactivate the economy. In response to this perceived betrayal, 
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FENOCIN and CONAIE withdrew their support from government after just six months in 
office and the latter resigned from all government posts (Ibid: 158). Contrary to the 
movement’s beliefs and similar to the experience of CIOAC and the CAP in Mexico, 
incorporation into the state’s hegemonic apparatus in an attempt to influence state policy 
from within had not only failed to bring about the desired changes; it had weakened the 
movement and its capacity to challenge the state and the neoliberal accumulation model 
that it was expanding and deepening. The indigenous movement’s alliance with Gutierrez 
had profound repercussions on the organisations that had supported him. It severely 
damaged their image as an ‘alternative’ political force (Lalander & Ospina, 2012: 20) and 
grassroots bases, the wider peasantry, and the general population blamed the indigenous 
movement for right wing policies (Davalos, 2006: 62). It was not until 2006 and the 
indigenous-peasant movement’s critical role in Correa’s rise to the presidency that it would 
once again represent a serious counter-hegemonic threat to the neoliberal order, although, 
as we will see, this threat has been heavily challenged by the very government it helped 
bring to power. 
 
4.3 The Food Sovereignty Movement in Mexico and Ecuador: 
A Counter-Hegemonic Movement? 
In order to asses both the counter-hegemonic potential of the food sovereignty movement 
in Mexico and Ecuador, and the use of food sovereignty discourse as a political strategy, the 
relationship between the state and peasant movements must be analysed. To do so, the 
structures of CIOAC and FENOCIN will be examined on the basis of the compositions and 
interests of the mass bases of both organisations, their leaderships, and the modes of 
interaction and representation between these elements. This corresponds to Gramsci’s 
(2007: 152) model for the modern Prince in which, he states, three fundamental elements 
must converge for the creation and development of a counter-hegemonic force to lead the 
intellectual and moral reform of civil society as the basis for a new state and economic 
system; a) ‘a mass element’, the mass bases of CIOAC and FENOCIN in our case; b) ‘the 
principle cohesive element’, both organisations’ leaderships; and c) ‘an intermediate 
element which articulates the first element with the second and maintains contact between 
them physically, morally and intellectually’. This element will here refer to the modes of 
interaction between the leadership and the bases, i.e. accountability and forms of 
representation.  
187 
 
In their interactions with the state all three elements, and so too an organisations’ struggles 
and counter-hegemonic force, are continually re-shaped. We saw in chapter two how 
CIOAC and FENOCIN’s struggles for land reform reconfigured the class constellations of 
their mass bases. Of particular importance for the food sovereignty movement is the role of 
leaders in organising and shaping the demands and interests of their bases into a coherent 
and effective political strategy that is capable of bringing about the structural 
transformation of the neoliberal food regime. For CIOAC and FENOCIN, we saw in chapter 
three how the interests of their members in the present conjuncture are guided by 
struggles for autonomy from and within the market. Leaders, or ‘intellectuals’ in Gramsci’s 
terminology, are critical for constructing and framing counter-hegemonic ideology and 
guiding counter-hegemonic practice. Central to this, on the one side, is the strategy of the 
state in attempting to neutralise, bypass or selectively incorporate counter-hegemonic 
leaders into its own hegemonic project for the purpose of legitimation. On the other are 
the bases themselves and forms of representation and accountability between leaders and 
members which can either inhibit the state’s strategy through embedding leaders in their 
organisations (e.g. ‘popular democratic’ organisations [Otero, 2004a]), or encourage it if 
leaders and their decision making power are relatively autonomous from those they 
represent (i.e. more ‘authoritarian’ or hierarchical, organisations). 
The literature on the food sovereignty movement tends to assume that, in the words of 
Carroll & Ratner, (2010: 8) ‘contemporary social movements are, prima facia, agents of 
counter-hegemony in their organised dissent to the existing order’. According to McMichael 
(2008: 225), ‘the food sovereignty movement fundamentally challenges the institutional 
relations of neoliberal capitalism...paradoxically reproducing the peasantry as an 
‘unthinkable’ social force, as a condition of its emergence as a radical world-historical 
subject’. This claim tacitly assumes the existence and exercise of counter-hegemony as a 
precondition for transforming the existing neoliberal food regime, while failing to address 
the role of the institutions promoting this regime in shaping and constraining the political 
terrain on which peasant organisations operate and their capacity to retain and practice 
counter-hegemony. A focus on discourse alone, without an examination of organisational 
practices, can easily lead to the misrepresentation or overestimation of the food 
sovereignty movement’s counter-hegemonic potential. This highlights another problem 
symptomatic of not only the literature on food sovereignty but also that of social 
movements in general; a failure to critically examine the relationship between movement 
leaders and those they represent. As Edelman (1999: 185) points out, a relatively 
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unproblematic view is taken of how organising takes place, tending to assume high levels of 
agreement between aspirations of leaders and grassroots participants. Most scholars have 
accepted uncritically leaders’ downplaying of their own impact and their related efforts to 
represent movements as spontaneous expressions of popular discontent. A notable 
exception is Otero (2004a) whose theory of political class formation proposes that three 
key factors - regional cultures, state intervention and leadership types - mediate between 
class structural processes and political outcome in the political formation of class (the 
process by which groups, classes and communities define their demands, construct 
organisations to defend and promote their interests, and establish alliances with other 
organisations [Ibid: 41]). Despite the great deal of overlap between political class formation 
and the construction and exercise of counter-hegemony, the two are not necessarily 
synonymous. Instead, I will suggest that the construction and exercise of counter-
hegemony for Mexico and Ecuador’s food sovereignty movement is similarly shaped by 
state intervention, but also by the three internal elements to subaltern organisations 
suggested by Gramsci that must converge for the development of a counter-hegemonic 
force.  
 
 
4.4 Organisational Structures and Counter-Hegemony in 
Mexico’s Food Sovereignty Movement 
 
The institutionalisation of the CAP and the consolidation of Salinas’ regime in the 1990s saw 
the neo-corporatised peasant movement unable to prevent market-promoting public 
policies that forced the ruin of rural Mexico, the extension and deepening immiseration of 
the social sector and mass out-migration from the countryside to urban informal sectors 
both within Mexico and abroad, the US especially (Bartra, 2004: 23). The national peasant 
movement’s weakness was founded on its own organisational structures and the political 
culture in rural Mexico on which the state’s hegemonic strategy reconstructed itself to 
consolidate both itself and the neoliberal model. 
CIOAC is a peasant ‘central’ that mimics the hierarchical structures of the PRI’s corporatist 
organisations; community or ejido groups form local committees which are then grouped as 
regional organisations. Regional organisations are, in turn, subsumed under state followed 
by national level committees. Each level of organisation consists of a committee, or 
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leadership group, whose structure is shared across all levels of the organisation. For 
example, local organisational presidents are subordinate to regional presidents and so on 
up to the level of national president where maximum authority rests. Power is centralised 
in the national leadership committee where organisational policies and actions are 
designed and put into practice via directives that are transmitted from the top down 
(Herrera, 1998: 172). This centralised organisational structure and Mexican political culture 
are mutually constitutive and continue to shape the national peasant movement and its 
capacity to construct counter-hegemonic organisations. Non-democratic, ‘cacique’ based 
power relations predominate at all levels and are characterised by dynastic family and 
kinship based leadership structures. 
The corporatist relations developed by the PRI through the CNC were imbued with 
authoritarian, patrimonial and patron-client traits. A political culture in which leaders 
considered organisations their own property and personal appropriation and distributional 
discretion of material resources became both a norm and socially accepted among the 
bases for PRI-affiliated groups. Ejidos created under agrarian reform were politically 
controlled by the PRI which organised the internal affairs of ejidos through designation and 
sponsoring of ‘comisariados ejidales’ - local strongmen and their power groups that were 
responsible for administering federal resources and social welfare programmes in return for 
social and political control of their populations (Mackinlay & Otero, 2004: 77-80). 
‘Independent’ organisations such as CIOAC, whose struggles had won land for their 
members from the 1970s to the 1990s, implemented the same internal ejidal structures as 
those created by the PRI and a centralised, pyramidal power structure encouraged the 
establishment of patron-client relations.  
The culture of corporatism and the clientelist practices that it enshrines continue to have 
deep roots in Mexican society and shape not only the state’s strategies of social control but 
also the struggles, expectations and conception of how politics is ‘done’ of CIOAC’s 
members, their leaders, and the Mexican peasantry in general. Following the 
institutionalisation of the CAP, CIOAC’s centralist structure increasingly became a 
mechanism of resource channelling from federal government in return for leaders’ social 
and political control of the organisation’s mass base. Critical to this control was active 
support for Salinas’ official termination of agrarian reform and relative ‘consent’ for the 
state’s application of neoliberal policies. This ‘consent’ is a relative, highly complex notion 
and its understanding requires analytical separation between a subaltern organisation’s 
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discourse and practice. CIOAC’s leaders constantly renounce neoliberalism and demand 
food sovereignty with an official organisational discourse that consistently rejects 
neoliberal policies. However, in practice, as we will see, the organisation has become 
dependent on, and subordinate to, the state’s apparatus of legitimation in a way that 
severely restricts its ability to actively contest the neoliberalism it discursively rejects. 
Nevertheless, CIOAC’s use of the discourse of food sovereignty - constructed on the 
rejection of the neoliberal model and the destruction it has wrought on the organisation’s 
membership - is a valuable political tool in its negotiations with the state. CIOAC’s 
membership of the VC and the influential food sovereignty principles it articulates provides 
an emotive set of discourses to mobilise its bases against a state implicated in the defence 
and promotion of neoliberalism. CIOAC uses this to wrest material concessions from the 
state, even if these concessions do not seek transformation of the existing model despite 
the organisation’s stated demands. 
The majority of writers that work on the Mexican peasant movement look at how its 
member organisations lost their political autonomy under Salinas’ ‘neo-corporatist’ project, 
de-radicalised their demands and strategies, and became legitimators of state policy in 
return for access to state resources (Bartra & Otero, 2008a; Grammont, 1993; Mackinlay, 
1996: de la Fuente & Mackinlay 1995). However, these analyses fail to adequately engage 
with why the organisations’ leaders opted to cede a degree of political autonomy in return 
for spaces within the state bureaucracy, access to state resources and recognition as 
legitimate state interlocutors for their members. This involved a move away from 
confrontational tactics and towards a policy of ‘critical engagement’ with the Mexican 
state. This strategy was not simply the result of the latter’s neo-corporatist strategy applied 
from above, but was also significantly shaped by the class dynamics of the autonomous 
movements’ mass bases and organisational structures in place to represent and channel 
interests and demands. CIOAC’s altered class composition from landless to predominantly 
landed peasants struggling for autonomy changed not only the nature of their demands but 
also their forms of expression and how they were to be presented to state institutions. This 
has had serious implications for how CIOAC’s leaders represent their members’ demands 
and the ever present difficulty of balancing the need to meet the immediate material needs 
of their members (through engagement with the state’s legitimacy apparatus), many in a 
constant state of subsistence crisis, while at the same time pushing for longer-term 
structural changes to eradicate the causes of this crisis (counter-hegemonic struggles 
contesting neoliberalism as the material basis of the ruling class’ hegemony).  
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During the land reform era CIOAC’s hierarchical structure extended itself across various 
regions and crystallised as a vanguardist organisation founded on the struggle for socialism, 
closely tied to the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), and manifested in the countryside as 
the struggle for land by landless peasants and agricultural workers. From the organisation’s 
emergence (as the CCI) in 1961, leading figures in the PCM dominated the organisation’s 
leadership structures. Urban ‘traditional’ intellectuals, these leaders sought rural support 
through targeted insertion into rural areas they perceived to be ripe for socialist organising. 
According to Gramsci (2007: 3) ‘organic intellectuals’, such as community leaders that 
CIOAC’s national leadership sought to incorporate into the organisation, are essential for 
the construction and development of counter-hegemony; their ‘function is to direct the 
ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong’. However, CIOAC’s 
hierarchical organisational structure, non-democratically elected leadership and its 
vanguardist nature tended to draw organic intellectuals vertically into its ranks and 
compromise the ‘organic’ relationship between leaders and led. Once land had been won, 
the revolutionary discourse of land expropriation and redistribution continued but 
increasingly failed to reflect the interests of a growing landed mass base. The non-
democratic nature of the organisation and its centralised structure meant that landed 
members could do little to re-shape CIOAC’s land redistribution discourse emanating from 
above, from leaders that grounded their strategies on the international struggle for 
socialism. It was not until the late 1980s that external factors; the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the international crisis of the Left, the rise of neoliberalism, and Salinas’ project to 
reconfigure the Mexican state, combined with the internal issue of the organisation’s now 
predominantly landed mass base to both force CIOAC’s leaders, as well as provide them 
with a seeming opportunity (through the UNORCA inspired CAP), to reshape the nature of 
their discourse, demands and political strategy. 
Salinas’ institutionalisation of the CAP led to the widespread belief among CIOAC’s leaders 
that the immediate material needs of a newly emerging class of small landholders 
struggling for autonomy could more conceivably be achieved by the organisation through 
working with the reconfigured state, not in opposition towards it. Political liberalisation not 
only opened up this opportunity - more importantly it seemed more conceivable, and a 
more effective political strategy, for peasant leaders to seek spaces and influence within 
the state apparatus to meet these emerging needs than a strategy based on remaining on 
the outside. This view was further encouraged by electoral reforms that began in 1977 by 
conferring legal status on the PCM that had previously been banned from participating in 
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electoral politics. Democratisation of the electoral system was used to accommodate 
subaltern interests into the hegemonic project and foster a belief among subaltern groups 
that their interests could be fully represented through a democratic electoral system. This 
strategy, combined with CIOAC and other Mexican peasant organisation’s non-democratic 
structures, would continue the process of deradicalisation that Salinas instigated with the 
CAP, further distancing counter-hegemonic discourse from actual practice. CIOAC’s 
leadership underwent what Gramsci termed ‘transformismo’ as a result of the articulation 
of the state’s reconfiguration of hegemony with an organisation whose leadership’s 
decision making was relatively autonomous from its bases.  
For Gramsci, ‘transformismo’ refers to the movement of left-wing radicals and intellectuals 
into the ‘enemy’ camp, or hegemonic apparatus (Gramsci, 2007: 157). That the state should 
be interested in incorporating organised dissent into its ideological apparatus is not 
surprising; by physically incorporating peasant leaders into the Mexican state, and partially 
(i.e. in ways that do not threaten the fundamental basis of its hegemony - the neoliberal 
accumulation model) incorporating counter-hegemonic discourse, the ruling class 
reproduces its hegemony through selective incorporation of counter-hegemony. In terms of 
the CAP, CIOAC in particular, ‘transformismo’ of the entire national, state, and even 
regional leadership structures took place. Leaders at all levels accepted the termination of 
agrarian reform. However, more fundamentally, ‘transformismo’ of CIOAC’s leaders led to 
the reconfiguration of the organisation from a counter-hegemonic group demanding land 
and contesting state hegemony and the accumulation model it promoted and defended, to 
an organisation based on soliciting resources from the state’s reconfigured legitimation 
apparatus without contesting the very nature of that apparatus; the state’s hegemony 
itself. The extracts below, taken from interviews with CIOAC leaders in Las Margaritas, 
Chiapas, demonstrate this ‘transformismo’ through the leadership’s change in focus and 
the organisational consensus around the end agrarian reform. 
‘At the beginning the struggle was for land. There was a lot of government 
repression...many died and many went to prison. Now we have experienced a 
change of focus. Now it’s the struggle for power and we have achieved many 
deputies, representatives, etcetera at the state and federal level. Now the 
struggle is for the development of our communities - roads, electricity, drinking 
water...The land question is not going to be able to continue in this zone 
because of Salinas and article 27. Now there’s no possibility of soliciting 
land...Now, since we can’t solicit land, what we do is solicit projects so that our 
people can buy land. We carry on the pacific struggle’. Roberto Alfonso, a 
founder of CIOAC in Las Margaritas and member of its municipal leadership 
committee (11 October 2012, Las Margaritas, Chiapas). 
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‘We knock on government doors...and seek solutions to ejido and community 
demands...If they don’t finance us, we pressure municipal, state and federal 
government. We mobilise under a mark of respect. This way we’ve resolved 
many of the needs of our membership. This way we’ve advanced...we speak 
with the government and get resources’. Recording of Luis Hernandez Cruz, 
CIOAC leader in Las Margaritas speaking in Ejido Emiliano Zapata, 
Municipality La Independencia, Chiapas, on 1 September 2012. 
CIOAC’s organisational structure, its modes of representation and accountability between 
leadership and bases, were certainly key elements that explain the scale of ‘transformismo’ 
over the neoliberal era. As Otero (2004a: 17-18) states, democratic leadership 
organisations have greater possibilities of retaining their independence from the state and 
establishing popular-democratic alliances with other organisations than non-democratic 
organisations. The more democratic their leaders, and the more participative their decision 
making mechanisms, the more probable an organisation will become popular-democratic 
(Ibid: 225) and therefore be able to resist leadership cooptation and a loss of political 
autonomy, and retain and expand a counter-hegemonic programme. However, it is neither 
sufficient analytically or fair on the organisations themselves to blame corporatist political 
culture, embedded clientelist practices and corrupt, undemocratically elected peasant 
leaders as the only causes of deradicalisation and the end of counter-hegemonic struggle 
(although they are without doubt major factors). As we saw above, the need for leaders to 
respond to the demands of their (now mainly landed) bases, even in centralised peasant 
organisations, should not be underestimated, nor the opportunities that seemed to present 
themselves when the CAP was at its zenith and, for the first time, it seemed conceivable 
that the state was genuinely in favour of peasant organisation ‘autonomy’ and a renewed 
basis for state-peasant movement relations. However, the relative autonomy enjoyed by 
CIOAC’s leaders from their bases accelerated processes of ‘transformismo’ as participation 
in formal electoral politics became ever more important for the organisation’s strategy. 
Electoral campaigns were decided upon by the leadership without the consultation of their 
bases and as the former became ever more submerged in official politics the links between 
them and their communities were weakened further. 
 
By channelling resources to individual organisations - either directly through the CAP or 
through municipal, state and national electoral positions won by CIOAC in alliance with the 
PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) political party - the state managed to divide the 
peasant movement. Leaders became ever more distanced from their bases at all levels as 
their struggles for power within the state apparatus came to dominate political strategy. 
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Leaders at the national level increasingly devoted their efforts to negotiating resources and 
projects with high level state officials in Mexico City and channelling them down to be 
administered by their state and regional level organisations. As a result the struggle for 
structural changes put forward by the CAP  - end to state promotion and subsidy of private 
capitalist production, more resources for the peasant sector, subsidised credit etc. - 
became increasingly decoupled from meeting the short-term material demands of the 
membership which sought access to the resource channels opened up to (and by) their 
organisation. Members’ struggles for autonomy from and within the market were 
addressed by CIOAC predominantly on an individual basis, articulating with the state’s own 
strategy of distributing palliative resources at the household level as a means of dampening 
rural unrest. Rather than developing a bottom-up collective political strategy based on 
members’ struggles for autonomy in order to tackle the causes of the agrarian crisis, access 
to state resources were used to deal with its symptoms.  
 
The opening up of resource channels between CIOAC’s leaders and federal government and 
state institutions led to the fragmentation and atomisation of the mass base and members’ 
reconceptualisation of their organisation from one struggling on a collective basis for the 
right to land, to a more strategic relationship based on individual (household) access to 
state funds. The lack of participatory decision making structures and grassroots 
involvement in the ideological construction of a new unifying counter-hegemonic 
programme left CIOAC unable to construct a coherent, bottom up strategy to represent 
members’ struggles to make a viable and dignified living from the land. To construct and 
retain counter-hegemony requires subaltern organisations to develop an independent 
socio-cultural and political consciousness and this is only possible in democratic 
organisations in which leaders are embedded in their bases and held accountable to the 
latter. There must be, in the words of Gramsci (2007: 188-189) ‘a matching of thrust from 
below with orders from above, a continuous insertion of elements thrown up from the 
depths of the rank and file into the solid frameworks of the leadership apparatus which 
ensures continuity and the regular accumulation of experience’. This was increasingly not 
the case as the focus of CIOAC’s leaders on struggles within the state (hegemonic) 
apparatus took growing precedence over work in grassroots communities, especially with 
regard to political organising and channelling of members’ demands into a coherent 
political strategy aimed at transforming their situation, rather than dealing with its 
symptoms through access to state resources. 
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‘The great majority of (peasant) organisation militants are now focused on 
what they hope to receive from government programmes, or on electoral 
processes. This, I say, has diverted the structure, the objectives, the spirit and 
practices of the social organisations that we knew 30 years ago’. Emilio 
Plutarco Garcia, founding member of CNPA and member of the 
organisation’s national council (15 February 2013, Xochitepec, Morelos). 
The reconceptualisation of CIOAC from a radical organisation that collectively struggled for 
land and worker control of the means of production, and an entity central to the lives of its 
members and the formation of their beliefs and values, to one whose primary function is 
instrumental - access to state resources - is evidenced especially by generational 
differences between those that struggled for land and more recent members that view 
CIOAC as a link to state resources. Both extracts below - the first from a CIOAC member in 
Oaxaca, the other from the organisation’s leader in that state - highlight the strategic, 
material based relationship that most of CIOAC’s members have with their organisation. 
CIOAC’s presence in Oaxaca dates from the mid-1980s and it has never been involved in 
land struggles. Its work has always been closely tied to electoral politics and (from 1989) a 
close working relationship with the PRD. CIOAC’s leader in Oaxaca has both built on, and 
further encouraged, clientelist relations for vote buying purposes. This has manifested itself 
as a demobilised membership (CIOAC has never mobilised its members in Oaxaca) with an 
instrumental relationship to the organisation. 
(Me) How have you gained from being a part of CIOAC?  
I’ve only got fertiliser. Others have received chickens, housing, shops. But after 
receiving the help many leave.  
(Me) Is this problem going to increase with Mario’s (state CIOAC leader) 
position as congressman?  
A lot of people, yes, will want to join because he’s become congressman. It’s 
going to attract more people with a strategic vision. We ourselves have been in 
the organisation a long time. Others stay two or three months for a project 
then leave. It’s a problem of raising the consciousness (concientización) of the 
people - CIOAC lacks this’. Simón Martínez , CIOAC member in the 
municipality of Zimatlan, Oaxaca (9 December 2012, Zimatlan). 
‘To all the new members, I want to tell you that yes, we have three years with 
me as congressman but CIOAC carries on working afterwards. As members we 
have rights and obligations because this happens; groups leave and join one 
organisation then another looking for resources’. Mario Rafael Méndez, PRD 
Congressman and CIOAC Oaxaca’s General Secretary in a state assembly of 
CIOAC Oaxaca with municipal CIOAC leaders, (3 December 2012, Oaxaca 
City).  
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In contrast to Oaxaca, many of CIOAC’s members in Chiapas and Guerrero occupy land won 
as a result of their own struggles. Much of the older generation were formed in the land 
struggle and their relationship with CIOAC goes far beyond material resources. As Holloway 
(2005: 208) notes,  for people involved in strikes and similar activities, the most important 
outcome of the struggles is often not the realisation of immediate demands, but the 
development of a community of struggle, a collective doing characterised by opposition to 
capitalist social relations. This was certainly the case for CIOAC’s land struggling peasants 
that gained not only instrumentally in terms of land access as a result of their struggles as 
CIOAC, but also collectively in immeasurable ways from the experience of struggle itself. 
The extract below demonstrates this, while also showing how more recently recruited 
members have a more strategic relationship with CIOAC as a result of its now 
overwhelming focus on electoral politics and accessing federal resources. 
‘I believe in CIOAC, it's part of the people (pueblo). They helped us fight for the 
land here and because of this we have our community. I'm with CIOAC for what 
they have brought us here, but some don't have the feeling of solidarity with 
CIOAC, just a strategic relationship because they think they will gain the most 
with them. That's why they left when the PRI came back with their promises 
and their return to power in the municipality’. Gilberto Absalom, CIOAC 
member in the community of Paredon (1 October 2012, Jitotol, Chiapas). 
A core element of the Mexican state’s response to the 1994 Zapatista uprising was its 
attempt to extend and deepen corporatist relations with peasant organizations, such as 
CIOAC, that had not eschewed contact with the state but instead continued to seek 
negotiations and presence within its structures. From its origins, the EZLN has struggled for 
a transformation of the relationships between rulers and ruled as a way to transcend 
capitalist social relations (Vergra-Camus, 2014). Unlike all previous guerrilla movements in 
Latin America, the EZLN does not seek state power directly. Instead it struggles to organise 
and strengthen subaltern organisations and classes within civil society in an attempt to 
transform the state and the capitalist social relations on which it is founded (Otero, 2004b: 
336-337). Its programme of local autonomy is not seen as a counterweight to state power, 
but instead aims to make that power superfluous through the creation of its own political 
and juridical spaces - founded on control of territory - so that people can practice their own 
way of life and government (Esteva, 1997: 15). The movement attempts to transform 
Mexico through the progressive construction of political spaces in which effective 
governance can happen, within a truly democratic society (Ibid: 20).  
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In the immediate aftermath of the uprising the EZLN attempted to build bridges between 
the PRD and construct a broad class alliance with civil society allies, including CIOAC. The 
latter supported the EZLN, even though they disagreed with the use of arms. However, this 
alliance was effectively terminated in 1996 when the state and federal government began 
signing individual agreements with independent peasant organisations that legalised their 
land occupations. The relationship between the EZLN and peasant organisations that retain 
relations with the state has effectively been non-existent ever since15. The EZLN’s political 
strategy of strengthening civil society vis-à-vis the state (Otero, 2004b: 337) is based on 
retaining the organisation’s independence from the state, not increasing integration into it 
as the majority of Mexico’s peasant organisations strive to do. As Vergara-Camus (2014: 
275) states, ‘For the Zapatistas, the opportunity of leading a “radical agrarian historical bloc” 
in Chiapas was lost to the far longer-standing capacity of the state to co-opt peasant 
organisations’. 
The uprising led to the flooding in of central government funds to support rival peasant 
organisations that had not rejected contact with the state, but on the contrary were looking 
to exert greater influence on the state through formal channels. It also increased the 
‘fairness’ of local elections, significantly levelling the playing field for non-PRI candidates in 
the hope of cutting support for the EZLN, preventing a major insurrection, and encouraging 
dissent to be expressed through formal means (Trejo, 2012: 15). This weakened the EZLN, 
many of whose members (with pressing material needs) returned to or joined peasant 
organizations that were now receiving a growing quantity of state resources channelled to 
their members and gaining presence in municipal governments. It also increased CIOAC and 
other independent peasant organisations’ dependence on the state and participation in 
electoral politics. 
 
The reconfiguration of the state’s legitimating apparatus in the countryside had effectively 
converted formerly radical, oppositional organisations such as CIOAC into allies of state 
legitimating institutions and administrators of their projects and resources. It altered the 
relationship between grassroots members and their organisations whose leaders became 
ever more integrated into the state (hegemonic) apparatus via electoral politics and the 
development of a close working relationship with the state’s institutions of legitimation. 
This acted not only to neutralise and incorporate a counter-hegemonic threat; resources 
and also peasant organisation leaders’ (growing) incomes came to depend ever more on 
                                                          
15 For a more in-depth analysis of the Zapatista’s political strategy see Vergara-Camus, 2014. 
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the insertion they could achieve within state legitimating institutions and electoral 
positions which, in turn, depended on managing the social unrest of their own bases. It also 
served to legitimate state policy to reconfigure the accumulation model in a way that would 
destroy the basis of the peasant economy and pave the way for the generalisation and 
deepening of capitalist social relations in the Mexican countryside. 
‘As social organisations we have been a factor in controlling various things that 
could have caused big problems in this country...We have been part of the 
control of people’s anger, of movements and more dangerous things. The 
government has wanted to control this with projects, state resources, across 
the whole country...This is how it works with the handouts, which are 
palliatives for poverty but at the same time they become an instrument of 
control’. José Dolores López Barrios, CIOAC’s national secretary (29 January 
2013, Mexico City). 
 
Rather than organisations autonomously administering peasant production, they became 
channels for administering palliative anti-poverty projects to maintain social control in the 
countryside in the context of the neoliberal attack on the peasant economy, growing crises 
of reproduction, and the disintegration of the peasantry itself. The resources these 
organisations receive and channel to their membership have become dependent on 
maintaining the status quo, i.e. agreement with the official discourse that the land reform 
era had come to its natural conclusion and that ‘rural development’ is now a question of 
productive efficiency rather than one of redistribution and can be achieved through the 
palliative projects being targeted at rural communities. The deradicalisation of struggles 
and organisations’ complicity in managing for the state their own bases in return for federal 
funds is inextricably related to another key component of the neoliberal state’s 
reconfiguration of hegemony; electoral reform and peasant movement participation in 
electoral politics. 
By the mid-1980s most CIOAC community leaders across Mexico had enrolled in parties 
that succeeded the PCM - firstly the PSUM (the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico) and then, 
in 1989, the PRD which formed through the merging of various smaller left-wing parties and 
a section of the PRI in 1989. The CIOAC-PRD alliance became a powerful actor in municipal 
politics in Chiapas in particular, where from the mid-1990s onwards, through success in 
municipal elections, the organisation was able to bring life-changing improvements to its 
members. 
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‘In 1996 I was named municipal president. Because of this we could access 
more resources and the communities that didn’t have anything were provided 
with many things - classrooms, electricity, roads, housing, drinkable water’. 
Miguel González Hernández, CIOAC leader and former municipal president in 
Jitotol, Chiapas (6 November 2012, Tuxtla Gutierrez). 
 
‘Before CIOAC came here around 20 years ago it was PRI and we had nothing. 
Absolutely nothing. CIOAC brought lighting, housing materials and money to 
pay builders, also some coffee plants a year ago... also they brought us roads, 
schools, none of which we ever had before’. Daniel Díaz Pérez, CIOAC member 
in the village of Amate (30 September 2012, Amate, Jitotol, Chiapas). 
The significant benefits derived from participation in electoral politics, however, came with 
a heavy cost in terms of CIOAC’s political autonomy and its role as an organisation pushing 
for radical social and structural change - the kind of organisation needed in the struggle for 
food sovereignty. An organisation pushing for radical social transformation must balance 
meeting the immediate material needs of the grassroots base with the struggle for 
structural changes that tackle the root cause of these needs. In the case of CIOAC, the latter 
have predominated in discourse only, with the former having come to completely dominate 
the organisation’s strategy in practice. CIOAC’s increased focus on electoral politics from 
the late 1980s onwards, embedded as it was (and still is) in a clientelist political culture, and 
without a coherent, unifying discourse that not only represented its now marginalised 
landed mass base but also originated from dialogue with this base, further shifted 
organisational practice towards meeting the immediate material demands of its members 
within the existing hegemonic apparatus and away from practices that questioned the very 
causes of these needs and proposing (necessarily) counter-hegemonic solutions. This has 
been accompanied by further distancing of leaders from their bases and accelerated 
processes of ‘transformismo’ as leaders, relatively autonomous from their bases, seek to 
further their own political careers with the votes of their organisation’s members. 
‘The problem is that the majority of our colleagues that have been deputies 
have limited themselves to this and end up distancing themselves from the 
organisation. They continue their political career and become distanced from 
their bases...Few are those that return to work with the bases and try to reduce 
the dependence of the organisation on official resources - something that really 
affects autonomy’. Emilio Plutarco Garcia, founding member of CNPA and 
part of the organisation’s national council (15 February 2013, village of 
Atlacholoaya, municipality Xochitepec, Morelos). 
CIOAC’s increasingly close relationship with the PRD, which is permeated and controlled by 
political and economic elites, clientelist, vote-buying practices, and has no serious proposals 
to transform the existing neoliberal food regime, does not correspond to the organisation’s 
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stated central goal of achieving a food sovereign Mexico and revolutionising production and 
power relations in the countryside. However, as stated earlier, this goal is largely rhetorical, 
a pragmatic political discourse employed to access and defend CIOAC’s access to state 
resources. Vicente Fox’s election to the presidency in 2000, and his administration’s 
attempt to cut all state obligations to the rural social sector, was contested by a peasant 
movement ideologically guided by food sovereignty. The way that different organisations 
interpreted the meaning of food sovereignty and how its discourse was employed by 
distinct groups within the movement highlight the importance of analysing food 
sovereignty as a political strategy, not only as an alternative model to the neoliberal food 
regime. 
 
4.5 ‘El Campo No Aguanta Mas’ (The Countryside Can’t Take 
Any More) 
The defeat of the PRI in Mexico’s 2000 national elections and Fox’s victory as a PAN 
(National Action Party) candidate marked the start of a new era in Mexico’s political history 
following 70 years of PRI monopoly. Soon after taking office Fox acted on the promises of 
his electoral campaign to do away with PRI corporatism and the neo-corporatist strategies 
that it had spawned. The new agricultural secretary withdrew financial support for the CAP 
in an attempt to further distance peasant organisations from negotiations with the state. 
Instead, the PAN government turned to TNCs, dynamic national capitalist producer sectors 
and agribusiness organisations such as the National Agricultural Council as principal 
interlocutors with the state. For peasant organisations this was an attempt by the state to 
break all ties (and responsibilities) with the peasantry in its goal of promoting capitalist 
efficiency in the countryside (Grammont & Mackinlay, 2006: 55). The national peasant 
movement responded with mass mobilisations and a coherent anti-neoliberal discourse 
which, on the surface, appeared to be converging into a counter-hegemonic movement 
representing a major challenge to Fox’s neoliberal policies. However, as we will see, the 
organisational structures and embedded political culture, especially among the 
movement’s peasant centrals, would demonstrate that their counter-hegemonic rhetoric 
based around the food sovereignty discourse was ultimately a political strategy founded on 
the defence of state corporatism, not in practice a counter-hegemonic movement for social 
and structural transformation. 
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The CAP united with other national and regional peasant organisations in November 2002 
to contest the withdrawal of its financing, the worsening economic situation for the mass of 
Mexico’s peasantry and the imminent liberalisation of 12 agricultural commodities in 
accordance with NAFTA that would deepen the rural crisis. These organisations, 12 in total, 
made a public declaration published in the national press titled ‘The Countryside Can’t Take 
Anymore: Six Proposals for the Salvation and Revaluation of the Mexican Countryside’ 
(MECAM). In synthesis, these proposals demanded: 
1. A moratorium on the agricultural chapter of NAFTA 
2. An immediate programme for 2003 to deal with the rural crisis and a longer term 
plan for 2020 
3. A total restructuring of rural financing 
4. Budget assignment of 1.5% of GDP for productive development, and 1.5% for social 
and environmental development of the rural sector in 2003. 
5. Guaranteed food health and safety policies for Mexican consumers 
6. Recognition of the rights and culture of indigenous peoples (ANEC, personal 
correspondence) 
On 31 January 2003 the group mobilised its bases and over 100 thousand people 
descended on Mexico City’s main square demanding response to their proposals, first and 
foremost that basic agricultural goods - namely corn and beans - be removed from NAFTA. 
With demand making no longer institutionalised and controlled by the state through 
clientelist channels, an emerging counter-hegemonic discourse rejecting NAFTA and 
demanding increased state intervention in favour of the peasantry rapidly gained strength. 
This was backed up with mobilisational tactics including the occupation of state institutions 
across the country. Freed (against their wishes) from subordination to the state’s client 
channels, for the first time since the CAP’s initiation in 1989 the national peasant 
movement was constructing a programme that fundamentally questioned the existing 
neoliberal model and proposed structural solutions to the immiseration that it had wrought 
on the countryside. The economic conditions that triggered MECAM - NAFTA’s opening of 
borders that brought the fall of internal prices, lack of markets for native products and the 
generalised ruin of all but the most capitalised rural classes (Rubio, 2003: 1) - combined 
with the administration’s attempt to cut corporatist ties with the CAP to trigger the most 
powerful national peasant movement in over a decade. It is no coincidence that Fox’s 
efforts to eliminate the CAP forced the national peasant movement into a position that 
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resulted in its strengthening.  A social actor’s capacity to disrupt political or economic 
stability is fundamental to its relative bargaining power (Fox, 1993: 25). Institutionalised in 
the CAP, the peasant movement’s access to resources was fundamentally based on the 
opposite principle of retaining such stability in order to bargain for palliative resources from 
the state’s legitimation apparatus. Once these channels were withdrawn, CIOAC and other 
CAP organisations were forced to make demands on the state from outside its spaces and 
used counter-hegemonic discourse and confrontational tactics to challenge political and 
economic stability. However, Fox goes on to argue that the paradox for social organisations 
is that, in their efforts to shape the state, it often manages to shape them (Ibid: 26). This 
has certainly proved accurate in the state’s response to the 2003 uprising that shaped and 
continues to define state-peasant movement relations in Mexico to this day. 
In response to the strong mobilisations and societal support for the movement the 
government was forced to organise eight tables of dialogue thematically guided on the 
basis of MECAM’s original demands. The fact that the government did not have a counter-
proposal to contest the peasant organisations indicated that, from the outset, the official 
strategy was to contain the movement without the intention of jointly constructing a 
project to salvage and restructure the countryside (Rubio, 2003: 17). On 23 April, following 
protracted negotiations between peasant leaders and the highest levels of government and 
the state bureaucracy, nine organisations of MECAM signed the National Agreement for the 
Countryside with the government. However, the final agreement did not resolve any of the 
counter-hegemonic demands of the movement - the exclusion of corn and beans from 
NAFTA liberalisation, a moratorium on GMOs, modifications to Article 27 of the 
constitution, exceptions to tariff cuts and reductions to rural budget (Rubio, 2004: 34), i.e. 
all of those demands that would impact the reproduction of the neoliberal accumulation 
model. This begs the question as to why nine of the twelve organisations signed an 
agreement that did not resolve any of the movement’s six core demands. Rubio (2004: 34) 
points out that, despite the lack of resolution of its core demands, the agreement did 
represent some significant advances for the peasant movement. It had incorporated 
peasant organisations into consultation regarding rural project design, agreed a 2.8 billion 
peso ($US 0.28 billion) emergency fund for urgent rural projects, and forced the 
government into agreeing to update and amplify PROCAMPO. It also created crop specific 
national production programmes targeted at small producers and designed to incorporate 
the most marginalised rural classes and groups. All of these demands could be engaged 
with by the state as a) they could be incorporated into the existing neoliberal accumulation 
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model, and b) by engaging with them the state could be seen to be acting on the peasant 
movement’s demands and neutralising and (partially) incorporating counter-hegemony into 
its project, thus reproducing its own hegemony and weakening the counter-hegemonic 
threat. 
According to prominent analyses of MECAM (Rubio, 2003; Concheiro & Quintana, 2004; 
Bartra, 2003a) whether or not organisations signed the National Agreement for the 
Countryside was not a cause of internal division within the movement, nor an important act 
in terms of furthering the movement’s core demands. It merely represented a first step in 
changing the relationship between the state and the peasantry. While symbolically this may 
have been the case the reality is that MECAM’s organisations, on the surface struggling on a 
shared platform of food sovereignty, were very distinct from the outset. The CAP’s main 
reason for mobilising was the withdrawal of their budget by a PAN government attempting 
to end state corporatism. On the other hand, organisations such as ANEC, UNORCA and 
CNOC were protesting NAFTA and the economic situation in the countryside more broadly. 
Although this did not prevent an alliance based on a shared agenda initially, this alliance 
broke down as a result of fundamental differences of interest within the movement that 
became apparent from the signing of the agreement onwards. These differences were 
based primarily on the structures of the organisations involved in MECAM and the political 
strategies employing a food sovereignty discourse that were pursued as a result of these 
factors. 
According to Bartra & Otero (2008b: 25) the most important aspect of MECAM was the 
political construction of the peasantry as a class, with class defined not as a structural 
position in the relations of production but a process in which people articulate common 
identities as a result of shared experiences. As such, the movement was a class 
convergence, a class programme, and a class based negotiation (with government) - a class 
based response to neoliberalism (Ibid: 26). However, whether class is defined as a 
structural position or one based on shared experiences, the assumption that the movement 
constituted a singular, united class response to neoliberalism is accurate in appearance 
only. Bartra & Otero go on to praise MECAM for achieving unity between organisations 
such as CIOAC with roots in the land struggle with groups based primarily on peasant 
production demands. However, they do not interrogate the fragile nature of this unity 
whose weakness, as we will see, is based fundamentally on the class cleavages and 
organisational and leadership structures between these two very distinct forms of 
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organisation. A lack of appreciation of these factors leads to shallow examination of 
movement demands and the strategies peasant organisations employ when engaging with 
the state that focus on leadership co-optation (Concheiro & Quintana, 2004: 4), clientelist 
practices (Navarro, 2002) or ‘good’ organisations seeking structural change versus ‘bad’ 
organisations seeking purely material benefits (Celis, 2005). These analyses are based 
purely on the relationship between the state and organisational leaderships without any 
examination of how the relationship between peasant leaders and their mass bases shape 
organisation strategies and relationships with the state. The class base of the organisation, 
its class specific interests and demands, shape - without determining - organisational 
strategies, forms of engagement, and demand-making vis-à-vis the state. In the case of 
MECAM there was, and remains, a fundamental class-based cleavage between the non-CNC 
members of the CAP and those of a peasant production based focus such as UNORCA, ANEC 
and CNOC. This difference was concealed under the strategic alliance in 2002 but did 
emerge following the signing of the agreement. The PAN administration was able to play on 
these differences to weaken and eventually destroy the movement. 
Peasant centrals represent some of the most marginalised landed peasants in Mexico. They 
include CIOAC, CODUC (Coalition for Democratic Urban and Peasant Organisations), the 
CCC (Cardenas Peasant Central) and CNPA (National Coordinator ‘Plan de Ayala’) (the latter 
began as a coalition of regional organisations, but its interactions with the state have seen 
it become as centralised as the traditional centrals). Although these organisations struggle 
in principle for the reversal of neoliberal policies they are directly accountable to a mass 
base with pressing and immediate material needs. For these organisations’ leaders the 
main goal of MECAM was to force the state to provide basic social infrastructure and 
services for their members and to ensure that there was a federal government budget 
allocated each year for providing these kinds of projects. CIOAC’s adhesion to MECAM and 
the mobilisation of their bases under the banner of food sovereignty must be understood in 
this light, as a political strategy to re-access state resource channels. It was not a struggle, 
as it appears on the surface, for the state’s transformation and the development of an 
alternative food and agricultural system.  
Second in importance for the centrals were demands for the productive development of 
their members’ land. The majority of CIOAC’s members, like those of CODUC, CNPA and the 
CCC, produce low yields of low quality on eroded, marginal lands and cannot afford inputs. 
A logic based on peasant household (relative) autonomy from the market (commodity and 
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labour) predominates (see chapter three) as the family nucleus attempts to reproduce itself 
through a combination of subsistence cultivation, commodity production and the sale of 
family labour power not on the basis of profit maximisation but with the overarching aim of 
securing long term access to the land. The strategy of the centrals’ leaders in MECAM was 
based fundamentally on attempting to meet the demands of this social base whose access 
to the land, and viability and quality of life on it, could be significantly enhanced through 
access to basic social services and support for production. That these were the overriding 
goals - and achievements - of CIOAC is corroborated by Lolo Lopez, CIOAC’s national 
secretary, as well as the fact that the organisation’s objective was first and foremost to 
contest the Fox administration’s attempt to cut its corporatist ties with the CAP. 
‘(Me) For CIOAC, what was the most important achievement of MECAM?  
Firstly that the government sat down with the peasant organisations. When 
Fox started he said that those organisations are good for nothing, that he 
wanted to end with them…The movement forced fundamental changes - firstly 
the financial ceilings and second we could create new programmes that didn’t 
exist before; rural housing, ’70 and over’, PROMOSAC (programme for women 
in the rural sector). Also for productive systems, coffee for example. These were 
substantial achievements - not fundamental ones because we said that there 
should be a change in the model because for 30 years this model hasn’t worked 
and has created more poverty, more inequality between the rich and the poor’. 
José Dolores López Barrios, CIOAC’s national secretary (11 February 2013, 
Mexico City). 
It is clear from the above statement where CIOAC’s priorities lay - re-establishing 
corporatist ties with the state was more important than pushing for a reversal of neoliberal 
policies. CIOAC and the other centrals agreed that structural change was necessary in the 
long term for the future of the Mexican peasantry. However, in the short term its leaders 
believed that the needs of their own members would best be served within the current 
model through pressuring the state to fulfil its obligations to the marginalised landed 
peasantry. The organisation and the expectations of its mass base are built on a discourse 
of the state’s obligations to the peasantry and the practice of leaders channelling state 
resources to their members via neo-corporatist and electoral channels. For CIOAC, MECAM 
provided a powerful counter-hegemonic discourse used by the organisation to force its way 
back into the state’s hegemonic apparatus to which it had become dependent. The 
organisation’s entire working practices had become based on clientelist resource 
channelling and leaders’ positions within the organisation as well as members’ (neo-
corporatist) expectations that legitimated their leaders on the basis of resource access 
made re-establishment of neo-corporatist relations with the state of paramount 
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importance.  This approach has been widely criticised by production based organisations 
within MECAM and commentators on the movement; it terminally weakened the counter-
hegemonic force of MECAM and its potential to bring about real structural transformations 
to the neoliberal accumulation model. However, these criticisms fail to recognise the 
difficult internal tensions that the centrals face. They must balance meeting their members’ 
pressing short-term needs with struggles for longer term structural changes in the context 
of historical processes of state (neo-) corporatism, centralised organisational structures and 
the resulting political culture that has permeated and developed in these organisations. 
Celis (2005), for example, states that the Centrals prioritised the negotiation of immediate 
programmes over the reorientation of policy and state institutions in favour of the peasant 
sector that production based organisations such as ANEC and CNOC were striving for. 
Concheiro & Quintana (2004: 15) similarly praise the latter group for seeking to modify the 
Mexican political system while the former cynically used the opportunities MECAM created 
to re-establish neo-corporatism. Remarkably they blame the centrals for ‘not being able to 
see beyond their own bases’ (Ibid: 4), as if their membership was of little importance in the 
grand scheme of structural change. Navarro (2003) similarly discounts the importance of 
following the consensus of the centrals’ bases, which decided that their organisations 
should sign the agreement with government, as if the leadership should see beyond the ill-
informed, misguided (mystified) ideas of those below them for the more important struggle 
for social change. However, Max Correa, national president of the CCC, indicates how 
difficult it is for his organisation, and the centrals in general, to combine the need to meet 
the demands of its members - something the above writers fail to examine - with systemic 
struggles. 
‘Some have the idea that instead of dedicating ourselves to the macro vision 
we focused on the micro of the operation rules of the programmes but it’s not 
like that because, at the end of the day, you have to understand that a macro 
agreement needs to produce results at the micro level. And at the micro level 
these results are achieved in the operation rules. There is where it says how 
much, how and where something concrete is going to be received by the 
people. Others say that we were only interested in securing organisational 
budgets (with state institutions and federal and state governments), not in 
changes to public policy, but you also have to ask another question - what do 
the people gain? So yes, you need to have a strategic long-term vision, 
structural transformations, but at the same time you have to be always giving 
solutions to the people in a concrete way. We carry on pressuring the 
government because it didn’t fulfil what it signed…but other organisations 
don’t have grassroots bases and aren’t obliged to respond to them with 
concrete things’. Max Correa, CCC national president (11 February 2013, 
Mexico City). 
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Max Correa makes another important observation with regard to organisational structure. 
Not only do the centrals represent a different class base with different class based demands 
to those of production oriented organisations; there are also important differences 
between these two types of organisations in terms of structure that shape how these 
demands are expressed and responded to. 
We saw earlier how UNORCA emerged to articulate the struggle for ejidal surpluses and for 
the promotion and support of peasant production more generally. In chapter two the 
origins of ANEC as an organisation representing producers of basic grains was discussed. 
CNOC’s origins are similar to those of ANEC in that it sought peasant control of state 
infrastructure and services for the coffee sector (rather than basic grains) as the state 
withdrew from peasant support in these areas. The two fundamental differences that these 
organisations have with regard to the centrals is a) the class composition of their bases and 
b) their organisational structures, both of which have led to them engaging with the state in 
different ways as they attempt to meet the specific demands of their memberships. 
The production oriented organisations of MECAM represent market-oriented peasants 
whose core demands are not social in nature. They tend to be previously relatively well 
established producers that worked closely with state institutions responsible for productive 
and marketing assistance in the developmentalist era and that have seen markets for their 
goods, and their ability to viably produce them, adversely affected or destroyed by 
neoliberal policies. These organisations do not experience internal pressures to meet 
peasants’ immediate material demands through access to state resource channels as they 
were never constituted on this basis. Rather than a hierarchical structure they operate 
more as a hub in a network of regionally autonomous producer organisations. Not only are 
their members relatively better off than most of those in the centrals; more importantly 
than that in terms of their class composition and interests, they are more market 
dependent. Rather than seeking (relative) autonomy from the market as the majority of 
CIOAC’s coffee growers do in Chiapas and Oaxaca, the members of production oriented 
organisations seek more equitable, or ‘fair’ integration into the market through state 
support and regulation, and the restriction of the power of agribusiness TNCs to shape 
markets in their favour. The latter necessarily demands structural change to the neoliberal 
accumulation model as their members are facing production and reproduction crises as a 
direct result of neoliberal economic policies that have removed state support for 
production and destroyed their markets by allowing heavily subsidised imports to flood the 
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internal market. Their market dependent members will continue struggling to survive and 
leaving the land unless neoliberal policies are reversed. Structural change is the only way 
that their members’ demands can be met. However, for the centrals, whose members’ core 
demands are based on social service provision followed by support for production - 
production based predominantly on the logic of achieving relative autonomy from the 
market rather than for increased integration into it - leaders work on the basis that real 
material improvements can still be provided to their members within the current model. 
According to these organisations’ leaders this is best achieved through a close working 
relationship with state legitimating institutions on the basis of maximising their 
organisation’s budgets with such institutions and ensuring that corporatist ties are not cut, 
but rather strengthened. The difference between these two distinct strategies - as a result 
of their distinct class bases and organisational structures - is clear in the three statements 
below, the first by CIOAC’s national secretary, the second by CODUC’s national president 
and the last by ANEC’s national leader. 
‘Their (ANEC) work is more business oriented (empresarial), ours is more social. 
Being a social organisation with a membership, with a social base, what we 
have to do is negotiate with the government. If you dedicate yourself to 
attending to a group of people, but for this group of people you have to deal 
with SEDESOL (Secretary for Social Development), but you don’t get on with the 
representative then they’re not going to attend to you and that’s going to 
screw the people’.  José Dolores López Barrios, CIOAC’s national secretary (11 
February 2013, Mexico City). 
(ANEC) is not a union based organisation. We are two distinct interests. CODUC 
is a union organisation whereas they dedicate themselves…to the issue of 
marketing - it is not a union organisation. You can’t deny that they have a 
political proposal and we coincide in some things, but in practice we differ. We 
coincide in our position against the government, but in practice they act in 
another way because of the interests of their group.’ Marco Antonio Ortiz 
Salas, CODUC’s national leader (1 February 2013, Mexico City). 
‘ANEC is an organisation of proposals, it doesn’t originate (like the centrals) 
from clientelism, PRI corporatism. We suggest proposals against the neoliberal 
system with new systems of organisation, without the vices of historic 
organisations… The peasant movement is not structured around a productive 
model…just paternalism, paternalism, paternalism. The peasant says - give me 
- and so if you want to have members you give them. In the moment we went 
to the table with government to try to change public policy they went to 
negotiate state resources for those that signed the agreement and we’re 
against this…against clientelism. But they, their members, their clientele, live 
off this. They are specialists in accessing resources, not in constructing 
autonomous organisations’. Victor Suarez, ANEC’s Executive Director (8 
February 2013, Mexico City). 
209 
 
The issue of clientelism highlighted by Victor Suarez in the above statement came to the 
fore in MECAM with the signing of the National Agreement for the Countryside and 
subsequently. However, rather than a simple process of leadership co-optation by the state 
implied overtly (Concheiro & Quintana, 2004) or tacitly (Celis, 2005; Navarro, 2003), 
clientelism and co-optation have historically shaped the politics and expectations within 
peasant centrals at all levels and in peasant movement-state relationships more generally. 
The centrals’ leaders organise and mobilise their members with the counter-hegemonic 
discourse of food sovereignty and demands to end neoliberal policies as a political strategy 
whose main objective - and achievement - is to increase access to the state’s hegemonic 
apparatus in the form of maintaining or increasing organisational budgets. Their use of food 
sovereignty discourse is not, in practice, counter-hegemonic as it seeks the continuation 
and expansion of the state’s neoliberal legitimation apparatus, not its transformation. This 
is not to suggest that CIOAC’s leaders are in favour of neoliberal economic policies. Rather 
their subordinate dependence on the state’s apparatus of legitimacy is based on not 
actively disputing its role in promoting neoliberalism. MECAM’s breakdown, although based 
on the different class and organisational structures of its constituent organisations and the 
distinct strategies employed to try to meet their interests, was accelerated by the state’s 
strategy of division through clientelism. It has since left the Mexican peasant movement 
weaker than it was in the decade leading up to MECAM.  
Following MECAM, members of the CAP not only managed to reverse Fox’s attempts to end 
with the state’s corporatist relations in the countryside; they actually reinforced them. Even 
Salinas’s reconfiguration rural corporatist relations did not achieve the relative control of 
the countryside and division of the peasant movement that has followed MECAM. The 
movement’s growing strength in opposition to the state elicited a response largely sought 
by the centrals themselves; the re-opening of neo-corporatist/institutionalised client 
channels and spaces within the state apparatus for these organisations. Not only did the 
Fox administration re-open these channels; it expanded them via a proliferation of rural 
social programmes administered by peasant organisations themselves, and the 
establishment of organisation specific annual budgets with state legitimating institutions. 
Increasing the presence of the ‘autonomous’ peasant movement within the legitimation 
apparatus of the state contributed to deepening the former’s dependence on the latter. It 
also increased the peasant movement’s subordination to the state, and its role in the social 
control of its own bases and of the Mexican countryside in general. This has further 
weakened the Mexican peasant movement’s capacity to push for fundamental changes to 
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policy and the neoliberal accumulation model more broadly. It’s counter-hegemonic force, 
critical for any advance in its ‘war of position’ with the state in favour of food sovereignty, 
has again been neutralised by the state and Mexico’s political culture imbued with 
corporatist, clientelist and patrimonial relations. It has further deepened CIOAC (and other 
centrals’) functional dependence on the state for their survival, which involves managing 
for the state their own grassroots bases. Counter-hegemonic struggles have been rejected 
or taken on a simulated, functional form aimed at demonstrating mobilisational and 
electoral strength to secure or retain state resource access, not to challenge and oppose 
the state and its role in promoting an accumulation model systematically destroying the 
viability of the peasant economy. CIOAC’s focus on state resources, rather than combining 
with oppositional struggles that demand access to state resources as a fundamental right of 
its members while simultaneously demanding fundamental changes to the accumulation 
model itself, has effectively substituted counter-hegemonic struggles.  
The following section will examine how, under very different conditions and circumstances, 
Ecuador’s national peasant-indigenous movement, FENOCIN in particular, has engaged with 
the ‘anti-neoliberal’ state project of Rafael Correa. It will show that, like CIOAC, increased 
integration of FENOCIN into the state apparatus, rather than resulting as expected in 
increased influence within the state to influence policy in its favour, has weakened the 
movement’s strength and counter-hegemonic potential, albeit via very different 
mechanisms as a result of distinct organisational structures and modes of state 
intervention. 
 
4.6 Organisational Structures and Counter-Hegemony in 
Ecuador’s Food Sovereignty Movement 
 
FENOCIN is a pyramidal structured confederation but, unlike CIOAC, its base organisations 
exercise considerable organisational autonomy with respect to internal decision-making. 
Their internal structures are not only relatively democratic in terms of leadership; they are 
also far more participatory and deliberative than their Mexican counterparts. Regular 
(typically weekly) meetings take place in both Andean and coastal organisations and involve 
participatory discussion that guide organisational activities and strategies within prevailing 
local, regional and national political and economic contexts. Most CIOAC municipal 
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organisations similarly convene weekly meetings in Chiapas and Guerrero, but these are 
closely related to issues regarding state projects and electoral issues. They are 
overwhelmingly led by municipal leaders and membership participation, while certainly 
active, is more important for determining who accesses state resources rather than guiding 
organisational strategy and forming the basis of programmes of struggle which, as we saw 
in the previous section, are largely determined by the leaders.  In FENOCIN, local and 
regional constituent organisations are not subject to the decisions and demands of the 
national leadership which acts instead as a central hub for articulating the demands and 
struggles of its bases and elaborating proposals and strategies on the basis of regular 
meetings between the national committee and the leadership groups of its member 
organisations (at least until the recent past and the government of Correa which, as we will 
see, has led to a crisis of representation for FENOCIN’s national leaders)16. Although the 
internal structures of FENOCIN's constituent organisations vary in terms of their class 
compositions (see chapter two), relatively democratic leadership structures in which 
leaderships are periodically replaced by internal elections predominate. State intervention, 
a central element in shaping organisational structure and the potential to construct, retain 
and exercise counter-hegemony, has historically not been defined by corporatist relations 
and resource channelling to organised subaltern groups and has, as a result, helped 
organisations retain their political autonomy and their internal democracy to a much 
greater extent than is the case in Mexico. So too did the proliferation of NGOs in Ecuador 
from the 1980s onwards. While the NGO model may arguably have contributed to the 
gradual process of substitution of radical, structural demands for a focus on identity politics 
and struggles for ‘rural development’ decoupled from issues of land and wealth 
concentration (Breton, 2008 & 2013), it nevertheless allowed peasant organisations to 
retain a far greater degree of political autonomy than their Mexican counterparts, 
subordinated and dependent as the latter were to the state under the neo-corporatist 
model. As a result, FENOCIN was able to retain a high degree of autonomy from the state - 
essential for the development and maintenance of independent sociocultural and political 
consciousness as the basis of counter-hegemony (Buttigieg, 1995: 19) - until the rise of 
Correa and his political movement.  
                                                          
16 As discussed in chapter 2, FENOCIN’s national leadership – traditionally based in the Andes – have neglected 
coastal organisations over recent decades and, more recently, even lost the support of some Andean groups as 
a result of alleged undemocratic decision-making. However, the national leadership has not historically 
interfered in the internal workings of its regional organisations where autonomy with regard to organisational 
strategy, political alliances and work with state institutions and NGOs has been – and remains – considerable. 
Rather, the national leadership is accused by some member organisations of acting unilaterally without the 
knowledge or support of the grassroots on issues of FENOCIN’s national policies and political strategies. 
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In the 1980s, FENOCIN leaders formed in the land struggle and ideologically guided by the 
struggle for socialism, like CIOAC, failed to update their arguments and strategies to the 
needs of its bases suffering the consequences of neoliberal transition and the leadership 
lost legitimacy (FENOCIN, 1999: 45). FENOCIN languished as demand for land was either 
fulfilled or diminished and leaders failed to adapt the organisation to the changing needs of 
its now landed mass base (Zamosc, 1994: 47). It stagnated as a social force and, according 
to its own leadership, became an organisation of paternalistic support based on providing 
the membership with resources from a reconfigured state apparatus of legitimation, 
namely the rapidly expanding NGO sector, international foundations and development 
agencies that attempted to fill the void left by state withdrawal. According to Pedro de la 
Cruz, FENOCIN's national leader from 1996 to 2009, as the management of these resources 
became more centralised, less democratic practices developed and the leadership and 
organisational direction became more personal, more 'caudillista' (Ibid: 48). Participation in 
the CONAIE uprisings of the 1990s and a change of FENOCINs leadership led to the 
organisation's internal restructuring and 'the institutionalisation of a new democratic 
culture for decision making' in which the role of the national leadership committee was 
reconfigured from an executive function to one of coordination in an attempt to return 
power of decision making closer to the bases (Ibid: 94). Participative decision making 
processes were instituted and a new organisational programme based on workshops with 
base organisations was implemented that prioritised lines of work in each union (Ibid: 96). 
The result was a significant upsurge in the organisation as a social force. It articulated a new 
discourse founded on indigenous and class based demands, including the recognition of 
Ecuador as an intercultural nation, indigenous cultural and territorial rights as well as 
demands for democratisation of land and water. 
Despite the national indigenous-peasant movement’s support of Gutierrez’s government, 
the independent organising tradition and political autonomy from the state historically 
exercised by Ecuador’s social movements meant that the debilitating effects of Gutierrez’s 
neoliberal turn were not catastrophic, especially for FENOCIN who had not entered 
government. FENOCIN’s leaders, following the organisation’s restructuring, were able to 
return to their bases and regroup a counter-hegemonic force based on a discourse that 
combined struggles for democratisation of land and water access, indigenous rights claims 
and support for peasant production backed up by a mobilised mass base that demanded an 
end to Gutierrez’s government. Unlike CIOAC in Mexico, FENOCIN’s organisational structure 
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and practices have historically been much more conducive to the development and 
retention of counter-hegemony. FENOCIN’s relatively high levels of internal democracy and 
participative decision-making practices from the mid-1990s onwards, combined with the 
state’s relative lack of corporatist practices or interference in the internal structures of 
Ecuador’s social organisations in general, has encouraged the development of an 
independent socio-cultural and political consciousness and construction of counter-
hegemonic discourses and practices that are only possible when leaders are embedded in, 
and held accountable to, their bases. In Otero’s (2004a: 225) terms, FENOCIN, at least from 
1996 to 2006, was a ‘popular-democratic’ organisation able to develop and mobilise an 
alternative hegemonic project. Rather than top-down dissemination of leaders’ decisions 
and strategies, FENOCIN’s proposals had, until the rise of Correa, tended to be driven from 
the bottom up. This is not to downplay the organisation’s internal problems, namely the 
historic domination of Andean over coastal interests, or decisions taken unilaterally at 
times by some national leaders once in power; despite these, the organisation’s structure 
has proved resilient to the maintenance of counter-hegemony as evidenced by its 
mobilisational capacity and the nature of its demands from the land reform era to its 
rejection of, and powerful mobilisations against, neoliberalism in the course of the 1990s to 
the early 2000s.  
As a result of Gutierrez’s neoliberal policies, waves of inconformity and spontaneous social 
protest continued across the country in response to the worsening economic situation. 
These waves of unrest were expressed in the 2006 presidential elections with the support 
of an ‘anti-systemic’ candidate whose strength derived from his criticism of the traditional 
political elite and his promise to reverse neoliberal policies. This candidate, Rafael Correa, 
an ex-minister of the economy, based his electoral campaign on a discourse very closely 
aligned to that used by Ecuador’s social movements over the preceding decade. With the 
support of the social movements, he reached the presidency and once in power managed 
to marginalise traditional political parties by convoking a constituent assembly that would 
reconfigure the national political landscape. 
The aim of redefining and restructuring the state via a national constituent assembly had 
been a demand of the social movements and other leftist political forces since 1999 and 
was made a reality by a government considered ‘close’ to the former, without being 
considered their own; it proposed changes in line with those demanded by the movements, 
but these did not involve concrete agreements between the two sides and Correa had 
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never been directly involved with Ecuador’s social organisations. Instead, Correa’s 
proposals were based on a new political project named ‘the citizen revolution’ that aimed 
to respond first and foremost to recent mobilisations by urban populations (Muñoz, 2010: 
156). The urban focus of the citizen revolution is critical for understanding Correa’s project 
to re-establish the state as the driver of efficient and more equitable capitalist 
development, and therefore his relationship with the peasant-indigenous movement. This 
project, in a similar way to Salinas’ modernisation project in Mexico, is based on access to 
cheap food for the mass of the labour force as a core element of making the national 
economy more competitive in an increasingly liberalised world market. This goal is 
fundamentally at odds with Ecuador’s peasant movement and its struggles for food 
sovereignty.  
April 2007 saw the formation of Ecuador’s National Constituent Assembly following a 
national referendum, a massive achievement for the peasant-indigenous movement. Hopes 
ran high among social movements that this was the political opening that they had long 
desired (Becker, 2011: 49). However, in the September 2007 elections for constituent 
assembly delegates Correa consolidated his power by winning a majority of seats. This 
granted him important room for manoeuvre regarding the shaping of the constitution. He 
had campaigned without a party but once in power constructed a new political movement - 
‘Alianza País’ (Country Alliance - AP). AP won nearly 70 percent of the votes for the 
assembly and FENOCIN’s national leader at the time, Pedro de la Cruz, became an AP 
delegate. De la Cruz, along with many other indigenous leaders, including some that had 
broken away from Pachakutic (the national indigenous party), aligned themselves with AP 
in the belief that they could most effectively influence the contents of the new constitution 
by working within Correa’s government (Ibid: 50). This decision would later prove critical 
for their organisations’ counter-hegemonic struggles once Correa began to backtrack on 
promises he had made to the movement in order to gain the presidency. Zibechi (2005) 
argues, with reference to CONAIE leaders’ insertion into Gutierrez’s government, that 
instead of being an alternative to state power, as it had been over the course of the 1990s, 
the indigenous movement’s leaders began a strategy of conquest of state power that had 
never before entered into the plurinational, anti-neoliberal political project. Doing so with 
little or no consultation with its bases and no concrete programmatic agreements with 
Gutierrez, the organisations lost support from the grassroots through their own actions. 
The same process took place with FENOCIN and other smaller peasant organisation leaders 
in their uncritical alliance with Correa. Even after the recent crisis that Ecuador’s social 
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movement had experienced through its integration with Gutierrez’s government, it was 
widely believed that this time the move from opposition to positions of power within the 
state would be different, that fundamental changes to the state and neoliberal policies 
could be achieved within Correa’s government and embedded in state institutions.  
The assembly itself was a space of genuine participation for broad sectors of Ecuadorian 
society. According to Unda (2011: 115), the proposals made by social movements found 
channels that allowed them to realise their demands, at least on paper in the new 
constitution. The process of drafting the constitution, especially the chapters relating to 
food sovereignty, was a hegemonic struggle for consensus over the scope and meaning of 
the term and the policies that would be required to bring it about. FENOCIN, the most 
important social organisation in terms of drafting proposals for domestic agrarian policy, 
proposed concrete commitments from the state to support small and medium sized 
producers, a necessity it argued for the achievement of food sovereignty. It also proposed 
state support to distribute land to the peasant sector to be complemented by affordable 
credit, state funded training, the prohibition of genetically modified materials and defence 
and promotion of locally adapted seeds. However, the ideological heterogeneity of AP and 
the state bureaucracy proved to be one of the greatest barriers to FENOCIN’s proposals. So 
too were agribusiness interests and supermarket chains (Supermaxi and PRONACA in 
particular) whose influence, though less overt, was none the less significant in the drafting 
of the constitution, allied to or inserted as they were (and remain) in the state bureaucracy, 
namely the Ministry of Agriculture (MAGAP).  
MAGAP and the Ministry of Coordination of Social Development tried to convince the 
assembly that rural development policy should be based on productive chains between 
peasants and big agricultural companies (Garcés, 2008). In addition, Correa himself was 
against FENOCIN’s proposal which he saw as a threat to his citizen revolution project; his 
plans for the productive development of agriculture involved GMOs and encouraging 
investment from transnational agricultural capital. Without the income that this would 
generate his project to re-centre the state as the driver of (capitalist) development would 
not be possible; for him, land redistribution and support for the peasant sector would not 
only discourage private capital investment but also drain the economy of the resources 
necessary for his hegemonic project. The result was a final constitution in which ‘food 
sovereignty’ was recognised as a guiding state policy, but without the core elements of 
FENOCIN’s proposals.  
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There remains the crystallisation of the struggle for hegemony within the constitution itself. 
The state was forced to recognise the food sovereignty discourse and incorporated it into 
its project to legitimate itself in Ecuadorian civil society. However, the state’s partial 
incorporation of counter-hegemony significantly weakened the movement’s force as Correa 
appropriated the food sovereignty discourse without the practical measures required to 
make the organisation’s proposals reality. The final version of the constitution contains 
contradictory articles pertaining to food sovereignty and their openness to interpretation. 
Article 281 states that food sovereignty constitutes ‘a strategic objective of the state’ to 
guarantee that all people, communities and nationalities have self sufficiency in healthy 
foods that are culturally appropriate. Article 282 says that the state will regulate equitable 
access to land and that the latifundio and the concentration of land are prohibited. 
However, in article 321 the state claims to recognise and guarantee the right to private 
property, provided it meets its ‘social and environmental function’, the meaning of which is 
nowhere specified, while Article 323 declares that any form of confiscation of property is 
prohibited (Political Database of the Americas, 2011). 
CONAIE critically supported the new constitution; it had not given them everything they 
demanded but it did represent advances for indigenous peoples, it was a strike against 
neoliberalism and a step towards opening up democratic participation (Becker, 2011: 59). 
FENOCIN, however, aligned itself completely with not just the new constitution but also 
Correa’s overall political project. CONAIE had already suffered the consequences of allying 
itself with the national government and was not going to uncritically support the new 
administration. FENOCIN and other smaller organisations, on the other hand, remained 
convinced not only of the new government, but also that it must support it absolutely and 
from within. The move from counter-hegemony to incorporation within Correa’s emerging 
hegemonic project presented itself as a ‘natural’ step to take for many peasant-indigenous 
leaders outside of CONAIE. 
‘We always questioned the state, even to the point of fighting against it. But 
when Correa assumed the presidency, the presidential campaign was 
fundamentally for change. Many governments had betrayed us before, but 
Correa came and convened the organisations and we came to incorporate 
ourselves in the new constitution that recognises the denouncements of the 
organisations’ struggles as rights’. José Agualsaca, national president of the 
FEI (10 April 2013, Quito). 
For FENOCIN, FEI, FENACLE and CNC-EA - Ecuador’s major indigenous/peasant 
organisations after CONAIE - 2006 was marked not only by their support for Correa’s 
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presidency but complete adhesion to his government (Trujillo, 2010: 16). By backing their 
proposals and using their discourses around food sovereignty, land and water 
democratisation, ‘interculturality’ etc. Correa hoped to create a political counterweight to 
the more powerful and well organised CONAIE, a major protagonist in the overthrow of 
Mahuad and Gutierrez and a potential threat to the stability of his own regime. The 
incorporation of these smaller organisations was an attempt by the nascent regime to 
consolidate a hegemonic bloc that could generate and expand the necessary consensus for 
Correa’s government and hegemonic project and protect it from counter-hegemonic forces 
on the far right, namely the Guayaquil business elite and the still powerful conservative 
landlord class. By favouring these smaller confederations at the beginning of his presidency 
and granting them official recognition as legitimate interlocutors of rural interests, Correa 
weakened CONAIE’s claim to speak for all native peoples (Becker, 2013: 10). The adhesion 
of FENOCIN to Correa’s government allowed it greater space of public action and 
recognition despite being less powerful than CONAIE, but had a significant impact on the 
organisation’s political autonomy. This served the government in the process of defining 
and legitimating proposals in the constituent assembly as CONAIE was no longer the 
overwhelmingly dominant organisation that could claim representation; it became a voice 
among others and FENOCIN acquired the greatest recognition within decision making 
apparatuses (Trujillo, 2010: 17). 
On 18 February 2009 Ecuador’s new food sovereignty law came into effect, enshrining in 
the country’s legal system articles 281 and 282 of the new constitution. However, as Correa 
has consolidated power it has become increasingly clear that his conception of food 
sovereignty is very much at odds with that of the peasant movement whose own vision was 
enshrined in the constitution and the law. Correa has appropriated the food sovereignty 
discourse, emptied the term of its original content and re-filled it with his own notions that 
now guide rural policy. The internal fragmentation and weakening of the peasant-
indigenous movement - namely the wedge the state has driven between CONAIE and other 
smaller, previously marginalised organisations such as FENOCIN, FEI, and FENACLE - has 
certainly not helped the food sovereignty movement to counter Correa’s strategy17. 
                                                          
17 While a number of writers rightly point out that Correa has been highly successful in weakening CONAIE (and 
political opposition in general) - one of the most vocal and powerful critics of his presidency and political project 
- through co-optation of social movement leaders into AP (de la Torre, 2010: 164; Unda, 2011: 120) and support 
for competing, smaller organisations such as FENOCIN that align with his project (Novo, 2010), tensions within 
the indigenous peasant movement were already prevalent prior to Correa’s rise to power. These were based on 
the perception of smaller organisations such as FENOCIN that CONAIE was increasingly dominating spaces 
within the state apparatus and control of state resources at the expense and active exclusion of other 
organisations following its participation in Gutierrez’s government, and that its discourse had become 
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However, the AP government’s hegemonic citizen revolution project has been highly 
successful in legitimising its own notion of food sovereignty and the policies put in place to 
implement it. This has not only received support from wide sectors of Ecuadorian society, 
but also from much of the grassroots bases of peasant organisations themselves despite 
the protestations of their national leaderships. FENOCIN’s internal structures and Correa’s 
policies of engaging with, discrediting and bypassing peasant organisations is central to 
understanding the food sovereignty movement’s weakening over the course of Correa’s 
presidency. The Ecuadorian state has gained support from grassroots communities whose 
leaders - increasingly drawn from their bases physically and ideologically as a result of their 
adhesion to Correa’s government and emphasis on high level negotiations and presence in 
state institutions at the expense of community level work - have failed to shape the food 
sovereignty discourse around their specific needs. As a result, Correa’s own notions of the 
term, and the policies that support it, have gained consensus among much of the rural 
population whose national organisations appear increasingly redundant now that the 
government ‘is on their side’. 
Correa’s own notion of food sovereignty, although not officially articulated, has been 
demonstrated in practice to a) not be based on democratisation of Ecuador’s still highly 
unequal agrarian structure (central to the food sovereignty movement’s own demands and 
the 2008 constitution), and b) be focused on increasing the productivity and efficiency of 
small- and medium-sized producers conceived as private farmers along capitalist lines. This 
is opposed to the centrality of sustainability, and the fostering and promotion of crop 
diverse agro-ecosystems, as the overriding objectives for the food sovereignty movement. 
In December 2008, when the food sovereignty law was still being drafted, Correa gave the 
first public indications that his position was at odds with that of the national peasant 
movement and the words of the constitution, and that putting the concept into practice 
may require adapting some of the constitutional agreements. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
increasingly ethnocentric and exclusionary of the non-indigenous population. Correa’s strategy developed these 
tensions to weaken CONAIE by driving a wedge between it and other peasant-indigenous organisations. At the 
organisational level, CONAIE appropriated control of CODENPE (Development Council of the Nationalities and 
Peoples of Ecuador) and state run bilingual education for itself, excluding other organisations. At the community 
level the ethnification of its discourse often excluded non-indigenous, or non-kichwa speaking people from 
access to its structures and the state resources it was able to mobilise. 
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‘We studied the food sovereignty law. Unfortunately in this there are still many 
ambiguities, a lot of imprecision…because food sovereignty isn’t a clear 
concept. What is food sovereignty according to the constitution? It’s not even 
‘food security’…it’s a list of good intentions: to combat poverty, so the people 
eat well, to give work to small producers, for land distribution…But this then 
doesn’t coincide with their concept of ‘food sovereignty’ which is understood as 
the country not being vulnerable in terms of food, right?...food sovereignty 
(according to the food sovereignty movement) is that we have, from the 
communities, from the little towns, from the parishes, from the cantons - food 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY! This is a barbarity! Because this would mean that every 
parish, in every family, in the plots (huertos) would have to plant from potatoes 
to rice, even have hens, pigs, cows…so that every person is food self-sufficient. 
That is a barbarity! It’s not possible. It’s not desirable...Why act against the 
principles of the modern economy, such as that of specialisation? That’s to say: 
if there’s land that’s good for potatoes and there’s other land that’s good for 
rice, well then one produces potatoes and the other rice, but not all potatoes 
and rice! That is inefficient, right?’ Rafael Correa, Enlace Ciudadano 99, 13 
December 2008. 
The above quote demonstrates not only Correa’s criticisms of the food sovereignty law as 
inefficient and unworkable, but also the intentional misrepresentation of the movement’s 
proposals to the masses (aided by direct access to the population via a mass media he 
increasingly controls) as part of a strategy of delegitimising both the proposals and the 
organisations themselves. Elías Arias, one of FENACLE’s national leaders, confirms this 
process: 
‘This government has come to power with the discourse of the social 
organisations. Agrarian reform - now the government takes it as a component 
of its work to show that it is fulfilling (its obligations) towards society…In the 
issue of family agriculture there is still no clear definition despite the food 
sovereignty law. We entered into debate with MAGAP that used to define that 
Ecuador should prioritise food security, that products enter to secure food 
supply instead of family production supplying the national market. There have 
been significant advances in this process, but the limitations are that the 
government has appropriated the political discourse’. Elías Arias, member of 
FENACLE’s national directive (7 May 2013, Guayaquil). 
Amongst peasant organisation leaders there is worry and frustration regarding Correa’s 
strategy and, more importantly, its success in reshaping the discourse of the movements 
that took him to power in a way that does not question the prevailing agrarian structure 
and which has still managed to retain, even consolidate, the power of Correa’s government 
and its legitimacy in the eyes of the mass of the population. Romelio Gualán, national 
president of the CNC-EA, describes how spaces to influence state policy have closed up to 
social organisations as Correa has consolidated power. 
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‘The government has stopped talking about the agrarian revolution. The 
government hasn’t provided a space so that social organisations can influence 
public policies, because of this we are really weak. Now MAGAP isn’t taking 
into account the suggestions of the social organisations. It gave us the agrarian 
roundtable just to justify that it is including the opinions of the social 
organisations when in reality it is not…MAGAP wants to control everything’. 
Romelio Gualán, national president of CNC-EA (11 April 2013, Quito). 
Romelio’s comments confirm Poulantzas’ (1980: 143) observation that popular masses 
cannot hold power in the state because of the unity of state power wielded by the 
dominant classes who shift the centre of real power from one apparatus to another as soon 
as the relationship of forces within any given one seems to be swinging to the side of the 
popular masses. FENOCIN’s struggles to occupy and administer COPISA - Plurinational and 
Intercultural Conference on Food Sovereignty - (an ‘autonomous’ [from the state] citizen 
body created in 2009 ‘to generate a wide process of debate for the construction of 
proposals for law, public policies and programmes around the issue of food sovereignty, 
with the active participation of organisations of civil society and institutions of the state’ 
[COPISA, 2014]) highlight this problem. Initially Correa’s government set up the institution 
to elaborate water, land and environmental laws in line with the promises of the 
constitution. However, after much organisational effort was dedicated to working within 
COPISA to elaborate these law proposals over the following years, the administration 
simply ignored the institution as decision making and power concentrated in the executive. 
As the organisation’s bases were neglected by a leadership focused on change from within 
the highest levels of the state, Correa’s project reached down to grassroots rural 
communities which increasingly bought in to AP’s project and rejected the legitimacy of 
their own leaders and their (counter-hegemonic) demands. 
By 2010/2011 the peasant leaders that had uncritically supported Correa’s rise to power 
became increasingly concerned that the achievements they had made on the paper of the 
constitution were stalling in their conversion into actual policy and that the government 
was consolidating itself around a discourse and policies that were increasingly opposed to 
the organisations’ own proposals. A central demand of rural organisations in 2006 was the 
question of land reform on the basis of (re)distribution as a necessary component of food 
sovereignty. While the food sovereignty law promised in the 2008 constitution had been 
promulgated, that pertaining to land - a much more controversial issue - had not been dealt 
with. In light of the complexity of the land issue it had not been included in the Food 
Sovereignty Law and so elaboration of the promised land law was delegated COPISA (at 
that time ‘The National Food Sovereignty Conference’) to be processed through MAGAP 
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(Rosero, 2011: 83). The final version of COPISA’s proposal was released in December 2011 
and, as stipulated in the 2008 constitution, its most controversial aspect was the 
prohibition of the latifundio. Article 25 of the proposed law defined maximum extension 
limits for landed property; 500 hectares on the coast and Amazon region, and 200 hectares 
in the Sierra (COPISA, 2011).  
In short, the proposal implied the peasant movement’s partial withdrawal from Correa’s 
project with a counter-hegemonic proposal that rejected the direction of the government’s 
rural policy. It demanded a radical transformation of Ecuador’s agrarian structure that 
would necessarily involve mass expropriation of private property and its redistribution 
among the peasantry. In light of its controversial implications, the proposal remained stuck 
in negotiations between the executive, MAGAP and the national assembly with Correa and 
AP hoping that it would eventually be abandoned. However, the lack of government action 
on the issue would further increase tensions with social organisations increasingly critical of 
Correa’s regime. Correa, in turn, would tackle these organisations head on and focus more 
attention and state resources on promoting his own (state capitalist) model of rural 
development at odds with that of the food sovereignty movement. 
By 2012 COPISA’s land law proposal remained blocked in the bureaucracy with no 
foreseeable advance. In response various peasant organisations (including FEI and CNC-EA), 
led by FENOCIN, took direct action in an attempt to force the government to approve the 
peasant movement’s ‘own’ land law proposal. Under the Participation Law, social 
organisations are able to present legal proposals to the national assembly with the support 
of 25,000 national citizens. On 20 March 2012 FENOCIN led a march of over 3,000 people to 
deliver their land law proposal backed by 41,780 signatures which, by law, had to be 
discussed and approved within the National Assembly within 180 days of its submission. 
This proposal, claimed by the organisations submitting it as their own, was actually the 
work of SIPAE (System of Investigation for the Agrarian Problematic in Ecuador), a research 
institute based in Quito that had elaborated the proposal and already submitted it without 
response to the National Assembly almost two years earlier. It was based on the 
attendance of SIPAE researchers at COPISA’s workshops and, submitted by FENOCIN under 
the participation law, was very similar to that of COPISA’s own proposal. Fundamentally, 
both proposals advocated the same extension limits for rural property and the 
expropriation of properties exceeding these limits or not fulfilling their ‘social and/or 
environmental’ functions. FENOCIN’s decision to force the proposal through the assembly 
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via the participation law represented a direct challenge to Correa’s administration from a 
peasant movement up until that point either unconditionally supportive of the government 
or ‘critical’ without being confrontational. This marked an important turning point between 
the peasant movement and the government and the latter would become increasingly 
aggressive towards the former in response to this counter-hegemonic threat from below. 
The extract below from Luis Andrango, FENOCIN’s leader at the time, clearly indicates how 
the Correa administration’s strategy of dealing with the peasant movement changed 
decisively following the proposal’s submission. 
When this (the land law proposal) became more than an initiative, a socio-
political actor demanding a profound change, there began to change the 
attitude of the government... In this moment the government saw it (as) a 
threat to the political stability of the regime. In that moment the government 
position towards the organisation changed; the position isn’t now considering 
us allies, but opponents to the project...they knew that placing limits on the 
extensions of properties implied conflict with economic sectors strongly linked 
to the government. As a result they (the government) couldn’t say publicly that 
they didn’t back it, but they needed to eliminate and annul the actors 
demanding this issue’. Luis Andrango, FENOCIN National President 2008-2013 
(15 May 2013, Quito). 
Correa’s partial incorporation of counter-hegemony in the form of legitimating and 
incorporating into his project peasant organisations such as FENOCIN, as a necessary 
element of constructing its own hegemony, had reached its limit. As soon as counter-
hegemony appeared to threaten the material basis of Correa’s project - private property as 
the foundation of the accumulation model - it had to be eliminated. Such a radical proposal 
as land expropriation cannot be even partially incorporated into the project and so had to 
be neutralised or destroyed. That the regime’s policy opposes redistribution despite this 
being enshrined in the national constitution is confirmed by MAGAP’s Land Law Director. 
‘(Me) the government is never going to approve an extension limit, right?  
No, never... An extension limit would mean expropriation. If we’re talking about 
the sierra with extension of more than 200 hectares it would mean the 
expropriation of a good part of the productive land and would cost the state 
billions of dollars. The state doesn’t have the resources for this. We’re talking 
about a total structural change that would imply an enormous economic 
regression, a regression in terms of development for the citizenry that will 
affect the whole country. It’s not viable economically. What is more important 
is a minimum limit, not a maximum limit. ‘Minifundisation’ is a problem here 
and in the future we want to have legal limits to avoid land fragmentation’. Dr. 
André Córdoba, MAGAP’s land law director (16 May 2013, Quito). 
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In addition to Correa’s appropriation and reinterpretation of the food sovereignty 
movement’s discourse, FENOCIN’s leaders have been complicit in their organisation’s own 
weakening as a direct result of their political strategies that have distanced them from their 
bases and prioritised gaining access to spaces within the state and government positions 
over organisational work in grassroots communities. FENOCIN’s land law proposal, rather 
than representing an instance of organisational strength as it may appear on the surface, is 
better understood as a manifestation of this weakness. 
The proposal submitted to the National Assembly by FENOCIN was not the organisation’s 
own; it was the work of SIPAE on the basis of COPISA workshops. While these COPISA 
workshops were in some cases conducted in regions where FENOCIN’s members 
participated this was not the norm. When the organisation sought signatures from its 
Andean members in support of the proposal not only had the majority not participated in 
its elaboration; they had never before even seen or discussed the document. Prior to 
launching the initiative the FENOCIN leadership had not even disseminated it among most 
of its bases. The majority signed it because their leaders asked them to do so. This is 
manifested in the fact that the organisation has been unable to mobilise its bases once 
more in response to the law’s lack of progress in the National Assembly; a counter-
hegemonic force demanding its application could not be sustained as the majority of 
FENOCIN’s bases did not feel the proposal their own. As such, leaders could not call on 
them for sustained mobilisation. The extracts below, taken from interviews with FENOCIN 
members from three different regional organisations, confirm the problem of leadership’s 
growing separation from the base, especially the first given that it is from a community 
leader of UNORCAC, widely considered among FENOCIN’s members as the most influential 
constituent organisation. 
We’ve always told them (FENOCIN’s leaders) that sometimes their decisions 
come from above and because of this there are failures. Any proposal that is 
made has to come from the bases but it doesn’t happen like this. The Land Law 
couldn’t be approved because it comes from their offices without knowing 
what is required in the communities because they don’t come to consult us … If 
our proposals aren’t being heard then we don’t give any importance to the 
FENOCIN proposal’. Juan Ulquianga, president of UNORCAC’s producer 
association (1 April 2013, Cotacachi). 
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‘They never consulted with us regarding the land and water laws. They just tell 
us that we have to demand the government address the issues, but they never 
consult us. Their proposals come from the directive, not from the producers, at 
least here in Tungurahua’. Silvio Palacios, PACAT (Agroecological Producers 
and Associated Trade of Tungurahua) member (25 March 2013, Baños de 
Agua Santa, Tungurahua). 
‘The majority of the organisations remain at the margins. Only some are taken 
into account.  
(Me) Where do their proposals come from then?  
They come from their advisors; there are assemblies and there they present 
their ideas, what they want to do, and we say if we agree. Afterwards their 
technicians elaborate them. A handful of organisations run FENOCIN’. 
Malaquías Santos, president of UNOCYPP in the province of Pichincha (14 
April 2013, Puerto Quito). 
The above quotes again confirm Edelman’s (1999: 185) assertion, made earlier with 
reference to CIOAC, that the social movement literature tends to assume high levels of 
agreement between the aspirations of leaders and their grassroots bases. Scholars almost 
universally assume that demands expressed by organisational leaderships are pure 
reflections of those of their bases. In the case of Ecuador this has led to one-sided analyses 
which attempt to explain the weakening of the indigenous-peasant movement solely on 
external factors, namely Correa’s strategy of containing and weakening social organisations. 
This will now be analysed, but in the context of the FENOCIN leadership’s separation from 
its bases and how this has significantly weakened the organisation’s capacity to respond to 
Correa’s strategy. The organisation’s struggle for state power has weakened it as leaders 
have come to occupy spaces within the state apparatus without the power of decision 
making. Meanwhile, counter-hegemonic struggles guided by food sovereignty have become 
less viable as important sectors of the organisation’s mass base have come to largely 
support Correa’s project. 
 
4.7 Correa’s ‘Agrarian Debt’: Bypassing Social Movements 
In response to growing criticism from the national peasant movement leadership as a result 
of the lack of progress on the land law and concrete policies regarding food sovereignty, 
Correa’s re-election for a third term in office in 2013 was marked by the administration’s 
stated focus on rural policy and recognition of the government’s ‘debt’ (deuda agraria) with 
the countryside. Since the 2013 elections the AP administration has propagated a discourse 
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around this ‘debt’, and a set of policies and strategies designed to repay it whose objective 
is to decouple the issue of rural development from a still unimplemented land law and the 
unresolved issue of land concentration. As with the term ‘food sovereignty’, how the 
‘agrarian debt’ is conceived is a hegemonic ideological struggle for consensus in civil society 
between Correa and the social movements. For FENOCIN’s leaders this debt is synonymous 
with the lack of both a land law and concrete policies relating to food sovereignty. Correa, 
on the other hand, claims to be advancing in the repayment of the debt through 
productivity improvements. Between the government and the peasant organisations it has 
become a hegemonic ‘war of position’ to define what the agrarian debt consists of and gain 
consensus for this interpretation in Ecuadorian civil society in order shape debates and 
rural policy around it. 
‘After it (the agrarian debt) was recognised by the government an effort was 
made to describe what the agrarian debt is. On one side the organisations raise 
their own agenda that proposes certain elements; land redistribution, 
deprivatisation of water, promotion of agro-biodiversity, for a change in the 
logic of credit issues and forms of production - issues of marketing and 
storage...They (the government) describe the agrarian debt as a problem of 
agriculture, not of the democratisation of the means of production, but that 
fundamentally it is a problem of productivity and of improving the 
competitiveness of agriculture. And that is the policy of MAGAP...We both 
recognise the agrarian debt but there is a very big disagreement in how it is 
understood’. Luis Andrango, FENOCIN national president 2008-2013 (15 May 
2013, Quito). 
FENOCIN is currently in a very weak position to project its own interpretation of the ‘debt’ 
as a result of the combination of Correa’s multi-faceted attack on the peasant movement 
following the 2012 mobilisation and FENOCIN’s internal organisational structure and 
practices that have significantly weakened peasant movement opposition to the state. 
Similarly to CIOAC in Mexico, the political strategy of seeking presence within the state 
apparatus has come to dominate the work of the organisation and deepen the problem of 
leaders leading ‘on behalf of’, rather than in accordance with, the decisions of their bases. 
The insertion into the state apparatus that FENOCIN has achieved has become increasingly 
redundant as a site of power and influence over state policy. As the organisation’s bases 
were neglected by a leadership focused on change from within the highest levels of the 
state, Correa’s project reached down to grassroots rural communities that increasingly 
bought in to AP’s hegemonic project. 
One of the most important and effective strategies employed by the Correa administration 
to weaken the peasant-indigenous movement has been to develop direct links between the 
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state and rural communities that actively bypass national peasant organisations. This 
strategy is not simply a reaction to increasing criticism and opposition to his policies by 
social movement leaders (Becker, 2012: 126), although this certainly is a factor. It is the 
ideological basis of Correa’s overarching project of the citizen revolution and has been 
facilitated by the organisations’ leaders themselves whose focus on working within state 
institutions and Correa’s AP has come at the cost of distancing them physically and 
ideologically from their bases. Correa’s citizen revolution aims to abolish of the kind of 
sectoral interest representation embodied in social organisations such as FENOCIN. The 
goal of the project is to forge a more homogenous citizenry and strengthen the state by 
recuperating for the executive authority over all decisions regarding public policy (Ospina & 
Lalander, 2012: 16 & 47). According to Breton (2013: 86), contrary to state rhetoric of 
‘interculturality’, the citizen revolution has a universalist face of rights and responsibilities 
that hides its elitist and exclusionary nature; it ultimately aims, in Eurocentric fashion, to 
consolidate a homogenising social model with little real respect for demands for 
recognition and autonomy from the very groups that brought Correa to power.  
Social organisations agree with the project of state strengthening; the food sovereignty 
movement advocates a strong state to control TNC activities and intervene in the economy 
to promote peasant agriculture. However, they believe that this strengthening must go 
hand in hand with democratisation of decision making via direct participation of the 
organisations which, for the government, is interpreted as corporatising the state (Ibid: 47). 
Correa, in addition to removing funding for state institutions run for and by social 
organisations, has also designed and implemented rural programmes without the input of 
rural organisations in either their design or implementation. According to Novo (2010: 7) 
this is a continuation of Gutierrez’s policy of distributing money at the community level 
through social programmes to co-opt the grassroots and bypass their social organisations. 
The first of these actions has received much attention in the literature, for example the 
removal of funding for CODENPE (state funded National Indigenous Development Council) 
as well as the withdrawal of CONAIE’s control of the bilingual education directorate, putting 
it under administration of the Ministry of Education. These were highly controversial moves 
heavily criticised by CONAIE for acting unilaterally as president and for authoritarianism 
(Becker, 2011: 51). However, the literature has paid a little less attention to how Correa has 
designed rural policy to actively bypass social organisation structures, something 
particularly relevant to FENOCIN, and how peasant organisations’ relationships with their 
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own bases have facilitated the effectiveness of this policy and weakened their own capacity 
to act as a counter-hegemonic force. 
The most important state rural programmes implemented under Correa’s government have 
all been based on forging direct links between the state/Correa and communities or intra-
community groups. Similar to Salinas’ establishment of PRONASOL in the 1990s in Mexico, 
Correa’s direct poverty subsidies such as ‘socio-bosque’ and ‘socio-paramo’, both monetary 
transfers for preserving forests and marginal highland soils respectively, and ‘bono de 
vivienda’, another state hand-out to pay for housing materials, are based on direct cash 
payments. So too are those programmes aimed at increasing the productivity and efficiency 
of peasant production to repay the agrarian debt. All aim to work directly at the community 
level and make the role of national organisations such as FENOCIN redundant. Behind the 
provision of poverty subsidies is a ritual of promoting the image of Correa as giving to the 
most needy (de la Torre, 2010: 164), as doing a ‘favour’ to the poor which risks being 
revoked from communities or groups that criticise the regime (Tuaza, 2011: 146). The great 
part of Correa’s discourse is aimed at the poor, oppressed and disenfranchised, and 
projected frequently through the media, especially his weekly broadcasts to the nation. 
This discourse, combined with the subsidies, is aimed at translating the possibility of change 
to these ‘citizens’ that working with his project and the reformed state can achieve 
(Andrande, 2011: 65). Social organisations are no longer necessary - Correa is now on their 
side. 
In terms of the administration’s productivity based interpretation of the agrarian debt, 
MAGAP has implemented projects accessible only to production based organisations. These 
organisations, many of whose members belong to regional and national level social 
organisations such as FENOCIN, have been encouraged to separate social from productive 
issues and focus on the latter in order to receive state support. The extracts below from 
federal and municipal level state institutions respectively, indicate how the strategy of 
linking directly with community groups entirely on the basis of productive issues, without 
engaging with the social organisations they are a part of, operates at all administrative 
levels: 
‘We don’t work with FEI, or with FENOCIN. We work with the bases. We don’t 
work above (this level) because it’s very complicated. Those who buy the land 
are peasants, not organisations. They (the organisations) can help them (land 
recipients) in many things they may want to do - in training, agro-ecology, 
whatever. But this is independent of what the ministry does’. Lester Gudiño, 
MAGAP Plan Tierras technician (20 May 2013, Quito). 
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‘MAGAP only works with grassroots organisations because this way we can 
assure the greatest number of beneficiaries, the greatest efficiency of action.  
(Me) Why should groups not currently organised in a local productive 
association do so?  
Because organised it’s easier to receive help from the government and private 
businesses to improve their situation. Once organised they can join the 
(provincial) cacao table (‘mesa de cacao’) where all the entities that form the 
sector - MAGAP, local producer organisations, businesses, provincial 
government; direct actors - talk and negotiate the process; profitability, quality 
improvement, buying and selling etcetera’. Arturo Rivera, MAGAP agronomist 
for the municipality of Quinindé (16 April 2013, Quinindé). 
Peasant organisations protest that the agrarian debt cannot be repaid without profound 
structural changes (the democratisation of the means of production, namely land and 
water) and that productivity enhancements for the sake of increased capitalist productivity 
of small producers will only increase the dependence of the peasantry on an ultimately 
volatile and proletarianising capitalist market, deepening, not resolving, the agrarian crisis. 
However, Correa’s strategy of forging direct links with the rural population on the basis of 
productivity enhancement has been highly successful in weakening FENOCIN precisely 
because of the historic lack of attention paid by the organisation’s leaders to its members’ 
production problems. Many of FENOCIN’s coastal organisations, UROCAL in particular, had 
already distanced themselves from FENOCIN’s political struggles from the later-1990s as 
their new needs - based on making a living from land won - were no longer being 
adequately represented by the organisation. As such, they sought out and received 
assistance for production and marketing from NGOs that proliferated in the country from 
the early 1990s. Their production and reproduction strategies are far more dependent on 
commodity markets than their Andean counterparts who seek (more) land and support for 
agro-ecology on the basis of retaining relative autonomy from commodity markets through 
strengthening household subsistence capacity. Correa’s conception of food sovereignty - 
based on improving the productivity and efficiency of small farmers along capitalist lines - 
and re-centring the state as the driver of development, is responding to the historically 
neglected demands of coastal organisations. As such, the government’s current 
productivity focus has not surprisingly been well received by FENOCIN’s more market 
dependent coastal members. In terms of the cacao sector, FENOCIN’s coastal organisations 
are involved in MAGAP’s ten year cacao rejuvenation project targeted specifically at 
peasant producers of the national cacao variety. There is much excitement and hope 
among FENOCIN’s cacao producers regarding this plan which has brought them into a close 
working relationship with MAGAP and further distanced them from FENOCIN’s own 
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struggles, focused as they are on land and water democratisation that predominate in the 
sierra but not on the coast. Manuel Morales expresses his organisation’s support for Correa 
and describes the cacao project below. 
‘He (Correa) has done so many things. This year MAGAP is going to help us with 
the pruning - a technical team of 15 or 20 people from MAGAP will come with 
machines to do the pruning. It’s free for up to 800 plants or a maximum of one 
hectare. It’s to show producers how our cacao plots should look, for sunlight 
and everything. Then we can copy their example on the rest of the land. There’s 
also the Rural Schools Programme that help with training and marketing. They 
have also given us plants - we have an agreement (with MAGAP) to receive 
plants and training’. Manuel Morales, president of AACH, FENOCIN 
organisation in Chucaple, Esmeraldas, and part of FENOCIN’s national 
leadership committee (15 April 2013, Chucaple). 
Joaquín Vázquez, UROCAL president, is similarly positive regarding the increasingly 
interventionist role of the state in the cacao sector and in forging direct ties with producer 
organisations.  
‘(The state) has to help with quality of production and value added with public 
policies. The state also has to support producer negotiations (with buyers) 
because we are producers in a determined territory and because of this we 
can’t negotiate well with businesses. And I believe that there are conditions to 
do this because now, in this political conjuncture, there are possibilities to 
influence in these spaces. We have to convert producers with low yields of poor 
quality cacao into efficient producers with good quality production and with 
value added’. Joaquín Vázquez, UROCAL president (1 May 2013, Machala). 
The extract above from UROCAL’s president is particularly interesting as it highlights how 
both the thrust of rural policy and the interpretation of the agrarian debt by Correa’s 
government is very much in sync with market-dependent coastal peasants producing for 
export facing significant challenges regarding production and marketing. In contrast to their 
Andean counterparts, struggles for autonomy within commodity markets predominate over 
those for relative autonomy from them. These peasants are not focused on the 
democratisation of the means of production as a core aspect of their struggles and by 
implementing rural policy that improves their market competitiveness and volume of 
production, Correa has garnered a great deal of support from coastal producer groups. This 
not only helps legitimise his regime and market-oriented state policy for the peasant sector, 
but also weakens social organisation leaders concentrated in the Andes that are pushing for 
radical structural changes based on a rejection of the neoliberal market, not increased 
integration in to it. However, in the sierra there has also been a significant weakening of 
FENOCIN under Correa’s presidency despite the focus of demands supposedly reflecting the 
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interests of indigenous Andean peasants. Again, but in distinct ways, this has been the 
result of the combination of Correa’s strategy and that of the organisation’s leaders 
themselves. 
While the government has certainly sought to co-opt and divide social organisations (de la 
Torre, 2010: 164; Trujillo, 2010) and bypass their structures to link the state directly with 
grassroots rural communities (Novo, 2010), it is important to recognise that Correa’s 
presidency and his anti-poverty programmes have received widespread support across 
much of the sierra (between 2006 and 2009 social spending more than doubled, from 0.7 
percent of GDP to 1.8 percent [Ray & Kozameh, 2012: 12]). This is based not on rural policy 
as such - FENOCIN’s members in the sierra are overwhelmingly critical of the government in 
this respect. However, there is widespread belief that this will change with the 
government’s emerging discourse on the agrarian debt. The support for Correa’s 
government, and the genuine belief that rural policy will turn in their favour, is based on 
massive state investment in infrastructure improvements since AP came to power that have 
significantly improved the lives of many in the sierra18. The extracts below, taken from 
interviews with members of FENOCIN’s regional organisations in the Andean provinces of 
Tungurahua and Imbabura respectively, indicates this stance, common to other FENOCIN 
members in the Andes. 
‘(Correa’s government) has hardly benefitted us at all in terms of PACAT but, at 
the parish level it has helped us so much. Before his government we had only 
just got electricity, (we had) dirt roads, no drinking water; no services, just 
electricity. Thanks to this president $1.5 million came direct for the construction 
of drainage, in every house there’s drinking water, and he gave us free 
telephones’. Manuel Torres, Treasurer of PACAT (26 March 2013, San Juan 
Picaihua, Tungurahua ). 
‘Yes, we have seen improvements to transport routes, an education centre and 
other big projects here like the road between Cotacachi and Intag.  
(Me) but projects specifically for the countryside?  
This hasn’t changed much; it (the government) hasn’t created sources of 
employment, technology for the peasant sector, drinking water still hasn’t 
reached the highest communities, nor irrigation sources. The transport routes 
don’t solve these problems…The social debt continues and there’s still a lot to 
do, but this same government recognises this debt’. Juan Ulquianga, President 
of UNORCAC’s producer association (1 April 2013, Cotacachi). 
                                                          
18 Public sector investment increased from 21% of GDP in 2006 to 44% in 2013. The vast majority of this was 
destined to energy, infrastructure, and transportation projects, as well as social development (World Bank, 2014) 
and financed with oil revenues. 
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Correa’s infrastructure projects have been accompanied by targeted rural anti-poverty 
programmes that have increased support for his government and weakened social 
organisations like FENOCIN. Since their high-point in 2006 when they were able to 
significantly shape the national debate and constitution in ways that radically challenged 
the neoliberal model, they have been increasingly forced onto the back foot and into ever 
more reactionary responses to a government that has appropriated their discourses, 
appealed to and garnered support from these organisations’ mass bases, and moved to 
progressively close spaces of participation and influence within the state that these 
organisations have created and occupied. By meeting the material needs of grassroots 
communities through state programmes that bypass social organisations - whether this is 
based primarily on productivity improvements for coastal peasants or anti-poverty 
subsidies and programmes in the sierra - Correa has weakened FENOCIN through 
demobilisation of its mass bases and, in turn, weakened the counter-hegemonic threat they 
posed to the (capitalist) state and his regime with their discourse of fundamental, structural 
change. In the ideological ‘war of position’ for hegemony in civil society, Correa’s 
conception of the rural debt and productive and anti-poverty policies is winning out over 
the peasant movement’s more radical struggle for food sovereignty.  
Counter-hegemonic struggles necessarily require a mobilised and informed mass base and 
close alignment of the aspirations and ideology of leaders and their mass bases. However, 
as mass mobilisation tactics were rejected and political autonomy ceded in favour of 
complete adhesion to Correa’s government, work among the bases was neglected. As 
positions opened for leaders within AP, FENOCIN’s leaders at the national level focused on 
occupying these spaces and elaborating programmatic and law proposals with various 
‘experts’ and technicians rather than working closely with their grassroots organisations to 
organise and articulate demands, formulate proposals, and disseminate developments 
across their organisations. This has led to the widely held perception among the bases that 
FENOCIN’s proposals come from ‘experts’ (for example SIPAE), not the members 
themselves. Also, as a number of FENOCIN and other social organisation leaders were 
integrated into the government, for their members the organisations appeared to become 
a means for projecting their leaders to political positions, creating a loss of trust and 
weakening the organisations (Trujillo, 2010: 17). Rather than social organisations they are 
perceived by many to have become political movements taken over by leaders with 
aspirations of political careers within AP. 
232 
 
‘The (FENOCIN) leaders never come. They just want to use us…It’s a political 
movement; when it’s convenient for them they seek us out, for example if 
someone from FENOCIN wants a political position, they seek our support’. 
Silvio Palacios, PACAT member (25 March 2013, Baños de Agua Santa, 
Tungurahua). 
While FENOCIN was prioritising occupying government and state positions and neglecting 
work with its bases, the government’s double strategy of forging direct links with 
communities while paying only lip service to social organisation proposals became 
increasingly apparent. In the eyes of the bases, FENOCIN’s adhesion to Correa’s project, 
rather than strengthening the organisation and its ability to turn its proposals into concrete 
policies as its leaders had imagined, actually made the organisation increasingly redundant 
and unnecessary. Having historically based their struggles on anti-capitalist, anti-
government and anti-neoliberal foundations, the rise of Correa and his anti-neoliberal 
discourse made them appear increasingly irrelevant. 
‘We joined with FENOCIN because of their proposals, but now there’s nothing. 
Now the one who supports us is the government. Now we have the help of the 
government, something we never had before’. Silvio Palacios (25 March 2013). 
As FENOCIN’s members came to see their organisation as an uncritical ally of Correa’s 
project, and the government began to invest in social programmes and infrastructure 
development to the benefit of many marginalised rural areas, many saw little reason to 
continue actively in the organisation. Counter-hegemonic proposals and strategies in 
opposition to Correa’s policies are now largely an untenable option as the bases have for 
the most part bought in to Correa’s project. As the organisations that uncritically allied with 
Correa during his campaign and first few years of his presidency have become increasingly 
critical of the government, Correa has in turn sought to delegitimise these groups through 
an aggressive media campaign while also stepping up repression of dissent and 
criminalising protest (Lalander & Ospina, 2012). 
FENOCIN’s leadership, increasingly frustrated by the lack of opportunities to influence state 
policy from within its apparatus, and having adopted a political strategy centred on state 
integration and government alliance that had distanced it from a base that it could no 
longer consistently and strategically mobilise, became more radical in its discourse and 
criticisms of Correa as it became apparent that AP would not implement the radical 
proposals enshrined in the constitution. In FENOCIN’s 2013 national congress held in 
Guayas (at which I was present), the outgoing leadership retained its critical stance towards 
the Correa administration, emphasising that in the past eight years the countryside had not 
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been revolutionised as promised, that the state continues to favour agribusiness and 
export-agriculture, not small and landless peasants, and that land concentration has 
continued with no sign of redistributive policies. This would prove the final critical act of the 
organisation as former national leader Pedro de la Cruz, AP member and Correa ally, was a 
central influence in installing a new leadership with greater representation from coastal 
organisations and those from the sierra explicitly supportive of Correa. From 2013 onwards 
the organisation’s discourse has significantly changed as it has become once more a vocal 
supporter of Correa and the citizen revolution. On 27 August 2013 FENOCIN’s current 
president and leader of a regional present organisation in the coastal state of Guayas stated 
his support for Correa’s planned oil extraction in the Amazonian Yasuni national park. On 10 
July 2014, following lunch with Correa, he stated that the organisation’s support for the 
president would continue and be strong, claiming that ‘not only is he good to his word, but 
he has made reality the demands which our grandparents fought for’ (quoted in ‘El 
Ciudadano’ online, 11 July 2014). FENOCIN has effectively ceased pressuring for the 
implementation of Land and Water laws since the new leadership was installed. 
 
4.8 Concluding Comments 
The structure of peasant organisations - their class bases, leaderships, and modes of 
interaction and representation between the two - are critical for the construction and 
maintenance of counter-hegemony vis-à-vis the state, the latter’s strategies to neutralise 
and eliminate opposition and, ultimately, the ability of the VC to make its demands reality. 
Following neoliberal transition the relationship between peasant organisations and the 
state in Mexico and Ecuador was radically reconfigured, seemingly presenting great 
opportunities for peasant leaders to shape the state and rural policy from within its 
apparatus. However, this opportunity significantly impacted these organisations’ political 
autonomy and their ability to transform society as a counter-hegemonic force. Peasant 
leaders, drawn further into the state apparatus and away from their bases, increasingly 
focused organisational efforts on capturing power within the state. This came at the 
expense of their political autonomy, grassroots organising and capacity to mount counter-
hegemonic struggles that challenged the state and its role in promoting and legitimating an 
accumulation model systematically destroying the basis of the peasant economy. Rather 
than shaping the state in their interests, it has led to the weakening of the peasant 
movement in both countries and lent legitimacy to the state which has partially and 
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selectively incorporated movement leaders and their discourses into its apparatus of 
legitimation in order to consolidate its own hegemony. While it is true that hegemony 
cannot exist without the constant though partial incorporation of counter-hegemony 
(Mallon, 1994: 71), in the case of Mexico and Ecuador’s peasant movements this 
incorporation has tended to reduce organisations’ political autonomy and encouraged the 
vertical ‘stretching’ of leaderships - both physically and ideologically - from their bases, 
weakening their transformative force. 
What does the preceding analysis tell us about the food sovereignty movement’s counter-
hegemonic force in the neoliberal era and struggles for and against state power? Inspired 
by the Zapatista’s struggles for autonomy and radical forms of democracy in Chiapas, 
Holloway (2005: 214) argues that to struggle through the state is ‘to become involved in the 
active process of defeating yourself’; state power is fallacy owing to the separation of the 
political from the economic in capitalism. Under capitalism, it appears that power is 
exercised in the political realm and that the state is the centre of power whereas, in reality, 
it is in the economic sphere - the relations of production - where the exercise of power is 
inherent in the separation of labour from the means of production (Ibid: 32). Zibechi (2010: 
125-128), also inspired by the Zapatistas, is similarly critical of peasant movement attempts 
to struggle for power within the state. He believes that state power forces social 
movements to delegate to a handful of representatives the defence of their interests in the 
state which inevitably disarms the movement and undermines its strength. Leaders are 
separated from their mass bases, accountability is compromised and they are co-opted. 
Participation in the state gives rise to a faction of peasant leader officials separated from 
their communities that form a new functional elite for the system of domination under the 
reconfigured legitimation apparatus of the neoliberal state. According to these arguments, 
CIOAC and FENOCIN’s struggles for state power are doomed to failure from the outset. 
They have been fooled by the mirage of state power through their participation and 
integration in the state’s legitimation project without seeing the other, more important side 
of the same coin: that this apparatus exists precisely to legitimate the state’s central role in 
the maintenance and promotion of capital accumulation that is systematically destroying 
their members’ livelihoods and threatening their continued existence on the land. 
The problem with these arguments is that they fail to contextualise their conclusions on the 
basis of concrete historical analyses of social organisations’ strategies which cannot simply 
opt in or out of incorporation into the state’s apparatus of legitimation. The decision 
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whether or not to occupy positions of power within the state apparatus is not a simple case 
of yes or no; CIOAC and FENOCIN’s strategies of seeking positions of influence within the 
state (from the end of the 1980s and mid-2000s respectively) has fundamentally 
reconfigured these organisation’s structures - their leaderships, the class characteristics of 
their mass bases, and the modes of interaction between the two - in ways that significantly 
restrict the possibility of withdrawing from it; the legitimacy of the leaders and the 
expectations of the bases of both organisations have come to rest too heavily on this 
insertion for withdrawal to be an option. The issue at stake for these organisations is rather 
to manage this insertion in ways that do not dissolve or destroy their counter-hegemonic 
discourses and practices. 
Dinerstein (2003) asks whether the apparent dilemma between seeking state power or 
constructing counter-power from outside of the state represents a false dichotomy. The 
experiences of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s political strategies have certainly not been 
overwhelmingly positive, but this does not mean that either organisation should - or indeed 
could - simply stop seeking to occupy spaces within the state apparatus. In the case of 
CIOAC, the use of the food sovereignty discourse as a political tool forced the Fox 
administration to recognise its responsibilities to the countryside - something that it was 
intent on shedding at the beginning of its term in office. MECAM forced the state to re-
open and re-configure spaces occupied by peasant organisations which, even if not 
accompanied by any steps towards food sovereignty in practice, has channelled essential 
and even life-changing resources to CIOAC’s grassroots members. For FENOCIN, despite the 
national peasant movement’s weakening as Correa’s regime has consolidated, inscribing 
food sovereignty into the national constitution was a massive achievement that continues 
to be a source of political power today. The government can continually be called to 
account on the basis of the constitution. The current lack of concrete policies relating to 
food sovereignty, despite its constitutional ratification, means that it remains at the centre 
of political debate. Ultimately, ‘food sovereignty’ is as much a political strategy aimed at 
wresting concessions from within the neoliberal model as it is one of transforming that 
model, and struggles both within and outside the state are critical elements of this strategy. 
Both cases demonstrate that the dilemma between power and counter-power, of 
occupying spaces within the state or remaining on the outside, is indeed a false one. If the 
organisations have been weakened, or mistakes made regarding organisational strategy, 
this has not followed inevitably from strategies seeking positions of power within the state. 
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As Bartra (2003b) contends, to change the world many things must be done, among them 
taking power, but avoiding that power takes us over. Mexico and Ecuador’s national 
peasant organisations do not believe that solely by occupying positions of power within the 
state that they will be able to change the world in their image, but neither do they believe 
that in order to change the world they must remain at the margin of power. What they 
must do, first and foremost, is implement a political strategy that truly represents and 
develops the proposals and demands of their bases by re-establishing the link between the 
leadership and the grassroots. Political strategy, rather than a top-down decision by 
leaders, must be decided on and instigated from below. This is echoed by prominent 
national peasant leaders in both countries: 
‘I think that political positions become a type of opportunism in personal terms 
of securing a position of comfort, and often that can end up distancing you 
from the big demands of the people linked to the organisational structure. The 
other thing is I think that the organisations have every right to define a type of 
electoral strategy, but the organisations. But when someone assumes their 
electoral strategy, using the organisation, it shouldn’t be this way. This way 
they end up not being the electoral strategy of the organisation, but being the 
organisation used for a personal strategy. That is a great problem within the 
organisations to make the structural changes they want and in the end the 
people believe that big changes can only come from the institutional 
perspective.’ Luis Andrango, FENOCIN president 2009-2013 (15 May 2013, 
Quito). 
‘We are not against participation (in electoral politics), but what doesn’t seem 
correct to us is that suddenly all the organisations turn entirely towards the 
electoral and it also worries us that the majority of regional leaders are now in 
this logic, seeking candidacies in the name of social organisations but 
abandoning many of their principles and tasks, most of all with regard to the 
strengthening of the conscience of the militancy. Some of us openly refuse to 
participate in electoral processes, except if this participation in a given 
municipality can strengthen a social organisation - not so much in terms of 
resources which is always difficult anyway because there aren’t many - but to 
express a new concept of power, to become a more democratic municipality 
that supports organisational, social and community processes of participation 
and training; where there are meeting spaces for social and cultural activities. 
Under this vision we don’t say that there isn’t the possibility of putting forward 
a candidate for the municipal presidency. But we ask ourselves - do we have 
the organisational structure and capacity in place here to be able to exercise a 
different kind of power? If not, then better no (candidate)’. Emilio Plutarco 
Garcia, founding member of CNPA and part of the organisation’s national 
council (15 February 2013, village of Atlacholoaya, municipality Xochitepec, 
Morelos). 
Both of the above quotes, particularly the second, concur with Harnecker’s (2005: 150) 
argument that it is necessary to take advantage of local political spaces, not simply reject 
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them as some radical leftists such as Petras & Veltmeyer (2006) & Holloway (2005) do, 
since municipal government in the hands of the Left can play an important role in 
promoting the growth of leftist forces. Municipal government can potentially be used as a 
showcase that demonstrates the potential of socially different political projects which could 
become spaces that form the basis of an alternative society, one guided by the principles of 
food sovereignty for example. In the ‘war of position’ to conquer ideologically and morally 
the terrain of civil society and therefore gain consensus for an alternative state, an 
alternative society, the struggle for positions of influence within the state apparatus must 
be carried out simultaneously with struggles outside of and against the state.  
The reality is that, in order to meet the pressing material needs of their mass bases, and 
already (at least partially) reconfigured at all levels by historic participation in electoral 
politics and struggles for state power, CIOAC and FENOCIN must continue with this strategy. 
However, as Bartra (2003b) contends, they must do so without their organisations 
becoming completely taken over by this struggle. In the cases of Mexico and Ecuador’s food 
sovereignty movements, putting their counter-hegemonic discourses into practice must 
involve establishing clearly defined strategies within the organisation that come from work 
with the bases as to how participation within the state apparatus and in electoral processes 
should take place, and how this links in with the fundamental goal of both organisations to 
promote peasant production in the struggle for food sovereignty and the end of 
neoliberalism. This will require the combination of institutional with non-institutional forms 
of struggle for hegemony, the efficacy of which will depend on politically autonomous, 
‘popular-democratic’ organisational structures; legitimate, democratic and truly 
representative leadership that articulates and develops demands from the bases into a 
unifying and coherent counter-hegemonic project that demands ‘food sovereignty’ as 
constructed by its grassroots bases.  
In Ecuador, the relative weakening of the indigenous-peasant movement is by no means 
necessarily terminal; Correa’s social spending - the basis of his support among subaltern 
classes - is built on oil exports, inherently volatile, and potentially a serious problem for his 
administration if world prices drop and force social programmes to be scaled back or 
withdrawn. The administration’s strategy of by-passing social movements with limited 
integration of the most influential social movement leaders into AP means that, in 
comparison to Mexico, the relative non-interference of the state in their internal structures 
has left social organisations’ political autonomy relatively intact. We already saw how the 
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indigenous-peasant movement was able to regroup as a counter-hegemonic force following 
its support of Gutierrez’s government and there is little reason to believe that this could not 
happen again in the case of Correa if oil prices drop. The possibility for CIOAC, on the other 
hand, to develop ‘popular-democratic’ organisational structures and be involved in 
counter-hegemonic struggles is much more circumscribed by Mexico’s long history of 
corporatism. This does not simply constrain peasant organisations’ counter-hegemonic 
potential but, more importantly, is a constituent element of their structures, from the 
expectations of the bases to the actions of the leaderships. However, organisations like 
CIOAC cannot simply be ignored and discredited - as they are by much of the literature on 
the Mexican peasantry - as universally and irreversibly ‘contaminated’ by state corporatism, 
dead-ends in struggles for social transformation. The seeds of discontent are ever present 
among CIOAC’s bases and counter-hegemonic strategies of its origins - struggles for land 
and labour rights in the 1970s - to the more sporadic acts of the not so distant past - land 
occupations in Chiapas in the mid-1990s and involvement in MECAM in 2001 - are ever 
present in the ideology, if not the practice, of the organisation. CIOAC’s counter-hegemonic 
potential still exists, even if weak, latent, and heavily restricted by its structure and 
relationship with the Mexican state at the present historical conjuncture. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
This thesis set out to examine the class dynamics, politics and ideology of ‘food sovereignty’ 
as a unifying discourse for peasant organisations in Mexico and Ecuador. It has looked at 
how and why this discourse is interpreted and exercised in different ways between and 
within peasant organisations of the VC. Contrary to much of the food sovereignty 
movement literature’s assumption of a unified ‘people of the land’ (Via Campesina, 2013), 
this thesis has shown that there exist important class, political and ideological differences 
within and between VC organisations that fundamentally shape the nature of struggles and 
the capacity of the movement to challenge neoliberal policies.  
In spite of very different histories of agrarian reform there has been a convergence 
between Mexico and Ecuador in regards to rural policies under neoliberalism, leading to 
the emergence of food sovereignty as a guiding set of principles for national peasant 
movements in both countries in the 1990s. This is part of a worldwide convergence across 
much of the global South in the neoliberal era and the VC, like other transnational social 
movements that have emerged over the past two to three decades, have sought to ‘scale-
up’ struggles beyond the national level in response to the increasing centralisation and 
mobility of capital. This scaling up has been a major factor in shaping the characteristics of 
transnational movements’ social bases. As de Sousa Santos (2001: 180-181) argues, the 
protagonists of these movements are no longer social classes, but social groups defined by 
collective interests. In his words, they are ‘impure’ with a heterogeneous mass base in 
terms of social relations and perceptions of collective action. As such, contemporary 
transnational social movements represent a departure from previous movements in which 
discourses tended to explicitly articulate class-based elements. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the VC’s rights based discourse has been critical for the construction of such a 
heterogeneous movement. It provides a shared language of struggle in an international 
movement so diverse in class, cultural and ideological terms. Does this change therefore 
confirm Slater’s (1991: 57) assertion that social movements in the neoliberal era deal with 
new forms of subjectivity that reveal the inappropriateness of centring notions of political 
change around the class imperative? For the VC – especially in its efforts to unite ‘small 
farmers’ in the global North with diverse peasant classes in the global South – organising 
around notions of class would seem particularly challenging, maybe even counter-
productive, for the construction of a politically strong international movement capable of 
challenging the neoliberal food regime. However, while the discursive construction of unity 
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and a shared rights based framework for mobilisation and demand-making may constitute 
an effective political strategy for such a broad-based movement, the current lack of 
engagement with class processes within the VC means that its universalising claims risk 
concealing exclusionary practices. Rural labour and the landless in Mexico and Ecuador’s VC 
organisations have little if any influence in shaping the VC’s political strategy yet are 
claimed to be represented by the movement’s all encompassing language of a unified 
‘people of the land’.  
Important differences within and between peasant organisations as to how ‘food 
sovereignty’ is interpreted and struggled for tend to be ignored or concealed by the 
movement and its proponents in an effort to promote the image of a homogenous 
peasantry united in its opposition to the neoliberal food regime. While this effort may have 
political objectives, it reduces the movement’s transformative potential by failing to 
address real causes of division and conflict. If such differences were addressed they could 
potentially be overcome to the benefit of the VC and its capacity to shape food and 
agricultural policies in favour of rural groups and classes currently confronting 
unprecedented forces of proletarianisation, immiseration and dispossession. As Borras et al 
(2008) rightly state, engaging with the complexities, contradictions, ambiguities and 
internal tensions that exist within rural movements is essential for advancing their 
transformative political projects. 
We saw in chapter one how processes of agrarian reform in Mexico and Ecuador have, in 
very different ways and to very different extents, shaped the agrarian structures of both 
countries and the emergence and development of their national peasant movements. I 
showed in chapter two how the class characteristics of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s mass bases 
were transformed by their own struggles for land. In both cases landless peasants and rural 
labourers became small producers occupying land on the basis of social property relations 
in Mexico and as cooperatives that would later be divided into individual plots as de facto 
private property in Ecuador. This, in turn, has shifted the nature of peasant movement 
demands, the classes they represent, under-represent, and don’t represent at all, and 
alliances and conflicts between and within national peasant organisations. The specific 
nature of peasant organisations’ demands for food sovereignty is heavily shaped by the 
historical development of their class bases and their relationships with national states and 
governments. As the class composition of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s bases became 
progressively dominated by landed members over the course of the land reform era, the 
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interests and demands of the landless were increasingly under-represented. As a result, 
both organisations’ demands for food sovereignty fail to incorporate the specific interests 
of rural labour as both distinct a class as well as a class fraction of semi-proletarianised 
peasants that depend to varying degrees on the labour market for their reproduction. 
The challenge of combining landed with landless struggles has proven extremely difficult for 
both CIOAC and FENOCIN. One reason for this is the shifting class compositions of both 
organisations’ mass bases towards a predominantly landed membership. However, the 
complete abandonment of the landless by both organisations is not a simple case of 
focusing scarce organisational resources on the majority. The interests of the landed 
peasantry may conflict with those of the landless making the construction of a shared 
platform of struggle particularly difficult, but also extremely important, for peasant 
movement strategies at all levels of organisation. CIOAC’s national leadership rejects 
outright tentative government proposals to oblige all rural employers - including the 
organisation’s own marginalised coffee growers employing workers for a few weeks per 
year - to contribute to social security payments for their workers. FENOCIN’s land law 
initiative was drafted and delivered without any input from workers on plantations whose 
jobs would be lost if proposed expropriation limits were applied.  
For the VC to legitimately represent the diverse rural classes that it claims to, it must 
seriously address the potentially conflicting interests that exist within and between landed 
and landless peasant classes. At present, the VC in Mexico and Ecuador under-represents 
the landless, rural labour and cash crop producers and cannot legitimately claim to 
represent all ‘people of the land’ in these countries. The lack of representation of these 
rural classes and class fractions means that some of the most marginalised rural producers 
lack voice within the VC’s structures to articulate their visions and shape discourses and 
demands for food sovereignty from the national to the international level. Although I 
demonstrated in chapter two that neither CIOAC’s nor FENOCIN’s landed members are 
interested in organizing around the labour element of their reproduction strategies, this 
does not imply that rural labour per se (fully proletarianised landless rural labour in 
particular) is uninterested in organizing around work. Recent mobilizations in March 2015 
by rural unions in northern Mexico (San Quintín, Baja California – see the recent issue of 
Jornada del Campo, number 94, July 2015) and the ongoing unionizing work of FENACLE on 
banana plantations in Ecuador are just two examples of important labour struggles that do 
not find voice and representation within the VC. The latter must engage with labour issues 
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within its existing organizations and establish links with rural unions much more if it is to 
more fully represent some of the poorest rural classes and strengthen the ‘unity in diversity’ 
that it promotes. 
Although class interests within the VC may be opposed as they stand this is not to suggest 
that they are inherently contradictory, inevitably incompatible, as structuralist notions of 
class may suggest. Returning to the debate between McMichael and Bernstein in the recent 
edition of the Journal of Peasant Studies (2014, issue 6), and in agreement with Jansen’s 
(2015: 227) assertion, the two sides of the discussion do not need to be mutually exclusive. 
As McMichael (2006: 476) argues, the corporate food regime catalyses a new agrarian 
question infused with, but not reducible to, class relations. The new agrarian question is 
constituted on the basis of an alternative politics and beliefs about what is possible on the 
land, a transformation against the accumulation imperative (Ibid: 2008: 210). McMichael 
(2014: 196) situates the food sovereignty movement as the archetypal ‘counter-movement’ 
as peasantries mobilise, and invert their designation as historical relic to historical subject, 
thereby defying the limitations of an objectifying capital lens. However, as Bernstein (2010: 
121) argues, the unity of this counter-movement cannot be assumed but would have to be 
constructed from class diverse rural organisations. The construction of multiple alternatives 
must actively seek to unite such diverse rural classes and groups that the FSM currently 
under-represents or fails to represent at all. The almost complete lack of representation of 
the landless/rural labourers is a major problem that both weakens the VC’s potential to 
contest the neoliberal food regime and undermines the movement’s ability to unify all 
marginalised people of the land. Even if, as McMichael (2006 & 2008) tacitly attests, 
peasant differentiation has been superseded by peasant pauperisation across all levels 
under the corporate food regime (Lerche, 2013: 384), immiseration is experienced 
differently between and within social classes and groups. Unity of response cannot be 
assumed but must be actively constructed from subaltern classes’ and groups’ multiple 
experiences of neoliberalism. The ideological project of the FSM claims to be doing this but 
is weakened by its exclusion of some of the most marginalised rural classes that it 
supposedly represents under its banner of ‘unity in diversity’. 
 
McMichael’s (2007; 2008; 2014) assumption of a ‘unified people of the land’ obscures and 
under-emphasises class dynamics within peasant movements and in processes of agrarian 
change more broadly. However, Bernstein’s (2001; 2006; 2014) more structural (or 
‘proletarianist’) understanding of class based on the capital/labour dichotomy and the 
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tendency towards differentiation is also limited in its analytical potential and practical 
significance for policy proposals and movement strategies. As shown in chapter three, 
struggles for autonomy demonstrate the role of peasant agency in resisting processes of 
dispossession and proletarianisation. Rather than the passive victims of external forces of 
capitalist development, land ownership provides a space for the construction of relative 
autonomy from and within the market. This allows non-(commodity) market dependent 
peasants to practice diverse production and reproduction strategies and adapt them in 
dynamic ways in response to changing conditions in commodity and labour markets. They 
may be integrated into capitalist markets, but the tendency towards differentiation is 
blocked or inhibited because they are not completely dependent on only one of these 
markets for their reproduction. 
The ways in which CIOAC and FENOCIN’s members struggle for autonomy - both from and 
within the market - highlight the importance of class consciousness in shaping peasant 
struggles. They also demonstrate the limitations of more structuralist understandings of 
class for interpreting contemporary struggles for food sovereignty. Autonomous struggles 
cast light on the limitations of Bernstein’s (2006) agrarian question of labour thesis in which 
he argues that today’s land struggles are driven by experiences of fragmentation of labour 
and the increasing scarcity of employment that pays a living wage. Negative experiences in 
the labour market - the increasingly informal, oppressive and scarce sources of wage work - 
certainly contribute to contemporary peasant struggles. As I showed in chapter three, a 
central element of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s members’ reproduction strategies revolves 
around minimising labour market integration. However, this is only one side of the story. 
More important is the role of class consciousness which, in the case of both organisations’ 
members, is more ‘peasant’ than ‘worker’. Their struggles revolve around the achievement 
of viable production on the land as a central element of how they define themselves, of 
who they are. The positive associations tied to landed production are more important than 
negative interpretations of wage labour in driving contemporary peasant demands for land 
and food sovereignty. These demands are not limited to control of territory for material 
production and reproduction, but extend to the very definition of land itself (Nugent & 
Alonso, 1994: 246) and to issues of social and environmental justice regarding how land is 
used. For CIOAC and FENOCIN, land is more than simply material; it is inseparable from 
their members’ identity, labour and cultural practices. In both organisations the political 
formation of class - the process by which groups, classes and communities define their 
demands (or objects of struggle), construct organisations to defend and promote their 
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interests, and establish alliances with other organisations (Otero, 2004a: 41) - revolves 
much more around the land and the injustices wrought by neoliberal rural policies in terms 
of abandonment of state support for the peasant sector and market liberalisation, than it 
does around  labour market dynamics.  
Taking into account both the insights and the limitations of agrarianist and proletarianist 
approaches, in chapter three I tried to develop the concept of struggles for relative 
autonomy from and within the market as a theoretical approach to understanding the class 
based nature of the food sovereignty movement. Under neoliberalism CIOAC and 
FENOCIN’s (landed) mass bases, like those of other VC organisations across the global South, 
have found it increasingly difficult to make a viable living from the land. Neoliberal policies 
have favoured the most capitalised producers to the detriment of most peasant classes, 
from the landless and land-poor to those with a relatively high degree of market integration 
that benefited from state support during the ISI period. Forces of dispossession and the 
tendency for the mass of the peasantry to undergo accelerated processes of 
proletarianisation have increased significantly in the era of neoliberal globalisation. 
However, proletarianisation is a tendency, not an inevitable consequence of capitalist 
development. The struggles of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao growers for relative 
autonomy from and within the market show how neoliberalism is resisted on the ground. 
The production and reproduction strategies of both organisations’ producers represent 
fluid and dynamic responses to neoliberal market forces. These responses are based on 
shifting patterns of household labour use that minimise exposure to volatile market forces 
and can successfully resist proletarianisation. The struggle for autonomy may resist not only 
proletarianisation, but also the full commodification of household production and therefore 
complete market dependence. As such, a production logic based on retaining land access to 
secure long-term survival prevails over a logic of efficient production along capitalist lines.  
I also showed in chapter three how CIOAC’s coffee growers and FENOCIN’s Andean 
peasants use money earned through wage employment and remittances to maintain 
subsistence plots that, in purely financial terms, would appear irrational, better spent on 
purchasing food for household consumption from the market. Land is not simply a refuge, 
increasingly the only remaining source of livelihood for those unable to find employment 
that pays a living wage (Bernstein, 2006: 13). It is imbued with social and cultural meanings 
that cannot be reduced to a simple economic calculus alone. The production and 
reproduction strategies of CIOAC and FENOCIN peasants are geared towards sustaining and 
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increasing land access and viability, even if this would appear to be a poor ‘investment’, or 
unprofitable, under capitalist rationality. Their struggles for a space of relative autonomy 
from and within the market are not only a response to forces of dispossession, 
proletarianisation and immiseration under neoliberalism. The relative autonomy that land 
access confers also contrasts with the complete lack of autonomy that characterises the 
labour market. This is not an entirely novel development under neoliberalism. Both 
organisations’ members fought for land in the 1960s and 1970s against landowner 
oppression and control of the means of production. Contemporary autonomous struggles 
are influenced by these past experiences and the successful struggles of older generations 
to control not only the land they worked, but also their own labour. Retaining control of 
both the labour process and the land is a central aspect of CIOAC and FENOCIN members’ 
struggles for autonomy today.  These same peasants show a distinct lack of interest in 
labour organising; rather than struggling to improve working conditions they are 
attempting to reduce or eliminate entirely their integration into the labour market by 
instead seeking better returns for landed production. In the case of CIOAC, members have 
actively broken agreements with landowners that would have improved their incomes and 
living conditions because they value participation in the cultures and ceremonial practices 
of their home communities - inextricably tied to landed production - over the possibility of 
improving their experiences in the labour market. 
Social class - politically understood - is therefore central to FSM dynamics and struggles. 
This makes McMichael’s (2006: 412) reframing of the contemporary agrarian question as 
one of ‘peasant resistance’ in opposition to neoliberalism a problem. It assumes a unity 
(also projected by the VC and its slogan of ‘unity in diversity’) within and between national 
VC organisations that currently does not exist, at least in the cases of Mexico and Ecuador. 
We have seen how peasant centrals in Mexico represent some of the most marginalised 
producers in the country whose production and reproduction strategies are geared towards 
retaining relative autonomy from the market. Their leaders work on the basis that 
significant improvements to their member’s lives can be achieved through increased 
engagement with state programmes, not opposition towards them. ANEC (National 
Association of Commercialising Enterprises), on the other hand, represents more market 
dependent ‘entrepreneurial’ producers. The organisation’s struggle for structural changes, 
withdrawal from NAFTA in particular, is seen as the only possible strategy for transforming 
the lives of their members. Although both organisations subscribe to the VC and its guiding 
principle of food sovereignty, how this is interpreted and the political strategies they follow 
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are heavily shaped by the class characteristics of their mass bases. As a result, there has 
been open conflict and a complete lack of joint work between the two organisations since 
the VC’s arrival in Mexico in 1996. Similarly in Ecuador, although not to the same extent, 
FENOCIN’s land law proposal was contested by FENACLE (National Federation of 
Agroindustrial Workers) as the latter was concerned that the agricultural labourers that 
compose the major element of its mass base would lose their jobs - and FENACLE its unions 
- if plantations were redistributed. 
I also showed in chapter three how the interests of marginalised cash crop producers, like 
those of the landless and rural workers, are not currently being addressed by the FSM. In 
terms of the VC, this is linked to the movement’s ambiguous stance on export production. 
The VC’s 2007 Nyéléni declaration states that the movement is fighting so that ‘all peoples, 
nations and states are able to determine their own food producing systems’. However, its 
stance remains that ‘food sovereignty prioritizes local and national economies and markets’, 
even if it ‘promotes transparent trade that guarantees just income to all peoples’ (Via 
Campesina, 2007). The role of trade remains ambiguous and cash crop producers under-
represented within the VC despite the importance of commercial production for the 
majority of marginalised peasants in Mexico, Ecuador, and across the global South. Peasant 
struggles for autonomy - both from and within commodity markets - and the logic of 
household production and reproduction strategies are heavily shaped by cash crop 
production. To represent their interests within the FSM the struggles and demands of such 
producers must be actively incorporated into the VC’s discourses and practices. 
Engagement with various forms of struggles for autonomy within the market, and the 
principles on which these struggles are based, could be a useful starting point.  
The experiences of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s coffee and cacao growers demonstrate that these 
producers often struggle as much to influence their markets as they do to escape from their 
most unpredictable, potentially proletarianising, characteristics. Their struggles for an 
element of control over production and marketing of export crops already falls within the 
VC’s broader struggles for democratisation of agriculture, of returning power to producers 
(and consumers) from agribusiness TNCs supported by the neoliberal state system. The 
majority of CIOAC and FENOCIN’s producers do not wish to, and in many cases physically 
could not, shift focus from export to staples production. They instead seek voice and 
influence in the markets they already occupy and the VC needs to do more to support such 
struggles through its discourse and actions. At present, the issue of coffee and cacao 
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transnational exporters entering into production and buying agreements with peasants 
across southern Mexico and coastal Ecuador is not being addressed by CIOAC, FENOCIN, or 
the VC at any level. Acting as individual producers, communities, or at best cooperatives, 
the highly unequal power relations on which these arrangements are based have 
potentially serious consequences for peasants that enter into them; they risk losing 
autonomy both from and within their markets and becoming dependent on TNE supplied 
inputs which, if revoked in the case of TNE relocation, could destroy production. Despite its 
potential significance for peasant livelihoods neither organisation, nor the VC at the level of 
Mexico, Ecuador, Latin America or internationally, have sought to engage with emerging 
dynamics in peasant cash crop markets despite their centrality to peasant production and 
reproduction strategies. The terms of the agreements between TNEs and coffee and cacao 
growers are a constant area of struggle. Organisational engagement with the issue across 
its bases and support with TNE negotiations could potentially be of great benefit to isolated 
producer groups currently negotiating on an individual basis with little or no previous 
experience of doing so. Coffee and cacao TNEs are claiming to provide significant 
opportunities to improve production and incomes for many marginalised producers for the 
first time in the neoliberal era. Failing to address the concerns of peasants considering 
entering into or already part of TNE agreements, coupled with the real threats that such 
agreements pose to their autonomy both now and in the future, risks losing their support 
and weakening the relevance of food sovereignty to producers of cash crops.  
The considerable challenge of representing diverse peasant classes within an organisation 
or movement is further complicated by the role of the state in promoting and defending 
the neoliberal food regime and the relationships it has developed with organised 
opposition. In the introduction to this thesis, Borras et al’s (2008) research questions were 
put forward as a guide to this research (see page 12). These questions have been engaged 
with in different ways, and to different extents, throughout the preceding chapters. 
However, the responses to all of these questions are heavily influenced by the role of the 
state. As such, any research into rural social movements that seeks to assess or further 
their transformative political projects must also examine in depth the relationship between 
peasant organisations and the state at all levels.  
State-peasant movement relations heavily shape agrarian structures, the class 
characteristics of peasant organisations’ mass bases, and their demands.  As I showed in 
chapter four, the state’s attempts to neutralise the counter-hegemonic potential of social 
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movements by partially incorporating peasant organisations’ leaders and demands into its 
apparatus is a major cause of division and conflict within and between peasant 
organisations. The strategic channelling of state resources and political positions to 
subaltern organisations and their leaders is also a major cause of conflict between national 
peasant organisations, even those that share common class characteristics and interests.  
Much of the FSM literature (McMichael, 2006 & 2008; Rosset, 2011; Teubal, 2010) focuses 
on peasant resistance against the neoliberal food regime without examining how a central 
element in this regime - the neoliberal state - engages with and attempts to neutralise this 
resistance in ways that dramatically influence the FSM’s transformative potential. Many 
peasant organisations, especially those in Mexico, are currently in a very weak position to 
transform the neoliberal model as a result of the neoliberal attack on the countryside and 
the Mexican state’s neo-corporatist policies. These organisations use the discourse of food 
sovereignty and their membership of the VC much more as a political tool than as a 
transformative project. This is not to deny food sovereignty’s usefulness for organisations 
like CIOAC; it has been employed by the Mexican peasant movement to wrest important 
material concessions from the state for a mass of the Mexican peasantry struggling to 
survive. It is simply to highlight the fact that assuming that a counter-hegemonic discourse 
of food sovereignty is synonymous with a transformative political project can vastly 
misinterpret and exaggerate movement claims. As central stated goal of the VC is to restore 
democratic local and national food systems (McMichael, 2014: 195) yet, as this thesis has 
shown, democratic organisational structures and practices within the movement cannot be 
assumed as they are currently by the vast majority of proponents of food sovereignty. 
Democratic forms of representation and accountability within social organisations are 
taken for granted in much of the contemporary social movement literature yet must be 
investigated rather than being assumed.  
For Mexican VC members, the food sovereignty discourse is constructed on the basis of a 
rejection of NAFTA and state withdrawal from the peasant sector, an ‘ideal opposite’ to 
Mexico’s neoliberal model. The 2000 movement ‘El Campo No Aguanta Mas’ (MECAM) was 
discursively and ideologically guided by food sovereignty. It prevented the Mexican state 
from completely abandoning the countryside to a liberalised market and represented an 
important victory for the organisations involved. However, most of these organisations 
were never struggling for ‘food sovereignty’ as an alternative socio-economic model from 
the outset. They were using the FSM’s unifying principles as a political tool to demand 
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access to the neoliberal state’s apparatus of legitimation, not to transform it. In Ecuador, on 
the other hand, the national indigenous-peasant movement had, up until 2006, had a far 
greater transformative potential than its Mexican counterpart. ‘Food sovereignty’ was 
enshrined in the 2008 constitution and there was widespread belief among rural subaltern 
classes that an agrarian revolution founded on the ideals of the food sovereignty 
movement would follow. However, the consolidation of Correa’s presidency, the increasing 
concentration of power in the executive, and the support that the AP (Country Alliance) 
government has received from wide sectors of Ecuadorian society have all allowed Correa 
to shape rural policy in favour of transnational capital and against the demands of the 
organisations that brought him to power. Nevertheless, while the FSM’s transformative 
potential may have been dramatically weakened as a result, the use of the food sovereignty 
discourse remains a powerful political tool that can always be drawn upon to hold 
government to account. This is especially the case as the term is enshrined in the 
constitution as defined by the organisations themselves. Failure on the part of government 
to institute policies geared towards achieving food sovereignty in Ecuador can be contested 
by rural movements for being unconstitutional and therefore acting against the country’s 
legal framework and the national interest. In both Mexico and Ecuador the discourse of 
‘food sovereignty’ acts as a common discursive framework and set of guiding and unifying 
principles for peasant organisations to organise and develop political opposition to 
neoliberalism. 
In chapter four I also argued that one of the central factors that shape state-peasant 
movement relations and the transformative potential of the FSM is a peasant organisation’s 
internal structure. By ‘internal structure’ I referred to the different roles and levels of 
leadership, the characteristics of the mass base, and the modes of interaction and 
representation between the two. Despite its importance for promoting or restricting the 
development of counter-hegemony, peasant organisations’ internal structures and forms of 
representation remain understudied in the FSM literature. However, accountability cannot 
be assumed. Nor can it be assumed that the words and actions of leaders are unmediated 
transmissions flowing from the bases. This is even more the case following the neoliberal 
restructuring of the state’s apparatus of legitimation in Mexico and Ecuador which has 
drawn peasant leaders into official positions of power, typically within the state 
bureaucracy or via electoral politics through alliances with political parties. 
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In both CIOAC and FENOCIN, there has been a growing physical and ideological separation 
between leaders and the bases as the former - and their organisations’ political strategies 
more generally - have come to focus ever more on occupying positions within the state. 
This has come at the expense of grassroots organising and the construction of political 
proposals and strategies through dialogue with their members. CIOAC, from its origins, has 
always had a centralised power structure but in the land struggle era its leaders were 
relatively more embedded in their home communities and accountable to their members. 
Even if relatively undemocratic, the ideological construction of communities of struggle 
united against landowners and their allies in the state forged long-lasting unity between 
leaders and the bases. As the organisation has become ever more dependent on electoral 
politics to provide state resources to its members, and struggles against the state have 
been effectively substituted for struggles within it, allegiance between CIOAC’s members 
and leaders at all levels has tended to become more pragmatic and ephemeral. For many 
members, ongoing support depends on resource access and allegiance may shift to other 
peasant organisations if access is jeopardised or cut. In the case of FENOCIN, historically 
relatively more democratic internally than CIOAC, the failure of leaders to adequately 
represent the interests of more market-integrated coastal producers with focus instead on 
more subsistence-oriented Andean peasants, has allowed Correa to garner significant 
support from the former. FENOCIN’s national leadership attempted to occupy positions of 
power within AP and the state bureaucracy following Correa’s rise to power in 2006. They 
did so with the expectation of being able to shape policy from within the state, but it has 
also distanced leaders from their support bases in the Andes. Even among its Andean 
members, FENOCIN’s traditional region of influence, members are turning away from 
actively supporting their organisation as many believe that Correa is now ‘on their side’.  
Given analysis of the experiences of CIOAC and FENOCIN with their respective national 
states, I hope to have shown that examination of the internal structures of FSM 
organisations is an important yet currently neglected area of research. Only through such 
analysis can the transformative potential of these organisations be gauged and understood. 
From such analysis scholars and advocates of food sovereignty may learn from 
organisational forms and practices of representation that have yielded positive results 
which could be disseminated and transferred between organisations of the VC. In light of 
this, Borras et al’s (2008) second research question - ‘what is the social base of the 
movements - which social classes, groups and sectors do they represent (claim to represent 
or not represent at all)?’ - should also ask - ‘and how do the internal structures of these 
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movements shape their political strategies and promote or inhibit their transformative 
projects?’ Organisations with very similar class characteristics can follow very different 
political strategies as a result of their internal structures and the historical relationships 
they have developed with the state. 
Analysis of peasant organisations’ internal structures and their relationship with the state is 
not only important analytically, but also for its potential practical significance for 
movement politics. Within CIOAC, for instance, the internal structure of its state level 
organisation in Guerrero is very different to that of Chiapas or Oaxaca. In villages that I 
visited in the mountains of Guerrero, CIOAC committees are responsible for administering 
state community projects and coordinate past and present beneficiaries in an attempt to 
maximise projects' effectiveness. They share experiences within communities and 
democratically and transparently manage state resource access in a way that minimises 
opportunism, namely people wanting to join the organisation simply for personal gain. 
Active involvement in the organisation is required, for example participation in 
mobilisations at the state and national levels, attendance at CIOAC meetings, and helping 
administer and share knowledge regarding community projects.  This contrasts with 
communities I visited in Chiapas and Oaxaca where CIOAC leaders are much more 
integrated into the PRD political party and where project delivery as a vote buying strategy 
is more important than instituting practices to maximise project impact. However, owing to 
the pyramidal structure of the organisation there is little or no communication between 
different state leaderships. If there were, CIOAC Guerrero’s community model for 
administering projects could be adapted and applied to other states to the potential benefit 
of much of the organisation’s membership. Similarly in Ecuador, the lack of coordination 
and joint work between provincial organisations weakens both FENOCIN’s transformative 
potential as well as its ability to materially improve the lives of its members. UROCAL 
(Regional Union of Coastal Peasants), a FENOCIN organisation on the Ecuadorian coast with 
over 20 years’ experience with certified cacao and banana production, could potentially 
provide much needed technical support and training to FENOCIN’s less productively 
consolidated coastal organisations. However, it has never engaged in joint work with AACH 
(Artisan Association of Chucaple) or UNOCYPP (Northwest Union of Peasant Organisations 
of Pichincha), cacao producing organisations in Esmeraldas and Pichincha respectively, far 
less productively developed than UROCAL and with little or no experience seeking 
alternative markets. As with CIOAC, FENOCIN’s internal structure lacks institutionalised 
mechanisms for sharing knowledge and expertise among its bases that could potentially 
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improve members’ lives, increase solidarity within, and strengthen the organisation as a 
social and political force. 
In addition to the class dynamics and internal structures of VC organizations, gender 
analysis of the movement – although not carried out as part of this research – is a critical 
area for further investigation. The VC at the international level focuses a great deal on rural 
gender inequalities that are often exacerbated by neoliberal policies and its core principles 
and commitments are constructed on the basis of full and equal rights of women. However, 
in the case of national level VC organisations in Mexico and Ecuador, decision-making 
structures are dominated by men from national level leaderships to municipal and 
community level committees. At the level of the household, the struggles for autonomy 
from and within the market analysed in chapter three are also heavily (and unequally) 
shaped by gender relations. Male heads of households tend to dominate decision-making 
with regard to production and reproduction strategies and the majority of those that 
migrate to distant labour markets are men, leaving women to work the family land and 
raise children. How gender dynamics shape struggle for food sovereignty at all levels 
therefore merits much more research. 
Although the food sovereignty literature tends to under-address the role of the state and 
peasant organisations’ internal structures, few writers of agrarian movements would, as 
Holloway (2005) and Zibechi (2010) do, reject the importance of seeking to shape state 
policy from within its apparatus. For peasant organisations like CIOAC and FENOCIN it is not 
a simple case of with or against the state (i.e. Holloway, 2005). A more nuanced political 
strategy is not only required, but also demanded by their bases. And it is certainly not the 
case that seeking to influence the state from within is an inevitable failure; the inclusions of 
food sovereignty in Ecuador’s 2008 constitution and the importance of MECAM in forcing 
the Mexican state to provide at least some form of support to the peasantry demonstrate 
not only the achievements that working within the state can achieve, but also how the lives 
of peasant organisations’ members can be improved through such engagement. However, 
on their own, struggles within the state are limited in their capacity to bring about 
significant changes to marginalised peasant classes. As I demonstrated in chapter four, the 
state’s apparatus of legitimation serves precisely to achieve the relative societal consent for 
the neoliberal accumulation model systematically destroying the peasant economy and 
peasant livelihoods. As such, institutional struggles must be combined with non-
institutional forms that challenge state power while simultaneously seeking to strategically 
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occupy official sites within the state apparatus as a means of accessing resources and 
shaping policy. 
CIOAC, FENOCIN, and the vast majority of peasant organisations at all levels in Mexico and 
Ecuador are at least partially constituted by the state. Their discourses, demands and 
strategies are heavily shaped by their interactions with the state in ways that prevent an 
outright rejection of seeking influence within its apparatus. Forms and processes of state 
engagement are not simply decided by leaderships autonomous from their bases. This is 
not to underplay the importance that leaders have in directing organisational strategies in 
ways that do not always necessarily have the full support, or even knowledge, of their 
members. However, they are still ultimately accountable to grassroots bases that have in 
most cases come to demand and expect state resources in the form of projects and 
programmes. Access to these is facilitated by engagement with the state, not rejection of it. 
The increasing integration of peasant leaders into official positions within the state, 
especially following neoliberal restructuring, was projected to their members as a necessary 
step in the advancement of their historical struggles. To varying degrees within and 
between peasant organisations, leaders’ legitimacy in the eyes of their members has come 
to rest on retaining and expanding this integration. Having successfully won land as a result 
of their own struggles, CIOAC and FENOCIN came to demand resources to enable newly 
landed peasants to make a viable living from it. It was widely believed that these resources 
could be more effectively accessed through gaining organisational presence and influence 
within the state apparatus as opposed to remaining on the outside.  To suggest that such a 
strategy was and is doomed to failure from the outset ignores or discredits the often life 
changing achievements that such integration has achieved. It is also of little practical use 
strategically for organisations struggling for food sovereignty that cannot simply choose to 
opt in or out of pursuing influence within official channels. Of more benefit is analysis of 
specific forms of state engagement (heavily influenced by organisations’ internal structures) 
that promote the maintenance of political autonomy vis-à-vis the state and political parties 
and that combine institutional with non-institutional struggles in ways that maximise the 
advancement of subaltern groups’ demands and their organisations’ internal solidarity, 
mobilisational capacity, and alliance building with other similar groups in counter-
hegemonic struggles. 
The preceding discussion has highlighted the importance of class dynamics, the FSM’s 
under and lack of representation of important social classes and groups, the significance of 
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autonomous struggles in the neoliberal era, and the centrality of the state and 
organisational structures in shaping peasant movement demands and strategies. What then 
is the role of the VC in engaging with these issues and furthering the food sovereignty 
movement’s transformative political project? As Demarais (2007: 8) states, ‘the Via 
Campesina’s international efforts have led to important shifts in the debate around food 
and agriculture’. For peasant leaders in Mexico and Ecuador the valuable contribution of 
the VC is widely recognised; it is heralded for encouraging transnational peasant solidarity 
by bringing together diverse experiences of resistance against the proletarianising and 
immiserating forces of neoliberal capitalism. It is similarly valued for contextualising 
national struggles within the wider international context. However, for the organisations 
that compose the movement, the nation state remains the central focus of demand making 
and the site to which most organisational work is directed. The VC, while encouraging unity 
at the international level through its international and regional level conferences, must do 
more to encourage joint action between member organisations at the national levels.  
The difficulties of achieving the unity required for sustained joint action among VC 
organisations with different class bases has already been recognised by Borras (2004) in the 
case of the Philippines. However, it is of critical importance if the movement is to 
successfully reverse neoliberal policies. At present, joint work among VC members does not 
take place at all in the case of Mexico, and in Ecuador it is limited to periodic meetings 
among the national leaderships of VC member organisations with little or no dissemination 
of the VC’s work among these organisations’ bases. Currently, peasant organisations in 
both countries articulate with the VC at the international level effectively on an individual 
basis without engaging in any form of combined action nationally. Although the food 
sovereignty discourse fed into the demands of MECAM in Mexico in 2000, the VC played no 
active organisational role in the movement. Nor was it present in FENOCIN’s land law 
initiative or in the drafting of the constitution.  Given that the nation state remains the 
central focus for these organisations, joint work between VC organisations at the national 
level could potentially yield significant benefits. This is not to underplay the importance of 
class, political and ideological differences that, as we have seen, are often a major source of 
conflict between these organisations. Despite these, the fact remains - and this is 
recognised by peasant leaders themselves - that there are important shared interests 
between them which could form the basis of a platform of unity. MECAM in Mexico and the 
Constituent Assembly in Ecuador are just two obvious examples of this potential. However, 
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one of the major obstacles to bringing this about, in addition to the factors already 
discussed, is the very structure and working practices of the VC itself.  
Rather than encouraging debate and the construction of shared agendas as equal partners, 
the VC disseminates information and organises its activities through one national 
‘coordinator’ organisation in each country. The coordinator - UNORCA in Mexico and 
FENOCIN in Ecuador - acts as both a gatekeeper to other national VC organisations and a 
kind of chairman of the VC at the national level. This creates a lack of trust and 
transparency in addition to non-gatekeeper organisations’ sense of being subordinates in 
the VC’s projects. Such heavy reliance on one coordinator organisation, as is the case at 
present, does not foster unity but on the contrary encourages disagreements and 
disengagement with the VC. This issue was also raised by Borras (2004) with regard to India 
where the national coordinator organisation’s discretionary control over granting VC 
membership and disseminating information was criticised by other Indian peasant 
organisations. However, the VC’s structures and working practices have remained 
fundamentally the same since Borras raised the issue over ten years ago. This is to the 
detriment of the movement at national and international levels.  
The combination of Mexico’s clientelistic political culture and the VC’s structure based on 
disseminating information through a single coordinator organisation in each country has 
exacerbated the difficulty of fostering inter-organisational unity. While UNORCA may 
formally occupy the role of national coordinator, control of the VC in Mexico is in reality in 
the hands (and office) of one of its former national presidents. Despite the protestations of 
Mexico’s VC organisations (apart from UNORCA which, while not publicly renouncing the 
actions of its former president, are nonetheless critical of his actions internally) at 
international VC meetings, the international secretariat has done nothing to resolve the 
issue. As a result, no national level VC meetings take place in Mexico, no attempts are made 
to construct joint platforms of struggle, and the country’s VC organisations have grown 
increasingly critical of the international movement’s structures and working practices. 
‘The problem with the VC is that it is a hierarchical, authoritarian 
organisation...the agenda of the VC is correct as it stands, but its structure and 
workings reproduce the systems of exclusion that the peasants and their 
organisations already experience in the neoliberal system and our simulated 
democracies’. Victor Suarez, ANEC’s Executive Director (8 February 2013, 
Mexico City). 
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Despite regular meetings between the leaderships of Ecuador’s VC organisations in which 
the VC’s work is disseminated and national level activities are proposed and discussed, the 
structure of the VC is still seen by most member organisations as undemocratic, opaque, 
and an obstacle to unified action. There is widespread criticism of FENOCIN’s position as 
national coordinator and the non-transparent nature of its relationship with the 
international secretariat. 
‘FENOCIN has had its merits as the representative of the VC in Ecuador, but it 
has also monopolised the opportunities that come with it (the role) and 
international presence. It’s something that the VC must analyse internally; the 
coordination should be much more participative. The VC has helped us with 
training courses, but we are invited via FENOCIN and don’t know how places on 
the courses are distributed or who shapes the contents of the training. This is 
something that the VC has to regulate and open up...it has to rotate the 
coordinator’. José Agualsaca, National President of the FEI (10 April 2013, 
Quito). 
Restructuring the VC at the national level in order to promote joint action, in addition to 
addressing rather than ignoring its internal tensions and issues of representation, is of 
paramount importance if the VC is to successfully reverse and ‘denaturalise’ the advance of 
neoliberalism and its forces of dispossession, immiseration, and ecological devastation 
(McMichael, 2007). Under the ongoing expansion and deepening of neoliberal food and 
agricultural policies, the production and reproduction strategies of ‘the peasantry’, and its 
place and role more generally in contemporary processes of agrarian change in Mexico, 
Ecuador, and Latin America more broadly, has become increasingly diverse and complex. 
Some peasants may be dispossessed as neoliberal capitalism develops, but others may 
resist dispossession through organised political resistance, their own autonomous struggles, 
and/or via arrangements with capital that may subsume peasant labour through hybrid 
forms that consolidate peasant livelihoods (Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2010: 182). The search for 
alternatives to the impoverishing and environmentally catastrophic neoliberal food regime 
requires the FSM and its proponents to recognise the differentiated and often conflicting 
responses, interests and political projects of subaltern rural classes (Jansen, 2015: 227) and 
their organisations. On the basis of this understanding must develop the construction, from 
below, of cross-class platforms and programmes of struggle truly inclusive and 
representative of the diverse social groups and classes whose livelihoods are becoming 
increasingly difficult to reproduce due to the unprecedented proletarianising and 
immiserating forces of neoliberalism. This is much easier said than done, but it is 
nevertheless critical if we are to deal with the multiple social and environmental crises that 
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stem from the neoliberal model of food and agriculture. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Template for Production and 
Reproduction Strategies. 
How did you come to access your land? How much land do you have? How is it used (i.e. 
subsistence/cash-crop/pasture/other)? How has this changed over time and why? 
How many family members do you have? Where do they live and work? (For off-farm 
family work) Do you/your family work off-farm? Who, where, when and for how long 
(seasonal, permanent, part-time, full-time, and change over time)? What are the pay and 
conditions like? Why do people leave and would they prefer to stay? Why do you stay on 
the land? Does/should CIOAC/FENOCIN represent those that leave to work off-farm?  
Subsistence cultivation - what do you produce and do you produce a surplus or deficit for 
household needs? What do you do with excess/how do you meet deficit? How has this 
changed over time and why? Do you use inputs, why/why not, and where do they come 
from? Is fragmentation and soil exhaustion a problem and how has this changed over time? 
Do you want/need more land? How does CIOAC/FENOCIN deal with these issues? 
Coffee and cacao: How much do you produce? Where/to whom do you sell it? In what 
form/level of processing? Why? How old are our plants and how much do you reinvest in 
quality and productivity improvement as percentage of income coffee/cacao generates? Do 
you have access to credit and how do you use it? CIOAC/FENOCIN’s strategy in the sector/ 
benefits received through your organisation’s struggles in terms of access to state 
programmes, production and marketing support? Do you have experience with alternative 
markets? Why/why not? What benefits and problems have you experienced in these 
markets and change over time? Would you like to produce organic/Fair Trade coffee/cacao 
or begin processing your beans? What are the entry barriers? How have prices changed 
over time and how has this affected our production strategies? What is your experience 
with intermediaries/TNEs in the sector? What are the biggest issues facing the coffee/cacao 
sectors and how should they be resolved? 
What is your experience with state productive projects and programmes and change over 
time? How does CIOAC/FENOCIN influence access to these and their forms?  
Have you had experience working with TNEs? Describe - risks/benefits/problems. Why did 
you enter agreements with them? When? How did it first start? What are your plans for the 
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future in terms of coffee / cacao production? How do you predict the situation will change 
for producers and why? 
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Appendix 2: Interview Template for Political and Social 
Issues. 
Why did you join CIOAC/FENOCIN? When? Describe our history with the organisation and 
its struggles? What have been the benefits of joining / what changes have 
CIOAC/FENOCIN’s struggles brought about? Why do people join now? Is the rationale the 
same as when you first joined? 
Are there other peasant organisations in the community/municipality? Describe the 
relationship and change over time. Have there been any internal divisions within 
CIOAC/FENOCIN here? Why? 
Did you struggle for land? Describe the process? Why did the land struggle end and will it 
ever be renewed? Why/why not? 
After the land struggle focus, what has become CIOAC/FENOCIN’s central focus of struggle? 
How have you participated? What successes/failures have you seen? What does the 
organisation’s commitment to food sovereignty mean to you? 
What is the difference between the CIOAC and the PRD / FENOCIN and the PSM? How does 
the relationship work between the two? Should CIOAC/FENOCIN leaders be involved in 
electoral politics? Why/why not? Are leaders accessible to you or hard to reach? 
Is CIOAC/FENOCIN a democratic organisation? How and why / why not? How are the 
demands and needs of people in the communities transmitted and expressed by the 
organisation? How are leaderships at all levels decided upon? How often do you attend 
CIOAC/FENOCIN meetings and what issues are discussed? Who decides on the issues? 
Which state social programmes/projects do you receive here? Opinions. How did / do you 
gain access to them? Can you /CIOAC/FENOCIN influence in the design of the 
projects/programmes? 
How is your organisation’s political strategy and focus of struggle created and disseminated, 
food sovereignty in particular? Do members shape organisational struggles and strategies?  
What mobilisations have you participated in? Why? What happened and what were the 
results? 
